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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis, empirically investigates issues pertinent to the partial privatization of Chinese 
initial public offerings at home and abroad, especially on issues relating to Chinese 
enterprises‘ seeking overseas listings. Based on the asymmetric information hypotheses on 
initial public offerings (IPOs) and cross-border flotation literature, the proposed research 
includes both short-run and long-run methods, and covers the entire offering process of 
Chinese firms‘ going public in overseas markets. 
 
The investigation begins with an overview of Hong Kong‘s and China mainland‘s 
financial markets in Chapter II. The limitation of development in the domestic capital 
market, the desire of bringing Chinese SOEs into the international market, and the appropriate 
conditions in Hong Kong encourage Chinese companies to issue new shares in Hong Kong.  
 
Chapter III provides a comparative analysis on underpricing of Chinese and non-Chinese 
firms in Hong Kong, in order to discover the influence of asymmetric information on overseas 
listing and the correspondent offering strategies of Chinese companies and their underwriters. 
They are normally underwritten by highly reputable bankers, and the overwhelming majority 
of Chinese firms went public via bookbuilding when the market is on an optimal evaluation 
base. The average price range seems to be relatively conservative for promoting subscription 
demands. The potential loss can be partially mitigated by a positive price revision and 
carefully market timing.  
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Chapter IV focuses on information disclosure and earnings forecasting accuracy in IPO 
prospectuses with their subsequent effects on aftermarket performance, since the accuracy of 
information becomes important in influencing IPOs offerings and after-market performance. 
The IPO profit forecasts errors represent a pessimistic bias on average, but it can be a crucial 
information resource for their investment decisions. The magnitude of forecasting errors is 
higher for China-related companies than local shares, indicating a higher asymmetric 
information level. The forecasts are not rational in the sense that managers correctly 
incorporate all available information, especially historical profits, in their forecasting. Also, 
the magnitude of forecasting errors can systematically affect the one-year trading 
performance. Due to the initial overvaluation, firms with higher initial returns actually 
underperform in the long run.   
 
And Chapter V, in order to discover the ultimate meanings and motives of such overseas 
listing, directly questions why and how the Chinese government takes so many many state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) public in the international market. It concludes Chinese SOEs‘ 
overseas primary listing takes on the formidable tasks of macroeconomic partial privatization, 
home market protection, and domestic infantile market development. Large and ‗healthy‘ 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the government‘s supporting industries are more likely 
to issue their shares on foreign, open, and well-developed stock exchanges when the target 
market is in good time of pricing and offering, in order to raise more capital, to operate under 
international standards, to send a positive signal of Chinese economic reform, and to 
indirectly protect the development of domestic financial market. Consequently, the partial 
privatization through an overseas primary listing approach is indeed a feasible way to 
facilitate domestic financial market growth, particularly for countries with a large economy 
but lack of a well-developed home capital market and a mature trading platform. 
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CHAPTER I     
INTRODUCTION 
 
Going public is one of the most significant events for enterprises to re-establish their capital 
structure, adjust corporate governance, and enhance financial capability. Therefore, various 
issues around initial public offerings (IPOs) have motivated researchers in accounting, 
economics, finance, management, as well as in law, in discovering IPOs‘ short-run 
underpricing and long-run performance puzzles. In particular, underpricing of IPOs refers to 
when the offer price is below the first day market price, while the long-run trading 
performance of IPOs is normally measured in three to five years after initial issuing by 
comparing the share price movements to various reference portfolios (Ritter, 1991; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995).  
 
1.1 Motivations of the Study 
1.1.1 Importance of studying Chinese IPOs listed in Hong Kong 
It is important to study Chinese IPOs listed in Hong Kong. These overseas listed firms are not 
only the empirical evidence for initial public offerings, but also a testing base on the topics of 
cross-border listings, emerging market financial reforms, and international approaches for the 
national privatization.  
To begin with, China‘s capital flows contribute to the global market. International capital 
flows flourished since 1990s, which have had an economically large and statistically 
significant impact on global economy.  The world‘s major exchanges have been fostered to 
meet the increasing amount of international capital flows and capture the growing demand of 
equity offerings beyond the border of the home marketplace, especially towards fast-growing 
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emerging markets. Chinese overseas listed issues provide an aggregate and particular testing 
base for overseas initial offerings.  
In addition, as one of the most fast-growing economic bodies with tremendous economic 
capacity, China‘s development is catching more attention from all over the world. China is 
growing through a period of economic and financial reform, the overseas primary listing has 
become one of the crucial methods to achieve the target of privatization and to develop 
domestic capital market. However, from the very beginning of the reform before 1980s, there 
has been a persistent puzzle of how to order and balance economic transition, privatization, 
and institutionalization. They probably could not occur at the same time, interact to the same 
degree, and proceed hand in hand.  The Chinese government seems to find a way to accelerate 
this interactive process. This is by taking state-owned enterprises (SOEs) public on the 
international marketplace. As the Chinese financial reform is pursued more widely and deeply, 
further developing the domestic market, the characteristics and performance of overseas-listed 
Chinese IPOs are more likely to vary over time. All of these are expected to offer a rich 
testing base to the thesis. 
Last but not the least, Hong Kong is naturally selected to examine Chinese overseas IPOs. 
At the current stage, Hong Kong remains the most optimistic target market for Chinese 
enterprises to raise capital, even being more attractive than the domestic A-share market for 
particular type of companies. Hong Kong is one of the special administrative regions of China, 
which in reality brings certain advantages of being ―home market‖. Between 1993 and 2007, 
more than 150 Chinese firms have been listed in foreign markets, about 90% of which choose 
Hong Kong as their primary listing market. The consideration behind effectively motivate the 
research of this thesis. 
 
1.1.2 Chinese IPOs are different from their Hong Kong Counterparts 
Although Hong Kong provides administrative orientations to mainland companies to list on 
its stock exchange, Chinese IPOs are always distinguished from other Hong Kong 
counterparts.  
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Condition on Chinese less developed financial market and the complicated classification 
system of Chinese stocks, the administrative selecting criteria by supervision departments 
results in the majority of Hong Kong listed Chinese companies must be tightly linked to the 
lifeline of national economy. Once to ensure successful offerings is set as priority, the 
perceived marketing strategies and pricing levels should exhibit being different from other 
private-owned firms in the market. In addition, due to the existence of higher degree in 
information asymmetry associated with overseas listings, Hong Kong listed Chinese IPOs are 
expected to generate more empirical implications. Such expectation partially interests this 
thesis, which proposes to investigate the systematic characteristics determining short-run 
underpricing and long-run performance of Chinese overseas listed IPOs. 
 
1.1.3 Chinese Overseas Listing is Significantly Driven by the Regulatory Aspects 
between Two Markets 
Chinese government has not fully dedicated the responsibility of being a market participant 
and intervenes in specific affairs, rather than being a solely regulator. In this circumstance, 
Chinese domestic market appears to be intensively policy directed. Meanwhile, facing a 
number of significant structural challenges, Chinese domestic financial market remain 
underdeveloped, lack of experienced institutional investors, weaken elements in banking 
system, and short of a predictable, transparent regulatory structure that fosters financial 
innovation. Without a meaningful institutional investor base, the market movement highly 
relies on noise retail investors, which results in a more speculative environment and a more 
volatile equity trading. More details have been introduced in Chapter II. In one word, Chinese 
domestic market has not fully prepared to drive national economy to a steady fast growth, to 
further open to massive foreign liquidity inflows, or to effectively protect investors from 
unanticipated global-spread economic conjunctures. 
Apparently, as one of the world leading capital markets, Hong Kong comprises an 
integrated network of institutions and markets which provide wide range of financial products 
and services on an international base. It is categorized as high liquidity and effective 
operation under transparent regulation. Established upon high economic freedom, Hong Kong 
provides a mature, regulated, and active marketplace for global institutional investors. 
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Chinese government regards overseas listing as part of domestic privatization and an 
important step of economic reforms. They regard primary overseas listings as means of 
forcing SOEs to conform to ―international standards‖ and establish ―modern corporate 
governance‖. In this circumstance, large and qualified state-owned companies within the 
government‘s supporting industries are more likely to issue their shares on foreign, open, and 
well-developed stock exchanges when the valuation level is appropriated, in order to obtain 
more capital-raising, to operate under international standards, to send positive signal of 
Chinese economy reform, and to indirectly protect the development of domestic financial 
market. 
The thesis, therefore, empirically investigates issues pertinent to the partial privatization of 
Chinese IPOs at home and abroad. Based on the asymmetric information hypotheses in IPO 
and cross-border flotation literature, the proposed research includes both short-run and long-
run methods, and covers the entire offering process of Chinese firms‘ going public in overseas 
markets.  
Prior studies, based on the experience of IPOs around the world, offer many wise 
explanations to the large amount of ―money left on the table‖, including the winners‘ curse 
(Rock, 1986; Ritter, 1984), self-interest investment bankers (Baron, 1982; Carter and 
Manaster, 1990), discriminate allocation (Aggarwal, Nagpurnanand and Manju, 2002), 
lawsuit avoidance (Tinic, 1988), signalling (Welch, 1989), bookbuilding (Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989), as well as information cascade (Welch, 1992). Apart from asymmetric 
information based models, evidence also suggests that the level of underpricing varies over 
time (Loughran, and Ritter, 2004) and across countries (Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist, 
1994). The thesis is built upon prior studies, but steps further by jointly testing and extending 
existing models. Each empirical chapter has different focuses to demonstrate the activities and 
motives of issuing firms, underwriters, investors, authorities, and the market as a whole.  
 
1.2 Empirical Issues 
1.2.1 Research Outline 
Empirical investigation begins with a comparative analysis of underpricing of Chinese and 
non-Chinese firms in Hong Kong. The phenomenon of Chinese firms having significantly 
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higher abnormal initial returns provides the evidence that overseas listing is naturally 
associated with higher information asymmetry. This is the premise of the thesis. Once holding 
this information barrier, both issuing firms and their underwriters have to act in a certain way 
to mitigate the possible loss and ensure successful offerings, which is the proposed objective 
of the first empirical chapter (Chapter III). Besides, the equity offering involves the issuing 
firm and investors, who are interrelated and interact on each other. Thus the accuracy of 
information becomes important in influencing IPOs offerings and after-market performance. 
Therefore, the subsequent empirical works in Chapter IV focus on the IPO earnings forecast 
and information disclosure mechanism by linking up trading performance with the divergence 
of opinion hypothesis (Miller, 1977). All of the above has shown overseas primary listing is 
facing more uncertainty, higher risks, and additional costs. The final empirical chapter 
(Chapter V) is proposed to establish the ultimate meanings and motives that encourage more 
and larger Chinese SOEs to raise capital through this approach. As suggested by the empirical 
results, the Chinese government regards overseas listing as part of the domestic privatization 
programme and as an important step of the ongoing economic reform. Consequently, rather 
than protecting the immature domestic security market, the overseas primary listing may 
bring the state authorities more successful experience to take the reform to the next level. The 
research questions, findings and implications of each chapter are summarized as follows. 
 
1.2.2 Summary of Chapters 
Before embarking on empirical investigations, Chapter II provides an overview of Hong 
Kong‘s and China mainland‘s financial markets, which does not only act as a preface of the 
whole thesis, but also begins the subsequent empirical studies in the following chapters. The 
limitation of development in the domestic stock exchanges, the desire of bringing Chinese 
SOEs into the international market, and the appropriate conditions in Hong Kong encourage a 
certain amount of Chinese companies to issue new shares in Hong Kong. China‘s domestic 
stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen) were launched at the beginning of the 1980s as 
part of the economic reform. As introduced in Section 1 of this chapter, before the Share 
Structure Reform in 2005, Chinese enterprises‘ stocks used to be classified by ownership into 
eight categories with different trading restrictions. The selection and ownership structure of 
overseas listed H-share
①
 and Red Chip
②
 stocks within these eight categories may be regarded 
                                                     
①
 H share refers to the shares of companies incorporated in mainland China that are traded on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange 
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as the foundation of their corporate characteristics, issuing incentives and after-market trading 
performance. Section 2 turns to briefly review the abnormal price premium of IPOs in 
domestic market and summarizes possible explanations for overseas primary listing. Non-
market-oriented listing selection procedures and simplified pricing methods result in 
disconnection between the pre-listing restructure, new share pricing, and after-listing dramatic 
initial returns in the domestic market. Also, the majority of selected H-share companies must 
be tightly linked to the national economy. The lottery allocation mechanism and enthusiastic 
public subscription in domestic equity offerings has been not appropriated to measure the 
market demand, not to speak of investors‘ sentiment. Accounting standards and information 
disclosure practices, as commonly argued aspects in cross-border listing literature, are 
building more blocks between domestic and foreign stock exchanges, which is most likely to 
change the picture of financial position and performance for proposed overseas listing 
companies. Retail-centralized investors‘ structure and limited investment alternatives further 
constrain the capability, efficiency and rationality of the home market. Restricted capital 
flows and newly launched international investment channels are difficult to be introduced and 
can hardly change the market environment in the short run. Last but not the least, intensified 
informative acceptance across segmented markets is showing greater closing movement and 
sentiments than years ago, which benefits both marketplaces in terms of long-run fundamental 
implications. Furthermore, Section 3 of this chapter introduces the Hong Kong financial 
market as a mature, steady-growing and appropriate trading platform to provide an optimal 
choice for Chinese enterprises to seek overseas primary listing. 
Chapter III, the first of the three empirical chapters, investigates the different 
underpricing levels between Chinese and non-Chinese IPOs in Hong Kong, in order to 
discover the influence of asymmetric information on overseas listing and the correspondent 
offering strategies of Chinese companies and their underwriters. It jointly tests a number of 
asymmetric information models, including the winner‘s curse model (Rock, 1986), the partial 
adjustment hypothesis (Benvenisite and Spindt, 1989; Hanley, 1993), and principal-agent 
models, to examine the underpricing of IPOs listed on the Main Board of the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (HKEx), covering the entire offering process, including preliminary pricing, 
issuing marketing, pre-listing price revising, and public offering. The results and main 
findings are summarized as follow. (1) Chinese enterprises received a mean initial return of 
19% on first trading days, doubling the initial returns of their local counterparts. (2) Cross-
sectional results are reliably consistent with the positive relationship between ex ante 
                                                                                                                                                        
②
 Red chips companies that are incorporated and listed in Hong Kong and are controlled (at least 35 
percent) by state-owned organizations or by provincial or municipal authorities in mainland China. 
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uncertainty and IPO initial returns, but the explanatory power of some conventional proxy 
appears to be minor. (3) Highly reputable bankers are able to enhance investment 
expectations and further promote the aftermarket trading performance, and investment 
banking industry in Hong Kong is within the monopolistic competition. (4) Most of IPOs are 
likely to time their offerings and take advantages of optimistic valuation during the ―hot issue 
market‖. Recent IPOs‘ initial trading performance has very significant impacts on follow-up 
issues thereafter. In Hong Kong, the bookbuilding became conventional in recent years and is 
preferable by larger deals. To further test the partial adjustment hypothesis and other related 
theories, this chapter then isolates 180 observations which going public by bookbuilding 
method. For bookbuilding IPOs, (5) in parallel with drafting listing documents, sponsors 
normally arrange pre-offering meetings with prospective institutional investors in order to 
collect indications of interests, therefore the private information from institutional groups has 
already been incorporated into the announced preliminary price range in IPO prospectuses. (6) 
The substantial information leakage in Hong Kong market acts to form information cascade 
(Welch, 1992), lower the costs of valuation, and aggregate the retail sector. Deviating from 
either lower limit or the midpoint of price range, this average positive revision is more likely 
driven by retail demand and their confidence on underwriters. (7) Hong Kong always stresses 
the importance of fair dealing and retail investors are more preferable in non-discretionary 
IPO allocation; consequently, once holding other things equal, larger price revisions are 
associated with larger proportion of retail allocations. (8) High public subscription can be 
transmitted to the aftermarket via a positive price revision, which in turn attracts more 
investors buying new shares and stimulates further ascent in share price (Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2002),  carrying the expectation of higher underpricing (Hanley, 1993; Lowry and 
Schwert, 2000; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). (9) However, the proportion of institutional 
allocation provides inconclusive evidence to predict initial returns. The firm-specific 
characteristics cannot consistently and powerfully explain the level of underpricing, providing 
the additional supports to the changing risk composition hypothesis by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). (10) The empirical results confirm the market timing hypothesis in the IPO literature 
(Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). (11) Chinese companies are endowed 
with a specific pricing and marketing strategy to reduce costs from underpricing and 
simultaneously ensure the success of equity offerings. The issuing size and ownership 
background make H shares and Red Chips easily become high-profile in the market. They are 
normally underwritten or jointly underwritten by top investment bankers, and the 
overwhelming majority of Chinese firms went public via bookbuilding. Referring to their 
oversubscription in both placing and public tranches, the average price range seems to be 
relatively conservative.  
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Chapter IV focuses on information disclosure and earnings forecasting accuracy in IPO 
prospectuses with their subsequent effects on aftermarket performance.  Most investors in the 
market, especially retail investors, do not have inside information about the issuing firms. In 
this case, the managers‘ earnings forecasting in IPO prospectuses can be a crucial information 
resource for their investment decisions. The accuracy of forecasts is expected to partially 
affect initial returns as well as trading performance. Empirical works jointly test Welch‘s 
(1992) investor sentiment hypothesis, De Bondt and Thaler‘s (1990) overreaction hypothesis, 
Miller‘s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis, and Loughran and Ritter‘s (1995) windows 
of opportunities hypothesis. The mean of IPO profit forecasts error is about 5.4 percent, such 
a low average indicates a possible agency problem. Issuing firms, with better knowledge than 
others, can take opportunity to seek additional benefit when they report the profit forecasting 
in new share offerings. In further tests for rationality of profit forecast, the managers‘ 
forecasting tends to be pessimistic, indicating management may not fully and correctly 
incorporate all information to the estimation. To link with short-run underpricing, there is no 
statistically significant difference between pessimistic and optimistic forecasting. However, 
the evidence also suggests that if the forecast is over-biased, investors have ability to adjust 
their investment expectation, which can lead to extremely high underpricing. In terms of a 
long-run investigation, consistent with the divergence of opinion hypothesis, firms with 
higher initial returns actually underperform in the long-run, which is due to the initial 
overreaction. The magnitude of forecast errors maintains systematic affect on the trading 
performance, while variables of divergence of opinion are powerful to partially explain the 
long-run underperformance puzzle of IPOs. In terms of contributions, the chapter includes 
new control variables in testing the determination of forecast error magnitude, such as using 
an insider dummy to control the wealth effect and dilution effect. Also, it combines IPO the 
forecast and the stock performance in immediate market to explain the long-run 
underperformance, which is in line with divergence of opinion hypothesis.  
The final empirical chapter, Chapter V, reviews the journey towards overseas listing of 
Chinese enterprises, investigates the meaning and political ends for the Chinese government, 
discovers the prime motives, how to select issuing SOEs, and what the benefits are of doing 
this. It aims to figure out the reasons behind the upsurge of Chinese companies‘ cross-border 
flotation, to find out the goals of the Chinese government to pursue economic and financial 
reform, and to point out possible suggestions for the development of the home stock market. 
This chapter jointly tests a number of models, including the market order hypothesis, bonding 
hypothesis, market timing hypothesis, and other asymmetric information models related to the 
improvement in corporate governance, investor protection, and IPO long-run performance. 
The findings can be summarized as follows. Since the Chinese government regards overseas 
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primary listings as a mean of forcing SOEs to conform to ‗international standards‘ and 
establish ‗modern corporate governance‘, such activities have been attached with more 
political considerations. The government has carefully selected ―qualified‖ enterprises and 
helped with pre-listing restructures to meet the high standards in foreign stock exchanges. 
Once solely considering issuing firms‘ incentives, large-scale and ―healthy‖ state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) within the government‘s supporting industries are more likely to issue 
their shares on foreign, open, and well-developed stock exchanges when the target market is 
in good time of pricing and offering, in order to raise more capital, to operate under 
international standards, to send a positive signal of Chinese economic reform, and to 
indirectly protect the development of domestic financial market. In addition, since foreign 
listing is driven by the needs of economy reform and SOEs‘ partial privatization, these listed 
firms are assigned for the priority of reorganization and exhibit better governance structure 
after listing, which in turn spreads positive effects onto the domestic financial market. In 
terms of investor protection, legal origin is an important determinant to accounting practice, 
corporate governance, disclosure procedures, and public controls, which can crucially affect 
the development of the capital market as well as market participants‘ investment expectations 
and activities. In short, partial privatization through an overseas primary listing approach is 
indeed a feasible way to facilitate domestic financial market growth, particularly for countries 
with a large economy but lack of a well-developed home capital market and a mature trading 
platform. The chapter contributes to existing literature in the following ways. On the one hand, 
in the tests of making decision to overseas primary listing, it tries to break through the 
conflicts between theoretical predictions and Chinese government‘s activities, providing 
further evidence that the ultimate purpose of overseas IPOs is to pursue the development of 
the domestic financial market. On the other hand, proxies of investor protection used in the 
long-run tests are introduced and yield valuable outcomes.  
 
1.3 Implications and Contributions of Main Findings 
In terms of implications, Chapter II has tried to provide updated information about Chinese 
financial reform, China‘s domestic market development, and the listing environment in Hong 
Kong. State authorities and market regulators are expected to find the gap between the home 
market and the world‘s leading stock trading platforms. Also, with easing of the capital flow 
constraints and the variation of investment channels, domestic investors may receive a general 
view and principal knowledge on the issue of overseas primary listing. 
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The findings in this chapter are expected to provide references in both academic literature 
and market practice. (1) This chapter examines the role of various determinants of IPO 
underpricing simultaneously and accounts for the market features in Hong Kong. However, 
the existing theories do not provide enough evidence to validate the influence of pre-offering 
rewards paid by underwriters to their regular clients, so that the non-discretionary allocation 
is terminated. (2) For prospective Chinese IPOs, it is essential to understand the underlying 
meaning behind the pricing strategy. Hong Kong market is entitled as the preferred platform 
to accommodate large Chinese IPOs. The strengths come from the restricted systematic 
monitoring (the non-discretionary share allocation), smooth information interchange (the 
information cascade), high-class underwriting services, matured institutional base, and 
affirmative investors recognition (the public demand).  (3) This study is likely to help 
investors, especially retail investors in Hong Kong, to figure out the significant determinants 
during the offering and possibly estimate the likelihood in pricing and share allocating. 
However, the study has some limitations. The empirical results are possibly driven by the 
regulatory concern and irreplaceable market features. Meanwhile, the testing framework 
implies the possibility that empirical findings may be sensitive to the selection of samples and 
measurement of variables.  
Chapter IV highlights the managers‘ earning forecasts in IPOs. It is expected to benefit 
investors, especially retail investors, to the extent of understanding management teams‘ 
incentives and behaviour in information disclosure. Also, for issuing firms and their managers, 
the accuracy of information disclosure during the IPO period is not the only strategy to 
promote public subscription, which is also tightly linked to the market performance in a 
certain period after going public. 
Finally, Chapter V explains the motive and decision-making of foreign capital floatation 
from the government‘s perspective. Issuing IPOs in Hong Kong is a feasible approach to re-
structure Chinese SOEs and to push current financial reform deeper. Meanwhile, for investors 
and academic researchers, especially for those without a Chinese background, this chapter 
may provide many hints to aid the understanding of the listing activities of Chinese SOEs in 
the international stock exchanges.     
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1.4 The Plan of Study 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Through reviewing the development of China‘s 
domestic financial market and its tight economic link to Hong Kong, Chapter II mainly 
summarizes the reasons and motives of overseas primary listing. Chapter III begins with tests 
of asymmetric information models, investigating the IPO underpricing puzzle, underwriters‘ 
incentives, and China-related enterprises‘ offering strategies. Following that, Chapter IV turns 
to focus on the earnings forecasting accuracy and information disclosure practice. It also 
discovers the relationship between this accuracy and IPO aftermarket trading performance, by 
emphasizing the significance of divergence of opinion. In terms of the motivation of China‘s 
partial privatization and increasing tendency for SOEs to seek overseas listing, Chapter V 
empirically examines the political and economic incentives of the Chinese government to 
continuously carry through this approach. In the end, Chapter VI offers a final conclusion and 
a proposal for future investigation. Each chapter includes a literature review, and tables and 
figures are reported at the end of each.  
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CHAPTER II 
CHINA ENTERPRISES LISTED IN HONG KONG 
– AN OVERVIEW OF HONG KONG  
AND CHINA DOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
China‘s stock market was launched at the beginning of the 1980s and is part of the economic 
reform. It operates two stock exchanges, both of Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHEx) and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZEx) were founded in 1990, and are governed by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). After nearly thirty-year development and several 
times of fundamental reforms, Chinese domestic stock markets have achieved great 
improvements, in terms of market capability, liquidity, as well as regulation and 
standardization. 
When the first Chinese enterprise issued IPO on the Main Board of Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKEx) in 1993, the journey towards overseas listing started. By the end of 2007, 
there have been a total of 1530 domestic listed companies and 154 foreign listed firms, 
including Hong Kong, Singapore, the U.K., the U.S., and so on. It is noted that, Hong Kong 
has been the best option of overseas listing all along, and this chapter will break the seal and 
conduct proposed research questions in the thesis. 
As a background introduction of the whole thesis, this chapter first illustrates the stock 
classification and market development, since the unique classification system of stocks hinges 
the going public process for Chinese enterprises. In addition, there must be some reasons 
behind the repetitious upsurges of overseas listing in past fifteen years, thus this chapter also 
aims to discover the endogenous problems of China domestic financial market and try to 
summarize number of explanation on why Hong Kong is an optimal choice to purse this 
overseas primary listing channel.  
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2.2 China Domestic Stock Markets and Classification of China-backed Stocks 
2.2.1 A Fast Growing Domestic Market – Importance and Challenges 
The history of Chinese stock offering can be traced back to 18
th
 November 1984 when 
Shanghai Feilo Acoustics Co. Ltd. initially issued common stock to the public and started 
dealing on 26
th
 September 1986. After then, domestic stock exchanges, including SHEx and 
SZEx, were launched on 26
th
 November 1990 and 1
st
 December 1990 respectively.  
It is generally believed that there are four important stages during the twenty-year course of 
development, i.e. the locally experimental stage (May 1987 – March 1992), nationally 
primary stage (April 1992 – June 2001), reform-driven recession stage (June 2001 – 
December 2005), and expanding growth stage (from 2006). In particular, during the third 
stage of reform driven recession, the government introduced funds into the market with a 
series of supporting policies, which had a pernicious influence upon stock trading, to the 
extent of declining capital-raising and optimum distribution of resources. This reform-driven 
recession potentially increased motives of overseas listing for large-scale state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Although such foreign listing was caused by various reasons, which will 
be discussed in this chapter carefully, the journey towards overseas primary listing has begun 
from this stage. Summary of China domestic security markets is reported in Table 2.1 and 
Figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.2 provides a more straightforward picture to discover the rapid growth of China 
domestic securities market. Since early 1990s, it has been through climbing tendency, 
especially after each time of financial reforms, in 2000 and 2005 respectively. Moreover, in 
2007, two years from the most recent Share Structure Reform, it was the first time of total 
market capitalization of A-share markets exceeding national economic aggregate, 
approximately 1.33 times as large as annual GDP. 
The building blocks for strong capital markets buttress the broader development of a 
prosperous economy. Efficient and competitive financial sectors help allocate scarce 
resources to their most productive uses and generate significant multiplier effects for 
economic growth. Well-developed financial market are a necessary precondition for China‘s 
development as well, to move the country towards its goals of more balanced, harmonious, 
innovation-based, and environmentally sustainable growth. It can offer a diverse array of 
financing channels, providing for more innovation and a lower cost of finance. Deep and 
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healthily liquid capital market is more likely to increase national-wide stability and reduce 
volatility. 
However, Chinese domestic financial markets are still facing number of significant 
structural challenges, i.e. remaining underdeveloped, lack of institutional investors, weaken 
element in banking system, and short of a predictable, transparent regulatory structure that 
fosters financial innovation. In particular, access to market is limited, restricting potential 
buyers, while bid-off spreads are wide, indicating a lack of competition and accordant 
liquidity. Because of a finite list of investment alternatives, the market is pending for diversity. 
Also, the quality of market participants varies widely. Without a meaningful institutional 
investor base, the market movement highly relies on noise retail investors, which results in a 
more speculative environment and a more volatile equity trading. In addition, China‘s 
commercial banking system is still transitioning to a modern, efficient, market-driven system 
with proper risk control. There are some risk-averse credits officers may still believe it is 
safer to lend to state-owned companies since the implicit government guarantees, rather than 
to dynamic small and medium-sized private businesses. And the consolidated disclosure of 
accounting and financial position has not been fully realized. Moreover, China is facing a 
regulatory regime that may be inhibiting innovation and development of a modern financial 
market. As China transitions from a centrally administered economy to a market-based 
economy, markets would better channel capital to the most dynamic sectors and businesses in 
the economy. The appropriate role of governments is to set the rules for the market as a whole 
and enforce them, rather than to make individual investment decisions. However, these rules 
are remained unclear enough and adherence to them is weak. Lastly, the all-around openness 
of China financial market is still placed on the agenda. Facing the weak external economic 
environment and the pressure of headline CPI inflation at a record high in the beginning of 
2008, Chinese government is in duty to shift into more tightening administrative policies. 
Either interest rate hikes or one-off exchange rate revaluation will directly beat domestic 
market and hurt investment expectations. Therefore, except for the enormous capitalization, 
the less-developed domestic market remains incomparable to world‘s leading capital markets. 
Chinese domestic market has not fully prepared to drive national economy to a steady fast 
growth, to further open to massive foreign liquidity inflows, or to effectively protect investors 
from unanticipated global-spread economic conjunctures.  
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2.2.2 Classification of Stocks by the Ownership 
As Mei, Xiong, and Scheinkman (2005)
③
 and many other papers have discussed, one of the 
characteristics for Chinese stock market is being highly government-controlled and the 
market is at most a partially privatized one. Chinese stocks were categorised by various 
ownerships before 2005. This classification system not only assigns the stocks with tradable 
or non-tradable (or called non-negotiable) characteristics, but also differentiates investors 
being domestic or international, in order to defines a demarcation line for the local financial 
market.  
In particular, domestic legal entities are allowed to hold non-tradable state-owned stocks, 
local founder stocks, employee stocks, and other legal-entity stocks; while foreign founder 
stocks are hold by international legal entities with various restrictions on proportions. All of 
these are attached restrictions to be freely traded in the stock market; while public-hold 
tradable shares are further separated as A-share, B-shares, and H-shares. Although every class 
of shares have the same voting rights, they cannot be freely converted. Besides, Red Chip 
stocks in Hong Kong are also regarded as Chinese stocks, even their registrations are out of 
China mainland. After 2005, Chinese enterprises do not issue non-tradable shares when going 
public, but the authority-related stocks still have several years lock-up restriction. The 
following is going to further introduce a series of tradable stocks. 
 
2.2.2.1 A-Share Stocks 
A-shares are listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange in Mainland China, 
denominated in Chinese Yuan (CNY). Since it was established in 1990, the A-share market 
has made great development. By the end of 2008, there have been more than 1530 listed A-
share companies, representing a total market capitalization of RMB20,758 billion 
(approximately US$2,965 billion). 
In 2005, the CSRC announced a pilot program to transform non-tradable stocks into 
tradable stocks with additional compensation (cash, rights, or warrants, etc.) to tradable-share 
holders. In order to stabilize the market, this transformation did not immediately change the 
float due to various lockup periods. This reform had deep and significant affects on the 
                                                     
③
 Mei J. P., Xiong W., and Scheinkman J.A., (2005), ―Speculative Trading and Stock Prices: Evidence 
from Chinese A-B Share Premia‖, AFA Philadelphia Meetings. 
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domestic market both during and after the reform period. The temporary suspension of new 
and subsequent equity offerings created a number of problems, such as low turnover and 
illiquidity. After the lock period, the transformed shares also crated downward pressure to the 
market. These problems were exacerbated due to an immature investor base and a lack of 
derivative trading platforms. 
In addition, Chinese government has not fully dedicated the responsibility of being a 
market participant. According to the ―Administrative Measures on IPO issuing‖ (2006), once 
prospective issuing firm submits the application to CSRC through their sponsors, during the 
first trial, the CSRC has to take counsel to local governments which the company is registered 
with, and to receive approvals from the National Development and Reform Commission. 
Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) also need permission from CSRC. 
The sponsor system puts into full practice in domestic securities market in February 2004. 
The market participation of international investment bankers is also under a rigorous 
supervision by state authorities. This situation results in less experience, ungraded 
independence, subordinate regulation, and limited services level for domestic investment 
bankers, which, on a whole, is not maturely geared to international practices.  
 
2.2.2.2 B-Share Stocks 
The B-share stocks, being traded in US dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in Hong 
Kong dollars on the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, are exclusively for foreign investors and 
allocated primarily by private placement until February 2001, when the CSRC allowed 
domestic individual investors to open B-share accounts and trade B shares in foreign 
currencies. By the February of 2008, there are 86 companies issuing both A- and B-shares and 
23 companies solely issuing B-shares. 
One company can issue both A- and B-shares. A- and B-shares have equal voting power 
and dividend rights, although the price of A-share is usually much higher than that of B-
shares. As Chen et al. (1999) report, overseas investors face language barriers, must cope with 
different accounting standards, and find it hard to get reliable information about the local 
economy and companies, the B-share markets are very small and illiquid in comparison with 
the A-share markets.  
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As shown in Panel A of Table 2.1, there is no new B-share stock newly issued from 2002, 
and during the bear market from 2001 to 2005, the market capitalization dramatically dropped 
more than 45% from the peak in 2001. And even after the hot year of 2007, B-share markets 
appeared to shrink more rapidly than A-share markets, indicating investors‘ inferior 
expectations. It has been impossible for declining B-share markets to satisfy the desire of 
China SOEs raising capital, consequently China government sights overseas markets to list on. 
 
2.2.2.3 H-share Stocks 
By definition, H shares are the shares of companies incorporated in mainland China that are 
traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Many companies float their shares simultaneously 
on the Hong Kong market and one of the two mainland Chinese stock exchanges (being A 
shares in home market). Existing China‘s law imposes various restrictions affecting the use of 
foreign exchange in the China and its remittance out of the China. Under current law, only 
foreign investors and investors from the regions of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are 
permitted to own the overseas listed foreign shares of a Chinese issuer. As a result, the two 
kinds of share in effect operate in separate markets subject to different investor demands.  
H-share companies also have state-owned shares and legal-person shares. Where legal-
person shares are shares owned by domestic institutions, most of which are themselves 
partially owned by the central or provincial government. Legal persons are typically business 
agencies or local-government enterprises that have helped to start up the public companies. 
Both state shares and legal-person shares are substantively non-tradable (at least within a few 
years after public offering). Therefore, some economists argue that legal persons are similar 
to state shareholders. 
The CSRC is responsible for selecting the SOEs and approving their applications for an 
overseas listing. The CSRC requires every listing go to through a ―pre-selection‖ process. 
Although the selection criteria were not exactly clear and were changing, there are only 
several general principles. For instance, firms have to be a certain size and had to show good 
performance with high growth potential. Firms also had to demonstrate a genuine need for 
capital: the net assets of a listed company had to be higher than RMB400 million, the pre-
listing ROE above 10%, and the proceeds of the offering above US$50 million
④
. The Chinese 
government had to have a controlling stake in these companies and retained absolute control 
                                                     
④
 See the requirements on CSRC official website. 
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in critical industries or enterprises. In this circumstance, such selection was often based on 
non-economic factors such as political connections, geographical quotas, ―protected‖ industry 
status, etc.  
 
2.2.2.4 Red-chip Companies 
In contrast with A-, B-, or H-shares, whose companies are incorporate in Mainland China, 
Red chips companies, by definition, are incorporated and listed in Hong Kong and are 
controlled (at least 35 per cent) by state-owned organizations or by provincial or municipal 
authorities in Mainland China. When these mainland firms look for expansion and overseas 
capital, they typically find ways to gain listing in Hong Kong, either through direct IPO or 
through backdoor listing.  
Red chip companies are essentially Chinese conglomerates that operate in China, although 
some also have businesses in Hong Kong. Unlike H-share companies, which tend to 
specialize in a singly activity, business in red-chip companies are more diversified. 
Substantially both Red chips and H shares are China-backed companies. By this definition, 
both Red chips and H-share companies will be investigated in the thesis. They are expected to 
represent similar market demand elasticity, pricing method, initial returns, as well as after-
market trading performance.  
 
In sum, the complicated classification system of Chinese stocks can be one of crucial limits 
to circumscribe certain sorts of companies to go public on either domestic or foreign market. 
Also, the ownership structure actually marks the importance of various firms to the national 
economy. In this case, SOEs, who form the lifeline of nation‘s economy, are naturally rated to 
have priority to choose a target issuing market when they seek to raise capital. However, the 
following section will figure out the factual reasons behind SOE‘s overseas primary listing in 
China, which is much more than raising fund merely.  
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2.3 Price Premium in Domestic Market, Possible Reasons and Motivations for Overseas 
Listing 
The thesis causally selects Hong Kong as a target market for empirical works, to investigate 
the China-backed enterprises seeking overseas listings. Hong Kong market cannot be isolated 
from the mainland economic body, and Chinese companies‘ financing activities always 
reflect the economic fundamental. Therefore, the rest of chapter will pay close attention to the 
development of Chinese domestic securities market, investigate the differences between two 
markets, and discover the possible reasons behind overseas listings, which can motivate 
empirical works in the rest of thesis. 
The large underpricing magnitude in Chinese domestic IPO market has attracted much 
attention in both academia and real business. According to existing literature, Su and Fleisher 
(1999) find an underpricing level to be as high as 948.6% for A-share IPOs before 1996; Tian 
(2003) observes an average initial return of 267% during the period of 1991-2000, while Chen, 
Firth, and Kim (2004) find first day closing prices of China A-share IPOs were about 145% 
higher than the offering prices from 1992 to 1997. In any case, the reported levels of 
underpricing in China A-share market are much higher than the mean of 60% in other 
emerging markets (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001), and also in excess of 16% in Hong Kong 
between 1996 and 2000 reported in Chapter 3. Instead of maximizing offering proceeds and 
saving listing costs, domestic prodigious underpricing implies an imperfect and less-efficient 
marketplace. Therefore, even overseas listing is necessarily associated with high-cost 
information asymmetry and hard-awarded public approbate, Chinese SOEs crowded round to 
access a well-developed international market.  
In Hong Kong, the pricing of IPOs is based on the company‘s size, financial position and 
performance, productive profitability, earnings and dividends, growth potentials, industry 
average pricing level, and market movement, etc. The initial returns, therefore, are also 
systematically related to these characteristics. However, most offering prices of A-share 
stocks more reflect government‘s subjective estimation than company‘s specific situation or 
information on public demand gathered during the pre-filing period. Thus, all A-share stocks‘ 
initial returns were dramatically high whatever is the bull or bear market. It is exhibited that 
A-shares‘ underpricing is almost irrelevant to widely-applied valuation characteristics and 
methods, and first-day price jump becomes a certain result of the primary equity offerings. 
Chang, Chen, Chi and Yong (2008) summarize four specific features of Chinese stock 
market, i.e. segmented ownership, separated A- and B-share markets, long time interval 
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between issuing and listing, and aggressively concentrated state ownership after listing. In 
addition, exploring through the IPO issuing procedures and after-market performance, 
number of characteristics cannot be ignored, such as the imposed pricing methods, lottery 
allocation mechanism, noisy retail investors, restricted capital and liquidity flows, as well as 
limited investment channels.  
 
2.3.1 Non-market-oriented Listing Selection Procedures and Simplified Pricing Methods 
The CSRC determines an annual quota for new shares to be issued each year. As argued in 
prior studies, for instance Yau and Steele (2000), on the basis of political considerations, the 
quota is allocated and balanced among the provinces and state-industrial commissions 
according to criteria which help to achieve regional or industrial development goals, in 
consideration of the balance among provinces and industries. In theory, business strengthen is 
the criterion for enterprises to be chosen.  
Pricing via book-building by consulting institutional investors was adopted in A-share 
markets from January 2005. Before 2005, a method of online fixed-price offering is 
commonly used from 1995. Most offering prices are calculated according to a formula set by 
the CSRC. The formula is made up of prospective company‘s after-tax earnings per share 
(EPS) and an imposed price-to-earnings ratio (P/E ratio). In which, EPS is reported by the 
company itself, while the offering P/E ratio is assigned by CSRC based on the most recent 
average locality and industry trading P/E ratio in the A-share market (Yu and Tse, 2006). In 
addition, the offering price is chosen by the CSRC several days, sometimes months, before 
market trading starts, and in most cases there is little feedback about public demand to allow 
adjustment in the offering price. The CSRC also takes chances of timing IPOs to the market 
situation and capacity, as well as to the needs of financial market reform. 
According to such prejudiced criteria, majority of selected H-share companies must be 
tightly linked to the lifeline of national economy. Consequently H-share firms‘ going public 
have been attached more political considerations and heralding missions in a combination of 
both privatization and cross-border listing. Once to ensure successful offerings is set as 
priority, the perceived marketing strategies and pricing levels should exhibit being different 
from other private-owned firms in the market. Meanwhile, due to the existence of higher 
degree in information asymmetry associated with overseas listings, H-share IPOs, since being 
idiosyncratic, are expected to generate more empirical implications. Such expectation 
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partially interests Chapter 3, which proposes to investigate the systematic characteristics 
determining underpricing on the Main Board of HKEx, by highlighting China-backed issuing 
firms.  
 
2.3.2 Lottery Allocation Mechanism and Enthusiastic Public Subscription 
As a result of the serious imbalance in supply and demand, the A-shares are allocated through 
a lottery system, in which there is a fixed price offer with investors bidding or quantities. The 
odds of winning the lottery depend on how much money joins the lottery. Winners are 
selected via a random number generating scheme and are entitled to purchase one thousand 
shares at the issue price by winning one number. As the demand for the new shares usually 
far exceeds the supply, only a small percentage of the subscriptions win the lottery. The quota 
system for new issues can be the main reasons for underpricing (Chi and Padgett, 2005). 
In this case, permanent thousands of times in domestic public subscription has been not 
appropriated to measure the market demand, not to speak of investors‘ sentiment. Only 
placing China-related firms into fledged trading environment, such as HKEx, the well-
educated investors can estimate seemly value and reveal their interests in a rational manner. 
Therefore, during both pricing and immediate trading, the Chapter 3 will also adopt public 
subscription level as one of the systematic factors to proxy investors‘ interests, preferences, 
and sentiments. 
 
2.3.3 Accounting Standards and Information Disclosure Practices 
China adopts domestic Standards and Accounting Systems of Business Enterprises (ASBE) 
(before 2006), Chinese Accounting Standards (CAS) (after 2006), and International 
Accounting Standards (IAS), while the latter two were recently introduced. Although based 
on IAS, ASBE is questioned to the extent of timely incorporating economic losses. In 
particular, ASBE is challenged to be in short of important asymmetric rules, such as lower-of-
cost-or-market, and impairment of long-term assets. Furthermore, ASBE is also lack of timely 
loss incorporation in financial statements certified by international auditors as IAS-compliant. 
However, simply relying on government‘s endogenous efforts to improve financial reporting 
is far from enough. Current Chinese accounting reform lies in simply imitating international 
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standards, which substantially needs to be complemented by number of areas, including legal 
system, corporate governance, as well as auditor training and independence (Ball, Robin, and 
Wu, 2000). 
In addition, according to Meng, Ren and Xie (2007), there is a lag for private information 
being fully incorporated into the stock price in China A-share markets. Consequently, the 
disclosure of information and related insider trading become a key issue to impact on market 
efficiency. Even the market can absorb any informative impact sooner or later, the lack of 
transparency or existence of asymmetric information block creates opportunities for insiders‘ 
rent-seeking behaviours. It has been a while that the Mainland market suffering less authority 
and lower litigable information disclosure guidelines till 30 January 2007, when the existing 
―Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies‖ became effective. The 
administrative deficiency substantially resulted in more incentives for insider trading and 
always generated unpredictable market volatility, which changed the government‘s role from 
a market regulator into a market ―tuner‖.    
Chapter IV tries to link accounting and disclosure practices with IPO underpricing and 
trading performances. Once pursuing an overseas listing, all of listing documents have to be 
formatted under the KDFRS or IFRS, while both are converged with the ISA Board. Hong 
Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA) always works at bringing HK into line with 
international practices in this area. Their affirmative updates and revisions in accounting 
standards have distinguished HK GAAP from Mainland China‘s norm. For instance, the 
Interpretation No.9 Accounting for Pre-operating Costs by HKSA (08 May 2000) revises the 
principle of matching expenses with income does not allow the recognition of items in the 
balance sheet which do not meet the definition of assets or liabilities. Accordingly, the 
capitalization of pre-operating costs can only be justified when realized and recognized in the 
balance sheet as defined asset. The revision effectively prohibits the capitalization of pre-
operating costs is likely to have significant effect on HK enterprises, particular those with 
interests in Mainland China where capitalization of pre-operating costs is an accepted 
accounting practice. Consequently, shifting in accounting standards is mostly likely to change 
the picture of financial position and performance for overseas listed firms, which in turn 
affects their accounting practices, operating activities, and information disclosure incentives 
to meet more rigorous provisions.  
In addition, the listing rules of HKEx have set out detailed and restricted requirements 
governing the accounting information disclosures (HKEx Listing Rules 4.01-4.29, updated 
No. 86, 10 March 2008). Chapter 4 finds a breakthrough point to affiliate primary equity 
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offerings with accounting and disclosure practices, i.e. the accuracy of forecasted earnings in 
the offering prospectuses and its effects to IPO initial returns and after-market performances, 
by involving both behavioural overreaction hypothesis (DeBondt and Thaler, 1990) and 
divergence of opinion (Miller, 1977).  
As far as the insider trading is concerned, in Chapter 5, the investors protection brings 
attention of legal rules in the jurisdictions within the financial markets. Since Hong Kong 
used to be British colony, the law system is built up on English-origin, while the law system 
in Mainland China more likely belongs to the civil law system. The differences in legal 
provisions and public controls raise research questions to deal with asymmetric disclosure and 
insiders‘ rent-seeking activities. 
 
2.3.4 Investor Structure and Limited Investment Alternatives 
According to rough estimates, the aggregate investment value of the various institutional 
funds constitute approximately one-third of the investable Mainland securities market value 
(equities and government bonds), and the investable securities account for about one third of 
the total market capitalization. The balance is held by retail investors. The securities 
investment funds (SIFs) are the major regularized institutional investor type ranked by 
investment value in the domestic stock market, holding approximately 10% of the market 
value. The non-regularized privately-offered funds may hold another 12%. About 28% of the 
units in the SIFs are held by insurance companies, which are forbidden to participate in the 
stock market directly. Securities companies are second major type, holding an estimated 9% 
through their proprietary account and asset management business for clients. The National 
Social Security Funds (NSSF), which entered the stock market recently, constituted only 
0.8% of market value, followed by trust and investment companies and the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII) (estimated to be 0.6% each). 
The development of the institutional investor base in China faces the obstacles of 
insufficient policy coordination and policy hindrance across sectors. But most important 
development obstacle is the lack of investment channels. Only investment in the domestic A-
share and bond markets is allowed, no risk management tools are available, no overseas 
investment is allowed, and insurance companies may only invest through direct channels.  
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It is perceptible that to establish a formed institutional investor base with various 
investment channels needs more than time. Any forward moving requires further openness to 
free global capital flows and additional regulations to domestic market participants. 
Meanwhile, it is necessary to adjust the ―policy-driven‖ psychology back to a ―market-
directed‖ mind by weakening the decisive role of government and minimizing volatile 
influences of policy alteration. However, at the current stage in China domestic market, 
precipitate modification can only disorder existing steady growth and hit investors‘ 
confidence, especially for retail investors. Simultaneously, the problems of Chinese SOEs 
press for immediate solutions. By all appearances domestic retail investors is not able to 
properly accommodate large-scale SOEs in the near future, which induces the likelihood of 
overseas listing as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
2.3.5 Restricted Capital Flows and Newly Launched International Investment Channels 
Since accession to the WTO in 2001, China has taken significant steps towards enhancing the 
convertibility of its foreign exchange capital and integrating the domestic capital market into 
the international capital market. In light of China‘s huge foreign reserves and desire to further 
access to external financial environment, China has developed number of channels for global 
capital flows. Also, due to the trade imbalance, China is under great pressure to revaluate its 
currency and to maintain a steady fast economy growth. To that end, on 13 April 2006, 
―People‘s Bank of China ⑤  Decree No.5‖ established a Qualified Domestic Institutional 
Investors Regime (QDII) to channel its massive foreign exchange reserves into international 
capital market.  
QDII covers qualified commercial banks, securities institutions, and insurance companies. 
The Regime provides new investment options for China‘s household bank saving deposits 
and National Social Security Fund. When combined with China‘s Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor Regime (QFII), which allows foreign capital to invest in Chinese A-
share markets and bonds, QDII offers a two-way channel for international capital flows via 
institutional investors. 
However, QDII is hard to be introduced since its establishment. First of all, being long time 
of short in investment options for Chinese citizens, buying investment fund and invest in 
overseas financial markets are more likely to remain at the stage of expectation and being 
                                                     
⑤
 People‘s Bank of China is the central bank of PR China. 
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prudent. Investors need more knowledge to adjust investment orientation and more 
preparation to enhance risk endurance. Meanwhile, growth of CPI inflation and downside 
import surplus engaged a certain amount of domestic capital liquidity, which in turn deflated 
the scope of capital outflows. In addition, the break-even required rate of return of QDII is 
high. Chinese currency is facing the pressure of appreciation at about 8-10% recently, while 
the one-year deposit rate is around 4%, thus at least the break-even point of overseas 
investment has to achieve a level as high as 12-14%. This perception is likely to be worse if 
Chinese government pursues campaign-style administrative tightening, aggressive interest 
hike, or one-off revaluation of currency. Consequently, even if the market is developed in 
right way, and opening more channels of investing diversification will spread capital 
distribution and facilitate domestic capital market, it still takes time. In this case, to encourage 
domestic companies listing on international open markets would be a more efficient and 
optimal alternative, which argument further interests Chapter 5. 
 
2.3.6 Intensified Coupling and Informative Acceptance across Segmented Markets 
Most recently, Hong Kong and China domestic markets are showing more significant closing 
movements and sentiments than years ago. So far, China-backed stocks have occupied more 
than half of Hong Kong market capitalization and are becoming more active. Considerably 
high market weight and subsequent influence of Mainland policies on Hong Kong stocks can 
be seen, not only to the extent of trading patterns, but also in terms of long-term fundamental 
implications. 
First, after primary listing H-share stocks in Hong Kong, major SOEs have re-entered the 
A-share market, enhancing the impact of China-backed companies in both markets. By the 
end of 2007, five largest components in Shanghai Composite Index, namely the PetroChina, 
ICBC, Sinopec, China Life, and Bank of China, which are dually listing H-share stocks in 
Hong Kong, have already achieved a combined weight of 47.2%.  
However, compared with matured markets, China domestic market appears to be 
intensively policy directed, since the high frequent changing in policies has remarkable and 
mixed impacts. From macroeconomic indicators, QFII, QDII, to the reduction of state 
shareholding, such policy-directed phenomenon is one of necessary characteristics in current 
stage of financial market development, and which is expected to continue for a fairly long 
period. 
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While, for Hong Kong, the impact of Mainland frequently adjusted policies can be less 
powerful. Hong Kong has been affected by global market and feasibly enhanced its 
speculative ability. Also, China domestic investment culture has much to do with the retail 
investors, which may not infect a market dominated by international institutional investors as 
Hong Kong.  
To this extent, for avoiding endogenous negative influences raised by domestic economic 
reform, a smooth and diversified marketplace may become a dynamic force for Chinese 
government to initially accommodate large SOEs in Hong Kong. It allows foreign-listed firms 
introducing better corporate governance and other successful experiences back to A-share 
companies, facilitating domestic capital market, and benefiting the economic reform, as 
investigated in Chapter 5. More important, being attached with many political meanings, the 
partial privatization via an overseas primary listing approach does sent a signal of 
development and improvement in Chinese economic fundamentals. 
In short, this section carefully intercepts the existing problems and possible explanations 
behind overseas primary listing. Meanwhile, it consciously extracts the subsequent empirical 
works in the thesis. The next section will provide further evidence regarding Hong Kong 
market as a preferable target market for Chinese enterprises to list on.  
 
2.4 An Overview of Hong Kong Financial Market as a Preferable Choice of Chinese 
Enterprises’ Overseas Listings 
Prior sections have paid closed attention to the development of Chinese domestic financial 
market and indicated how Hong Kong, as an optimal trading platform for Chinese enterprises, 
can help listed firms to break through the domestic limits. This section, furthermore, will 
provide more information about current situation in Hong Kong, and eventually answer the 
question why Hong Kong is a best choice for Chinese companies seeking overseas primary 
listing.  
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) contributes an international market 
place for Hong Kong and Mainland China securities and derivatives products. Hong Kong has 
a well established legal system based on English common law and adopts Hong Kong or 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In past decades, especially since 1990s, 
HKEx has provided a strong and attractive foundation and offshore capital market for 
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companies to raise funds, with sufficient market capability and liquidity, various investment 
alternatives and derivatives, restricted accounting and disclosure practices, as well as 
knowledgeable institutional and retail investors. Meanwhile, being Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR) of China since 1
st
 July 1997 and holding continuous close 
business links to the Mainland China, it is always strategically placed in a high growth region 
and provides an ideal platform for global issuers to achieve exposure in the rapidly growing 
Mainland market. As an internationally recognized financial centre with abundant 
professional China expertise, HKEx has provided many Asian and multinational companies a 
gateway to the Mainland China, and even to the Great China Area
⑥
. 
 
2.4.1 Mature and Circumspect Trading Platforms 
HKEx operates two trading platforms of the securities market, namely the Main Board and 
the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM). According to existing Regulatory Framework and 
Rules
⑦
, both markets adopt a disclosure-based regulatory regime in which listed issuers are 
required to make timely disclosure of price-sensitive information to help investors make 
informed investment decisions. The Main Board is a market for capital formation by 
established companies with a profitable operating track record or companies meeting 
alternative financial standards to the profit requirement. GEM is an alternative market 
established in January 1999 to provide capital formation opportunities for growth companies 
from all industries and of all size. 
In particular, according to the rules governing the listing of securities (the Listing Rules) on 
the Main Board of HKEx, the issuer must satisfy either the profit test or the market 
capitalization/revenue/cash flow test, or the market capitalization/revenue test. In each of the 
test, it is all required that, to meet the profit test, a new applicant must have an adequate 
trading record under substantially the same management and ownership for no less than three 
financial years during which the profit attributable to shareholders must, in the profit test for 
instance, in respect of the most recent year, be not less than HK$20 million and, in respect of 
the two preceding years, be in aggregate not less than HK$30 million
⑧
. In addition, 
management continuity for at least the three preceding financial years; and ownership 
                                                     
⑥
 The Great China Area generally refers to East Asia countries/regions except for Japan in common 
sense, which have closed economic links with China, including Korea, Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, 
and other South East economies.  
⑦
 Last updated Regulatory Framework and Rules of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. can be 
found in its official website: www.hkex.com.hk. 
⑧
 HKEx Listing Rules 8.05, 8.05A, and 8.05B, updated No. 86, 10 March 2008. 
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continuity and control for at least the most recent audited financial year. These criteria may 
vary between different industries, such as mineral companies, newly formed ‗infrastructure 
project‘ companies, etc. 
GEM is particularly designed to growth enterprises which do not fulfill the 
profitability/track record requirement of the Main Board. New applicants in the GEM must 
demonstrate at least 24 months of active business pursuits immediately preceding the date of 
submission of the listing application, with a minimum market capitalization of no less than 
HK$46 million
⑨
. Since profitability is removed from conditions of listing, this enables growth 
enterprises to raise capital on the growth opportunities of the region under a well-established 
market and regulatory infrastructure. Meanwhile, it offers investors an alternative of investing 
in ―high growth, high risk‖ businesses, provides a fun raising venue and a strong identity to 
foster the development of technology industries in Hong Kong, and promotes the 
development of venture capital investments.  
 
2.4.2 Steady and Growing Market Place 
The first listing of H shares of a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) in Hong Kong in 1993. 
Since then, a close relationship emerged between Mainland businesses and the Hong Kong 
market, a relationship that is reflected in the Hong Kong market‘s fund raising track record. 
By the end of 2007, a total of 154 domestic companies had issued IPOs, and 57 issued 
subsequent equity offerings (SEOs), raising capital up to US$107,508 million. The Capital 
raised by H-share companies in last 15 years has been briefly summarized in Table 2.2.  
Mainland enterprises have sparked off waves of large scale capital formation by in the 
Hong Kong and other global securities markets.  Three times of issuing upsurge can be found 
in 1997, 2000, and after 2005. In particular, apart from the one in 1997 is owe to the Hong 
Kong's return to Chinese sovereignty and domestic enterprises took the advantages of 
integrated economy body, the rests were more likely due to Chinese SOEs‘ partial 
privatization and grading economic reform, represented by the suddenly increased number of 
offerings, total capital raised, and average issuing size. In terms of China‘s partial 
privatizations via an overseas primary listing approach, Chapter 5 will aggressively 
investigate in more details. 
                                                     
⑨
 See Chapter 11 of GEM Listing Rules, www.hkgem.com. 
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Whatsoever, Hong Kong has become the first and preferable choice of China-backed 
companies raising capital and seeking overseas primary listings. According to the China 
Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) authoritative statistic
⑩
, by 2007, there were 148 H-
share traded on international stock exchanges, 111 of them were only listed on HKEx; 37 
issued both A and H shares in segmented HKEx and domestic exchanges, 13 dually listed in 
HKEx and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); 5 dually listed in HKEx and London Stock 
Exchange (LSE); and 3 solely listed in Singapore. 
It raises a question that why China-backed companies will choose Hong Kong as a priority 
for overseas listing. On one hand, China has domestic stock markets and can also offering 
stocks for international subscription, such as B-share stocks, then seeking external funds to 
finance the companies cannot fully explain such amount of IPOs in various scales; on the 
other hand, Hong Kong market has very synchronous moving direction with highly closed 
tendency to China domestic stock exchanges (as shown in Figure 2.1), therefore, although 
Hong Kong provides more investment derivatives, it is still not an optimal choice to the 
extent of risk diversification. Thus a general sense about overseas listings and/or cross-border 
listings may not be applied in the case of Chinese-backed firms. However, this conflicting 
phenomenon has lasted for 15 years and is likely to be maintained at the current stage, 
offering abundant pending questions to the study in this thesis.  
The first reason can be the level of market development. Compared with the newly 
established Chinese stock market, Hong Kong‘s mature market should make a bigger 
contribution in channeling foreign funds to Mainland enterprises. In other words, 
correspondingly, HKEx is more preferable for large-scale China-backed companies to 
maximize capital raised. The comparison of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges is shown in following Table 2.3. 
Hong Kong market is a mature and fast-growing open market, with significantly higher 
market capability and more listed securities than two China domestic stock exchanges except 
for the extraordinary year of 2006. 
                                                     
⑩
 See CSRC‘s monthly report of Summary for H Shares (2008.02). 
- 43 - 
 
For one thing, after several decades of development, Hong Kong stock market 
accommodates more companies to list on than any domestic A-share markets, approximately 
1.37 and 1.70 times to Shanghai and Shenzhen A- and B-share markets respectively
11
. 
In terms of the market capacity, by end of 2006 when China domestic stock exchanges 
recovered from the most recent market fundamental reform, the total market capitalization of 
HKEx (including both of Main Board and GEM) represents approximately 1.51 times to the 
sum of Shanghai A-shares and Shenzhen A-shares
12
, and the situation is likely to hold 
throughout most of sample years. However, the jumping happened in 2007, which was the 
first time when the total Shanghai A-share capitalization exceeded Hong Kong; 
simultaneously. During this year, the market size dramatically enlarged by 1.55, 3.78, and 
3.30 times in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Shenzhen respectively. Actually, as suggested in 
many empirical studies, the immature market conditions always result in more uncertainties 
on pricing and market movement.  
The underlying sudden change was largely inflicted by the unsuccessful approaches of 
selling off state-owned shares around 2000, which upset the investors and brought into a bear 
market from the following year. In 2005 the Chinese authorities pursued a new round of 
market reform to reclassify non-tradable shares into tradable shares. Chapter 5 will 
aggregately put emphasis on this issue. Meanwhile, the CSRC suspended IPO issuing for all 
Chinese companies in every classes of shares, which in turn dragged market down to the 
bottom in the middle of 2005. Right after phasing completion in the end of April 2006, on 17 
May, the CSRC released the ―Administrative Measure on IPO issuing‖ and reopened the 
launch of IPOs. However, such structural break has had deep and significant affects to the 
domestic markets. Since extremely lack of turnover and market liquidity, the reopened equity 
offering channel brought great attentions of domestic enterprises and investors, the cumulated 
offering applications were rolling into newly formed stock exchanges and created one-off 
capital bursting.  
As known, the abnormal initial returns of China A-share IPOs are remained puzzle, though 
some studies addressed the reason on investors‘ limited investment alternatives. It can be 
imagined, with a mass of new shares issued at the same time, retail investors, which carries 
                                                     
11
 Although the total number of listed A-share firms is more than Hong Kong listed companies, the 
calculation can hardly integrate two A-share trading platforms, since Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges are operating separately. 
12
 The increasingly marginalized B-share markets are excluded. With no equity offering since 2004, 
there has been argued that B-share markets are lack of turnover and liquidity and set to be merged into 
the country's A-share markets. 
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the major component in domestic market, crowded into the stock markets, subscribed shares, 
frequently traded, and lead to the wild fluctuation and over liquidity. Panel B in Table 2.3 
provides more details to the sound bull market during this period. In particular, with more 
IPOs were introduced to the market and more Chinese residents opened new investment 
accounts, total market turnover immediately reacted to this change and was enhanced by 
226% in Shanghai and 243% in Shenzhen, while Hong Kong market still kept a comparably 
steady growth. As a consequent to the weakness external environment (the subprime problem 
in the U.S at the end of 2007) and the increasing threat of inflation and over-liquidity in 
internal economy, such one-off transformation finally returned back to original level, with the 
P/E ratio dropped from the peak of over 60 times on average down to 30 times in the 
beginning of 2008. Although Hong Kong market was negatively influenced by the change to 
the extent of market pricing level, the market maintained the capability and order on the 
whole. 
This gap indicates that, Hong Kong has reliable ability to accommodate more and larger 
firms to list on, to help them in accessing highly standardized accounting and disclosure 
practices, and to supervise them on establishing modern corporate governance. All of these 
are very important for China SOEs to consider with. Most of firms seeking public offerings 
incentively expect a steady and flourishing trading platform. Hong Kong market has kept on 
continuing growth in most aspects. Meanwhile, China A-share markets fluctuated in past 
years, and B-share market was at a standstill and even began to glide. Under this circumstance, 
domestic listing may bring additional risks to large companies, since they will become a 
market flags once trading, and become testers of related reforms likewise. 
In short, listing in Hong Kong, which is the closed overseas stock exchange for both 
geographic and economic considerations, is not only an economic but more politic manner. 
The Chinese government is hardly concerned about sending signals to the market or gaining 
political support. Its main target at the early stage was to raise foreign capital. Later, the 
Chinese government wished to use foreign listings as means of improving the quality of SOEs 
and of making them role models for locally listed SOEs. As stated by Zhou Daojong, the 
former chairman of the CSRC: Overseas-listed companies are all outstanding enterprises that 
are representatives of their respective industries to an extent. I hope you can also be the 
models of listed companies. The achievement of an overseas-listed company is not only the 
company‘s own business, it relates to country‘s image of reform and openness (26 May 1995, 
CSRC web news). 
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2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
In comparison of the Hong Kong and Chinese domestic financial markets, this chapter mainly 
discusses the possible explanations and motivations behind overseas primary listing. Through 
a detailed introduction of both Hong Kong and Chinese domestic financial markets, this 
chapter completes the task to catch sight of why Chinese enterprises are full of enthusiasm 
about overseas primary listing in Hong Kong. Chinese domestic financial markets are still 
facing number of significant structural challenges, i.e. remaining underdeveloped, lack of 
institutional investors, weaken element in banking system, and short of a predictable, 
transparent regulatory structure that fosters financial innovation. The ultimate development of 
the financial market still has a long way to go.  
This chapter finds a number of possible reasons for overseas primary listings in Hong 
Kong: 
(1) One of the characteristics for Chinese stock market is that it is highly government-
controlled and the market is at most a partially privatized one. The complicated classification 
system of Chinese stocks can be one of crucial limits to circumscribe certain sorts of 
companies to go public on either domestic or foreign market. Also, the ownership structure 
actually marks the importance of various firms to the national economy. In this case, SOEs, 
who form the lifeline of nation‘s economy, are naturally rated to have priority to choose a 
target issuing market when they seek to raise capital. 
(2) Existing non-market-oriented listing selection procedures and simplified pricing 
methods create more information barriers and results in the market being inefficiency. 
Meanwhile, As a result of the serious imbalance in supply and demand, the A-shares are 
allocated through a lottery system. The permanent abnormal public subscriptions have been 
not appropriated to measure market response, while the subsequent underpricing represents 
the lack of market rationale. 
(3) Exploring through the IPO issuing procedures and after-market performance, number of 
characteristics cannot be ignored, such as the imposed pricing methods, lottery allocation 
mechanism, noisy retail investors, restricted capital and liquidity flows, as well as limited 
investment channels. The development of the institutional investor base in China faces the 
obstacles of insufficient policy coordination and policy hindrance across sectors. 
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(4) The gap between accounting standards adopted in the domestic market and the widely 
used international accounting standards exacerbates asymmetric information block and the 
underlying disclosure mechanism in the Mainland marketplace is pending for norms.  
(5)Although a number of new policies have been carried out to channel capital outflows 
across the border, the immediate influence is hardly observed at the current stage.  
And (6) since Hong Kong and the domestic market are likely to merge to the extent of 
closed movements and sentiments, Hong Kong can still be regarded as a segmented trading 
platform by reducing the intensive-policy-directed effects and providing a steady-growing 
environment.  
Apparently, Hong Kong has provided a strong and attractive foundation and offshore 
capital market for China-related companies to raise funds, with sufficient market capability 
and liquidity, various investment alternatives and derivatives, restricted accounting and 
disclosure practices, as well as knowledgeable institutional and retail investors. In one word, 
Hong Kong has been regarded as the most optimal target platform for Chinese domestic 
enterprises to raise capital over home market. 
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Table 2.1 Capital Raised by H-Share Companies  
in the International Financial Market (1993-2007) 
The table reports the total capital raised by H-share companies during 1993 
and 2007, including both initial offerings and subsequent equity offerings. 
Year IPOs SEOs Warrants Delist 
Capital Raised 
(US$ mil.) 
1993 6 
   
1,049 
1994 12 
   
2,234 
1995 2 1 
  
379 
1996 6 1 1 
 
1,212 
1997 17 2 2 
 
4,685 
1998 1 2 
  
457 
1999 3 
   
569 
2000 5 
   
6,790 
2001 8 1 
 
1 882 
2002 16 1 
  
2,323 
2003 18 3 2 
 
6,492 
2004 18 8 
  
7,826 
2005 12 12 
 
1 20,647 
2006 23 11 
 
2 39,348 
2007 7 15 1 2 12,616 
Total 154 57 6 6 107,508 
 
Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission13 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 See the official website of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC): www.csrc.gov.cn
 
.
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Table 2.2 Comparison of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges  
by Market Capability and Turnover (2002 – 2008*) 
 
The table compares the market capability and turnovers between Hong Kong, Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002 to 2008. In Panel A, Column 1 lists number 
of listed companies, Column 2 reports the total market capitalization, while Column 3 
mainly highlights the average market valuation in three markets. Then Panel B reports 
the market turnover in both number of shares and in money amount. 
 
Panel A: Market Capability 
  Total   Hong Kong    Shanghai   Shenzhen 
  HK A Share   Main Board GEM   A Share B Share   A Share B Share 
 
Column 1: Number of Listed Companies 
       2002 978 1,201 
 
812 166 
 
705 54 
 
496 56 
2003 1,037 1,261 
 
852 185 
 
770 54 
 
491 57 
2004 1,096 1,349 
 
892 204 
 
827 54 
 
522 56 
2005 1,135 1,355 
 
934 201 
 
824 54 
 
531 55 
2006 1,173 1,398 
 
975 198 
 
832 54 
 
566 55 
2007 1,241 1,507 
 
1,048 193 
 
850 54 
 
657 55 
2008* 1,243 1,529   1,054 189   852 54   677 55 
 
Column 2: Total Market Capitalization (Billion Dollar/Billion CHY) 
    2002 HKD 3,611 RMB 3,739 
 
HKD 3,559 HKD 52 
 
RMB 2,492 RMB 44 
 
RMB 1,247 RMB  34 
2003 HKD 5,548 RMB 4,152 
 
HKD 5,478 HKD 70 
 
RMB 2,940 RMB 40 
 
RMB 1,212 RMB  50 
2004 HKD 6,696 RMB 3,631 
 
HKD 6,629 HKD 67 
 
RMB 2,571 RMB 30 
 
RMB 1,060 RMB  42 
2005 HKD 8,180 RMB 3,181 
 
HKD 8,113 HKD 67 
 
RMB 2,286 RMB 24 
 
RMB    895 RMB  36 
2006 HKD13,338 RMB 8,812 
 
HKD13,249 HKD 89 
 
RMB 7,112 RMB 49 
 
RMB 1,700 RMB  79 
2007 HKD20,697 RMB32,459 
 
HKD20,536 HKD161 
 
RMB26,850 RMB134 
 
RMB 5,609 RMB128 
2008* HKD17,783 RMB20,758   HKD17,670 HKD113   RMB16,820 RMB 78   RMB 3,938 RMB 94 
 
Column 3: Market Average P/E Ratio (Times) 
       2002 -- -- 
 
14.89 21.75 
 
34.5 30.61 
 
-- -- 
2003 -- -- 
 
18.96 38.79 
 
36.64 30.32 
 
-- -- 
2004 -- -- 
 
18.73 28.65 
 
24.29 20.15 
 
-- -- 
2005 -- -- 
 
15.57 22.94 
 
16.38 12.4 
 
16.96 9.11 
2006 -- -- 
 
17.37 21.86 
 
33.38 23.97 
 
33.61 21.01 
2007 -- -- 
 
22.47 44.91 
 
59.24 59.3 
 
72.11 26.71 
2008* -- --   13.49 16.91   36.6 36.9   32.38 13.9 
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Panel B: Market Turnover 
 
  Hong Kong    Shanghai Stock   Shenzhen Stock 
  Main Board GEM   A Share B Share   A Share B Share 
 
Column 1: Total Turnover (Million Dollar/Million CHY) 
2002 HKD 1,693 HKD 37 
 
RMB 5,752 RMB 81 
 
RMB 3,079 RMB 48 
2003 HKD 10,921 HKD 98 
 
RMB 11,004 RMB 145 
 
RMB 4,551 RMB 402 
2004 HKD 9,724 HKD 33 
 
RMB 4,624 RMB 74 
 
RMB 2,850 RMB 185 
2005 HKD 18,500 HKD 85 
 
RMB 10,128 RMB 68 
 
RMB 5,629 RMB 88 
2006 HKD 43,618 HKD 140 
 
RMB 58,748 RMB 345 
 
RMB 24,594 RMB 395 
2007 HKD 43,364 HKD 229 
 
RMB 133,165 RMB 515 
 
RMB 60,389 RMB 384 
2008* HKD 72,664 HKD 273   RMB 62,302 RMB 206   RMB 27,517 RMB 208 
 
Column 2: Total Turnover (Million Shares) 
2002 2,943 68 
 
633 18 
 
374 13 
2003 6,504 116 
 
1,428 28 
 
635 74 
2004 20,122 52 
 
810 21 
 
517 42 
2005 21,104 106 
 
1,980 23 
 
1,137 25 
2006 24,899 226 
 
8,591 86 
 
3,452 91 
2007 60,501 310 
 
7,666 53 
 
3,388 49 
2008* 117,433 1,194 
 
4,555 29 
 
2,031 31 
 
Column 3: Total Market Turnover (Million Dollar/ Million CHY) 
2002 HKD 1,730 
 
RMB  5,834 
 
RMB 3,127 
2003 HKD 11,020 
 
RMB 11,150 
 
RMB 4,953 
2004 HKD  9,756 
 
RMB  4,698 
 
RMB 3,035 
2005 HKD 18,585 
 
RMB 10,197 
 
RMB 5,717 
2006 HKD 43,758 
 
RMB 59,093 
 
RMB 24,989 
2007 HKD 43,593 
 
RMB 133,680 
 
RMB 60,772 
2008* HKD 72,937   RMB 62,508   RMB 27,725 
 
 
* By 17 April 2008.  
   Source: HKEx14 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 See the Market Highlights published in the official website of Hong Kong Stock Exchange Ltd. www.hkex.com.hk
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Table 2.3 Summary for China Domestic Security Markets (1992-2006) 
  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 
No. of Listed Companies 
         (A、B share) 53 183 291 323 530 745 851 949 
 (B share) 18 41 58 70 85 101 106 108 
 (H share) - 6 15 18 25 42 43 46 
 
Market Cap. & Valuation 
        Total Issued Capital (Share bil.)  6.89 38.77 68.45 84.84 121.95 194.27 252.68 308.90 
where: Negotiable (share bil.) 2.12 10.79 22.60 30.15 42.99 67.14 86.19 107.97 
Total Mkt. Cap. (RMB bil.)  104.81 353.10 369.06 347.43 984.24 1,752.92 1,950.56 2,647.12 
where: Negotiable Mkt. Cap.  — 86.16 96.89 93.82 286.70 520.44 574.56 821.40 
Avg. PE Ratio（%） 
        Shanghai — 42.48 23.45 15.70 31.32 39.86 34.38 38.13 
Shenzhen — 42.69 10.28 9.46 35.42 41.24 32.31 37.56 
 
Trading Performance 
        Trading Vol. (share bil.)  3.80 23.42 201.33 70.55 253.31 256.08 215.41 293.24 
Total T/over (RMB bil.)  68.13 366.70 812.76 403.65 2,133.22 3,072.18 2,354.43 3,131.96 
No.of Investors (000) 2,166.50 7,776.60 10,589.80 12,424.70 23,072.30 33,333.30 39,111.30 44,811.90 
Avg. T/over Ratio（%） 
        Shanghai — — 1,134.65 528.72 913.43 701.81 453.63 471.46 
Shenzhen — — 583.83 254.52 1,350.35 817.43 406.56 424.52 
Shanghai Comp. Index (close)   780.39 833.80 647.87 555.29 917.01 1,194.10 1,146.70 1,366.58 
Shenzhen Com. Index (close) 241.20 238.27 140.63 113.24 327.45 381.29 343.85 402.18 
             2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
No. of Listed Companies 
         (A、B share) 
 1088 1160 1224 1287 1377 1381 1434 
 (B share) 
 114 112 111 111 110 109 109 
 (H share) 
 52 60 75 93 111 122 143 
 
Market Cap. & Valuation  
       Total Issued Capital (Share bil.)  
 379.17 521.80 587.55 642.85 714.94 762.95 1,492.64 
where: Negotiable (share bil.) 
 135.43 241.06 203.69 226.99 257.72 291.48 563.78 
Total Mkt. Cap. (RMB bil.)  
 4,809.09 4,352.22 3,832.91 4,245.77 3,705.56 3,243.03 8,940.39 
where: Negotiable Mkt. Cap.  
 
1,608.75 1,446.32 1,248.46 1,317.85 1,168.86 1,063.05 2,500.36 
Avg. PE Ratio（%） 
 
       Shanghai 
 58.22 37.71 34.43 36.54 24.23 16.33 33.30 
Shenzhen 
 56.03 39.79 36.97 36.19 24.63 16.36 32.72 
 
Trading Performance  
       Trading Vol. (share bil.)  
 
475.84 315.23 301.62 416.31 582.77 662.37 1,614.52 
Total T/over (RMB bil.)  
 6,082.67 3,830.52 2,799.05 3,211.53 4,233.40 3,166.48 9,046.89 
No.of Investors (000) 
 58,011.40 66,504.20 68,418.40 69,812.40 72,157.40 73,360.70 78,540.00 
Avg. T/over Ratio（%） 
 
       Shanghai 
 492.87 269.33 214.00 250.75 288.71 274.37 541.12 
Shenzhen 
 509.10 227.89 198.79 214.18 288.29 316.43 609.38 
Shanghai Comp. Index (close)   
 2,073.48 1,645.97 1,357.65 1,497.04 1,266.50 1,161.06 2,675.47 
Shenzhen Com. Index (close)   635.73 475.94 388.76 378.62 315.81 278.75 550.59 
Source: CSRC 
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Figure 2.1 Total Market Capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
(Jan. 1995 – Jan. 2008, HK$ in billions) 
Source: HKEx 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Total Market Capitalization to GDP in China Domestic Markets 
(1992 –2007, RMB in billions) 
 
Source: CSRC 
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CHAPTER III 
WHETHER HONG KONG IS AN OASIS FOR CHINA ENTERPRISES 
TO SEEK OVERSEAS LISTING – EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
ON IPOS UNDERPRICING AND UNDERWRITING ACTIVITIES 
☼
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) has been widely discussed in Finance 
literature. Many prior studies, based on the experience of IPOs around the world, offer many 
wise explanations to the large amount of ―money left on the table‖. More recent research 
develops the theories into various extensions, such as market participants‘ behavioural rent-
seeking, cross-border listing and so on. However, none of existing models can be fully 
exacted from market specifications around the world, or explain the initial offering puzzles 
convectively and entirely. The gap in the literature motivates this chapter. 
On the basis of the asymmetric information theories, this chapter is interested in the pricing 
of new shares, mechanism of equity offerings, and activities of market participants. 
Simultaneously, many studies pay attention to the cross-border listing. Additional costs, being 
either directly or indirectly, are normally raised by the diversity in accounting standards, 
disclosure requirements, investors‘ recognition, as well as systematic monitoring. By this 
token, an overseas listing can be associated with a higher level of information barrier.  
Hong Kong market may offer an ideal testing ground for both the IPO underpricing and 
cross-border listing. As one of the world-leading stock exchanges, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKEx) provides a strong and attractive offshore marketplace. Since 1993 when 
the first Chinese IPO, Tsingtao Brewery Co. Ltd. (0168.HK), primarily listed in Hong Kong, 
the HKEx has been regarded as the optimal platform for Chinese enterprises to seek primary 
overseas listings. By the end of 2008, 150 out of 154 overseas listed Chinese enterprises 
                                                     
☼
  I am especially grateful to Mr. Brahim Saadouni, the external examiner, for detailed comments that 
substantially improved the chapter. He also kindly provide me with the data on offer information such 
as methods of offer, share allocation, price range, and subscription multiple. 
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chose Hong Kong as the initial listing marketplace, and the total market capitalization of 
Chinese enterprises have kept dramatically increase over time. These firms appeared to be 
quite distinct from others. According to the sample, during the period of 1996 and 2005, the 
underpricing was about 11.5% on average for all Hong Kong listed IPOs. However, Chinese 
enterprises received a mean return of 19% on first trading days, doubling the initial returns of 
their local counterparts.   
The ongoing events of Chinese IPOs in Hong Kong and their obvious underpricing 
motivate studies in this chapter. First, irrespective of the origin of the firm (Chinese or non-
Chinese IPOs), the determinants of the level of underpricing in Hong Kong is investigated. 
Also, the progressive changes in the market may have impacts to the price-setting framework, 
such as facing difficulties in the economy. In addition, many questions are raised on the 
bookbuilding method. It is the dominant offer method in the U.S., but is gaining popularity in 
Hong Kong in recent years. Since many IPO studies pay close attentions to the pricing, share 
allocating as well as the incentives of underwriters during the bookbuilding process, it is 
worthy to find the common ground and differences by alternatively applying Hong Kong data. 
All above may be help to figure out how Chinese IPOs go public in Hong Kong. Their higher 
initial returns should be enhanced by a pricing and marketing strategy to offset the loss and 
costs raised by possible asymmetric information and overseas listing.  
In this chapter three models of asymmetric information are jointly tested. They are the 
winner‘s curse model (Rock, 1986), the partial adjustment hypothesis (Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989; Hanley 1993) and the principal-agent models on underwriters‘ activities. Rock‘s theory 
establishes the most frequently used framework in the IPO literature, which argues that a 
higher level of underpricing will be positively related to a higher level of ex ante uncertainty. 
Hanley‘s study is consistent with the Benveniste-Spindt model and the ―partial adjustment 
hypothesis‖ treats underpricing as compensation paid by underwriters to investors who truly 
release information about the issuing firms. Meanwhile, underwriters may strategically 
allocate discounted shares to their favourite investors.  Especially when the valuation is costly 
but accurately pricing is less crucial, underwriters play an important role in strategically 
setting the prices. Holding their superior information level, investment bankers are more 
likely to receive benefits from both issuing firms and investors.  However, the mispricing will 
be limited if investment bankers care their reputation capital at stake. Last but not least, 
issuing firms tend to time the offers and take advantages of optimistic valuation during the 
―hot issue market‖. 
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The testable sample includes 410 observations which went public on the Main Board of 
HKEx during the period between January 1996 and December 2005. The empirical 
investigation begins from the systematic characteristics on underpricing for all observations 
regardless their offer methods. Then, bookbuilding IPOs are separated from original sample 
and serve to examine the price revision and share allocation based on bookbuilding theories. 
According to the empirical results, Hong Kong listed IPOs were suffering a high initial return 
of 11.5% on average. The cross-sectional results on IPO underpricing are reliably consistent 
with the positive relationship between ex ante uncertainty and IPO initial returns, but the 
explanatory power of some conventional proxy appears to be minor. In addition, although 
there is no direct and statistical evidence to prove top underwriters‘ persistent underpricing 
phenomenon, highly reputable bankers are able to enhance investment expectations and 
further promote the aftermarket trading performance. And Recent IPOs‘ initial trading 
performance has very significant impacts on follow-up issues thereafter. 
To further test the partial adjustment hypothesis and other related theories, this chapter then 
isolates 180 observations which going public by bookbuilding method. The investigation 
covers many key aspects in building-the-book, ranging over pre-offering marketing, public 
subscribing, pricing discovering, share allocating, as well as immediate aftermarket trading. 
This section also summarizes the idiosyncratic characteristics of Chinese IPOs, which may 
help to reduce the implicit costs and mitigate risks of failure in the overseas offerings. Main 
findings are summarized as follow: 
(1) The bookbuilding services in Hong Kong are normally provided by a few top 
international bankers and China-related leading financial institutions, their procedure is very 
much alike. Due to the existence of underwriters‘ pre-offering activities, the private 
information from prospective institutional groups may have already been incorporated into 
the announced preliminary offer price range in IPO prospectuses. Then the substantial 
information leakage in Hong Kong market acts to form information cascade (Welch, 1992), 
lower the costs of valuation, and aggregate the retail sector.  
(2) Hong Kong always stresses the importance of fair dealing and retail investors are more 
preferable in non-discretionary IPO allocation. The exercise of the overallotment option 
solely depends on the level of public subscription. Consequently, once holding other things 
equal, larger price revisions are associated with larger proportion of retail allocations. And 
high public subscription can be transmitted to the aftermarket via a positive price revision, 
which in turn attracts more investors buying new shares and stimulates further ascent in share 
price (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002).  
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 (3) Larger price revision reflects a greater yield of private information from the public 
tranche, which will carry the expectation of higher underpricing (Hanley, 1993; Lowry and 
Schwert, 2000; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). A positive price revision indicates underwriters 
have knowingly incorporated more favourable information. However, the proportion of 
institutional allocation provides inconclusive evidence to predict initial returns. Also, the 
firm-specific characteristics cannot consistently and powerfully explain the level of 
underpricing The empirical results also confirm the market timing hypothesis (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). Lastly, there is no strong evidence to reject the 
public information is freely available to all participants and price-setting reflects the market 
movements.  
(4) Ultimately, the market weights and influencing power of Chinese firms imply that 
Hong Kong is an optimal overseas market. Facing the additional costs raised by either 
regulatory differences or information asymmetry in overseas listings, Chinese companies are 
endowed with a specific pricing and marketing strategy to ensure the success of equity 
offerings. The issuing size and ownership background make H shares and Red Chips easily 
become high-profile in the market. They are normally underwritten by top investment bankers, 
and the overwhelming majority of Chinese firms went public via bookbuilding. Referring to 
their oversubscription in both placing and public tranches, the average price range seems to be 
relatively conservative. However, when the abundant valuation opinions and subscription 
indications are exchanged among investors, the growing number of subscription applications 
encourages underwriters to force up the offer price accordingly. Besides, the successful 
offering has to take market timing into account.  
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature that has practical implication. The 
findings are expected to provide references in both academic literature and market practice. 
First, based on existing IPO literature, this chapter examines the role of various determinants 
of IPO underpricing simultaneously and accounts for the market features of the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. It concludes that asymmetric information models can insistently but partially 
explain the level of underpricing. Evidence on bookbuilding theories is consistent with the 
partial adjustment hypothesis. It also confirms the important roles of underwriters and the 
facts of timing the issues. However, there is no much conclusive result to the institutional 
allocation, and the existing theories do not provide enough evidence to validate the influence 
of pre-offering rewards paid by underwriters to their regular clients. Consequently, the non-
discretionary allocation is terminated, current studies stress more on the process after the 
drawing up IPO prospectuses. Secondly, in term of the practical implications, for prospective 
Chinese IPOs in Hong Kong, it is essential to understand the underlying meaning behind the 
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pricing strategy. Hong Kong market is entitled as the preferred platform to accommodate 
large Chinese IPOs. The strengths come from the restricted systematic monitoring (the non-
discretionary share allocation), smooth information interchange (the information cascade), 
high-class underwriting services, matured institutional base, and affirmative investors 
recognition (the public demand). Besides, this study is likely to help investors, especially 
retail investors in Hong Kong, to make conclusive investment decisions in IPO events. They 
can figure out the significant determinants during the offering and possibly estimate the 
likelihood in pricing and share allocating.  
However, the study has some limitations. The empirical results are possibly driven by the 
regulatory concern and irreplaceable market features. Meanwhile, although the regression 
functions have jointly considered many asymmetric information models, none of them is 
powerful enough to solely explain the underpricing phenomenon. This situation not only 
shows the current gap in the literature, but also implies the possibility that empirical findings 
may be sensitive to the selection of samples and measurement of variables.  
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Initially there is a literature review in 
Section 3.2. Section 3.3 lists the testable hypotheses and underlying research questions. 
Section 3.4 gives the description of methodology and definitions of variables used. Sample 
and its features are reported in Section 3.5, followed by empirical tests in Section 3.6. Then 
the chapter is concluded in Section 3.7. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
This section summarizes many widely cited studies in IPO underpricing literature, especially 
researches conditional on the information asymmetry. The review begins with the decision of 
going public and timing of the issues, according to the testable sample in this chapter, the 
number of IPOs and their initial returns dramatically fluctuate over time. The ―hot issue 
market hypothesis‖ is expected to offer some solutions to this phenomenon. More importantly, 
this section lists the most popular theory of the ―winner‘s curse model‖ in Rock (1986) and 
the prevailing studies on its core implication, i.e. the positive relationship between the ex ante 
uncertainty and IPO underpricing. Review also highlights the subsequent Benveniste-Spindt 
Model (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) and the ―partial adjustment hypothesis‖ (Hanley, 1993), 
which focus on how can price revision and share allocation strategically reflect the investors‘ 
indication received during bookbuilding period and its influence to the level of underpricing. 
In addition, this study has not ignored the important roles of underwriters and the potential 
agency problem between investment bankers and other market participants. On one hand, 
underwriter will not misprice new shares too much to hurt their reputation; on the other hand, 
the small oligopolies in investment banking industry may provide opportunities for top 
bankers to seek additional benefits.   
 
3.2.1 Decision of Going Public and Timing of IPOs 
Generally, most of firms issuing IPOs may be due to the desire of raising capital and entering 
a public marketplace. Many prior studies investigate the motivations for enterprises to do so. 
According to Welch and Ritter (2002), the first formal theory, the life cycle theory (Zingales, 
1995), indicates a potential relationship between going public and takeover. By going public, 
enterprises thus help facilitate the acquisition of their company for a higher value than what 
they would get from an outright sale. However, this may over simplify the decision making of 
issuing IPOs. Black and Gilson (1998) indicate that motives of going public vary across 
different type of firms. 
 Alternatively but more conventionally, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) link the decision 
of going public with the dispersion of ownership. Early in its life cycle a firm will be private, 
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but if it grows sufficiently large, it becomes optimal to go public. Maksimovic and Pichler 
(2001) point out that favourite market performance can positively influence the product 
market competition. 
Theories mentioned above all consider the determinants of going public decision from the 
point of issuing firms. Besides, the market-timing develops a series of asymmetric 
information models where firms try to time the market for more favourable pricing, which in 
turn maximizes the capital-raising (Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Choe, Masulis, and Nanda, 
1993; Subramanyam and Titman, 1999; Schultz, 2000).   
By using a unique data of Italian firms, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) find that 
larger companies and companies in industries with high market-to-book ratios are more likely 
to go public. To do so may help to reduce the costs of capital. This argument is consistent 
with Lerner (1994) that industry market-to-book ratios have a substantial effect on the 
decision to go public rather than to seek additional venture capital financing. 
More recently, relevant studies pay increasing attention to the growth opportunities of the 
issuing firms. Lowry (2002) finds that, investors‘ sentiments, growth opportunities, and 
adverse selection considerations all are determinants of aggregate IPO volume. In addition, 
Lowry and Schwert (2002) find that high IPO initial returns lead high IPO activity by about 
six months. Valuation of most recent issued IPOs triggers more IPOs and higher initial returns.  
It is actually difficult to test the decision of going public since it is hard to determine which 
and how many private firms could have issued IPOs. Meanwhile, for many state-owned 
enterprises, their going public may be attached many other non-economic reasons. The 
following review will turn to focus on more testable hypotheses, i.e. IPO theories based on 
information asymmetry.  
  
3.2.2 Asymmetric Information Models I – The Winner’s Curse 
Early studies, including Stoll and Curley (1970), Reilly (1973), Logue (1973), and Ibbotson 
(1975), have observed a systematic high initial return (or called ―underpricing‖) between the 
offer price and the first day closing price. The general focus of the underpricing puzzle is how 
to properly price new shares in order to match market supply and demand. 
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Most of popular explanations on the underpricing phenomenon are based on the existence 
of information asymmetry. There are many discussions around who own superior information 
than the others, informed investors, issuing firms, or investment bankers. 
The best known asymmetric information model is Rock‘s (1986) Winner‘s Curse Model, 
which is an application of Akerlof‘s (1970) lemons problem. This model depends upon the 
existence of two types of investors. Among which, there is a group of outside investors who 
have better knowledge about the prospective cash flow than does the issuing firms. 
Meanwhile, it is assumed that both the issuing firms and its underwriting banks are 
completely uninformed about the true value of the shares on offer.  
Faced with the adverse selection problem, uninformed investors require an additional initial 
return on average. In particular, if the new shares are priced at their expected value, these 
informed investors crowd out the others when good issues are offered and withdraw when bad 
issues are offered. This is also called ―to leave a good taste in investors‘ mouths‖ (Ibbotson, 
1975). Moreover, to justify assumptions in the paper of 1986, Rock additionally notes that the 
market aggregately has better information than any individual participant, including the issuer 
itself. Since the issuer and banks are assumed to have the same information, the model differs 
from the agency problem: the bank acts in the firm‘s interest. 
The winner‘s curse model generates a number of testable implications. Once to resume 
being rational, there should have no any underpricing when all outside investors receive the 
same information about the firms and truly release their interests. Similarly, the informed 
investors‘ conditional underpricing return should just provide a normal return on their 
information production. However, a direct test for the model may not be feasible because 
informed and uninformed investors cannot be distinguished in practice. 
A fundamental empirical implication, according to Ritter (1984) and formalized in Beatty 
and Ritter (1986), is that the greater is ex ante uncertainty, the higher is expected underpricing. 
Further supports include Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch 
(1989), etc.  
This hypothesis has received overwhelming empirical supports and various proxies of ex 
ante uncertainty have been used in the literature, including characteristics of the issuing firm, 
offering process, underwriting syndicate, and market movement.  
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Popular proxies based on company characteristics include age (Ritter, 1984; Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003, etc.), size (Ritter (1984)), or the industry 
difference (Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu, 2003). Besides, it is common to include 
the number of uses of IPO proceeds as disclosed in the prospectus (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) or 
the number of risk factors listed in the prospectus (Beatty and Welch, 1996). However, with a 
lack of standardization, it remains unclear how variations in each proxy can reflect underlying 
uncertainty. Similarly, aftermarket variables such as trading volume (Miller and Reilly, 1987) 
or volatility (Ritter, 1984 and 1987) rely on information which was not in fact available at the 
time of the IPO.  
Another approach of comparing ex ante uncertainty proxies is on underwriters‘ reputation. 
Through the choice of the underwriter, the firm can reduce the uncertainty about its prospects 
and therefore reduce the need for underpricing (Carter and Manaster, 1990). This argument 
can be traced back to Beatty and Ritter (1986). They first demonstrated that there is a 
relationship between expected underpricing and the uncertainty of investors regarding its 
value. The underpricing equilibrium is enforced by investment bankers, who have reputation 
capital at stake. ‗Cheating‘ will lose either potential investors if it does not underprice enough, 
or issuers if it underprices too much. Therefore, it forfeits the value of investment bankers‘ 
reputation capital to avoid greater mispricing so as to avoid the loss of business. Proxies of 
underwriter reputation have intersection with models on bookbuilding theories and the agency 
problem, which is raised by information asymmetry based on the interest conflicts between 
investment bankers and issuing firms (Booth and Smith, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990; 
Michaely and Shaw, 1994) or a reputable auditor (Titman and Trueman, 1986). However, this 
raises a question to the chapter. There is a significant characteristic of China-related 
companies‘ overseas listing: the hiring of highly reputable investment bankers as sponsors of 
lead managers. Meanwhile, these companies consistently underprice their new shares more 
than local firms. The normal hazard problem therefore particularly needs to be underlined and 
this chapter will continue the discussion on underwriters‘ activities in the following section. 
Apart from previous discussion, underpricing can also be reduced by removing the 
information barrier between informed and uninformed investors. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) 
model their optimal behaviour and generalize the notion that issuers have an incentive to 
reduce underpricing. They argue that if issuers can take costly actions that reduce 
underpricing, they will do so up to the point where the marginal cost of reducing underpricing 
further just equals the marginal benefit. This marginal benefit is not measured by 
underpricing itself, but by the reduction in the issuer‘s wealth loss from underpricing. 
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It is noted that, almost every underpricing theory predicts a positive relationship between 
risk and returns. These can be used as indirect tests for the winner‘s curse model, however, 
Ritter (1984) attempted to square underpricing cycles with the winner‘s curse, and he argues 
that, if the winner‘s curse is the only reason for underpricing, then changes in the extent of the 
winner‘s curse – say, arising from changes in ex ante uncertainty – should be the only reason 
why underpricing varies over time. However, he finds that it is industry specific events, rather 
than changes in the risk composition of IPOs, that drive changes in initial returns.  
Alternatively but relatively, Loughran and Ritter (2004) find some changes in the 
characteristics of firms going public. Classical proxies have been too minor to explain much 
of the variation in underpricing over time and there is a stationary risk-return relation. It is 
noted that, their changing risk composition hypothesis is also based on Ritter‘s (1984) that 
riskier IPOs being underpriced by more than less-risky IPOs. 
Furthermore, besides the winner‘s curse model, a information cascade model developed by 
Welch (1992) offers more explanations under the information asymmetry. In an informational 
cascade, investors attempt to judge the interest of other investors. They only request shares 
when they believe the offering is hot. In support, Amihud, Hauser, and Krish (2003) find that 
IPOs tend to be either undersubscribed or hugely oversubscribed, with very few offerings 
moderately subscribed. 
This asymmetric information may be applied to most markets. Investors, especially retail 
investors, are normally regarded to be less informed than other market participants. In Hong 
Kong, retail investors may have better knowledge on China‘s macroeconomic development as 
well as China-backed companies, especially when the company being representative of its 
respective industry. The level of information asymmetry for individual retail investors is 
expected to be less on average but not vanish at all because, according to the sample, China-
backed companies still suffered from higher underpricing on average. However, this is 
normally followed by a significantly greater level of demand than for other firms. Such 
relation between demand and return may demonstrate a more serious asymmetric information 
problem such that, when Chinese companies list in Hong Kong, all market participants 
recognize or even assume the drawback of information asymmetry. Consequently, issuing 
firms and underwriters have flexibility to choose whether or not to underprice new issues. 
However, for retail investors in Hong Kong, they may persistently assume the existence of 
information asymmetry and hold passion of subscribing China-backed IPOs. As disclosed by 
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in 2004, with the rise of institutional investors, by 2003, 
local retail investors still contributed less than one-third of total cash market turnover. This 
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implies the Hong Kong market has a larger proportion of retail investors than other major 
international security markets, and as a result, the whole market‘s asymmetric information 
level may be aggravated.  
 
3.2.3 Asymmetric Information Models II – Benveniste-Spindt Model and Partial 
Adjustment Hypothesis 
Another explanation on the underpricing comes back to the original assumption about the 
level of information hold by various market participants. If some investors are better informed 
than either the issuing firm or other investors, their information will become one of the main 
concerns for the investment bank when taking a company public. With bookbuilding 
becoming increasingly popular, gathering information during the bookbuilding is attached 
with more meaning. During the bookbuilding process, especially when the issuers go on a 
―roadshow‖, the underwriter pursue marketing the company to prospective investors,  
collecting information on the demand as an indication of interests to adjust pricing level. In 
this circumstance, the underwriter often provides some combination of more IPO allocations 
and higher underpricing for those who reveal the decision to buy newly offered shares. 
A commonly cited study is from Benveniste and Spindt (1989). Based on Baron and 
Holmstron (1980), they investigate how investment bankers use indications of interest from 
their client investors to strategically price and allocate IPOs. Their model demonstrates an 
asymmetric information environment. Investors provide underwriters with their private 
information about the value of IPOs during the preliminary filing period. As compensation, 
underwriters allocate more discounted new shares to these investors. Also, underwriters do 
not fully incorporate this private information into the offer price. Spatt and Srivastava (1991) 
are consistent with Benveniste-Spindt model (B-S model) and show that bookbuilding allows 
underwriters to induce investors to reveal their information truthfully, by underpricing and 
discretionarily allocating new shares. 
So far, it has reviewed a few most cited studies on this topic. There are two components in 
the bookbuilding theory, i.e. the asymmetric price discovery and strategic share allocation. 
Therefore, the following will summarize related studies on the price revision during the 
bookbuilding period. 
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3.2.3.1 Evidence on the Price Revisions 
Price discovery is one of the essential components in the bookbuilding theory, which is 
mainly concerned with how underwriters incorporate information received during the 
subscription period and whether the price revision is systematically related to the initial 
returns.  
Hanley (1993) builds a ―partial adjustment‖ model, which illustrates the effects of price 
revisions in the pricing period and subsequent influence to the initial returns. The paper 
suggests bookbuilding allows informed investors to extract positive information and raise the 
offer price in response, though the price will rise further in the after-market because some 
money has to be left ‗on the table‘. However, underwriters do not entirely adjust their pricing 
upward to keep underpricing constant when demand is strong. Thus the price revision and 
underpricing level are positively correlated.  
Sherman and Titman (2002) confirm that information asymmetry should affect the 
precision of the price-setting process. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) also argue the offer 
price reflects a conditional expectation.  
To the extent of the content of information, Loughran and Ritter (2002) criticize Hanley‘s 
interpretation and show that underwriters do not fully incorporate both private and public 
information into the offer price. This appears to contradict the B-S framework, since by 
definition, public information is freely receivable for all market participants and the 
underwriter does not need to pay any compensation. They alternatively prefer the ―prospect 
theory‖, which predicts pre-issue shareholders care more about the wealth change rather than 
the money been left on the table.  
Lowry and Schwert (2001) also develop the partial adjustment model into public 
information view. They firstly indicate that the midpoint of the filing range is not an unbiased 
predictor to the offer price and price updates are affected by both positive and negative 
information asymmetrically. Meanwhile, underwriters do not fully incorporate either private 
or public information into the offer price. Their study provides further evidence to Loughran 
and Ritter (2002). As a complement, Shleifer and Daniel (2002) find initial returns are 
significantly related to market returns up to three months before the offering. Lowry and 
Schwert (2004) re-examine this question. While their findings confirm the existence of a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between offer price revisions and pre-pricing 
market returns, they argue that this effect is negligible economically. Therefore, this chapter 
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is interested in how underwriters incorporate information to revise the offer price and whether 
the price revision is positively related to IPO underpricing.  
 
3.2.3.2 Evidence on Share Allocations – Discretionary or Non-discretionary? 
Price revision and share allocation are always interacting and supplementing each other. 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) confirm Hanley‘s conclusions. When given the opportunity 
to allocate IPOs among both regular and retail investors, underwriters would maximize 
proceeds by using a combination of price and allocation discrimination. The results are 
subject to the restrictions on uninformed-price and restrictions on the allocation of 
oversubscribed issues. Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) additionally suggest that institutional 
investors capture a large fraction of the short-run profits associated with IPOs and US 
underwriters tend to strategically allocate more shares to their favourite clients. 
Sherman and Titman (2002) also confirm underwriters‘ discretionary allocation mechanism 
is used to maximize the information gathered during the bookbuilding period. Once pricing 
being costly and accuracy is less important, underpricing is expected to just compensate to the 
revealed private information. However, when accurately pricing is essential, the number of 
participating investors will be positively associated with the level of underpricing, which is 
also regarded as to earn the economic rents. 
Empirical investigation faces a problem of data availability. Lee, Taylor, and Walter (1999), 
and Jenkinson and Jones (2004) directly test the bookbuilding theory and the results are 
consistent with the partial adjustment hypothesis. However, their samples are collected from a 
private database and are relatively small.  
Latter studies include Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002) which support a positive 
relationship between institutional allocation and IPO initial returns. Institutional allocations 
contain indication of private interests and are not reflected in pre-market public information. 
Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (2003) also find both institutional allotment and 
underwriter reputation increase monotonically with the chosen IPO price level, i.e. post-IPO 
turnover displays an inverted U-shaped relation to the IPO price. Firms choosing a higher 
(lower) stock price level experience low (higher) mortality rates. 
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As underpricing is an international phenomenon, there are differences on IPO share 
allocation between the U.S and Hong Kong. Many studies emphasize the diversity among 
international markets in IPO share allocation and underpricing. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) 
use a unique data set of 39 European equity issues to test the bookbuilding and strategic 
allocation problem. Because their detailed data includes all the bid details and the allocations 
to each institutional investor, they actually look more closely at underwriters‘ discretionary 
allocation activities. Their paper finds allocations are related to certain characteristics of more 
informative indication of interests, for instance the quantity bids with price limits by regular 
investors. The conclusions are supported by Cornelli and Goldreich (2003). However, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2004) find that, except for valuable information received during 
bookbuilding, allocation is more likely to be influenced by whether the investor is a long-term 
holder of the stock. Again, this paper remains the problem of limited data.  
By using international data, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) push forward via a 
multivariate approach. Their results support the argument that IPO allocations, price revisions, 
and initial returns are jointly determined. In other words, the degree of price revision depends 
on the information collected from investors, which also reflects their expected rewards in both 
allocation and aftermarket trading, which can be one of the essential ideas in this chapter. 
They find a diverse set of allocation restrictions in bookbuilding, i.e. being discretionary or 
non-discretionary. Their paper finally concludes that initial returns are directly related to 
information production and inversely related to institutional allocations. If so, there may 
indirectly indicate that allocation restrictions can lead to higher initial returns. 
Close to French and U.K., there are restraints on IPO share allocation and requirements of 
the clawback provision in Hong Kong. Hong Kong always advocates fair dealing with small 
investors. Interests and subscription demand from the public offering tranche are apt to 
receive more attentions from underwriters. Hong Kong‘s high disclosure standards allow this 
chapter to assess the effect of allocation restriction on price discovery and initial returns of 
IPOs. As stated in Cheng, Chan and Mak (2005), underwriters use non-discretionary 
allocation of IPOs to favour small investors in Hong Kong. They conclude the result may be 
driven by the regulatory concern.  
It is worth noting that the theoretical paradigm in the IPO literature has no systematic 
evidence about the nature of the private information released by investors. In practice, there 
always has the pre-roadshow marketing, though which underwriters and prospective investors 
interact extensively before building the book. In such a case, their interests and expectations 
may have already influenced the preliminary price range. There are many channels for the 
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pre-selling information leakage in Hong Kong. ―Grey market‖ for new shares sometimes even 
starts ―trading‖ during the bookbuilding period. The potential importance of pre-roadshow 
interaction has been firstly explored by Jenkinson, Morrison and Wilhelm (2006). In many 
markets outside the U.S and Japan, this interaction may begin with the pre-selling research by 
analysts, whose pre-bookbuilding evaluation will often involve prospective investors‘ view. 
The survey by Jenkinson and Jones (2007) also provide valuable evidence on this issue. 
However, currently it is not feasible to define the source and details via assessable data.  
In short, since the pre-roadshow information leakage is very likely to happen in Hong Kong, 
and top underwriters always arrange meetings for prospective investors before the 
subscription period, IPOs in Hong Kong are expected to differ from those in the U.S to the 
extent of the interaction between subscription, price revision, share allocation, and initial 
returns. In addition, the B-S framework assumes underwriters and their issuing firms have the 
same information level. But this is not necessarily the case in practice. A further critical 
discussion around underwriters‘ activities will be summarized as the agency problem in the 
next section. 
 
3.2.4 Asymmetric information Models III – The Principle-Agent Models 
Theories of bookbuilding emphasize the important role of investment bankers and their 
benefits over information processing and allocation decisions. Many researchers, such as 
Loughran and Ritter (2004), discover the ‗dark side‘ of these institutional arrangements, by 
highlighting the potential agency problems between the underwriter and the issuing firm. It is 
noted that, although this chapter isolates the principal-agent models from other asymmetric 
information models, the key condition and sole content are common. The separation is more 
likely to emphasize bankers‘ incentives. Once assuming underwriters have a superior 
information level than issuing firms, the information gap will automatically encourage 
underwriters to seek additional benefits. 
The topic is not new but the empirical evidence on this point is mixed, reflecting the 
phenomenon that underwriter‘s balancing the gain and loss of their stake.  As mentioned, the 
underpricing represents a wealth transfer between the issuer and investors, which can give 
rise to rent-seeking behaviour. A key feature of bookbuilding is the power enjoyed by IPO 
underwriters over both the pricing of new shares and allocation to investors. Underwriting 
fees are typically proportional to IPO proceeds, and are inversely related to underpricing. This 
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provides a countervailing incentive to keep underpricing low. But banker‘s private benefits of 
underpricing are expected to greatly exceed the loss of underwriting commissions. Early 
studies tend to define a negative relationship between underwriter reputation and initial 
returns. However, more recent research starts to criticise this negative relationship, especially 
conditioning on the monopoly of investment banking industry.  
The original agency conflicts are concerned with investment bankers‘ informational 
advantage. Baron and Holmstrom (1980) and Baron (1982) construct screening models to 
exam underwriter‘s benefits from underpricing. To induce optimal use of the underwriter‘s 
superior information, the issuer delegates the pricing decision to the investment banks. Given 
its information, the underwriter self-selects a contract from a menu of combinations of IPO 
prices and underwriting spreads. Once assuming the determinant power of market demand, to 
do this can optimize the underwriter‘s unobservable selling efforts. 
Underwriters, as requisite intermediaries, collect indications of interests from investors and 
advise the issuer on pricing the issue. If underwriters receive compensation from both the 
issuer and investors, the underwriter has an incentive to recommend a higher offer price than 
merely charging for the gross spread. Also, underwriters, being repeat participant, have to 
ensure that new issues are properly priced so as to win future business.  
As shown in Beatty and Ritter (1986), underwriters that underprice too much should 
subsequently lose credits in the market. Carter and Dark (1990) and Carter, Dark and Singh 
(1998) have already proved that the underwriter reputation proxy is significantly related to 
IPO initial returns, thus the better the reputation of the underwriter, the less is the short-run 
underpricing. Nanda and Yun (1997) and Dunbar (2000) come to the same conclusion that 
mispricing hurts an investment bank‘s reputation capital. 
Several proxies for underwriter reputation have been developed in the IPO literature. Logue 
(1973) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) first develop a measure of underwriter reputation. Carter 
and Manaster (1990) formulize this argument to examine the returns earned by subscribing to 
IPOs. By conducting tests of underwriter reputation measures using a sample of IPOs issued 
from 1979 to 1991 in the US, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) conclude that, among the 
various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, including Cater and Manaster (1990), 
Johnson and Miller (1988), and Megginson and Weiss (1991) measures, the Carter-Manaster 
reputation ranking is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the 
context of the three-year performance.  
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It is noted that, although the Cater-Manaster ranking is for investment bankers in the US 
market, most of them have subsidiaries or branches in Hong Kong. These institutes largely 
maintain the business standing and have extensive influences in the local market. Moreover, 
according to the sample, most of large Chinese enterprises are likely to hire one of these top 
investment bankers as a core sponsor to underwrite their overseas IPOs. Thus the Cater-
Manaster measure is applicable in this study. 
Dunbar (2000) additionally summarizes on underwriters‘ market share. For established 
banks, IPO initial returns, one-year abnormal performance, abnormal compensation, industry 
specialization, analyst reputation, and association with withdrawn offers have significant 
impacts on changes in market share. The less reputable banker is placed at higher risk and 
higher ex ante uncertainty.  
However, the empirical results can be sensitive to the sample period. Beatty and Welch 
(1996) find the sign of the relationship has changed since the 1970s or 1980s. There is a 
conceivable positive relationship between prestigious bankers and IPO underpricing, which 
may conflict from Rock‘s (1986) expectations. One hypothesis, demonstrated by Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), is that banks have begun to underprice IPOs strategically, in an effort to 
enrich themselves or their investment clients. Another is that top banks have lowered their 
criteria for selecting IPOs to underwrite, resulting in a higher average risk profile as well as 
higher underpricing for their IPOs. 
The choice of lead underwriter is usually known a few months before the initial trading day. 
Issuers and investors thus have ample time to condition their participation on its predicted 
returns. Many studies, such as Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), argue that issuers do not choose 
underwriters randomly, nor do banks randomly agree which companies to take public. In this 
case, the underwriting contracts actually are presumably made by optimizing agents. They 
generalize the notion that issuers have an incentive to minimize underpricing. As costs, to hire 
a higher reputable underwriter may help to reduce the potential loss.  
The early analysis of costs tends to focus on the fees charged by the underwriting 
syndicates. Since underwriting fees are typically proportional to gross proceeds, investment 
banks are expected to have an incentive to minimize underpricing. A widely cited paper is 
Chen and Ritter (2000) on the seven percent solution among investment bankers in the U.S. 
They believe underwriters will not prefer a blind competition through ―cents-off promotion‖. 
This leads to an almost fixed high commission among the industry.  
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More recent research alternatively turns to the underwriter persistent underpricing 
phenomenon. On the understanding that local investment banking industry is under the 
oligopolistic competition, there is a tendency for some underwriters to persistently underprice 
more than others. Strategic underwriters can leverage their exposure since the selectively 
information processing is profitable.  
By using the U.K data, Ljungqvist (2003) find that making the bank‘s compensation more 
sensitive to the issuer‘s valuation should reduce agency conflicts and subsequent underpricing. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) also develop a prospect model to explain how and why 
underwriters may profit from these transfers. The model focuses on the covariance between 
the underpricing amount and broad wealth changes of underwriters. Their empirical results 
predict that there should be partial adjustment in the ―hot issue market‖ and the underpricing 
is a form of indirect compensation to underwriters.  
Loughran and Ritter (2004) further support this conclusion and develop the changing issuer 
objective function hypothesis. Facing a local oligopoly of underwriters, both analyst coverage 
and ‗spinning‘ activity can bring additional compensation to higher reputable bankers. This 
compensation motivates them to see rather than avoid underpricing. Additional evidence 
includes Hoberg (2004), which presents a rational model on the strategic persistence 
phenomenon. The model predicts IPO underpricing will arise because underwriters compete 
imperfectly, while bankers with more market power actually have left more tastes in 
investors‘ mouths.   
The investment banking industry in Hong Kong is within oligopolies and the majority of 
the market power is shared by a few top international flagships and China-related ‗pilots‘ of 
financial institutions. Also, this small group of investment bankers always has the ability to 
win any deals and is frequently hired by large China-related companies. In the light of the 
significant underpricing of Chinese IPOs, it is predicted that, at least partly, top underwriters 
behave strategically in setting the offer price. The results may be diversified, on the one hand, 
most investment bankers will be cautious to IPO valuation and fears to undermine their 
reputation; on the other hand, for a few top investment bankers, by holding superior 
information and advanced market share, there is temptation to seek additional compensation. 
Here the compensation refers to the tradeoffs between the wealth loss from underpricing and 
reputation capital, and the wealth gain from underwriter compensation and benefits of future 
business.  
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So far, this section has intensively reviewed a series of information asymmetry models, 
including the ―hot issue market‖ hypothesis, the winner‘s curse model, the partial adjustment 
hypothesis, and the potential agency problem. However, none of existing theories can give a 
ready answer to fully explain the overseas listing activities of Chinese IPOs in Hong Kong. 
Current gap in the literature may inspire that investigations on IPO underpricing in Hong 
Kong have to synthesize explanatory powers of various models and take market features into 
account. This chapter tries to provide more empirical evidence for existing asymmetric 
information models and pays a closer attention to specific circumstances in Hong Kong.  The 
research questions are summarized in the following sections.  
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3.3 Testing Hypotheses and Research Questions 
 
3.3.1 Testing Hypotheses 
Based on the discussion above, the testable hypotheses of this chapter are listed as follow: 
1. As suggested by the winner‘s curse model (Ritter, 1984; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; and 
Rock, 1986), due to the adverse selection problem caused by asymmetric information, 
the new shares must be priced at a discount in order to guarantee the participation of 
uninformed investors, therefore, the ex ante uncertainty and the expected 
underpricing should be positively associated. 
2. According to the B-S model (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989), the price revision during 
the bookbuilding period will incorporate the information gathered from investors. 
Underpricing therefore is the compensation paid by underwriters for investors to 
release the real interests. Therefore, the price revisions are expected to reflect newly 
received information about investors‘ demand. Then a larger price revision reflects a 
greater yield of private information, which will carry the expectation of higher 
underpricing (Hanley, 1993; Lowry and Schwert, 2000; Loughran and Ritter, 2002).  
3. Since the reputation capital is valuable and preservable for underwriters, the reputation 
of the underwriter and the short-run underpricing should be inversely related. 
However, within the local oligopolies, their strategic activities may create opportunity 
for additional rent-seeking, which may lead to a positive relation between their 
reputation and the level of underpricing.  
4. Firms‘ decisions to go public may be largely driven by market timing attempts (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2002). This chapter expects that valuation of most recent issued IPOs 
triggers more offerings and higher initial returns (Lowry and Schwert, 2002). 
 
3.3.2 Research Questions 
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In addition to testing of the above hypotheses, this chapter seeks to answer following 
questions: 
1. An overseas listing generally represents larger uncertainty and faces higher information 
asymmetry. If it is the case, have Chinese IPOs been consistently underpriced more than 
others in Hong Kong? 
2. Regardless of the offer method being bookbuilding or not, which firm-, underwriter- and 
market-specific characteristics of ex ante uncertainty can systematically predict the level of 
short-term underpricing for IPOs listing in Hong Kong? This is not only for understanding the 
general situation of Hong Kong IPOs, but also convinced of the additional costs paid to 
overseas listing in the form of underpricing.  
3. Hong Kong market differs from the U.S market to the extent of restrictions on share 
allocation. Also, the public demand has a significant effect for IPOs‘ pricing behaviours and 
aftermarket performance. If so, what can attract small investors rushing to IPOs?  
4.  If the pre-sale marketing activities have become routine, what is the impact to the price 
discovery during the bookbuilding period? Once the preliminary price range has been 
influenced by prospective institutional investors, how do underwriters incorporate newly 
received information from the public offering tranche? And does the persistent underpricing 
phenomenon exist in the Hong Kong market? All of these questions are expected to help with 
understanding the conscious activities of Chinese IPOs. 
5.  As for the share allocation, who have been favoured by underwriters, the retail or the 
institutional? And what is the reason behind? 
6. Is there any strategy for overseas listed Chinese firms to secure their successful offerings? 
And does this pricing and marketing strategy have any necessary relation to their underwriters? 
7. For all firms going public by bookbuilding, conditional on the non-discretionary share 
allocation and upward price revision, what are systematic determinants to the level of 
underpricing? And does the ―hot issue market‖ provide opportunities to take advantages of 
optimistic valuation? Especially, the overseas listing is to effectively utilize the disparity 
among different financial markets, therefore a concentrative listing of Chinese IPOs in certain 
period is expected to be encouraged by the optimal market expectation.  
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3.4 Methodology and Definitions of Variables 
 
 
The OLS cross-sectional regression equations are tested to investigate the series of 
underpricing phenomenon of IPOs on the Main Board of HKEx. Independent variables 
include the public subscription, price revision, share allocation, and initial return. Since the 
public subscription, price range, price revision and share allocation are particularly designed 
for the bookbuilding offer method, to a better understanding, independent variables will be 
clearly defined in Section 3.6.2. 
Dependent variables are defined and categorized into three groups, i.e. the firm, 
underwriter, and market-specific characteristics. In particular, the firm-specific characteristics 
include the firm age (AGE), size (SIZE), China-related background (CHN), the days of 
subscription period (PRE_DAY), the public subscription level (SUPBSCRP), the percentage 
width of the preliminary price range (PR_WIDTH), and the allocation between different 
groups of investors (INST_ALLOT, RET_ALLOT); the underwriter-specific characteristics 
include the reputation ranking (RANK), and the dummy of top bankers (TOP_UNDWR). In 
terms of the market-specific characteristics, the pre-offering market return (RTN_MKT), 
volatility (VOL_MKT), and pre-offering average IPO initial returns (RTN_IPO) are included.  
 
3.4.1 Firm-specific Characteristics - Companies’ Age and Size 
Prior literature, including Ritter (1984, 1991), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Muscarlla 
and Vetsuypens (1990), all use relevant variables about years of companies‘ business in 
cross-sectional regression functions. Muscarlla and Vetsuypens argues that there was more 
underpricing of young firms than of older firms in the 1980s but the relation is not strictly 
monotonic. Between 1999 and 2000, there were more young firms went public, which 
increased the proportion of young firms associated with the internet bubble. Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) re-examine this position and find the increase in underpricing over time is not 
solely due to a shift towards younger firms in the age distribution of firms going public. 
Instead, the relationship between age and first-day returns is not stationary. 
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Alternatively, Lowry and Schwert (2004) apply a dummy variable associated with firms‘ 
age into the model to examine the relationship between the issuing firms‘ characteristics and 
price revision of IPOs. They predict that a ‗carve-out‘ company will be more underpriced 
when going public.  
Following existing literature, the age of firms is included into this study and a negative 
relationship is expected. The interval between the offer date and the date the firm was 
founded is used to determine the age of the issuing firm (AGE). The relevant information 
around found dates of observations can be collected from the offering prospectus and 
converted into years. Where the founding date was unavailable, the date of incorporation was 
used. The actual control variable here is the logarithm of AGE so as to reduce skewness. It is 
noted that, a number of prior studies adopt logarithm of (1+AGE) as the proxy, for instance 
Loughran and Ritter (2004). The main reason may be that there are a number of venture 
capital firms in their sample with an AGE less than 1 year. However, because a three-year 
trace record is required for all companies to list on the Main Board in Hong Kong, it is 
unnecessary to add plus one for the age of each observation. 
It is noted that, particularly with regards to China-related observations, the mean value of 
AGE in the sample may be lower and, to some extent, this may result in testing bias. In 
particular, merely in order to list in Hong Kong, a common progress for Red Chips is to 
initially register in the Cayman or British Virgin Islands after they have already been 
maturely incorporated in mainland China for years. Similarly, H shares always have been 
restructured from previously state-owned factories or companies. Their actual operating 
periods are therefore much longer than the history of incorporation dates listed in 
prospectuses. However, since many H shares suffered much reorganization, either merger or 
segmentation, it is too hard to assign a unique criterion for their actual beginnings of 
incorporation. Thus most observations of China-related IPOs in this chapter are assigned the 
date of incorporation listed in the prospectus as the date of foundation. 
To exam the relationship between a company‘s corporation history and the initial return 
when it going public, the following hypothesis is tested: 
Hypothesis 1: An issuing firm with longer corporation history is expected to be 
more informative to investors. Its underpricing level therefore will be lower than 
IPOs of younger companies. 
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The size of the issuing firm has also been commonly used as one of the ex ante 
uncertainties. As argued by Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Tinic (1988), smaller issues are 
more likely to be speculative in nature and offered by start-up firms. Fernando, 
Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (2003) also predict that there is a negative relationship between 
underpricing and issue size. In addition, an investment banker could use underpricing as a 
way to reduce marketing effort, which may be greater for larger issues (Baron, 1982). Hence, 
this chapter defines the logarithms of amount of funds raised (SIZE), which is the net offering 
proceed by excluding overallotment, as one of proxies. To be consistent with Rock‘s (1986) 
―winner‘s curse‖ model, this chapter expects as follow: 
Hypothesis 2: Larger-size issuing firms are expected to underpriced less than 
small-size ones.  
 
3.4.2 Chinese Enterprises’ Overseas Primary Listing 
 Theoretically, the regulatory restrictions, disclosure requirements and information barriers 
will increase the indirect costs of cross-border listing. For various reasons, many Chinese 
enterprises choose Hong Kong as the primary listing platform. At least, to compare with other 
international stock exchanges, Hong Kong investors, including both institutional and retail 
groups, are expected to have better knowledge on Chinese economy and Chinese companies, 
which partially mitigates the potential loss raised by information asymmetry. However, 
investors‘ degree of recognition cannot entirely retrieve all of the market differences. 
Underpricing of China-related firms is still expected to differ from other IPOs. If it is the case, 
the successful offering should also be assisted by an effective issuing strategy. 
Hypothesis 3: Conditional on information asymmetry and market disparity, 
Chinese IPOs are expected to be underpriced more than others in Hong Kong. 
Meanwhile, the bookbuilding offer method and effective issuing strategy may help 
Chinese companies achieve successful offerings.  
  
3.4.3 Underwriter-specific Characteristics 
- 76 - 
 
Commissions paid to underwriting syndicate are often proportional to the funds raised, such 
as selling commissions and underwriting fee. Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) generalize the 
notion that, if issuers can take costly actions in order to reduce underpricing, such as hiring a 
reputable underwriter, the breakeven point is the marginal cost of reducing underpricing 
further equals the marginal benefit. Empirical analysis of the costs of going public tends to 
focus on the fees charged by investment banks, which are generally revealed in prospectuses 
and/ or to regulatory authorities.  
As a regular participant in the equity offerings, investment banks also have an incentive to 
minimize underpricing. Empirical evidence includes Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Chan 
and Ritter (1991), Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), and Parbhala and Puri (1998), supporting that 
US underwriters behave strategically in the pricing and allocating of IPOs. The more 
uncertain the value of the firm, the greater the asymmetry of information between issuer and 
underwriter, and thus the more valuable the latter‘s services become, resulting in greater 
underpricing. 
However, on the Main Board in Hong Kong, underwriters charge 2.5 percent of the 
principal amount in most cases, which is similar to the ―7 per cent solution‖ in the US. The 
percentage of underwriting fee is therefore expected to have little power in explaining the IPO 
underpricing phenomenon.  
Alternatively, the significant effect of underwriter‘s reputation has been widely discussed 
in the equity offering literature. Being intermediaries, underwriters may receive compensation 
from both issuing firms and investors. However, to do so may result in the loss of future 
business and fail from their competitors. Hanley (1993) document the relationship between 
reputation of underwriters and the price revision. The experience of the underwriter is 
included as an independent variable to capture two potential explanations for changes in the 
offer price. The first explanation is that smaller, inexperienced underwriters may be more 
likely to misprice new issues. If this is the case, the market share of the lead underwriter will 
be negatively related to changes in the offer price. The second explanation is that larger, 
experienced underwriters are able to sell to a greater pool of informed investors who provide 
valuable information during the waiting period. Therefore, changes in the offer price will be 
positively related to the experience or reputation of the lead underwriter.  
Many proxies of underwriter reputation have been developed in IPO literature. Logue 
(1973) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) are among the first to develop a measure of underwriter 
reputation. Also Johnson and Miller (1988) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) measures 
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require less effort to construct. This chapter include two proxies to measure underwriters‘ 
reputation, i.e. the reputation ranking (RANK), and the top banker dummy (TOP_UNDWR). 
It is noted there is no academically approved ranking particularly for investment bankers 
in Hong Kong. However, being one of the top international markets and offshore financial 
centres, most of world-leading investment bankers have established branches or subsidiaries 
for many years. Securities are freely traded by international investors. Therefore, this chapter 
continues to use the reputation ranking (RANK) from Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, 
Dark, and Singh (1998). This ranking is based on each investment bank‘s market weight, i.e. 
more prestigious underwrites more shares, and is ranked higher on a 0 to 9 scale. For the 
period not covered by Carter et al. (1998), Ritter further provide the ranking in the 1992-2000, 
2001-2004, and 2004-2007 periods. Underwriting syndicates involve a few investment 
bankers but playing different roles. This chapter only measure the reputation of lead 
manager(s) (or called the ―core sponsor(s)‖), since only lead managers are crucial to the 
pricing of IPOs. If there is an IPO which hires more than one investment bank as joint 
sponsors or joint managers, the rank of this IPO will be the mean of joint sponsors or joint 
managers‘ reputation ranks.  
Hypothesis 4: Once assuming investment bankers would not risk their reputation 
and future business, to follow the majority of IPO literature, prestigious 
underwriters will price new shares more accurately and in turn decrease the level 
of underpricing. 
It is noted that, to use ranking as the only measure is likely to create problem. The rank 
represents each bank‘s ability and experience on pricing and marketing new firms, or 
provident other services. But retail investors are lack of macro concept regarding the whole-
market. Their perception of investment is accumulated via day-by-day, one-by-one market 
news and trading results. It possibly leads to a phenomenon that, frequent market participants 
are easier to receive attentions from retail investors than a bank with large dimension of 
business but have a lack of deals. A large investment banker may have the ability to 
underwrite a big deal, but this ability does not necessarily lead to frequent market 
participation. For instance, some overseas investment bankers with a Japanese background, 
their business focuses on companies or companies‘ control shareholders which incorporate in 
Japan, therefore its business is limited by the frequency of this Japanese firms seeking listing 
in Hong Kong.  
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The investment banking industry in Hong Kong can be categorised as oligopoly, the 
majority of the market power is shared by a few top international flagships and China-related 
leading financial institutions. A global ranking cannot fully reflect the market weights and 
competition advantages of these regular participants. Therefore, this chapter further conducts 
a top underwriter dummy variable (TOP_UNDWR) to simulate this situation. It equals to one 
if the lead sponsor(s) is one of the following investment banks: Bank of China International, 
HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, China International Capital Corporation (CICC), 
Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Industrial and Commercial 
Bank Asia, and JP Morgan; zero otherwise.  
Hypothesis 5: The investment industry in Hong Kong is within small oligopolies. 
If the main portion of market is intensively shared by a number of top bankers, 
they may intently underprice new shares to attract their investors and earn 
additional credits in future business.  Therefore, both issuing firms, especially 
Chinese firms, and their underwriters have reasonably balanced the pricing, 
allocating, market-making, and the need of raising capital in IPO events. 
According to the sample, about 27% of observations were underwritten by these ten 
bankers. For IPOs went public by bookbuilding, 84 out of 180 firms (about 46.7%) chose 
these top bankers to be their core sponsor(s), or called lead manager(s). And Chinese firms 
seem to prefer top bankers when going public in Hong Kong. This can help to answer two 
questions, i.e. ex ante uncertainty and banker‘s persistent underpricing phenomenon. Two 
proxies have been tested separately due to their high correlation. 
 
3.4.4 Market-specific Characteristics – Public Information 
Lowry and Schwert (2001, 2004) preciously examine the effects of information learned 
between the prospectus date and the offer date. According to their empirically results, the 
underwriter‘s treatment of public information beginning at the time the preliminary price 
range is set, and continuing through the determination of the final offer price. The price 
revision not only depends on the demand from investors, but also significantly reflects the 
market movements prior to the offering date. And finally the public information has been 
fully incorporated into the final offer price. 
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Since one of the objectives of this chapter is to examine the pricing efficiency of IPO, 
public information should necessarily be investigated. Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that, 
in the partial adjustment model, private information should only be partially incorporated into 
the offer price, but public information should be fully reflected. Public information is costless 
to receive for all market participants.  
This chapter adopts two public information proxies in regressions to measure the market 
return and risks on the whole, i.e. the average market return and market volatility prior to the 
offering. In particular, the average market return (RTN_MKT) is defined as the return of 
Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering; the market volatility (VOL_MKT) 
is defined as the daily volatility of Hang Seng Index within the same period. The set of time 
window is based on the general process of IPO events in Hong Kong. It is noted that, the 
volatility is one of the typical measures of risk. Since a high volatility represents a wavy 
fluctuation in the market and the dispersion in expectations, it is also a proxy for the ex ante 
risk facing by investors when they decide to subscribe new shares. 
Hypothesis 6: The underpricing is expected to be influenced by the market 
environment. Particularly, for firms going public by bookbuilding, the price 
revision is expected to reflect the market condition. Thus IPOs can be priced 
efficiently to the extent of incorporating public information into the offer price.  
 
As far as the ―hot issue market‖ phenomenon is concerned, recent empirical research has 
focused on information spillover as the main driver for it. The supporting evidence for the 
spillover effect is strong. Lowry and Schwert (2002) and Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm 
and Yu (2003) find that IPO volume is highly sensitive to the outcomes of recent offerings. 
Specially, if the offering performance of IPOs in a given month exceeds original expectations, 
the number of IPOs in the subsequent months increases dramatically. Ljungqvist, Nanda, and 
Singh (2003) provide explanation for the ascending underpricing during the hot market period, 
which is because the hot market can end prematurely, carrying IPO stock inventory become 
more risky. Moreover, the hot market has offered IPOs advantages of optimistic valuation, 
issuing firms, therefore, appear not to price their stock very aggressively.  
According to this phenomenon, another proxy of market information is adopted to measure 
the ―hot issue market‖ situation, i.e. the average initial return of recent IPOs (RTN_IPO). It is 
the average initial return of IPOs going public within 60 trading days (approximately three 
- 80 - 
 
calendar months) before the offering date. The reason of setting the time window of three 
calendar months is because, when companies decide to go public, they normally file an 
application with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to launch an IPO three months before the 
prospective first trading date. The offering is also subject to document preparation and 
required interrogation. 
Hypothesis 7: According to the “hot market” hypothesis, the initial return of an 
IPO should be positively related to the average initial return of recently issued 
new firms. 
 
So far, this section gives the definitions of mainly used control variables in the cross-
sectional investigations and corresponding expectations. These variables have been widely 
applied in the IPO literature to test underpricing models based on information asymmetry. 
The next section will turn to report the data selection and sample distribution.  
 
- 81 - 
 
3.5 The Sample and Its Features 
 
From the Hong Kong Exchange Clearing Limited‘s (HKEx) New Listing Annual Reports of 
the Main Board, this chapter identifies 410 IPOs of common stock between January 1996 and 
December 2005, covering up to 96% of the population, as shown in Table 3.1. During the 
sample period 479 IPOs were made in the Main Board of HKEx, 18 investment funds and 32 
introductions
15
 are excluded from the sample. In addition, 19 observations are deleted because 
of unavailability of sufficient data.  
Table 3.2 further reports the sample distribution by ownership backgrounds.  The sample 
includes 89 Chinese firms and 321 non-Chinese ones. There is a special period from 1998 to 
2002 during which, Hong Kong was suffering the post-crisis economic adjustment. 
Meanwhile, China‘s financial market was processing several reforms for future development. 
From 2002, with the development of China‘s reform and the economic recovery of the Hong 
Kong financial market, an increasing number of Chinese SOEs finished their incorporation re-
organization to weak their state-owned impression, followed by more and more H-share 
companies seeking to list in Hong Kong. Table 3.3 further reports the sample distribution by 
offer methods. The pure fixed-price offering has not been a commonly used offer method in 
recent years, while there is a clear transition towards the bookbuilding since 2000. There are 
180 IPOs going public by bookbuilding, about 44% of the sample. 
The offering prospectuses of IPOs during the period of 1996 and 1999 are obtained from 
Thomson Research. Rest of listing documents in other years and the list of Chinese-related 
companies are published in Hong Kong Stock Exchange official website. Firms‘ 
characteristics are collected from prospectuses, including prospective price range, lead 
underwriter(s), firm size, firm age, and shareholding background. The offering price and net 
proceed (funds raised) are gathered from the HKEx New Listing Annual Reports. The 
offering information, including offer method, share allocation, and subscription multiples are 
gathered from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange website and the Factiva database. Then market 
trading data are from the Datastream.  
                                                     
15
 Defined by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Main Board Listing Rules (Chapter 7, 7.13 – 7.17), an 
introduction is an application for listing of securities already in issue where no marketing arrangements 
are required because the securities for which listing is sought are already of such an amount and so 
widely held that their adequate marketability when listed can be assumed. Therefore, the switch of the 
issuer‘s listing platform is not the same as purely new listing. The Rules Governing the Listing of 
Securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (Volume One) is published on the official 
website of Hong Kong Exchange Clearing Ltd. (http://www.hkex.com.hk). Chapter 7 is under the 
Equity Securities Rules. The version in this chapter is updated on 1 January 2005. 
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3.6 Empirical Investigation on IPOs’ Subscription, Price Revision and Initial Returns  
 
The empirical investigation begins from the systematic characteristics on underpricing for all 
observations regardless their offer methods. Then, bookbuilding IPOs are separated from 
original sample and serve to examine the price revision and share allocation based on 
bookbuilding theories. Lastly, as one of the main implications, this section compares the 
differences between Chinese and non-Chinese IPOs, then realizes a specific strategy used by 
Chinese large IPOs to offset drawbacks of information asymmetry and simultaneously ensure 
the success in equity offerings. 
 
3.6.1. The Systematic Characteristics of IPOs’ Underpricing for All Offer Methods 
This section is a direct test of the Winners‘ Curse Model (Rock, 1986) and the principal-agent 
problem to the extent of underwriters‘ activities. As a general implication, following Beatty 
and Ritter (1986), there expects a positive relationship between the ex ante uncertainty and 
initial returns, which ensures the uninformed investors will make investment decisions and 
subscribe the new shares. This section has not particularly separated observations by offer 
methods, since the rest of empirical works will examine the bookbuilding firms in detail. 
 
3.6.1.1 The Level of Underpricing in Hong Kong 
This chapter defines two measures for IPOs‘ underpricing, i.e. the initial return (IR) (Equation 
3.1), and the market-adjusted initial return (MIR) (Equation 3.2). In which,                                                   
                                                         (3.1)       . 
                                                                                           (3.2) 
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where P0 is the offer price, and P1 is the closing price of the first trading day. Market-adjusted 
initial return takes the difference between IPO‘s initial return and Hang Seng Index daily 
return on the first trading day (Rm). 
The summary statistics of initial returns is reported in Table 3.4. The average initial 
abnormal return of new shares is about 11% during the sample period. Firms going public by 
pure fixed pricing method are underpriced more than others. Although bookbuilding has a 
lower initial return on average as compared to the pure fixed-price offers, it cannot simply 
draw the conclusion on which method may help to reduce the level of underpricing. Since 
equity valuation and trading performance are largely influenced by the market environment, 
while the frequency of each offer method keeps changing, it needs to take a closer look on the 
year-by-year base.  
Table 3.5 lists the average returns by years. The level of underpricing does vary over time, 
which may provide a reasonable expectation of market timing theory. Again, the changes in 
average initial returns reflect the post-crisis economic recovery period from 1998 to 2002. 
Also, the fluctuation of annual average initial return may clarify whether bookbuilding IPOs 
actually underpriced more than fixed-price ones.  
Table 3.6 further separates the average initial returns by offer methods. Pure fixed-price has 
not been used recently. The gap of average initial returns between fixed-price and 
bookbuilding methods dramatically waves during the sample period. There is no method 
persistently underpriced more than the other, but the bookbuilding appears to have left more 
money on the table in most recent years. In bookbuilding offers, underwriters have to 
incorporate the ―indication of interests‖ gathered during the filing period and adjust the offer 
price to meet the market demand. However, many asymmetric information based 
bookbuilding theories have discovered the relationship between the market demands, price 
revisions, and initial returns. This section empirically examines the systematic determination 
or prediction of IPO‘s underpricing in general. And the following Section 3.7.2 will 
intensively discuss the price discovery, share allocation and initial returns for bookbuilding 
IPOs.  
The summary statistics and correlation matrix of explanatory variables are given in Table 
3.7 and Table 3.8. In particular, comparisons of explanatory variables between different offer 
methods markedly represent the traits of bookbuilding. Most of Chinese IPOs went public by 
bookbuilding, especially large companies. While bookbuilding firms are normally 
underwritten by highly reputable bankers, with an average rank at 6.78. In which, 46% is 
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categorized as oligarch. However, pure-fixed price offers appear to take more advantages of 
the favourable market movements. Indeed, this factor can be treated as exogenous, since 72 
out of 91 pure-fixed price offers are within the years of 1996 and 1997 when Hong Kong 
market abnormally soared and feared slump before the financial crisis. Moreover, in Table 3.8, 
only the RANK and TOP_UNDER show a high correlation. Therefore the subsequent cross-
sectional examination regards them as substitutes and tests separately. Before turn into the 
cross-sectional investigation, the chapter also provides an elementary comparison between 
Chinese and non-Chinese IPOs in the following section.  
 
3.6.1.2 A Comparative Analysis of Features of Chinese and Non-Chinese IPOs 
Since this chapter aims to find whether the level of asymmetric information will consistently 
influence the underpricing of overseas listed firms, this section, in addition, splits 
observations into Chinese and non-Chinese firms. The comparison of offering characteristics 
between two groups is reported in Table 3.9, and the last column reports the t-statistics for 
difference in means. 
During the sample period, the average initial returns and market-adjusted initial returns of 
Chinese firms are significantly higher than non-Chinese ones. To list on the overseas stock 
exchange, large-size Chinese enterprises persistently hire more experienced bankers to 
underwrite their public offering. They may assume that only higher reputable bankers are 
capable to ensure a successful offering. In other words, the corporate with top bankers not 
only meets Chinese enterprises‘ requirement, but also become a part of overseas listing 
strategies. Accordingly, the public demand appears to be much higher than local issues. As a 
result, their underpricing exceeds the market average level. They are also likely to time their 
offers to seek advantages from the ―window of opportunity‖. It is expected that the demand 
curve of Chinese IPOs is more sensitive to the market movement, especially other IPOs‘ 
trading performance immediately after offering. 
This is only a very general comparison. Accordingly, this chapter may argue that, if 
mentioned variables are proved to be determinants of IPO underpricing, they can also give 
hints to Chinese IPOs to act strategically. To support this argument, Section 3.7.1.3 
composites a cross-sectional model and directly tests the determinant characteristics of IPOs‘ 
underpricing, including proxies of the ex ante uncertainty, the principal-agent problem, and 
the market timing hypothesis.  
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3.6.1.3 Empirical Results of Cross-sectional Regressions on IPOs’ Short-run 
Underpricing (All Offer Methods) 
So far, the chapter has reported the level of underpricing in Hong Kong, the differences 
between offer methods, and the comparison between Chinese and non-Chinese firms. 
According to existing literature, a number of characteristics are deductively as determinants 
or, at least, have significant impacts on IPO underpricing. Then this section aims to provide 
more evidence via a cross-sectional investigation. Explanatory variables comprehend issuing 
firm, underwriter, and market environments. The results of cross-sectional regressions are 
reported in Table 3.10.  
Main results are consistent with the classical expectations of the Winner‘s Curse Model, i.e. 
high ex ante uncertainty related to the issuing firms is normally followed by larger 
underpricing.  
In particular, China-backed IPOs are persistently and significantly underpriced more than 
others. Longer preliminary price-setting period represents a higher level of uncertainty about 
the issuing firms and market demand, the initial return, therefore, is significantly and 
negatively correlated to the number of days between prospectus releasing and the close date 
of subscription application. In addition, the negative coefficient of issuing firm‘s size is 
consistent with the prediction of the Winner‘s Curse Hypothesis. However, the relationship 
between the initial price jump and the age of firm is statistically insignificant in the regression. 
A possible cause can be explained by the changing risk composition hypothesis (Loughran 
and Ritter, 2004). To coincide, they also obtained an insignificant result in this case. They 
indicate the reasons that, although Ritter‘s (1984) argument of higher ex ante uncertainty can 
result in higher underpricing, there have been some changes in the characteristics of firms 
going public, and these changes have been too minor to explain much of the variation in 
underpricing over time if there is a stationary risk-return relation. The insignificant result of 
Age may be also raised by the so-called pre-listing reorganizations, especially in the case of 
Chinese-related IPOs. The pre-listing reorganization includes many aspects, such as adjusting 
capital structure, optimizing financial position and performance, improving corporate 
governance, as well as other preparations to meet high listing standards and secure a better 
performance in the initial offering. The newly reformed enterprises sometimes are split from 
their parent companies, and register to become a separate legal entity in Hong Kong as their 
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own.  Consequently, many enterprises‘ corporative records are much shorter than their real 
business. They only ―look young‖. 
In terms of underwriter-specific characteristics, the proxy of reputation indicates that 
creditable bankers are able to enhance investment expectation and further boost the market 
demand, which will in turn result in a more favourable price jump after the offering. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) develop a model where investment banks with special 
expertise in evaluating firms use high standards to determine the value of an issue. Such 
activities develop a high reputation because investors observe better aftermarket trading 
performance. If prestigious underwriters tend to show a high quality of the firm and their own 
services level, underpricing will be a gratified symbol. 
As far as the prediction of top bankers‘ persistent underpricing activities is concerned, the 
empirical evidence has not statistically provided strong support to this argument. However, 
according to the definition of this variable, the chosen underwriters have actually carried 
about 80% market weight. In this case, the positive sign of the coefficient still have its 
economic meaning as the indication of this phenomenon. Booth and Smith (1986) emphasize 
the certification role of bankers‘ reputation that pricing may reflect potential adverse inside 
information. In addition, Menyah and Paudyal (2002) criticize that low quality issues 
marketed by reputable underwriters will be more underpriced
16
. If underwriters compete 
imperfectly within small oligopolies, such as in Hong Kong, the imperfect competition allows 
underwriters to sell IPOs at lower prices without losing market share to rival. Therefore, 
underpricing is an alternative to reduce the costs associated with the underwriters and, to 
further build reputation by the aftermarket trading performance. It also can be interpreted as 
an agency problem between the issuer and its banker (Baron, 1982). This problem arises from 
the fact that bankers deal repeatedly with institutional investors but infrequently with issuers. 
If treating underwriter choice as exogenous, it always leads to the erroneous inference that 
more reputable bankers are related with higher level in underpricing (Habib and Ljungqvist, 
2001). 
Variables of market-specific characteristics clearly demonstrate a few systematic relations 
between individual IPO return and market movement. On one hand, the level of underpricing 
is influenced by recent new shares‘ trading performance. Statistically significant and positive 
relationship between underpricing and recent IPO average return is consistent with majority 
                                                     
16
 Menyah, K. and K. Paudyal, 2002, IPO decisions and the costs of going public (Version 1.4, 28 Feb. 
2002), EFMA 2002 London Meetings, page 5, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=302331 or 
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.302331. 
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of existing literature on the ―hot issue market‖. Loughran and Ritter (2002) predict an 
increase in the expected average underpricing of all IPOs that are in the hot market period, 
which may last for a few weeks. Meanwhile, it may be worthy to predict that the price setting 
of new shares actually follows a usual routine and regards the recent IPOs‘ after-market 
performance as reference. On the other hand, newly offered stocks and the market as a whole, 
interact to each other. More volatile market movement represents higher risks and uncertainty; 
the new shares will therefore be further underpriced to secure a successful offering. The 
negative coefficient of market return does also make sense. 
 
In short, this section provides many empirical evidences to the existing literature, including 
the winner‘s curse model, ex ante uncertainty, and market timing hypothesis. However, the 
tests so far have not distinguished the impacts of different offer methods, especially when 
bookbuilding become the dominant offering mechanism in recent years. The next section will 
turn to focus on the pricing and allocation in bookbuilding offers and test a number of 
asymmetric information models related to this issue. 
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3.6.2 Pricing and Allocation Strategies in the Bookbuilding Offers and their 
Relationship to the Initial Returns 
3.6.2.1 Demand of Retail Investors – The Predictions of Public Subscription Multiples 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) examine the institutional bids submitted under the 
bookbuilding procedure. They find oversubscription has a significant effect for IPOs. 
Oversubscription and demand elasticity are positively correlated with the first-day 
aftermarket return.  
Public subscription multiples of over 200 times are not uncommon in Hong Kong. 
According to the sample, there are 21 out of 180 bookbuilding IPOs have been 
oversubscribed more than 200 times by the public. 9 of them even had over 500 times retail 
subscription. Such enthusiastic demand indicates that small investors, in such case, are able to 
correctly guess that the offer price was ―too low‖, even without a precise valuation approach. 
The phenomenon of extremely high level of oversubscription can be explained by the 
particular contractual arrangement. There is a substantial information leakage about market 
demand that occurs after the preliminary price range or the offer price has been set, and 
before the issue closes for bidding by investors. As a result, the information leakage allows 
investors (including the previously uninformed ones) to realize that the sometimes issuing 
firm has actually been highly underpriced. 
As argued by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), rumours spread about the number of 
applications that were picked up on any given day. Newspapers and news media often carry 
stories about investor sentiment towards a given issue. For instance, the case of BOCOMM 
(3328.HK)
17
, was one of the most popular big-ticket IPOs in Hong Kong for over a year. The 
retail tranche was 204 times over-subscribed and the institutional tranche more than 20 times 
covered. Even on 09 June, four days before the subscription period began, a reporter claimed 
that ―Bank of Communications' shares have been expected two times oversubscribed by 
institutional investors … (which) began its initial public offering (IPO) road show on 06 
June‖, while during the subscription period it reported that ―Bank of Communications' -
US$1.9 billion IPO is 155 times oversubscribed by private investors … Bank of 
Communications' IPO price will be set on 18 June‖ (Pacific Epoch, 2005 a, b). 
                                                     
17 
BOCOMM, a H-share stock trades on the Main Board of HKEx with stock code of 3328. 
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Another important channel to release the market demand is that, investors often borrow 
from banks to pay for large subscriptions. Far Eastern Economic Review (1993) states a 
―snowball effect‖ in Hong Kong, which means investors are forced to apply for many more 
shares than they want and usually have to borrow money for the subscription in hot IPOs.  
In some cases the information leakage may be even greater because of grey markets in 
Hong Kong. ―Grey markets‖ for IPO shares sometimes begin trading during or even before 
the subscription period. According to Harrison (1994, page 273), ―(the grey market) become 
apparent whether or not the stock is a good buy at the offer price … Consequently, issues tend 
to either flop or to be massively oversubscribed‖. For instance, a few days before the pricing 
determining date in the already-mentioned Bank of Communications case, the price in grey 
market reached HKD 2.80, which was over the preliminary filing price range between HKD 
1.95 – HKD 2.55. However, the grey market price dropped back to HKD 2.50 on the date 
before offering, which is exactly equal to the final offer price determined by the issuer and 
lead underwriters (Goldman Sachs Asia and HSBC). If investors could realize the offer price 
is ‗too high‘, and the failure of the offering is costly, the new shares may have to be 
underpriced more compared to the situations in which there is no information leakage.  
The demand level is closely related to the price revision as well as the initial return. If the 
subscription is predictable, both the price adjustment and underpricing will be predictable to 
some extent. The following will take a close look at the level of public demand.  
 
Public Demand for Chinese IPOs 
This section highlights the difference between the demand for Chinese and non-Chinese IPOs. 
Chinese IPOs received a markedly higher level of public subscription at about 116.28 times 
on average during the sample period, while other non-Chinese observations had no more than 
69 times in their public subscriptions. To further specify the offering style of Chinese firms, 
Table 3.11 provides a clear comparison of public subscription (Column 1), price revision 
(Column 2 and 3) and market-adjusted initial returns (Column 4) between Chinese and Non-
Chinese observations by year.  
In the years of 1996 and 1997, just before the East Asian financial crisis, the average 
subscription times of Chinese IPOs doubled others. Then, in the years from 2003 when the 
China B-share market started to be stagnant in domestic stock exchanges and Chinese 
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enterprises crowed into Hong Kong market, the demand of China-backed firms still appeared 
to be enthusiastic. Only from 1998 to 2002 the subscription levels appear weak. During this 
recovery period of the East Asian financial crisis, the investment expectation and financial 
ability of retail investors were seriously destroyed. Although local shares seemed to perform a 
little better, the market on a whole were suffering the downward pressure. Also, Chinese 
domestic financial market embarked on two structural reforms regarding to the management 
over the reduction of state shares in 1999 and 2001 respectively. These two reforms neither 
successfully sold off the state-owned shares, nor strengthened investors‘ confidence on SOEs‘ 
reform. The number of Chinese enterprises to seek overseas primary listing has reached the 
bottom. In 1998, there is only one Chinese company, Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd. 
(1171.HK) issued IPOs by bookbuilding in Hong Kong. Actually, it is still hardly to make 
conclusion that Chinese IPOs were not attracted for Hong Kong retail investors. During the 
unfavourable period from 1999 to 2002, most of H-share and red chip firms received a certain 
level of public subscription all along. Especially, the most oversubscribed offer in 1999 and 
2000 were all Chinese firms, i.e. Great Wall Tech Co. (74.HK) at 97 times and China 
Insurance International (386.HK) at over 50 times. And in 2001, 3 out of 6 Chinese IPOs 
exercised the over-allotment option due to their high public subscription. After 2003, Chinese 
IPOs became most favoured once more to predominate over local firms. Meanwhile, Chinese 
issuing firms are more likely to positively revise the offer prices and receive favourite initial 
returns eventually. 
Apart from the negative influence raised by Chinese SOEs‘ reform, there may be four 
reasons why China-backed companies can obtain such enthusiastic demand from Hong Kong 
retail investors. Firstly, the demand is enforced by their China background. For either H 
shares or Red Chips, they are directly or indirectly owned by China‘s leading ministries, the 
State Council, provincial authorities, or other State-owned enterprises. Before listing overseas, 
they had certified with the CSRC‘s pre-selection criteria and represent outstanding 
performance in the related industries. This ownership structure and favourable corporate 
results enhance retail investors‘ confidence on the expected return in immediate-market 
trading. Secondly, Hong Kong retail investors are expected to have better knowledge in 
China-backed firms and their steady trading performance, which has become an attraction for 
retail investors. The SOEs‘ desire of raising capital and concern of ensuring successful 
offerings encourage retail investors. Thirdly, China-backed firms are normally underwritten 
by reputable investment bankers which have already released positive information to the 
market. Top bankers‘ high service level enhances retail investors‘ confidence. The 
relationship between underwriters and China-backed companies as well as their pricing and 
marketing strategies will be discussed based on empirical results. Last but not least, China-
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related firms tend to time the offerings. In brief, the higher level of oversubscription may 
become a component rather than outcome of their pricing and marketing strategy. 
 
Distribution of Oversubscription Multiples and Other Related Characteristics 
Table 3.12 reports the distribution of oversubscription multiples and corresponding price 
revisions, initial returns, and mean of dependent variables. The separation points of 1, 15, 50, 
100 and 200 times are basically in reference to the code of clawback provision. In particular, 
the transfer from public offer to placing may occur under insufficient public subscription (less 
than 1); 10% of total shares offered will be automatically transferred from placing to public 
offering when the public subscription multiple is between 15 and 50 times, 30% when it is 
between 50 and 100 times, and even 50% when it is 100 times or more. 
40 out of 180 bookbuilding IPOs have been oversubscribed beyond 100 times and, they are 
always followed by significantly higher initial returns of more than 20%. It is noted that, these 
subscription times refer to Hong Kong public offering which normally allocate 10 percent to 
30 percent of total shares in IPOs. However, even carrying a relatively small proportion, a 
significant oversubscription can still result in a positive price revision and subsequently high 
initial return. In the sample, when subscription times are below 15, issuing firms and their 
underwriters are likely to negatively adjust the offer price by about 2.5% from the midpoint 
on average to avoid a failed offering without sufficient demand. Nevertheless, the aftermarket 
returns were still unfavourable. Paradoxically, when the demand level being extremely high, 
such as more than 200 times, the initial return will be remarkably higher at 44.7% on average. 
The average price revision, in this circumstance, has reached the upper limit of the price range. 
Therefore, a direct and positive relationship between subscription multiples and the 
underpricing level is expected to coincide with the winners‘ curse model and the partial 
adjustment model. Once controlling other systematic characteristics, following a rational line, 
the subscription level is predicted to be positively related to the price revision, and so leads to 
a higher initial return in aftermarket trading on the whole. 
In terms of other variables, firm-specific characteristics, as measures of ex ante uncertainty 
around new shares, are too minor to explain the difference in the levels of oversubscription. 
Meanwhile, public information available before the release of prospectus shows a significant 
effect to the public subscription multiple. Although market index return appears to be stable 
across every subscription level, the recent IPOs‘ average return indicates a significantly 
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positive effect to the public demand. As far as the agency problem models are concerned, 
underwriters, especially high reputable underwriters, play an important role in marketing, 
pricing, and offering new shares. Good quality issues underwritten by more reputable bankers 
are more attractive to investors. 
So far, Section 3.6.2.1 has investigated the public demand for bookbuilding IPOs in Hong 
Kong. The pricing of an IPO begins at the time the IPO is filed, and thus next section starts 
the investigation of the pricing process at this point. The preliminary price range should 
provide some information about how underwriters expect to price the offering. In fact, prior 
literature which has used the midpoint of this price range as an unbiased predictor of the final 
offer price assumes that underwriters incorporate all available information in setting the 
preliminary price range. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that this might not be the case. 
Some people argue that, investment bankers deliberately set the price range low during the 
1990s, with the hope of generating momentum and thereby increasing demand for the 
offering. Yet many investment banks deny that this is the case, and Loughran and Ritter (2002) 
also provide some evidence against this story. Therefore, the bookbuilding process may not 
be fully informative and the public subscription level may subsequently be predicable by 
some systematic characteristics. The following section will turn to focus on the price 
discovery during the bookbuilding period, and aim to find how underwriters price new shares. 
 
3.6.2.2 Price Discovery in the Bookbuilding Process and Subsequent Price Revision 
3.6.2.2.1 Definitions of Price Revision 
Setting preliminary price range and price revision during bookbuilding period is quite 
different between Chinese and non-Chinese observations. Rock (1986) assumes initial 
offerings gives underwriters wide discretion in allocation and setting prices. Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) investigate that bookbuilding allows underwriters to induce investors to reveal 
their information truthfully, by underpricing and favourable allocation of new shares.  
Following prior literature, this section applies a number of variables to measure and 
illustrate the pricing and allocation in the bookbuilding process. In discovering the pricing 
strategies, the empirical examination conducts three proxies on the price range and price 
revision, including the Hanley price revision (H-PR) (Hanley, 1993) (Equation 3.3), Cornelli-
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Goldreich price revision (CG-PR) (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001; Ljungqvist and Wihelm, 
2002) (Equation 3.4), the percentage width of price range (PR_WIDTH) (Equation 3.5).  
                                                    (3.3) 
                                                          (3.4) 
                                 (3.5) 
where, PH PL PM are the upper limit, lower limit, and midpoint of the preliminary offering 
price range respectively, which are released in the IPO prospectus. And P0, again, is the offer 
price. As argued by Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002), the offer price as reflecting a conditional 
expectation, it represents the culmination of primary market price discovery. Both of H-PR 
and CG-PR are most commonly used proxies in literature and do not have fundamental 
difference to each other. In particular, CG-PR is negative if priced below the lower limit, and 
equal to 1 if priced at the upper limit. Many studies, including Hanley (1993) and Loughran 
and Ritter (2002), used to regard the midpoint of price range as an unbiased predictor to the 
offer price. Therefore, if new shares are priced at the midpoint of preliminary price range, H-
PR is 0 and CG-PR is 1/2. To enhance the comparability of empirical results, this chapter 
include both measures to investigate the price discovery in primary markets. Only using CG-
PR may slightly increases the standard errors over those obtained by H-PR (Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2002, page 178).  
Also, the chapter defines two measures to proxy share allocation for institutional and retail 
investors respectively, i.e. the proportion of institutional allocation (INST_ ALLOT) 
(Equation 3.6) and proportion of retail allocation (RETL_ ALLOT) (Equation 3.7). 
                               (3.6) 
                                     (3.7) 
Bookbuilding in Hong Kong normally involves a hybrid offering mechanism, with both of 
placing and public offer tranche. In which, bookbuilding is only used with the institutions 
participating in the placing tranche, while individual are required to take part in the public 
offer. Literally, institutions can submit bids in either placing or public offer tranche. However, 
due to the existence of oversubscription in public offer, larger bids are usually associated with 
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lower allocations subject to lottery rationing. In this case, an institution would rather believe it 
stands a better chance to receive higher allocation in placing tranche. Therefore, by excluding 
shares offered by other method, this chapter assumes all of placing shares have been allocated 
to institutional investors, and the rest of new shares are subscribed by retail participants. 
 
3.6.2.2.2 Magnitudes of Price Revision in the Bookbuilding 
Baron and Holmstrom (1980) indicate an investment banker has an opportunity to obtain 
private information by conducting pre-selling activities. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) further 
investigate how investment bankers use indications of interest from their client investors to 
price and allocate new issues. The most commonly cited study is the ―partial adjustment 
hypothesis‖ by Hanley (1993), indicating that underwriters do not fully incorporate 
information received during the pre-offering period and always strategically allocate 
discounted shares to their favourite investor groups. Things may be different in Hong Kong, 
which always emphasizes ―fairness‖ and offers more priority to protect small investors‘ 
wealth. Consequently, conditioning on the non-discretionary allocation policy and the 
overallotment option, this section will exam the price discovering and share allocation in 
Hong Kong. 
For the testable sample of 180 bookbuilding IPOs, Table 3.13 reports the distribution of the 
price revision as well as means and standard deviations of related offering characteristics, 
segmented by CG-PR and H-PR respectively. 
According to Panel A in Table 3.13, only 3 out of 180 observations are priced below the 
range, and none of them has an offer price which exceeds the upper limit of the range. This 
phenomenon may be partially explained by underwriters‘ additional costs. In Hong Kong, 
along with investors‘ bids to subscribe new shares, they must submit a check for the desired 
shares, price at the high end of the preliminary price range. If the final offer price is set below 
the range, or if a bidder gets less than the requested shares, the underwriter will issue a refund 
without interest. Apparently, if the offer price is expected to be set above the upper limit, 
underwriters have to issue an amended prospectus and give investors the option to resubmit 
application or withdraw. In other words, an exceeded high offer price not only involves more 
direct costs for underwriters to reissue listing documents, but also indirectly requires re-
collecting information of market demands. This is also consistent with Hof (1999) that, since 
potential investors anchor on the midpoint of the file price range, if the offer price is raised 
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too far above this, some potential investors will withdraw. In this case, it is rational to set a 
wider price range rather than riskily surpass the upper limit. Underwriters are unwilling to 
adjust the offer price too much. 
For the rest of 177 observations, 21 IPOs have the offer prices set equal to the lower limit. 
Their average initial return is consequently the lowest among subsamples. Apparently, 54 
firms (about 30% of all bookbuilding samples) eventually set a final offer price equal to the 
upper limit of the price range. They also received heated public subscription and highest 
initial returns. Therefore, roughly speaking, the result is consistent with Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) that, once a file price range has been set, there tends to be a positively sloped demand 
curve. It also can be explained by the Welch‘s (1992) cascades argument. An increasing in the 
offer price generally results in increased demand, because it is the signal to both institutional 
and retail investors that other investors want to purchase the issued new shares.  
However, institutional and retail allocations seem to have insignificant difference among 
various levels of price revisions. It is not saying to contradict to Ljungqvist and Wilhelm‘s 
(2002) conclusion that constraints on bankers‘ discretion reduce institutional allocations and 
result in smaller price revision. For one thing, the hybrid offers have to be pre-assigned to the 
public offer tranche in Hong Kong. The indifference is mainly driven by the conventional 
concern. Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, a standard IPO process includes a pre-roadshow section. 
It is a combination of sell-side pre-selling research, educating sales team, and marketing to 
preponderating prospective investors. The underwriter can collect information of valuations 
and main concerns on firm‘s uncertainty. Large investors are easier to access to more 
resources and relatively fixed costs of constructing their own valuation models. This is not 
only the preparation for the roadshow after the releasing the prospectus, but also the important 
step to verify the potential buyers. If it is conjectured that many institutional investors‘ 
information has been incorporated into the preliminary price range, it is important to clarify 
retail investors‘ interests. However, small investors hardly build their own valuation models. 
Many popular methods, such as earning and cash-flow ratios, may be narrow and limited. In 
this circumstance, they always follow a perceived consensus among other investors, which is 
impossible to distinguish being informed or uninformed. Consequently, the most necessary of 
the roadshow would be receiving information from the public sector, to estimate the demand 
from ―the rest of investors‖. The additional evidence is that price range itself has been hardly 
revised in Hong Kong. However, the chapter still expect an inverse relationship between 
institutional allocation and price revision to give evidence of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm‘s 
theory. 
- 96 - 
 
Chinese firms are more likely to positively revise their stocks and price them close to upper 
limit of the price range. Except that only one H share whose offer price dropped below the 
lower bound of the price range, nearly all of overseas primary listed Chinese stocks have been 
set at a higher offer price right before the offering. Thus it is unilateral to merely account for 
ex ante uncertainty, since its influence can be a two-way effect rather than a purely positive 
variation. Therefore, this chapter expects to discover a specific offering strategy for Chinese 
enterprises that they are good at exploiting retail investors‘ sentiments to promote pre-market 
subscription. By setting a visually wider price range followed by a more positive price range, 
this strategy can ensure a successful offering, i.e. to minimize associated costs and maximize 
fund raised simultaneously. A further discussion of Chinese enterprises‘ offering strategy will 
be specified in latter section. 
In terms of public information incorporated in the price revision, most recent IPOs‘ average 
initial return has significant and positive impact on the magnitude of price revision. In other 
words, underwriters tend to seize the occasion of ―hot issue market‖. Meanwhile, the price 
revision is also associated with the market volatility, which is to control for noise and 
idiosyncratic information reflected in the market. A downward movement in the market sent 
the signal to the underwriter to price new shares conservatively. The sophisticated opinion 
would be that greater uncertainty surrounding the true value of the shares is more likely to be 
reflected in the offer price.  
In Panel B of Table 3.13, initial returns, CG price revisions, and other characteristics are 
segmented by various levels of the Hanley price revision measure. To coincide with the 
partial adjustment hypothesis, bookbuilding allows underwriters to response to positive 
information and raise the offering price, though the price will rise further in the aftermarket 
because some money has to be left ―on the table‖. However, 27 firms with price revision 
above 10% obtain lower initial returns than other positively revised ones. There may have 
three possible explanations. For one thing, they received hot market demand but did not meet 
the hot market, noted the market average return is relatively low during their offering period. 
Or, their less-discounted shares were not able to attract more investors to participant in 
aftermarket trading. Also, as far as the larger width of price range is concerned, this revision 
may be caused by uncertainty regarding to the intrinsic value of the issuing firm. 
The comparison of other variables also provides supplementary evidences. More than 70% 
Chinese firms prefer an upwards adjustment in setting the final offer price. This common 
practice may be due to higher level of risks to seek overseas listing. Also, the positive 
revision can enhance capital-raising and in turn secure a successful equity offering.  
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As far as the public subscription multiple is concerned, the larger price revision may be a 
pricing strategy to give an expectation of more money being left on the table. Then a further 
update of offer price may positively signal to the market for a subsequent higher initial return. 
This may be explained by both investment confidence and cascade effect. Thus investors do 
not really care whether the IPO has been mispriced too much or not. Essentially, they are 
concerned with how much money they could obtain from this investment decision. Therefore, 
once the new shares have become highly desired, they will naturally predict a higher initial 
return in the aftermarket. In this circumstance, underwriters will send positive signal to the 
market via a positive price revision. 
In terms of sponsors‘ activities, IPOs having ―modest‖ price revision are underwritten by 
most reputable bankers. On one hand, prestigious bankers will not misprice; on the other hand, 
as repeated participants in equity offerings, they have more experience and better ability to 
discover the intrinsic value of the issuing firms. Consequently the preliminary price range will 
be set more conservatively. Of course, the underwriter‘s reputation also account as the 
offering strategy of Chinese firms, since most of them serve large Chinese enterprises.  
It is noted that, according to the Benveniste-Spindt model and Hanley‘s argument, 
bookbuilding theory has two components, i.e. pricing and allocation. On one hand, the final 
offer price will be adjusted based on the information gathered during the preliminary filing 
period; and this information will not be fully incorporated into the final offer price. On the 
other hand, how to allocate new shares between institutional and retail investors is also the 
key issue that underwriters may seek benefit in the process of building-the-book. It is worthy 
to distinguish which offering characteristics can systematically influence the direction and 
magnitude of the price revision, as tested in the following section.  
 
3.6.2.2.3 The Predictability of Price Revisions during the Pre-listing Period 
So far, it is clear that the average price revision of the sample is positive. Meanwhile, 
according to Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Hanley (1993, 1995), this pricing adjustment 
is based on the information gathered during preliminary filing period. Therefore, underpricing 
is regarded as compensation paid by issuing firms and their underwriters to those investors 
who release their private information on subscription interests. However, the pre-selling 
research and educating investors are commonly adopted in Hong Kong, which facilitates the 
information leakage among investors, reduces the cost of valuation, and shapes the cascade 
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among retail investors. In this circumstance, if new shares are allocated upon a non-
discretionary base, can those well-documented systematic characteristics maintain the 
capability to predict the final offer price? 
This section examines the extent to which underwriters incorporate available information 
about the company at the time they set the initial filing range, especially the predictability of 
price updates between prospective filing price range and final offer prices. Table 3.14 and 
Table 3.15 report the descriptive statistics for control variables used in the cross-sectional 
models to test the price revision in bookbuilding mechanism. And the regression results are 
shown in Table 3.16. 
 
Firm-specific Characteristics 
Coefficients of companies‘ age, as a classical proxy of the ex ante uncertainty, are not 
statistically significant in all three models. The may be explicable to the extent that 
underwriters have already incorporate this aspects into the preliminary filing price range. As 
mentioned before, there is normally a pre-roadshow meeting between issuing firms, 
underwriters, and the major prospective institutional investors. It is logic to believe that, most 
of the considerations around the ex ante uncertainty have been incorporated into the price 
range. In this circumstance, demand from retail investors, as the unachievable objective in the 
pre-roadshow section, become the most sensible influence to the price revision. This intuition 
of the relationship between the public demand and price revision has been approved by the 
positive and significant coefficient of the public subscription multiples. Meanwhile, China-
related dummy is not statistically significant in Model 1, indicating that the public demand is 
indeed a very crucial influence to the price revision, especially the upward revisions. When 
excluding the subscription from the regression, coefficient of China-related dummy become 
positively significant to the price revision. Therefore, the results still support the expectation 
that Chinese IPOs are more likely to positively revise their offer price. To do this may be due 
to the high public demand, or part of their pricing and marketing strategy to induce capital-
raising from IPOs. 
 
Underwriter-specific Characteristics  
- 99 - 
 
IPOs underwritten by highly ranked investment bankers are likely to have a more positive 
price revision. This suggests that bankers that are more reputable are more conservative in 
setting the initial price range. One potential explanation is that in some cases issuers and their 
underwriters implicitly agree on the prospective price range before it is publicly released in 
the prospectuses. Apparently, the larger price revision may give an expectation of more 
money being left on the table. Retail investors normally care the money they could earn from 
buying new shares, therefore once the demand level is higher than expected, they will 
naturally predict a higher initial return. A positive price revision obviously becomes an 
optimal signal from the underwriter. However, when the demand is not satisfied enough, a 
negative revision may be due to underwriter seeking a higher subscription to ensure a 
successful offering and leave more benefits to investors. Conditional on small oligopolies, 
prestigious underwriters may be likely to set a relatively conservative prospective filing price 
range to win the business from issuing firms. They hold a superior information level than do 
issuing firms, investors, and even other investment bankers, which results in a more 
significant price revision. 
 
Market-specific Characteristics  
Benveniste, Ljungqvist, and Wilhelm (2002) argue that issuers learn not only through their 
own marketing efforts but also through those of their rivals. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) 
further interpret that price discovery is related to both deal-specific information and 
information spilling over from contemporaneous transactions, including secondary market 
performance. The insignificant coefficients of market return, market volatility and recent 
average IPO return provide the evidence that, public information, as being costless for every 
participants in the market, has been incorporated into the filing price range. That is to say, the 
price revision more depends on the private information received during the bookbuilding 
period, especially the demand from retail investors. The modest movement in the market is 
not likely to be a very sensitive issue for underwriters. 
Last but not least, the institutional allocation appears to have statistically significant 
influence to the price revision. According to prior literature, the bookbuilding theory includes 
two components, i.e. price discovery and share allocation, the next section will intensively 
give further analysis on the issue of share allocation.    
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3.6.2.3 Allocation of New Shares – Are some subscribers favoured by underwriters to 
receive more discounted shares?  
3.6.2.3.1 Definition of Variables and the Non-discretionary Allocation in Hong Kong 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) argue that IPO allocation policies favour institutional 
investors. By test 1032 IPOs in 37 countries in 1990s, they find that shares allocated to 
institutional investors are about two times than those received by retail investors. However, in 
the U.S., allocation policies are discretionary and have no enough constrains to investment 
bankers‘ rent-seeking behaviours. Therefore many studies, such as Benveniste and Wilhelm 
(1990) and Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), suggest that institutional investors capture a large 
fraction of the short-run profits associated with IPOs and U.S. underwriters tend to 
strategically allocate new shares. In addition, Cornelli and Goldreich (2002) find institutional 
investors‘ demand is the influential determinant to the price setting. 
However, there are rules and constraints on allocation discretion in many other countries. 
Asian underwriters believe institutional investors are more likely to do rushing selling on the 
first trading day. In Hong Kong, to prevent institutional investors‘ short-term profit-taking 
activities, share allocation of IPOs is non-discretionary. Retail investors receive priority in 
share allocation to ensure aftermarket stability. Hong Kong introduced the clawback 
provision (or called the ―overallotment option‖) in 1997. It stipulates that, when public 
offering is highly demanded, shares in the placing tranche should be transferred into public 
offering tranche. The exercise of clawback provision only depends on public demand. 
Although the insufficient subscription in public offer may result in the inverse transfer back to 
placing offer, underwriters do not frequently meet this situation. In other words, the 
overallotment option enables retail investors to condition their investment decision upon 
feedback received from institutional investors. Therefore, an inverse relationship between the 
institutional allocation and price revision as well as the initial return is expected to provide 
further evidence to the bookbuilding theories.  
This chapter conducts two proxies for share allocation, i.e. the proportion of intuitional or 
retail allotment (Equation 3.6 and 3.7). As mentioned above, placing shares are not offered 
for public but only involve institutional investors. On the contrary, public offers are allocate 
on a pro rata basis and most likely to be subscribed by retail investors exclusively.   
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In addition, two measures of institutional investors‘ profits will be investigated, as defined in 
Equation 3.8 and Equation 3.9. 
Amount of Inst. Profits = (P1 – P0) × Shares hold by institutional investors             (3.8) 
Return of Inst. Investors = IR =            (3.9) 
Table 3.17 reports the distribution of share allotment in bookbuilding IPOs and descriptive 
statistics of individual variable, which are segmented by proportion of institutional allocation 
(Column 1), exercise of overallotment option (Column 2), institutional profits amount 
(Column 3), and institutional profit ratio (Column 4). On all accounts, the price revision, 
initial returns and institutional profits are inversely associated with the proportion of 
institutional allocations. This is consistent with Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) that 
constraints on bankers‘ discretion reduce institutional allocations and result in smaller price 
revision. According to the bookbuilding theory, bankers simultaneously have the determinant 
power on how much to allocated to any group of investors and how much to revise the offer 
price in response. Therefore, the level of price revision also depends on allocations to two 
groups of investors.   
 
3.6.2.3.2 The Relationship between the Price Discover and Share Allocation 
To begin with Column (1) in Table 17, variables are segmented by median of institutional 
allocation (90%). The listing rules in Hong Kong always require a certain level of public 
holding for listed companies. The implicit restriction in hybrid offers that 10% of the issued 
shares have to be pre-assigned to the public offer tranche. In this column, the public 
subscription multiple, width of price range, and the average price revision are dramatically 
distinguishing between subsamples. Apparently, other ex ante uncertainty factors, underwriter 
reputation proxy, and market information characteristics show relatively insignificant 
difference. In particular, the public demand is negatively associated with the proportion of 
institutional holdings, while the price revision more relies on the retail demand, it also has an 
inverse relation to the institutional allotment. This may be at least partially due to the 
clawback provision.  
To step further, in Column (2), variables are segmented by the exercise of overallotment 
option. 108 out of 180 bookbuilding IPOs eventually exercised the clawback provision, 
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because of the high oversubscription in the public offer mechanism. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 
(2002) indicate that allocation restrictions affect the price discovery associated with 
bookbuilding and in turn affect the level of underpricing. Larger price revisions should be 
inversely associated with large institutional allocations, other things equal.  
As predicted, these 108 IPOs received high public subscription at over 100 times, had a 
significant and positive price revision right before the offerings, and consequently performed 
better in the aftermarket with a average initial return of 17.7%. The Securities and Futures 
Commission in Hong Kong always emphasizes faire dealing with small investors. Chen, Chan 
and Mak (2005) find evidence that underwriters use non-discretionary allocation of IPOs to 
favour small investors in Hong Kong. When the market is lack of the steady trusting 
relationship between investment bankers and large investors, or when the market is not able to 
effectively control for block trading activities, underwriters prefer to allocate relatively more 
underpriced new shares to retail investors.  To conclude, to be consistent with previous 
expectation, the share allocation of IPOs in Hong Kong is non-discretionary and more 
disposed to small investors in policy.  
In addition, more than half of heavily oversubscribed IPOs were underwritten by top 
investment bankers with an average reputation ranking at 7.5, getting the advantage over the 
rest of issuing firms. This finding is consistent with Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) and 
Brennan (1996) that, underwriters allocate relatively more profitable IPO shares in order to 
entice small investors to take part in the subsequent IPOs by the same underwriters. To do this 
may strengthen the reputation of these underwriters and bring in higher services charges in 
their future business.  
 
3.6.2.3.3 The Gains of Institutional Investors from Bookbuilding IPOs 
Chinese issuing firms seem to make more profits in money for their institutional investors 
than other firms. And large size companies also provide more steady return than small one. It 
is noted that, more than half of large companies are Chinese firms. Proportion of institutional 
allotment appears to be negatively related of the institutional profits, which again suggests 
that retail investors are more favoured by underwriters. All things considered along with the 
public subscription multiple and price revision, it may be the truth that informed investors 
provide their superior valuation information during pre-roadshow marketing period which is 
useful in setting the initial price range rather than revising the offer price. Since this group of 
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investors have already had impact on the price setting, their final bids to new shares cannot be 
inferred to be informative or uninformative. As indicated in Jenkinson, Morrison and 
Wilhelm (2006), in most of countries outside the U.S. and Japan, the interaction between the 
buy-side and sell-side starts when researches circulated by analysts working for sponsors or 
other syndicate members (Jenkinson and Jones, 2007). Not all of investors have their own 
valuation models to serve as a proxy for incremental information production, especially retail 
investors. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect the tightly progressive relationship between 
share allocation and public subscription, price revision as well as the initial return of IPOs. 
At the same time, the whole progress of pricing and allocation procedure cannot be lack of 
underwriters‘ operation. As more frequent participants in the equity offering events, the top 
underwriters can provide superior services on pre-sale research and marketing to institutional 
investors. Rely on their competitive advantages in accurately pricing new shares, they can 
always attract retail investors to take part in IPO events. 
In Column (3) of Table 3.17 when segmenting by the zero rate of institutional return, the 
results are most likely to be accordant. As it is defined, the institutional return ratio is 
equivalent to the initial return. However, Chinese firms‘ initial return, or equivalently called 
institutional return, is not significantly different from non-Chinese firms, implying that 
allocation can be non-discretionary.  
 
3.6.2.3.4 A Perceived Offer Strategy of Chinese Overseas Primary Listed IPOs  
So far, this chapter has compared Chinese and non-Chinese issuing firms to the extents of 
retail demand, institutional allocation and the subsequent price revision. Before further 
investigating the underpricing phenomenon, this section also try to summarize a perceived 
offer strategy of Chinese overseas primary listed IPOs.   
Table 3.18 compares offering characteristics, share allocation, price revision, and initial 
returns with t-statistics between Chinese and non-Chinese IPOs which went public by 
bookbuilding method.  
Within the group of firm-specific characteristics, only the coefficient of company‘s size is 
statistically and significantly different between two subsamples. It is noted that, most of Hong 
Kong listed Chinese enterprises are partially owned by state authorities, even government 
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departments themselves. These enterprises constitute a certain part of mainstay of the national 
economy. Consequently their large size is more likely to be regarded as an inherent 
characteristic rather than reducing ex ante uncertainties. 
However, as far as a few key pricing indications are concerned, Chinese issuing firms are 
statistically different from rest of observations. First of all, this pricing strategy has to have 
the consent of their underwriters. The group of underwriter-specific characteristics offers the 
necessary support to their pricing and marketing strategies. China-related companies are 
attending to hire more highly reputable investment bankers, especially those top bankers with 
sufficient experience and frequent market participation. 
In addition, Chinese large issuing firms obviously need more subscription from 
institutional investors to ensure the successful offering in the placing tranche. Meanwhile, 
Hong Kong retail investors are not able to fully absorb such amount of capital needs. 
Nevertheless, if the underwriter provides pre-roadshow research and marketing, institutional 
investors‘ indication of interests have been incorporated into the preliminary price range and 
released in the prospectuses. In this circumstance, as mentioned, the main target of 
bookbuilding process becomes receiving information from retail subscribers. Both 
underwriters and their issuing firms understand that it is more costly for small investors to 
accurately build their own pricing model. Their decision making process may reflect more 
sentiments than rational judgements. This situation offers Chinese companies a good 
opportunity to avoid potential loss from overseas listing. On the basis of high public demand, 
they still try to price the IPOs as high as possible. Although China-related enterprises have a 
higher level of ex ante uncertainty, they retain the expectation to maximize the funds raised 
by offerings. The gap between the actual quality and the expectation is mitigated via a 
significantly positive price revision on average.  
Last but not least, if the market condition is not satisfied, a pleasing initial return is difficult 
to achieve. Therefore, the last component of this pricing and marketing strategy has to take 
the market movement into account, i.e. timing the offering. The academic literature argues 
that increases in the valuation of comparable firms reflect improved growth opportunities. But 
more favourable investors‘ sentiments could also play a role in the increased valuations. 
When investors are overoptimistic, newly listed firms may take advantages in a ―window of 
opportunity‖. Lowry (2002) finds that investor sentiments, growth opportunities, and adverse 
selection considerations are determinants of aggregate IPO volume. Moreover, Lowry and 
Schwert (2002) and other authors find that high IPO first-day returns lead high IPO activity 
by about six months. These studies are proved by market-specific characteristics, especially 
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the average return of IPOs going public in three months before the offering date. A 
significantly higher level of IPO returns may be one of the motives to encourage China-
related firm going public during the ‗hot issue market‘. 
 
To summarize, the strategy is formed by Chinese background, leading underwriters, 
conservative price range, substantial information leakage, high public demand, and finally the 
positive price revision. The issuing size and ownership background of Chinese IPOs always 
catches eyes in Hong Kong market. Then in the bookbuilding, their reputable sponsors 
additionally certify the quality and future prospects of the issuing firm. The problem is, 
referring to the overheated public demand, preliminary pricing seems to be relatively 
conservative. In this circumstance, if underwriter realises that investors only account their 
money return and pricing accuracy is relevantly negligent, the positive information leakage on 
valuation and subscription can easily result in the climbing in offer price. Besides, the 
successful offering has to take market timing into account.  
Therefore, this section agrees with the argument that Hong Kong market is entitled as the 
preferred platform to accommodate large Chinese enterprises. Prospective Chinese IPOs may 
take advantages from the regulatory preferential treatments, affirmative investor recognitions, 
substantial information flows, and highly professional brokerage services. 
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3.6.2.4 The Determinants of Bookbuilding IPOs’ Initial Returns – A Direct Test  
 
So far, this chapter has examined the reasons of high public subscription, determinants of 
price revision, and non-discretionary share allocation in Hong Kong. Following prior studies, 
the final test of the bookbuilding theories will focus on examining the systematic factors of 
IPOs‘ initial returns.  Based on information asymmetry, the existing literature have argued 
many theories to explain the underpricing puzzle, including the winner‘s curse model, the 
partial adjustment hypothesis, agency problem explanations, and market timing, etc. The 
following section will jointly test above hypotheses to provide more empirical evidence to the 
underpricing models.  
To begin with, Table 3.18 reports the mean of variables used in the cross-sectional 
regressions, by decanting them into two groups. In Column (1), observations are separated by 
zero initial return, and in Column (2) observations are segmented by the median initial return 
(0.0349).  Column (1) is more likely to reflect the same information as it is in Column (4) of 
Table 3.17. By definition, rate of institutional profit is equivalent to the initial return of IPOs.  
When interpreting Table 3.18 as a whole, firm-specific characteristics cannot consistently 
and powerfully explain the level of underpricing. This may coincide with Loughran and 
Ritter‘s (2004) ―changing risk composition hypothesis‖. On the contrary, share allocation, 
public subscription, price revision as well as market movements are confirmed to be 
intimately connected to the level of underpricing in the aftermarket. If a heavily subscribed 
IPO attracts more retail and institutional investors, even after an ascending price revision, its 
abnormal initial return are expected to be larger than other new shares.  
In particular, according to Economics theories, levels of demand and supply decide the 
equilibrium price of goods. In like manner, when assuming the supply of issuing firms is 
controlled, the demand level is expected to be positively related to the first-day return. This 
prediction is consistent with the Benveniste-Spindt model that underpricing is directly related 
to the information gathered during preliminary period. 
Meanwhile, the price revision is expected to be positively associated with the initial returns. 
As predicted by Hanley (1993), initial returns are positively and significantly related to the 
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percentage change between the preliminary price range and the final offer price. Underpricing 
is higher when offer prices are increased and positive information is released during the 
bookbuilding period. Most of the bookbuilding theories agree that, if it is not possible to 
compensate the release of information through increased share allocation, then underpricing 
must also be used to compensate investors for revealing good information. This also provides 
the explanation of the relationship between the institutional allotment and underpricing. If the 
published prospectuses have already incorporated institutional interests and expectations, and 
if bookbuilding mainly aims to receive indications of interests from small investors, a 
formalized clawback provision may not be adequacy enough to satisfy the public demand. In 
the immediate market, therefore, more investors, including both institutional and retail ones, 
are expected to take part the trading on the issuing date.  
To further test these predictions, Table 3.19 reports the results of cross-sectional OLS 
regressions for average initial returns by groups of independent variables. Dependent 
variables include both initial returns in Column (1) and market-adjusted initial returns in 
Column (2). Results between two dependent variables are believed to be highly consistent. 
Also, both the Hanley price revision measure and the Cornelli-Glodreich price revision 
measure are adopted as substitute in the tested models.  
In order to avoid the autoregressive problem, the testing model actually does not use public 
subscription multiple together with price revision or institutional allocation. Alternatively, it 
gives a simple OLS regression between public subscription multiples and the initial return. 
Although not been reported in the table, a t-statistics of 11.35 between public subscription 
multiples and the initial returns supports the prediction that underpricing is an increasing 
function of the public demand (11.49 for the market adjusted initial returns). That is to say, 
when the public subscription reaches 100 times, the expected abnormal initial return should 
obtain 9% on average. The result is consistent with Cornelli and Goldreich‘s (2003) statement 
that oversubscription has a small but statistically significant effect for IPOs. In particular, 
oversubscription and demand elasticity are positively correlated with the first-day return. 
The previous sections in the chapter have clearly confirmed the important role of public 
subscription. In Hong Kong market, where the oversubscription level from retail investors is 
greater than 15 times but fewer than 50 times, 30% of shares are reallocated to retail investor. 
Even if the underwriters exercise the overallotment option (usually 15% of the shares offered) 
and fully allocate to institutional investors, the institutional allocation still decreases to 74%. 
Once there is a high demand from the public, institutional investors receive much fewer 
shares for oversubscribed IPOs, therefore investors with an unsatisfied demand will bid for 
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the issue and push up the price on the first of trading. This can be regarded as the market 
sentiment which drives the IPO price (Welch, 1992). It is noted that, the public demand is not 
only a crucial aspect to influence the exercise of overallotment option, but also the main 
determinant of the price revision. Consequently, both of share allocation and price revision 
are expected tightly associated with the public demand as well as initial return, which may 
indirectly offer some evidence to the functional influence of public subscription.  
In Table 3.19, issuing firms‘ age have statistically significant result in all models, while the 
proxy of size being insignificant. A possible cause can be explained by the changing risk 
composition hypothesis (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). To coincide, they also obtained an 
insignificant result for proxies of ex ante uncertainty when they ran the regression of average 
initial returns for the firms which went public after the 1990s. They indicate that, although 
Ritter‘s (1984) argument of higher ex ante uncertainty leading to higher underpricing has 
been validated by many studies, there have been some changes in the characteristics of firms 
going public, and these changes have been too minor to explain much of the variation in 
underpricing over time if there is a stationary risk-return relation. Meanwhile, as far as the 
market specification is concerned, in Hong Kong, only large IPOs will choose the 
bookbuilding method to go public since this method normally involves more costs in 
underwriting, marketing and pricing. Therefore, merely size cannot distinguish companies‘ 
quality and aftermarket performance.  
In terms of Chinese overseas listed IPOs, the China-related dummy variable has a 
significantly positive relationship to the underpricing as predicted before. First of all, there is 
a persistent underpricing of China-related companies listing overseas, which can be raised by 
either higher ex ante uncertainty or higher asymmetric information (Rock, 1986; Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986). In addition, since China-related firms have a larger range of price revision 
following a higher level of oversubscription, the immediate market price jump may be 
boosted by the higher demand. Once recognizing the possible underpricing of these firms, the 
investors who are not allocated new shares will bid immediately after trading as they expect a 
further increase in the secondary market. Also, even overseas listing associates with higher 
level of asymmetric information, Chinese companies‘ government-related background may 
give investors more confidence to the extent of their profitability and trading performance. 
Particularly in recent years, Chinese listed companies carry more market weight and higher 
quality of site, which have been in favour of Hong Kong investors.  
Price revision, both H-PR and CG-PR, as predicted before, is positively and significantly 
associated with the underpricing for all observations. As bookbuilding theory suggest, 
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underpricing is payment for information. Larger price revision reflects a greater yield of 
private information, which will carry the expectation of higher underpricing (Hanley, 1993; 
Lowry and Schwert, 2000; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). A positive price revision on average 
indicates that the underwriters have incorporated more favourable information, especially 
interests of retail investors. Underwriters need to adjust the offer price according to the costly 
information gathered during the bookbuilding period. Sherman and Titman (2002) also 
suggest when investors‘ valuation is costly, there exists a moral hazard problem. Both the 
number of investors and subsequent underpricing will become larger in order that investors 
can earn economic rents. 
However, the percentage width of the preliminary price revision is not statistically 
significant across models. A possible reason can be the pre-selling marketing activities. By 
arranging meeting with prospective institutional investors, underwriters have already 
mastered the majority of valuation information and investment interests before distributing 
prospectuses.  Therefore the width of price range may not entirely reflect the uncertainty on 
setting the offer price. Only the negative sign of coefficient in width of price range represents 
the possible negative relationship. In other words, a wider range of price revision represents 
the greater uncertainty of underwriters when pricing the issue.  
The proportion of institutional allocation is not statistically significant, providing 
inconclusive evidence about the role of the share allocation function on the underpricing. In 
the Benveniste-Spindt framework, allocation of discounted shares is the compensation 
provided to investors who truly release their private information about the issuing firms. 
When the IPO is heavily oversubscribed by the public sector, the underwriter must exercise 
the clawback provision, transferring a certain percentage of new shares from placing tranche 
to public offer. By design, this makes retail participation more attractive and is expected to 
reduce underwriters‘ reliance on underpricing to compensate other insiders. The clawback 
may result in a more diverse shareholder base without affect underpricing, which is 
inconsistent with many previous studies using U.S data. However, this result also indicates 
that investment bankers do not strategically price new shares in order to implement a target 
shareholder base. Both retail and institutional investors are relative to the successful offerings, 
while pre-roadshow marketing and overallotment provision make it unnecessary to underprice 
an IPO so much to attract investors. The negative coefficient hints the diversity in the initial 
shareholder base may actually be relatively more important for issuers. Moreover, since the 
investment capability for retail investors is relatively limited, and the proportion of public 
offered shares are limited as well, the negative sign may indicates some economic meaning.  
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The rank of underwriters has insignificant results in all three models. However, the 
negative the sign of the coefficient is consistent with Carter and Manaster (1990). Prestigious 
underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings which results in a smaller incentive to 
acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are 
associated with IPOs that have lower returns. Although the top underwriter dummy in Model 
1.a and 2.a of Table 3.19 is not statistically significant and cannot provide very conclusive 
evidence either. In fact, the insignificant coefficient can also be regarded as a signal of the 
local oligopolies in investment banking industry. Recalling Table 3.7, to compare the mean of 
underwriters‘ ranking and number of top underwriters across different offer method, it shows 
a clear picture that 84 out of 180 bookbuilding firms are underwritten by few top financial 
institutes, and the average rank reaches 6.78. Without any doubt, only high prestigious 
bankers are able to provide bookbuilding services to the issuing firms. Underwriter‘s historic 
performance has a differential impact on the market share of underwriters. The results are 
consistent with the mutual choice model on firms and underwriters choosing each other, as 
documented by Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005). Their model implies that more able 
underwriters underwrite more issues, which gives them a larger market share as well as a 
further building of reputation. However, even conditioning on the small oligopolies, there is 
the latent division of works within the investment banking industry in Hong Kong. Especially 
for many of Chinese enterprises seeking Hong Kong listing, their lead sponsor(s) normally 
have been engaged in the reorganizations before listing, such as consulting on the corporate 
governance, advising on the financial auditing, and even being as one of the strategic 
investors. The underwriting contracts often become a kind of subsequent services. This 
banking relationship may also explain the insignificant coefficient of underwriter-specific 
dummy. Lastly, the level of persistent underpricing is restricted because normally the after-
market price stabilization support and continuing obligation of issuing firms are parts of 
underwriting contracts. 
In terms of the pre-offering IPOs average initial return, a significantly positive effect is 
suggested by the results in Table 3.19. This is consistent with one of the puzzles regarding 
IPOs, the existence of ‗hot issue‘ markets. Following Ibboston and Jaffe (1975), a ‗hot issue 
market‘ is defined as a month in which the average first-day return is above the month‘s 
medium average first-day return. Other authors, such as Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994), 
argue that the IPOs‘ hot market lags average first-day returns by several months. There is 
strong positive serial correlation in the monthly average first-day returns. Currently, the 
literature offers no explanation to coincide with rational behaviour on the part of investors 
that can generate this positive autocorrelation when there is a rise in the market. Results are 
also consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2002) that an increase in the expected underpricing 
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of all IPOs which going public during the selling period, whether on the next day or in five 
weeks later. Moreover, because sell periods overlap, there will be autocorrelation in the first-
day returns, which may result in an inertial trend in the IPO initial returns.  
With respect to market movements, initial returns may not be predicted by the market index 
return during the bookbuilding period. In other words, the price of IPOs in Hong Kong may 
be more efficient to the extent that underwriters have incorporate public information into the 
offer price. However, market volatility appears to be statistically and positive associated with 
IPOs‘ initial returns. High market volatility represents a higher risk of investment since a 
highly volatile market means that prices have huge swings in very short periods of time. The 
positive sign of the volatility may be partially due to the variation in macroeconomic 
environment during the sample period. Recall Table 3.11, initial returns of IPOs fluctuated 
over time. It is reasonable that volatility is proportional to the market liquidity, trading 
volume, as well as the stock returns.  
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3.7 Summary, Conclusions, and Implications 
 
3.7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
Driven by the fast-growing tendency and large underpricing of Chinese overseas IPOs in 
Hong Kong, this chapter questions on the significant differences between Chinese and non-
Chinese firms. Although being the  Special Administrative Region of China, Hong Kong 
market is grounded on a different legal and ordinance system. Its accounting standards, 
investor structure and characteristics, pricing methods, and market premium significantly 
differs to the mainland. It is quite obvious that the doubled underpricing for Chinese IPOs 
cannot merely be the concession paid to offset information asymmetry from overseas listings, 
otherwise, the annual average initial return of Chinese IPOs should be less fluctuating or 
appear to be decreasing over time. Meanwhile, Chinese firms are generally distinguished 
from their local counterparts to the extents of inherent corporation characteristics, exceptive 
ownership backgrounds, demanding underwriting contracts, and inconceivable market 
demand. If the primary overseas listing inherently accompanies information barriers and 
systematic risks, it is worthy to investigate what makes Hong Kong become the optimal 
marketplace for Chinese enterprises to go public.  
Well-developed asymmetric information models explore the underpricing phenomenon by 
assuming market participants, including issuing firms, underwriters, institutional investors 
and retail investors, are set to hold different levels of costly private information. This 
information is crucial in pricing new shares. Therefore, the transfer of private information 
involves additional costs (or compensation), and the costs (or compensation) are represented 
by the abnormal underpricing.  
The study emphasizes the conjunction and combined effects of asymmetric information 
models. Empirical investigation is mainly based on the winner‘s curse model (Rock, 1986), 
the partial adjustment hypothesis (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Hanley 1993), the principal-
agent models, the information cascade theory (Welch, 1992), and the hot issue market 
hypothesis (Lowry and Schwert, 2002).  
By testing 410 IPOs of common stocks in Hong Kong from January 1996 to December 
2005, the study finds China-related IPOs are significantly underpriced. The average initial 
return of Chinese firms is twice the mean of their local counterparts. The cross-sectional 
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investigation concludes the positive relationship between ex ante uncertainty and the level of 
underpricing. However, reputable investment bankers are more likely to act as the guarantee 
of successful offerings and the driving force of market subscription.  If acknowledging that 
equilibrium price is determined by supply and demand, investment bankers‘ reputation cannot 
effectually reduce the abnormal initial return. However, the top underwriters‘ persistent 
underpricing receives statistically insignificant evidence and cannot provide more affirmative 
outcomes. In addition, it is certain that underpricing is largely stimulated by recent IPOs‘ 
optimistic performance of immediate aftermarket trading. This can be the strong support to 
the market timing argument. 
The empirical investigations further moves on to testing bookbuilding related theories, 
especially the price discovery, share allocation, and how underwriters deal with received 
information during the preliminary period. The results are reliably in line with the 
Benveniste-Spindt framework and show that bookbuilding allows underwriters to induce 
investors to reveal their information truthfully. It is noted that, market features in Hong Kong 
essentially differs from the U.S market. Pre-selling research and educating investors are 
commonly adopted in Hong Kong, which facilitates the substantial information leakage 
among investors. Also, small investors take advantages of the existing ―grey market‖. The 
information flow reduces the cost of establishing valuation models and shapes the cascade 
among retail investors. More importantly, as the key component of bookbuilding theories, the 
share allocation in Hong Kong is categorized as being non-discretionary. Fair-dealing term 
requires a certain proportion of public holding and protects retail subscribers. Then the 
clawback provision further secures retail group‘s rights. In this case, the empirical study is in 
the light of both well-developed bookbuilding models and market specific features. 
For 180 bookbuilding IPOs within the sample period, the high-frequent oversubscription in 
the public offering tranche implies the subsistent information leakage in the market and 
supports the investors cascade hypothesis. The mean subscription multiple of 116 times for 
Chinese IPOs cannot only benefits from their inherent characteristics, such as production 
capacity and competitive strengthens. Investors‘ recognition partially owe to their 
experienced underwriters. 
Two measures of the price revision (Hanley, 1993; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001; 
Ljungqvist and Wihelm, 2002) all reflect an upwards adjustment on average. And apparently 
non-discretionary share allocation with positively sloped public demand together encourages 
about 30% observations eventually set a final offer price at the upper limit of price range. 
However, there is no statistical evidence for the impact of institutional allotment, implying the 
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possibility that announced preliminary price range may have already incorporated 
institutional valuation opinions. If it is the case, the primary task during the subscription 
period is to estimate demand of the retail group.  
Also conditional on the non-discretionary allocation term, retail investors receive priority 
in share allocation. The exercise of overallotment option only depends on demand in the 
public tranche and enables retail investors to condition their investment decision upon 
feedback received from institutional investors.  
The evidence shows that bookbuilding IPOs were not necessarily less underpriced than 
others. Larger and positive price revision reflects a greater yield of favourable private 
information from the public tranche, which will carry the expectation of higher aftermarket 
price. The underpricing also takes advantages of the ―hot issue market‖ to the extent of 
optimistic valuation. However, the variable of institutional allotment receives statistically 
insignificant result, while the proxies of ex ante uncertainty appear to be less powerful to 
predict the level of underpricing.  
Last but not least, this chapter draw the conclusion that, Hong Kong is a capable and 
optimal market to accommodate the Chinese companies that are going public. By learning a 
mass of experience and lessons from 1990s, Chinese overseas listed firms steadily improves 
their financing environment and offering skills. A perceived offering strategy at least can 
efficiently attract much attention in the market. Prospective Chinese companies are apt to 
obtaining relatively optimal underwriting contracts from a few leading investment bankers, 
which are always known for outstanding client base and distinct professional services. Via 
pre-selling marketing activities, issuing firms and their underwriters can primarily consult 
institutional investors to draft the listing documents. The filing price range in IPO 
prospectuses is a very important indication to the final offer price.  
Since most of retail investors fear costs and are incapable to accurately build valuation 
model, it is common to assume they would use the intermediate value as benchmark and best 
estimate. Consequently, when substantive information leakage shapes demand and valuation 
among potential investors in the market, the conservative price range can convincingly 
promote public subscription. If the bookbuilding process also catches up with the ―hot issue 
market‖, a positive price revision and subsequent high initial return become the anticipated 
outcomes.  
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3.7.2 Implications of Findings 
As for implications, via jointly testing a number of outstanding models on asymmetric 
information, this study stands for the combined explanatory power all the while. More 
important, it makes much account for the market features in Hong Kong. The subsequent 
empirical results are liable as complements to the IPO literature and other related research. In 
addition, prospective overseas listing firms in China can benefit from this study. The 
introduction of listing regulations, offering procedure and market environments may help 
them to understand the target market, while the offering strategy can be a valuable reference. 
Moreover, retail investors, especially Hong Kong retail investors, can profit from this study as 
well. Empirical findings are able to be utilized in their valuation and decision-making process. 
They can have a better knowledge about IPO prospectus and underwriter‘s activities, make a 
better use of the existing information leakage and institutional feedback, and even possibly 
estimate the likelihood in pricing and share allocating. 
However, the limitations cannot be neglected. As mentioned, the combination of popular 
underpricing theories implies the bottleneck in IPO literature to the extent of pricing model. 
Also, the specific features in Hong Kong may let empirical findings be sensitive to the sample 
and less applicable to other markets. Lastly, the pre-offering marketing behaviour has not 
attracted enough attention in academia. In many international markets, the pre-offering 
inquiry has become indispensable in underwriter‘s workflow. It is difficult to estimate costs 
paid for receiving valuable quotes in the pre-offering meetings. While it is not clear how far 
can this costly information be reflected in the IPO prospectus and roadshow. If this is the case, 
the existing bookbuilding theories are expected to be significantly revised. However, the 
information source may be hardly traced and required data may be not practically accessible. 
Finally, this is the first empirical chapter in the thesis. This chapter mainly discusses the 
issuing costs and uncertainties faced by Chinese IPOs in Hong Kong, whose results are 
expected to provide a sin qua non for the subsequent investigations. Equity offering and 
underpricing is only a beginning on the Journey towards overseas listing. Next chapter will 
focus on the earnings forecasts and underlying impacts to the valuation and aftermarket 
performance of IPOs. Then last empirical chapter can reasonably question on the motives and 
main determinants to the upsurge of Chinese overseas listing.   
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Table 3.1  Total Number of IPOs on the Main Board in Hong Kong  
and Usable Sample (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
The table lists number of IPOs on the Main Board in Hong Kong from January 2005 to 
December 2006. Population represents the actual number of deals in the year. By 
excluding observations being introduction offer, mutual funds and with missing data, the 
―Tested Sample‖ reports the tested observations in this chapter. 
      
  Population Introduction Mutual Funds Missing Tested Sample 
1996 48 4 0 0 44 
1997 82 3 1 1 77 
1998 32 3 1 0 28 
1999 31 2 0 1 28 
2000 43 2 3 1 37 
2001 31 0 1 0 30 
2002 60 5 9 0 46 
2003 46 7 2 0 37 
2004 49 3 1 14 31 
2005 57 3 0 2 52 
All 479 32 18 19 410 
 
 
Table 3. 2  Sample Distribution of Chinese (CHN) and non-Chinese (Non CHN) IPOs  
(by Years) (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
The table reports the sample distributions of Chinese (CHN) and non-Chinese (Non CHN) 
IPOs in the sample period. ―No. of IPOs‖ represents the number of tested observations in 
each year. H-share firms (H Shr) and Red Chips (Red) are categorized as Chinese 
enterprises. 
 
  No of IPOs CHN H Shr Red Non CHN 
1996 44 12 6 6 32 
1997 77 24 15 9 53 
1998 28 2 1 1 26 
1999 28 6 3 3 22 
2000 37 5 3 2 32 
2001 30 6 3 3 24 
2002 46 5 4 1 41 
2003 37 11 10 1 26 
2004 31 6 5 1 25 
2005 52 12 9 3 40 
All 410 89 59 30 321 
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Table 3.3  Sample Distribution by Offer Methods in Hong Kong  (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
The table shows the sample distribution by offer methods in Hong Kong during the 
sample period. Pure fixed price offer, fixed price offer, and bookbuilding offer are main 
offer methods in Hong Kong. The last row reports the percentage of each offer method in 
the sample. 
     
 No of IPO Pure Fixed Price Fixed Price Bookbuilding 
1996 44 24 1 19 
1997 77 48 5 24 
1998 28 13 11 4 
1999 28 3 16 9 
2000 37 3 24 10 
2001 30 0 19 11 
2002 46 0 33 13 
2003 37 0 16 21 
2004 31 0 7 24 
2005 52 0 7 45 
All 410 91 139 180 
% to Sample - 22.2% 33.9% 43.9% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4  Descriptive Statistic of IPO Initial Returns (IRs) and Market-adjusted Initial 
Returns (MIRs) by Offer Methods (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of IPO initial returns (IRs) and market-adjusted 
initial returns (MIRs) by three offer methods during the sample period. ―% of sample‖ is 
the percentage of whole tested sample.  
 
  All Pure Fixed Price Fixed Price Bookbuilding 
  IR MIR IR MIR IR MIR IR MIR 
No of IPO 410 91 139 180 
% of Sample - 22.2% 33.9% 43.9% 
Mean 11.5% 11.6% 26.8% 27.0% 4.9% 4.8% 8.9% 9.0% 
Median 4.3% 4.3% 13.9% 13.2% 2.0% 2.3% 3.5% 3.7% 
Max 316.7% 317.1% 316.7% 317.1% 130.0% 131.4% 222.1% 223.1% 
Min -45.0% -44.3% -45.0% -37.7% -42.4% -44.3% -44.4% -40.0% 
S.D 0.342 0.341 0.530 0.529 0.225 0.226 0.265 0.264 
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Table 3.5  Descriptive Statistic of IPO Initial Returns (IRs) and Market-adjusted Initial Returns (MIRs) 
by Years (Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
                 
  No of  Initial Return   Market Adjusted Initial Return 
  IPOs Mean Median Max Min S.D   Mean Median Max Min S.D 
1996 44 21.6% 11.2% 125.0% -14.9% 0.31  21.4% 11.3% 124.9% -15.5% 0.31 
1997 77 30.0% 13.9% 316.7% -38.7% 0.62  30.2% 13.2% 317.1% -40.0% 0.62 
1998 28 -1.1% 2.4% 21.4% -45.0% 0.16  0.0% 4.1% 22.2% -37.7% 0.15 
1999 28 3.8% 1.2% 64.1% -24.1% 0.21  3.5% 1.1% 65.0% -25.2% 0.21 
2000 37 5.7% 2.0% 130.0% -42.4% 0.33  6.2% 1.4% 131.4% -44.3% 0.33 
2001 30 3.4% 4.2% 34.0% -44.4% 0.14  3.2% 3.8% 33.2% -35.2% 0.13 
2002 46 5.8% 4.0% 48.0% -37.5% 0.15  5.7% 4.7% 47.5% -35.8% 0.15 
2003 37 12.5% 8.9% 72.7% -35.0% 0.19  12.4% 8.0% 73.3% -35.2% 0.20 
2004 31 4.8% 1.9% 28.6% -20.9% 0.11  4.7% 2.0% 30.0% -20.8% 0.11 
2005 52 3.6% 1.3% 42.2% -22.9% 0.13  3.5% 1.1% 41.3% -22.8% 0.13 
All 410 11.5% 4.3% 316.7% -45.0% 0.34   11.6% 4.3% 317.1% -44.3% 0.34 
 
 
 
Table 3.6  Comparisons of IPO Initial Returns (IRs) and Market-adjusted Initial Returns (MIRs) across Offer 
Methods by Years( Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
                
  ALL  Pure Fixed Price  Fixed Price  Bookbuilding 
 
No of 
IPOs IR MIR  
No of 
IPOs IR MIR  
No of 
IPOs IR MIR  
No of 
IPOs IR MIR 
1996 44 21.6% 21.4%  24 30.6% 30.5%  1 50.0% 49.5%  19 8.8% 8.5% 
1997 77 30.0% 30.2%  48 35.4% 35.4%  5 12.8% 13.6%  24 22.8% 23.3% 
1998 28 -1.1% 0.0%  13 -4.2% -2.9%  11 2.6% 3.2%  4 -1.1% 0.8% 
1999 28 3.8% 3.5%  3 8.1% 7.2%  16 2.0% 1.4%  9 5.6% 6.2% 
2000 37 5.7% 6.2%  3 12.6% 15.8%  24 6.4% 6.7%  10 2.1% 2.3% 
2001 30 3.4% 3.2%  0 - -  19 4.8% 3.9%  11 1.1% 2.0% 
2002 46 5.8% 5.7%  0 - -  33 5.8% 5.8%  13 6.0% 5.6% 
2003 37 12.5% 12.4%  0 - -  16 5.8% 5.5%  21 17.6% 17.7% 
2004 31 4.8% 4.7%  0 - -  7 4.8% 4.7%  24 6.3% 6.1% 
2005 52 3.6% 3.5%  0 - -  7 3.6% 3.5%  45 4.6% 4.4% 
All 410    91 - -  139    180   
% 100%       22.2%       33.9%       43.9%     
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Table 3.7. Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables in Testing IPO Underpricing for All Offer Methods 
(Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
The Sample includes 410 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs from 1996 to 2005 where the complete data on all of the variables 
is available, including 89 Chinese IPOs and 321 non-Chinese IPOs. The dependent variables in all regressions are the Initial 
Returns (IR) and Market-adjusted Initial Returns (MIR) of new shares. The PRE-DAY is number of days between the close 
of subscription application to the offering date. The CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is either Red 
Chip or H-share stock, and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity offering. The AGE is 
the natural logarithm of the years since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as of the IPO. The RANK is the reputation 
ranks of underwriters. The TOP_UNDWR is the Dummy variable of local top underwriters, equal to one if the lead sponsor(s) is 
one of the following investment banks: Bank of China International, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, CICC, Morgan 
Stanley, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Industrial and Commercial Bank Asia, and JP Morgan; zero otherwise. The 
RTN_IPO is average initial returns of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The NO_IPO is 
number of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index 
twenty trading days before the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before 
the offering. For dummy variables, the table also reports the number of observations with the dummy equal to 1, and the 
correspondent proportions to the whole sample.  
 
120 
 
 
            
 
Panel A. All Sample         
  
PRE-DAY CHN SUBSCRP SIZE AGE RANK TOP_UNDWR RTN_IPO NO_IPO RTN_MKT VOL_MKT 
Mean 8 - 67.64 19.34 2.43 4.98 - 0.12 11 0.01 0.01 
Median 7 - 11.67 18.77 2.40 4.00 - 0.07 10 0.01 0.02 
Max 21 - 1276.00 24.99 4.62 9.00 - 0.69 27 0.07 0.20 
Min 3 - 0.06 17.73 0.00 1.00 - -0.13 1 0.00 -0.37 
S.D 2.52 0.41 149.27 1.58 0.80 3.01 0.45 0.16 5.69 0.01 0.07 
Skewness 1.25 1.38 4.18 1.02 -0.24 0.19 1.02 1.34 0.75 2.36 -1.02 
Kurtosis 2.32 -0.10 21.35 0.41 1.12 -1.70 -0.96 1.41 -0.08 1.04 4.03 
No. of Dummy=1 - 89 - - - - 112 - - - - 
% of Dummy=1 - 21.7% - - - - 27.3% - - - - 
            
 
 
Panel B. Pure-Fix            
  
PRE-DAY CHN SUBSCRP SIZE AGE RANK TOP_UNDWR RTN_IPO NO_IPO RTN_MKT VOL_MKT 
Mean 10 - 76.32 18.38 2.58 4.38 - 0.25 15 0.02 0.01 
Median 10 - 26.40 18.23 2.48 3.00 - 0.27 15 0.01 0.02 
Max 17 - 892.00 20.26 3.85 9.00 - 0.69 26 0.07 0.18 
Min 5 - 0.42 17.73 1.39 1.00 - -0.13 3 0.01 -0.33 
S.D 2.34 0.25 143.04 0.56 0.51 2.83 0.35 0.20 5.91 0.01 0.09 
Skewness 0.56 3.56 3.61 1.03 0.04 0.65 2.08 0.04 -0.03 1.79 -1.12 
Kurtosis 0.26 10.89 15.21 0.85 0.10 -1.30 2.36 -0.64 -0.90 4.95 2.37 
No. of Dummy=1 - 6 - - - - 13 - - - - 
% of Dummy=1 - 6.6% - - - - 14.3% - - - - 
            
 
    tbc. 
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Panel C. Fixed-Price  
  
PRE-DAY CHN SUBSCRP SIZE AGE RANK TOP_UNDWR RTN_IPO NO_IPO RTN_MKT VOL_MKT 
Mean 9 - 33.37 18.30 2.39 3.06 - 0.06 9 0.01 0.01 
Median 8 - 4.52 18.06 2.40 2.00 - 0.04 8 0.01 0.01 
Max 21 - 652.58 21.13 4.22 9.00 - 0.66 25 0.03 0.20 
Min 4 - 0.52 17.73 0.00 1.00 - -0.12 2 0.00 -0.18 
S.D 2.77 0.19 80.69 0.71 0.73 2.25 0.31 0.12 3.88 0.01 0.07 
Skewness 1.49 5.04 4.76 1.74 -0.56 1.80 2.56 2.36 0.85 0.87 0.06 
Kurtosis 3.20 23.73 28.66 2.76 1.60 1.97 4.59 7.71 1.62 0.71 0.52 
No. of Dummy=1 - 5 - - - - 15 - - - - 
% of Dummy=1 - 3.6% - - - - 10.8% - - - - 
 
 
 
            
Panel D. Bookbuilding           
  
PRE-DAY CHN SUBSCRP SIZE AGE RANK TOP_UNDWR RTN_IPO NO_IPO RTN_MKT VOL_MKT 
Mean 7 - 89.39 20.63 2.39 6.78 - 0.10 11 0.01 0.01 
Median 7 - 17.49 20.60 2.42 7.67 - 0.07 10 0.01 0.02 
Max 15 - 1276.00 24.99 4.62 9.00 - 0.65 27 0.06 0.18 
Min 3 - 0.06 17.75 0.00 1.00 - -0.13 1 0.00 -0.37 
S.D 1.84 0.50 184.40 1.48 0.94 2.55 0.50 0.14 5.91 0.01 0.07 
Skewness 1.38 0.27 3.61 0.32 -0.01 -0.99 0.13 1.79 0.80 3.80 -1.72 
Kurtosis 3.36 -1.95 15.27 0.14 0.35 -0.44 -2.00 3.58 -0.01 2.67 8.05 
No. of Dummy=1 - 78 - - - - 84 - - - - 
% of Dummy=1 - 43.3% - - - - 46.7% - - - - 
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Table 3.8. Correlation Matrix of Control Variables in Testing IPO Underpricing for All Offer Methods 
(Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
The Sample includes 410 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs from 1996 to 2005 where the complete data on all of the variables 
is available, including 89 Chinese IPOs and 321 non-Chinese IPOs. The dependent variables in all regressions are the Initial 
Returns (IR) and Market-adjusted Initial Returns (MIR) of new shares. The PRE-DAY is number of days between the close 
of subscription application to the offering date. The CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is either Red 
Chip or H-share stock, and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity offering. The AGE is 
the natural logarithm of the years since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as of the IPO. The RANK is the reputation 
ranks of underwriters. The TOP_UNDWR is the Dummy variable of local top underwriters, equal to one if the lead sponsor(s) is 
one of the following investment banks: Bank of China International, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, CICC, Morgan 
Stanley, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Industrial and Commercial Bank Asia, and JP Morgan; zero otherwise. The 
RTN_IPO is average initial returns of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The NO_IPO is 
number of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index 
twenty trading days before the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before 
the offering.  
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PRE-DAY CHN SUBSCRP SIZE AGE RANK 
TOP_U
NDWR 
RTN_IPO NO_IPO 
RTN_
MKT 
VOL_
MKT 
No. of days bet. appl. Close day 
to listing date 1.00           
CHN -0.05 1.00          
Public Subscription Multiple -0.04 0.21 1.00         
Ln (Fund Raised) -0.07 0.62 0.15 1.00        
ln(Age) -0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.01 1.00       
Ranking -0.08 0.40 0.15 0.43 0.03 1.00      
Top Banker dummy -0.05 0.26 -0.02 0.40 -0.02 0.66 1.00     
Recent IPO Rtn 0.03 0.12 0.34 0.10 0.02 0.15 -0.01 1.00    
No Recent IPO -0.06 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.14 -0.05 0.42 1.00   
20D Mkt Rtn 0.04 -0.09 -0.17 -0.19 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 0.09 1.00  
20D Mkt Daily Volatility -0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.15 -0.26 1.00 
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Table 3.9  Comparison of Control Variables between Chinese and non-Chinese IPOs  
for All Offer Methods (Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
The Sample includes 410 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs from 1996 to 2005 where 
the complete data on all of the variables is available, including 89 Chinese IPOs and 321 
non-Chinese IPOs. The dependent variables in all regressions are the Initial Returns (IR) 
and Market-adjusted Initial Returns (MIR) of new shares. The PRE-DAY is number 
of days between the close of subscription application to the offering date. The CHN is the 
dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, and 
zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity offering. 
The AGE is the natural logarithm of the years since the firm‘s founding date or 
incorporating date as of the IPO. The RANK is the reputation ranks of underwriters. The 
TOP_UNDWR is the Dummy variable of local top underwriters, equal to one if the lead 
sponsor(s) is one of the following investment banks: Bank of China International, HSBC, 
Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, CICC, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse First Boston, 
Goldman Sachs, Industrial and Commercial Bank Asia, and JP Morgan; zero otherwise. 
The RTN_IPO is average initial returns of IPOs which going public in three months 
before the offering date. The NO_IPO is number of IPOs which going public in three 
months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index twenty 
trading days before the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng 
Index twenty trading days before the offering. t-statistics is reported in brackets. 
 
 
  All IPOs CHN NON-CHN   t-value 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  (mean) 
IR 0.12 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.09 0.04  (2.47)* 
MIR 0.12 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.03  (2.50)* 
PRE-DAY 8 7 7 7 8 8  (-5.02)* 
SUBSCRP 67.64 11.67 127.73 32.50 50.83 10.18  (4.39)* 
SIZE 19.34 18.77 21.21 21.07 18.82 18.39  (16.14)* 
AGE 2.43 2.40 2.44 2.45 2.43 2.40  (0.12) 
RANK 4.98 4.00 7.26 7.67 4.36 3.00  (8.75)* 
TOP_UNDWR 112 27.3% 44 49.4% 68 21.2%  (5.47)* 
RTN_IPO 12.1% 7.0% 15.8% 9.6% 11.1% 6.6%  (2.40)* 
NO_IPO 11 10 12 11 11 10  (2.22)* 
RTN_MKT 1.4% 1.2% 1.3% 1.1% 1.4% 1.3%  (-1.76) 
VOL_MKT 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01   0.13 
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Table 3.10  Results of Cross-sectional Regressions in Testing IPO Underpricing 
for All Offer Methods (Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
The Sample includes 410 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs from 1996 to 2005 where the complete data 
on all of the variables is available. The dependent variable in all regressions is the Initial Returns (IR) 
and Market-adjusted Initial Returns (MIR) of new shares. The PRE-DAY is number of days between 
the close of subscription application to the offering date. The CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if 
the issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of fund raised in the equity offering. The AGE is the natural logarithm of the years since the firm‘s 
founding date or incorporating date as of the IPO. The RANK is the reputation ranks of underwriters. The 
TOP_UNDWR is the Dummy variable of local top underwriters, equal to one if the lead sponsor(s) is one 
of the following investment banks: Bank of China International, HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch, 
CICC, Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Industrial and Commercial Bank 
Asia, and JP Morgan; zero otherwise. The RTN_IPO is average initial returns of IPOs which going public 
in three months before the offering date. The NO_IPO is number of IPOs which going public in three 
months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before 
the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the 
offering. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
method. 
 
    
 
  
  All Methods 
 IR   MIR 
Constant  1.216 1.031  1.231 1.044 
 (3.93)* (3.36)*  (3.99)* (3.40)* 
PRE-DAY -0.014 -0.015  -0.015 -0.015 
 (-2.10)* (-2.21)*  (-2.19)* (-2.30)* 
CHN 0.134 0.138  0.134 0.138 
 (2.75)* (2.82)*  (2.76)* (2.83)* 
SIZE -0.063 -0.050  -0.063 -0.050 
 (-4.05)* (-3.34)*  (-4.07)* (-3.35)* 
AGE -0.028 -0.030  -0.026 -0.028 
 (-1.42) (-1.54)  (-1.32) (-1.44) 
RANK 0.021   0.021  
 (3.08)*   (3.12)*  
TOP_UNDWR 0.073   0.074 
  (1.78)   (1.80) 
RTN_IPO 0.562 0.589  0.567 0.594 
 (5.17)* (5.38)*  (5.22)* (5.43)* 
NO_IPO 0.001 0.003  0.001 0.003 
 (0.43) (0.81)  (0.42) (0.81) 
RTN_MKT -4.259 -4.155  -4.218 -4.113 
 (-1.95) (-1.89)  (-1.94) (-1.87) 
VOL_MKT 0.557 0.624  0.487 0.554 
 (2.45)* (2.74)*  (2.14)* (2.44)* 
R2 0.17   0.16   0.17 0.16 
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Table 3.11 Comparisons of Public Subscription Multiples, Price Revisions (Hanley and Cornelli-Goldreich Measures),  Initial Returns and Market-
adjusted Initial Returns between Chinese and Non-Chinese Bookbuilding IPOs by Years (Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
  (1) Public Subscription   (2) Price Revision (Hanley)   (3) Price Revision (CG)   (4) Mkt-adj Initial Return (MIR) 
  All CHN Non-CHN   All CHN Non-CHN   All CHN Non-CHN   All CHN Non-CHN 
1996 40.15 53.59 25.21 
 
0.07% 0.03% 0.11% 
 
50.47% 46.91% 54.42% 
 
8.49% 13.42% 3.01% 
1997 148.66 175.55 83.37 
 
1.37% 2.71% -1.89% 
 
60.03% 72.63% 29.44% 
 
23.30% 31.45% 3.50% 
1998 10.02 2.25 12.61 
 
-1.26% 0.21% -1.75% 
 
37.75% 50.98% 33.33% 
 
0.81% 3.91% -0.22% 
1999 20.26 28.36 10.13 
 
4.29% 2.50% 6.53% 
 
67.78% 68.66% 66.67% 
 
6.19% 1.95% 11.50% 
2000 14.85 11.68 18.01 
 
2.04% 0.75% 3.33% 
 
67.52% 64.61% 70.43% 
 
2.29% -0.20% 4.78% 
2001 48.69 44.68 53.50 
 
4.65% 6.04% 2.98% 
 
72.83% 86.83% 56.03% 
 
1.98% 8.82% -6.22% 
2002 24.25 11.38 32.30 
 
-1.84% 1.96% -4.21% 
 
47.42% 58.17% 40.70% 
 
5.63% 5.18% 5.92% 
2003 139.44 196.81 76.33 
 
4.34% 8.25% 0.05% 
 
71.21% 87.76% 53.00% 
 
17.71% 20.32% 14.84% 
2004 137.09 306.65 80.57 
 
2.97% 3.56% 2.78% 
 
62.62% 65.05% 61.81% 
 
6.14% 9.78% 4.93% 
2005 96.01 84.80 100.08 
 
0.34% 2.22% -0.34% 
 
54.75% 57.73% 53.67% 
 
4.42% 3.92% 4.60% 
All 89.39 116.28 68.83   1.63% 3.17% 0.45%   59.53% 67.71% 53.28%   8.97% 13.97% 5.16% 
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Table 3.12 Distribution of Public Subscription Multiples and Mean of Variables for 
Bookbuilding IPOs (Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
The Sample includes 180 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs by bookbuilding from 1996 to 
2005 where the complete data on all of the variables is available, including 78 Chinese IPOs 
and 102 non-Chinese IPOs. The IR is the initial returns of IPOs, while MIR is the 
correspondent market-adjusted initial return. The H-PR and CG-PR are measures of the price 
revision during the price setig period, defined as the percentage difference between the 
midpoint of price range (or the lower limit of price range for CG-PR) and the offer price. The 
CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share 
stock, and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity 
offering. The AGE is the natural logarithm of the years since the firm‘s founding date or 
incorporating date as of the IPO. The INST_ALOT is proportion of the institutional 
allocation. The RANK is the reputation ranks of underwriters. The PR_WIDTH is 
percentage width of preliminary price range. The RTN_IPO is average initial returns of IPOs 
which going public in three months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of 
Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily 
volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering. 
 
 
 
         (0,  1) [1, 15) [15, 50) [50, 100) [100, 200) [200, +∞) 
No. of IPOs 12 75 33 20 19 21 
Public Subscription 0.448 4.702 28.839 75.341 142.550 504.157 
PR (Hanley) -0.057 -0.025 0.047 0.034 0.082 0.083 
PR (Cornelli&Goldreich) 0.307 0.368 0.745 0.689 0.931 0.955 
IR -0.027 0.009 0.028 0.074 0.209 0.447 
MIR -0.030 0.010 0.033 0.073 0.210 0.446 
       No. of CHN 6 29 12 11 9 11 
SIZE 20.901 20.447 20.797 20.496 20.792 20.783 
AGE 2.855 2.287 2.429 2.347 2.448 2.485 
PR-WIDTH 0.296 0.232 0.230 0.219 0.214 0.208 
RANK 7.876 6.288 7.035 6.664 7.948 6.549 
TOPUNDWR 7 34 18 8 12 5 
RTN_IPO 0.034 0.088 0.104 0.101 0.131 0.174 
RTN_MKT 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.009 
VOL_MKT 0.008 0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.037 0.025 
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Table 3.13  Distribution of Price Revision in Bookbuilding Offerings and Means of Offering Characteristics  
(Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
 
The Sample includes 180 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs by bookbuilding from 1996 to 2005 where the complete 
data on all of the variables is available, including 78 Chinese IPOs and 102 non-Chinese IPOs. The IR is the initial 
returns of IPOs, while MIR is the correspondent market-adjusted initial return. The H-PR and CG-PR are measures of 
the price revision during the price setig period, defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of price range 
(or the lower limit of price range for CG-PR) and the offer price. The CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if the 
issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in 
the equity offering. The AGE is the natural logarithm of the years since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as 
of the IPO. The INST_ALOT is proportion of the institutional allocation. The RANK is the reputation ranks of 
underwriters. The PR_WIDTH is percentage width of preliminary price range. The RTN_IPO is average initial returns 
of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index 
twenty trading days before the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days 
before the offering. t-statistics is reported in brackets. 
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Panel A. Segmented by CG-PR 
             
  
P0 < PL 
(CG_PR<0) 
     PL ≤ P0 ≤ PH   P0 > PH 
(CG_PR>1) 
 
 All 
P0 =  PL 
(CG_PR=0) 
PL < P0 < PH 
P0 = PH 
(CG_PR=1) t-value  
 Mean s.d.   Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Hi v.s Lo     
No of IPOs 3 -  177 - 21 - 102 - 54 - -  0 
IR 0.078 0.129  0.089 0.267 -0.043 0.157 0.035 0.132 0.242 0.397 (3.18)*  - 
MIR 0.076 0.130  0.090 0.266 -0.039 0.140 0.036 0.132 0.241 0.398 (3.14)*  - 
H-PR -0.147 0.058  0.019 0.081 -0.094 0.051 0.008 0.073 0.083 0.037 (-13.97)*  - 
CHN 1 -  77 - 4 - 49 - 24 - (2.07)*  - 
INST. ALLOT. 0.852 0.050  0.860 0.076 0.875 0.028 0.863 0.086 0.848 0.066 (-1.79)  - 
RETL. ALLOT. 0.111 0.030  0.104 0.048 0.115 0.029 0.096 0.049 0.114 0.049 (-0.08)  - 
SUBSCRP 25.219 35.188  90.482 185.734 3.937 4.610 54.105 124.688 192.851 262.163 (3.29)*  - 
PR_WIDTH 0.192 0.081  0.231 0.110 0.214 0.131 0.258 0.107 0.186 0.089 (-1.10)  - 
RANK 7.334 0.577  6.769 2.575 6.128 2.979 6.623 2.681 7.294 2.116 (1.90)  - 
TOP UNDWR 0 -  84 - 11 - 51 - 22 - (-0.90)  - 
RTN IPO 0.078 0.183  0.102 0.142 0.056 0.070 0.083 0.132 0.157 0.164 (2.71)*  - 
RTN MKT 0.009 0.003  0.012 0.006 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.005 0.011 0.004 (-1.95)  - 
VOL MKT -0.025 0.045   0.009 0.067 -0.046 0.102 0.012 0.056 0.023 0.059 (3.63)*   - 
 
tbc. 
130 
 
 
 
                   Panel B. Segmented by H-PR 
 
  H-PR < 0 
 
H-PR = 0 
 
0 > H-PR > 10% 
 
H-PR > 10% t-value 
  Mean s.d.  Mean s.d.  Mean s.d.   Mean s.d. (-tive  v.s  +tive) 
No of IPOs 61 - 
 
7 - 
 
85 - 
 
27 - - 
IR -0.011 0.147 
 
0.039 0.047 
 
0.156 0.337 
 
0.117 0.158 (-4.57)* 
MIR -0.010 0.142 
 
0.035 0.057 
 
0.156 0.338 
 
0.120 0.154 (-4.63)* 
CG-PR 0.110 0.197 
 
0.286 0.267 
 
0.848 0.158 
 
0.977 0.045 (-23.14)* 
CHN 20 0.473 
 
2 0.488 
 
42 0.503 
 
14 0.509 (-2.10)* 
SIZE 20.413 1.614 
 
19.470 1.058 
 
20.776 1.403 
 
20.940 1.375 (-1.33) 
AGE 2.472 0.911 
 
2.413 1.040 
 
2.350 1.005 
 
2.356 0.809 (0.80) 
INST. ALLOT. 0.872 0.065 
 
0.876 0.046 
 
0.849 0.086 
 
0.864 0.063 (1.65) 
RETL. ALLOT. 0.109 0.059 
 
0.124 0.046 
 
0.104 0.044 
 
0.089 0.017 (0.88) 
SUBSCRP 8.143 13.446 
 
17.610 31.056 
 
127.44 226.54 
 
171.80 197.46 (-6.21)* 
PR_WIDTH 0.260 0.124 
 
0.161 0.182 
 
0.191 0.079 
 
0.302 0.069 (2.49)* 
RANK 6.117 2.919 
 
6.572 2.299 
 
7.238 2.192 
 
6.878 2.606 (-2.33)* 
TOP UNDWR 27 0.501 
 
1 0.378 
 
42 0.503 
 
14 0.509 (-0.46) 
RTN IPO 0.085 0.125 
 
0.044 0.070 
 
0.125 0.167 
 
0.093 0.095 (-1.34) 
RTN MKT 0.013 0.009 
 
0.016 0.007 
 
0.011 0.004 
 
0.011 0.004 (1.18) 
VOL MKT -0.007 0.075  0.030 0.058  0.016 0.050  0.010 0.087 (-2.01)* 
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Table 3.14 Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Testing Predictability of Price Revision and Underpricing for Bookbuilding IPOs 
(Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
The Sample includes 180 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs by bookbuilding from 1996 to 2005 where the complete 
data on all of the variables is available, including 78 Chinese IPOs and 102 non-Chinese IPOs. The IR is the initial 
returns of IPOs, while MIR is the correspondent market-adjusted initial return. The H-PR and CG-PR are measures of 
the price revision during the price setig period, defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of price range 
(or the lower limit of price range for CG-PR) and the offer price. The CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if the 
issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in 
the equity offering. The AGE is the natural logarithm of the years since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as 
of the IPO. The INST_ALOT is proportion of the institutional allocation. The RANK is the reputation ranks of 
underwriters. The PR_WIDTH is percentage width of preliminary price range. The RTN_IPO is average initial returns 
of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index 
twenty trading days before the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days 
before the offering. 
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Panel A. All              
  IR MIR H-PR CG-PR 
INST_ 
ALLOT 
PR_WI
DTH SIZE AGE RANK 
TOP_U
NDWR 
RTN_
IPO 
RTN_
MKT 
VOL_
MKT CHN 
Mean 0.09 0.09 0.016 0.103 86.00% 23.00% 20.63 2.39 6.78 - 0.1 0.01 0.01 - 
Median 0.03 0.04 0.037 0.132 90.00% 22.20% 20.6 2.42 7.67 - 0.07 0.01 0.02 - 
Max 2.22 2.23 0.179 0.453 95.70% 59.20% 24.99 4.62 9 - 0.65 0.06 0.18 - 
Min -0.44 -0.4 -0.227 -0.125 33.70% 0.00% 17.75 0 1 - -0.13 0 -0.37 - 
S.D 0.26 0.26 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11 1.48 0.94 2.55 0.5 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.5 
Skewness 4.02 4.11 -0.61 0.39 -2.74 0.74 0.32 -0.01 -0.99 0.13 1.79 3.8 -1.72 0.27 
Kurtosis 26.8 27.6 -0.32 -0.08 14.42 1.18 0.14 0.35 -0.44 -2 3.58 26.72 8.05 -1.95 
No. of Dummy=1 - - - - - - - - - 84 - - - 78 
% of Dummy=1 - - - - - - - - - 46.70% - - - 43.30% 
 
 
tbc. 
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Panel B. CHN            
  IR MIR H-PR CG-PR 
INST_ 
ALLOT 
PR_WI
DTH SIZE AGE RANK 
TOP_U
NDWR 
RTN_
IPO 
RTN_
MKT 
Mean 0.14 0.14 0.032 0.145 87.30% 22.00% 21.45 2.41 7.41 - 0.14 0.01 
Median 0.05 0.05 0.053 0.139 90.00% 21.30% 21.25 2.4 8 - 0.08 0.01 
Max 2.22 2.23 0.156 0.453 95.70% 59.20% 24.99 4.6 9 - 0.65 0.06 
Min -0.19 -0.21 -0.188 -0.125 69.80% 0.00% 17.79 0 2 - -0.13 0 
S.D 0.35 0.35 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.11 1.43 1.09 1.94 0.5 0.16 0.01 
Skewness 3.76 3.77 -0.88 0.27 -0.73 0.9 0.22 -0.07 -1.41 -0.21 1.08 4.45 
Kurtosis 18.26 18.36 0.28 0.24 -0.52 1.9 0.25 -0.24 1.41 -2.01 0.98 28.48 
No. of Dummy=1 - - - - - - - - - 43 - - 
% of Dummy=1 - - - - - - - - - 55.10% - - 
             
Panel C. NON-CHN     
 
 
       
  IR MIR H-PR CG-PR 
INST_ 
ALLOT 
PR_WI
DTH SIZE AGE RANK 
TOP_U
NDWR 
RTN_
IPO 
RTN_
MKT 
Mean 0.05 0.05 0.004 0.123 85.00% 23.70% 20 2.38 6.3 - 0.08 0.01 
Median 0.02 0.02 0.024 0.123 90.00% 22.80% 20.08 2.48 7 - 0.05 0.01 
Max 0.53 0.52 0.179 0.438 91.30% 58.80% 23.1 4.62 9 - 0.63 0.03 
Min -0.44 -0.4 -0.227 -0.053 33.70% 0.00% 17.75 0 1 - -0.1 0 
S.D 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.11 1.19 0.82 2.85 0.49 0.12 0.01 
Skewness 0.32 0.42 -0.42 0.50 -3.31 0.63 -0.01 0.07 -0.66 0.41 2.79 1.34 
Kurtosis 1.46 1.3 -0.53 -0.19 16.49 0.89 -0.6 1.04 -1.22 -1.87 9.94 1.47 
No. of Dummy=1 - - - - - - - - - 41 - - 
% of Dummy=1 - - - - - - - - - 40.20% - - 
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Table 3.15  Correlation Matrix for Variables in Testing Predictability on  Price Revision and Underpricing for Bookbuilding IPOs  
(Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
The Sample includes 180 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs by bookbuilding from 1996 to 2005 where the complete 
data on all of the variables is available, including 78 Chinese IPOs and 102 non-Chinese IPOs. The PR is measures of the 
price revision during the price setig period, defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of price range and 
the offer price. The CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, and 
zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity offering. The AGE is the natural logarithm 
of the years since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as of the IPO. The INST_ALOT is proportion of the 
institutional allocation. The RANK is the reputation ranks of underwriters. The PR_WIDTH is percentage width of 
preliminary price range. The RTN_IPO is average initial returns of IPOs which going public in three months before the 
offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering. And the 
VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering. 
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PRE-
DAY 
SIZE AGE 
INST_ 
ALLOT 
SUBS 
CRP 
PR_ 
WIDTH 
PR RANK 
TOP_ 
UNDWR 
RTN_ 
IPO 
NO_ 
IPO 
RTN_ 
MKT 
VOL_ 
MKT 
CHN 
PRE-DAY 1.00              
SIZE -0.14 1.00             
AGE -0.15 0.48 1.00            
INST_ ALLOT -0.03 0.01 0.06 1.00           
SUBSCRP 0.21 -0.14 -0.25 -0.02 1.00          
PR_WIDTH -0.05 0.13 0.03 0.07 -0.01 1.00         
PR 0.03 -0.08 -0.07 0.09 -0.21 -0.11 1.00        
RANK -0.08 0.16 0.22 0.03 -0.08 0.33 -0.15 1.00       
TOP_UNDWR -0.16 0.22 0.45 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 -0.19 0.24 1.00      
RTN_IPO -0.05 0.15 0.45 -0.06 -0.28 -0.18 -0.06 0.12 0.52 1.00     
NO_IPO 0.01 0.20 0.18 -0.17 0.29 0.31 -0.22 0.13 0.18 -0.04 1.00    
RTN_MKT -0.02 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.08 -0.18 -0.06 0.09 -0.10 0.35 1.00   
VOL_MKT -0.13 0.10 0.11 -0.05 0.07 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.16 1.00  
CHN -0.08 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.06 -0.10 -0.37 1.00 
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Table 3.16  Results of Cross-sectional Regressions in Testing Price Revision for 
Bookbuilding IPOs (Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
The Sample includes 410 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs from 1996 to 2005 where the complete data on 
all of the variables is available. The dependent variable in all regressions is the Price Revision (PR), defined 
as the percentage difference between the midpoint of price range and the offer price. The CHN is the dummy 
variable equal to one if the issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, and zero otherwise. The SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity offering. The AGE is the natural logarithm of the years 
since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as of the IPO. The INST.ALOT is proportion of the 
institutional allocation. The RANK is the reputation ranks of underwriters. The PR-WIDTH is percentage 
width of preliminary price range. The RTN_IPO is average initial returns of IPOs which going public in 
three months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days 
before the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before 
the offering. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent method. 
 
  Price Revision (PR) 
Constant -0.0232 -0.0405 0.0475 
 
(-0.19) (-0.34) (0.38) 
CHN 0.0110 0.0167 0.0189 
 
(181)   (1.98)* (2.05)* 
SIZE 0.0054 0.0101 0.0040 
 
(1.03) (2.16)* (1.74) 
AGE   -0.0033 -0.0006 -0.0013 
 
(-0.51) (-0.10) (-0.20) 
INST.ALOT -0.1156 -0.1836 -0.1871 
 
(-1.41) (-2.22)* (-2.29)* 
SUBSCRP 0.0001 
  
 
(4.23)* 
  
PR-WIDTH -0.0569 
  
 
(-1.00) 
  
RANK 0.0061 
 
0.0061 
 
(2.16)* 
 
(2.13)* 
RTN-IPO 0.0493 
  
 
(1.09) 
  
RTN-MKT 0.5340 
  
 
(0.52) 
  
VOL-MKT 0.0395 
  
 
(0.42) 
  
R2 0.20 0.08 0.10 
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Table 3.17 Institutional Allocation and Institutional Profits for Bookbuilding IPOs (Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
The Sample includes 180 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs by bookbuilding from 1996 to 2005 where the complete data on all 
of the variables is available, including 78 Chinese IPOs and 102 non-Chinese IPOs. The INST_ALLOT is the proportion of 
institutional allocation of new shares. Institutional Profit is calculated as shares hold by institutional investors multiplied by the 
difference between the offer price and first day closing price. The Institutional Profit Ratio therefore is equivalent to the initial 
return of IPOs. The IR is the initial returns of IPOs, while MIR is the correspondent market-adjusted initial return. The PR is 
measures of the price revision during the price setig period, defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of price 
range and the offer price. The CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, 
and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity offering. The AGE is the natural logarithm of 
the years since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as of the IPO. The INST_ALOT is proportion of the institutional 
allocation. The RANK is the reputation ranks of underwriters. The PR_WIDTH is percentage width of preliminary price range. 
The RTN_IPO is average initial returns of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The RTN-MKT is 
return of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering. And the VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index 
twenty trading days before the offering. t-statistics is reported in brackets. 
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Column (1)  Column (2)  Column (3)  Column (4) 
Segmented by Median  
Institutional Allocation  
Segmented by Exercise of 
Overallotment Option 
Segmented by Median 
Institutional Profits 
Segmented by Zero  
Institutional Return 
(Median INST.ALLOT=90%) (Whether the option is exercised) (Median=HKD18.448 mil) (Inst. Prof Ratio = 0) 
 
INST. 
ALLOT. 
< 90% 
INST. 
ALLOT. 
≥ 90%   
 
Not Be 
Exercised  
 Be 
Exercised    
 
INST. 
PROF. < 
Median 
INST. 
ALLOT. ≥  
Median   
 
INST. 
PROF. 
Ratio ≤ 0 
INST. 
ALLOT. 
Ratio > 0   
  Mean Mean t-value  Mean Mean t-value  Mean Mean t-value  Mean Mean t-value 
No. of IPOs 86 94 - 
 
72 108 - 
 
90 90 - 
 
52 128 - 
IR 0.126 0.055 (1.80) 
 
-0.042 0.176 (-6.82)* 
 
-0.049 0.226 (-8.14)* 
 
-0.106 0.168 - 
MIR 0.126 0.057 (1.77) 
 
-0.042 0.177 (-6.89)* 
 
-0.046 0.226 (-8.06)* 
 
-0.1 0.167 - 
INST. PROF. 242.426 61.961 (1.41) 
 
-134.217 336.45 (-4.06)* 
 
- - - 
 
-283.738 323.651 - 
CHN 34 44 (-0.98) 
 
24 54 (-2.25)* 
 
29 49 (-3.07)* 
 
20 58 (-1.84) 
SIZE 20.809 20.46 (1.60) 
 
19.974 21.062 (-4.99)* 
 
20.093 21.16 (-5.15)* 
 
20.658 20.614 (0.18) 
AGE 2.577 2.228 (2.52)* 
 
2.198 2.526 (-2.29)* 
 
2.256 2.533 (-1.99) 
 
2.136 2.5 (-2.48)* 
INST.ALLOT - - - 
 
0.886 0.843 (4.18)* 
 
0.872 0.847 (2.27)* 
 
0.882 0.851 (2.75)* 
SUBSCRP 122.283 59.305 (2.31)* 
 
16.468 138.012 (-5.55)* 
 
28.003 150.786 (-4.73)* 
 
20.408 117.42 (-4.93)* 
PR_WIDTH 0.207 0.251 (-2.81)* 
 
0.245 0.22 (1.36) 
 
0.24 0.219 (1.29) 
 
0.237 0.227 (0.49) 
PR 0.029 0.004 (2.01)* 
 
-0.034 0.05 (-7.11)* 
 
-0.017 0.05 (-5.83)* 
 
-0.021 0.032 (-3.81)* 
RANK 6.859 6.704 (0.41) 
 
5.771 7.45 (-4.24)* 
 
5.951 7.606 (-4.58)* 
 
6.911 6.724 (0.44) 
TOP UNDWR 37 47 (-0.93) 
 
26 58 (-2.36)* 
 
35 49 (-2.11)* 
 
26 58 (-0.57) 
RTN IPO 0.109 0.098 (0.55) 
 
0.091 0.112 (-0.96) 
 
0.092 0.115 (-1.07) 
 
0.12 0.096 (0.93) 
RTN MKT 0.012 0.011 (1.59) 
 
0.013 0.011 (1.67) 
 
0.011 0.012 (-1.28) 
 
0.011 0.014 (-2.29)* 
VOL MKT 0.003 0.013 (-1.04)   -0.001 0.014 (-1.43)   -0.008 0.024 (-3.39)*   -0.021 0.02 (-3.14)* 
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Table 3.18  Comparison between Chinese and non-Chinese IPOs and Means of Offering 
Characteristics in Bookbuilding (Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
 
The Sample includes 180 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs by bookbuilding from 1996 to 2005 
where the complete data on all of the variables is available, including 78 Chinese IPOs and 102 
non-Chinese IPOs. The IR is the initial returns of IPOs, while MIR is the correspondent market-
adjusted initial return. The SUBSCRP is the public subscription multiples. The INST_ALLOT is 
the proportion of institutional allocation of new shares. The H-PR and CG-PR are measures of the 
price revision during the price setig period, defined as the percentage difference between the 
midpoint of price range (or the lower limit of price range for CG-PR) and the offer price. The CHN 
is the dummy variable equal to one if the issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, and zero 
otherwise. The SIZE is the natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity offering. The AGE is the 
natural logarithm of the years since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as of the IPO. 
The INST_ALOT is proportion of the institutional allocation. The RANK is the reputation ranks of 
underwriters. The PR_WIDTH is percentage width of preliminary price range. The RTN_IPO is 
average initial returns of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The 
RTN-MKT is return of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering. And the 
VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering. t-
statistics is reported in brackets. 
 
  
Column (1) 
Separated by Zero IR   
Column (2) 
Separated by Median IR 
 
MIR ≤ 0 MIR > 0 
t-value  
MIR ≤ 3.49% MIR > 3.49% 
t-value   Mean Mean   Mean Mean 
IR -0.106 0.168 - 
 
-0.055 0.233 - 
MIR -0.100 0.167 - 
 
-0.053 0.232 - 
SIZE 20.658 20.614 (0.18) 
 
20.522 20.731 (-0.94) 
AGE 2.136 2.5 (-2.48)* 
 
2.393 2.396 (-0.22) 
CHN 20 58 (-1.84) 
 
34 44 (-1.51) 
INST. ALLOT. 0.882 0.851 (2.75)* 
 
0.878 0.842 (3.33)* 
SUBSCRP 20.408 117.42 (-4.93)* 
 
23.371 155.418 (-5.13)* 
PR_WIDTH 0.237 0.227 (0.49) 
 
0.242 0.218   (1.52) 
H-PR -0.021 0.032 (-3.81)* 
 
-0.009 0.041 (-4.22)* 
CG-PR 0.4301 0.6779 (-3.99)* 
 
0.442 0.748 (-5.47)* 
RANK 6.911 6.724 (0.44) 
 
6.502 7.055 (-1.46) 
TOP UNDWR 26 58 (-0.57) 
 
41 43 (-0.30) 
RTN IPO 0.12 0.096 (0.93) 
 
0.092 0.115  (-1.08) 
RTN MKT 0.011 0.014 (-2.29)* 
 
0.011 0.012 (-1.59) 
VOL MKT -0.021 0.02 (-3.14)*   -0.011 0.028 (-4.09)* 
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Table 3.19  Results of Cross-sectional Regressions in Testing Initial Returns 
for Bookbuilding IPOs (Hong Kong Main Board, Jan. 1996 – Dec. 2005) 
 
 
 
The Sample includes 180 Hong Kong Main Board listed IPOs by bookbuilding from 
1996 to 2005 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is the Initial Returns (IR) and Market-adjusted Initial 
Returns (MIR) of new shares. The CHN is the dummy variable equal to one if the 
issuing firm is either Red Chip or H-share stock, and zero otherwise. The SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of fund raised in the equity offering. The AGE is the natural logarithm 
of the years since the firm‘s founding date or incorporating date as of the IPO. The 
INST_ALOT is proportion of the institutional allocation. The RANK is the reputation 
ranks of underwriters. The PR_WIDTH is percentage width of preliminary price range. 
The H-PR and CG-PR are measures of the price revision during the price setig period, 
defined as the percentage difference between the midpoint of price range (or the lower 
limit of price range for CG-PR) and the offer price. The RTN_IPO is average initial 
returns of IPOs which going public in three months before the offering date. The RTN-
MKT is return of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the offering. And the 
VOL_MKT is daily volatility of Hang Seng Index twenty trading days before the 
offering. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White‘s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent method. 
 
      
  IR   MIR 
  
Model  
(1.a) 
Model 
(2.a) 
Model 
 (3.a)   
Model  
(1.b) 
Model 
(2.b) 
Model 
 (3.b) 
Constant 0.108 0.175 0.052 
 
0.094 0.160 0.034 
 
(0.28) (0.48) (0.14) 
 
(0.24) (0.43) (0.09) 
CHN 0.051 0.052 0.043 
 
0.051 0.052 0.043 
 
(2.20) (2.24) (2.05) 
 
(2.20) (2.23) (2.05) 
SIZE -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 
-0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(-0.27) (-0.11) (-0.06) 
 
(-0.25) (-0.10) (-0.05) 
AGE -0.039 -0.041 -0.045 
 
-0.038 -0.040 -0.044 
 
(-1.98)* (-2.10)* (-2.35)* 
 
(-1.97)* (-2.04)* (-2.29)* 
INST.ALLOT           -0.140 -0.161 -0.114 
 
-0.119 -0.140 -0.093 
 
(-0.55) (-0.64) (-0.46) 
 
(-0.47) (-0.55) (-0.37) 
PR_WIDTH             -0.259 -0.259 -0.272 
 
-0.262 -0.261 -0.276 
 
(-1.47) (-1.47) (-1.59) 
 
(-1.48) (-1.48) (-1.60) 
H-PR                  0.546 0.546 
  
0.567 0.567 
 
 
(2.42)* (2.43)* 
  
(2.51)* (2.51)* 
 CG-PR 
  
0.171 
   
0.175 
   
(3.72)* 
   
(3.80)* 
RANK  -0.009 -0.012 -0.012 
 
-0.009 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(-0.97) (-1.35) (-1.42) 
 
(-0.96) (-1.32) (-1.39) 
TOP  -0.029 
   
-0.029 
  
 
(-0.66) 
   
(-0.64) 
  RTN_IPO               0.492 0.509 0.479 
 
0.490 0.507 0.476 
 
(3.62)* (3.82)* (3.67)* 
 
(3.59)* (3.79)* (3.63)* 
RTN_MKT               3.083 2.941 2.122 
 
2.895 2.756 1.926 
 
(0.98) (0.94) (0.69) 
 
(0.92) (0.88) (0.62) 
VOL_MKT               0.966 0.983 0.914 
 
0.865 0.882 0.811 
 
(3.28)* (3.36)* (3.18)* 
 
(2.93)* (3.00)* (2.82)* 
R2 0.247 0.245 0.278   0.235 0.234 0.268 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE ACCURACY AND RATIONALITY OF PROFIT FORECASTS IN IPO 
PROSPECTUSES – AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN HONG KONG  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Profit forecasts disclosed in prospectuses for IPOs provide important information to evaluate 
a company‘s performance and in assisting the prospective investors to decide whether to 
subscribe to the offered shares. New issues in many current and former British 
Commonwealth nations often publish profit forecasts in their prospectuses. Firth (1998) 
demonstrates that profit forecasts can be an extremely crucial signal for company valuation, 
and public disclosure of forecasts can reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, hence lower the agency costs. However, in order for the earnings forecasts to be 
credible or useful, they need to be accurate. Some of the listed companies are found to have a 
wide gap between their actual earnings and what they have been forecasted in their respective 
prospectuses (Kwok, 1994).  
One of the purposes of this study is to examine the accuracy of earnings forecasts released 
in IPO prospectuses by using firms listed on the Main Board in Hong Kong. This chapter 
highlights the difference between Chinese and non-Chinese firms, comparing their strategies 
of earnings management. The research is worthwhile since profit forecasts are the major 
valuation parameter for IPOs and knowledge of the general level of forecast accuracy is 
important for investors, regulators, and policy makers. Previous research in Hong Kong and 
elsewhere has yielded mixed findings on the accuracy of IPO profit forecasts, thus additional 
studies are warranted to shed more light on the issue. This study evaluates the reliability of 
earnings forecasts made in the prospectuses by IPO companies. 
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Meanwhile, the IPO underperformance in the long run is observed as an anomaly in the 
stock markets around the world. According to Ritter (1991), the relationship between the 
long-run underperformance and the short-run underpricing phenomenon is an unresolved 
mystery in the IPO literature, though these puzzling occurrences have prompted substantial 
research to investigate the causes of IPO underpricing. Moreover, little attention has been 
paid to the long-run differences between those IPOs that are under or over-priced. The 
majority of literature assumes management knows what the market value will be after listing; 
this may be a tenuous assumption in many settings. Therefore, apart from short-run tests for 
underpricing, this chapter will also discuss the IPO long-run underperformance.  
Based on the asymmetric information assumption, this chapter incorporates the agency 
problem theory, signaling hypothesis, Welch‘s (1992) investors sentiment hypothesis, De 
Bondt and Thaler‘s (1990) overreaction hypothesis, Miller‘s (1977) divergence of opinion 
hypothesis, and Loughran and Ritter (1995) the windows of opportunities hypothesis. 
The tested framework is designed as follow. Since the reliability of profit forecasts will be 
of important concern to investors, this chapter begins with testing the accuracy of IPO profits 
forecasts by using various measures. Then once the level of forecasting errors is discovered, it 
is necessary to investigate whether the management forecasting in IPO prospectuses is more 
accurate since managers are normally assumed to have better knowledge of the issuing firm 
than other do. In addition, due to much of the information in a prospectus is voluntarily 
disclosed, De Bondt and Thaler‘s (1990) theory is used to capture the bias and rationality of 
the earnings forecasts. Then the cross-sectional test is adopted to identify the determinants of 
forecasting accuracy magnitude. However, the question remains that, whether investors in the 
market can discover biases in forecasts or whether investors can rationally incorporate the 
level of forecasting accuracy when they make investment decisions. In other words, the 
followed section turns to investigate the relationship between forecast errors and the short-
term underpricing phenomenon as well as the long-run IPO trading performance. Tests not 
solely incorporate variables representing whether actual earnings are above or below 
expectations, but links the magnitude forecasting errors with IPO performance. It is expected 
143 
 
that if the forecasts prove to be inaccurate, abnormal returns occur, which will affect the 
investors‘ expectations as well as long-run returns.  
This chapter uses a sample of 256 IPOs listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Main 
Board from 2000 to 2006, including both forecasting (172) and non-forecasting (84) 
observations. According to the empirical results, the mean of IPO profit forecasts error in 
prospectuses is about 5.4%, indicating the forecasted profits are slightly lower than the actual 
profit on average. The magnitude of forecasting errors, the absolute forecast error, is about 
10%, which is consistent with prior studies in Chen et al. (2000). Although forecast errors 
exist, the management‘s forecasting has superiority over popular time-series forecasting 
models. The result shows evidence of a possible agency problem where, issuing firms have 
better knowledge than others, which yields the opportunity to seek additional benefits when 
they report the profit forecasting in initial offerings.  
In the further tests for rationality of profit forecasts, De Bondt and Thaler‘s (1990) 
behavioural model of analyst forecasting bias is applied to management forecasts. The results 
demonstrate a pessimistic bias, and the significant slope coefficients of different portfolios, 
including all sample, H-shares and local firms, suggests forecasts are not rational in the sense 
that management correctly incorporates the available information (i.e. the historical profit) in 
its forecasts.  
OLS cross-sectional regressions test various systematic determinants of the magnitude of 
forecasting accuracy. In which, proxies of higher level in ex ante uncertainty are inversely 
related to forecast accuracy, while China-related companies have a higher level of absolute 
forecast errors. Moreover, when the market is ‗hot‘ and market conditions are more volatile, 
the managers have a strong incentive to incorrectly report profit forecast in prospectuses.  
To test the relationship between forecast accuracy and short-run underpricing, this chapter 
conducts different portfolios to compare and contrast. By comparing the initial return and 
market-adjusted initial returns, in the first trading day, both forecasting and non-forecasting 
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IPOs have a similar level of underpricing, and the results are consistent with the whole 
sample in most of the tested years. The statistical insignificance between pessimistic and 
optimistic forecasting may due to the lag of first financial announcement, which is normally 
in three to six months after trading. However, the evidence suggests that if the forecast is 
over-biased, i.e. the forecasting error is excessive (higher than the median of the absolute 
forecast error), investors have the ability to adjust investment expectations, which results in 
extremely high underpricing. 
To trace the effects of forecast accuracy to stock trading performance, the empirical section 
turns to conduct an event study during the first financial announcement period by using the 
cumulative abnormal returns of IPOs. According to Miller‘s (1977) theory, the empirical test 
includes a proxy of divergence of opinion, which is defined as the early-market volatility. For 
the whole sample, underpricing, IPOs‘ early-market volatility, market index volatility, and 
China-related background are significantly associated with abnormal returns. As far as 
portfolio of forecasting observations are concerned particularly, the result demonstrates that 
excessive forecast bias will have a short-term effect on stock prices since investors need time 
to discover the intrinsic value of the firm and adjust their expectation.  
In terms of long-run investigation, this section directly tests the investors‘ sentiment 
hypothesis and divergence of opinion theory. In the first part, following prior literature of 
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), this chapter tests the long-run 
underperformance by using different abnormal return measures, the cumulative abnormal 
returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns, which are adjusted by market indices as well as 
control firms matched by market value and industry. After three years of trading, IPOs 
significantly underperform than the benchmark. In addition, consistent with divergence of 
opinion theory, firms with higher initial returns actually underperform in the long-run, which 
is due to the initial overvaluation. Moreover, although only a few long-run performance 
measures are significant in the testing of performance difference between forecasting and 
non-forecasting firms, the magnitude of forecast errors still systematically affects the one-
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year trading performance. And finally, all variables of divergence of opinion are powerful to 
partially explain the long-run underperformance of IPOs. 
There are a number of contributions in this chapter. First, the chapter offers more detailed 
empirical evidence in testing the forecast accuracy as well as its effect to IPO performance in 
both the short run and the long run. Secondly, in testing the determination of forecast error 
magnitude, the study include new control variables, including public subscription times to 
simulate investors sentiment and an insider dummy to control the wealth effect and dilution 
effect. Thirdly, this chapter initially combines IPO forecast and the divergence of opinion 
hypothesis to explain the long-run underperformance. In addition, as an extension of Chapter 
1, this study further investigates the characteristics of China-related companies‘ overseas 
listing. Moreover, the event study of IPO forecasting effect during the first financial 
announcement period will offer more topics to financial market studies. Finally, since the 
research is important as profit forecasts are the major valuation parameter for IPOs and so 
knowledge will benefit investors, issuing firms, regulators, and other market participants. 
The chapter is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 will give an introduction of Hong Kong 
voluntary profit forecasting as well as short-sale constraint. Section 3.3 will be a literature 
review on a number of hypotheses. The methodology and research questions are summarized 
in Section 3.4, followed by Section 3.5, which is a data description. Empirical studies are in 
Section 3.6, including tests on forecasting accuracy, superiority, rationality, short-run effects, 
and long-run effects. The chapter will be concluded at the end. 
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4.2 Voluntary Profit Forecasting and Short Sale Constrains in Hong Kong 
 
Empirical researches always take market specific features into accounts. Especially, to listing 
on HKEx, influences of market regulation and conventional practice act as constraints to 
mitigate management optimism on the earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses. The profit 
forecasting information is voluntary in Hong Kong, which give managers‘ opportunities to 
take advantage from appropriately and effectively using forecasting information to market 
their IPOs.  Meanwhile, only based on the short sale constrains, the theory of divergence of 
opinion can become a magnifying lens for the price discovery of IPOs. In particular, Miller 
(1977) proposes that divergence of opinion can lead to initial overvaluation and subsequent 
underperformance in markets with restricted short-selling. Because of the short sales 
constraints, optimistic investors have stronger wills to purchase shares whereas pessimistic 
investors mostly stay out of the market. In this case, an upward biased pricing level will exist 
at the beginning of trading. However, as short sale constraints are removed over time and the 
intrinsic value is found by the market, overpriced assets are likely to have underperformance 
in the long term. Consequently, this section provides further information on the profit 
forecasts disclosure in prospectuses and the short-sale constraints in Hong Kong. 
 
4.2.1 Voluntary Disclosure in Hong Kong 
The IPO process is similar to the practices in Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
and Singapore, but contrasts with the US prior to 2004. American IPO shares are sometimes 
initially listed on an OTC market whereas in Hong Kong the shares are listed on the full 
exchange board. Moreover, in the US the precise offer price is not fixed in the prospectus but 
is instead set a day or so before share allocation and after the underwriter has measured the 
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likely demand. American IPO shares are often sold to specific clients of the underwriter and 
to specialist investors rather than the general public. The company, the underwriter, and other 
sponsors of the issue can communicate privately to these select investors and so the 
prospectus is of relatively less importance than in Hong Kong, where the prospectus is the 
only communication between the company and investors. In Hong Kong, the popularity of 
this practice has increased in recent years, as more than half of the offerings used 
bookbuilding after 2004. During half of the sample period, the use of this method is 
increasing but is still a small proportion. Nearly 70% of IPOs in the sample period chose 
fixed-price offerings whose offering price is determined before the subscription tranche opens. 
It is noted that, with the increased popularity of this offering method, gathering information 
during the bookbuilding process offers more meaning in pricing a new issue. Profits forecasts 
would appear to be important in fixing the issue price. Some authorities contend that the 
profit forecast is fundamentally important (Harford, 1969). 
Companies that make new issues of shares in Hong Kong and list the shares on the 
Exchange must comply with the provisions of the Companies Ordinances and satisfy and 
abide by the requirements and rules of the Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd. (HKEx). 
Initial public offerings, including Hong Kong companies, H-shares, or Red Chips
18
, must be 
accompanied by a detailed prospectus which describes the terms of the share offer and 
discloses various prescribed pieces of information. Details of the offer that must be disclosed 
include the offer price, a number of shares to be sold, and the dates for the opening and 
closing of subscriptions. Details about the company include the operating and financial 
history of the company, business activities, pro-forma balance sheets, management team, 
major contractual obligations, debts and liabilities, future plans, planned uses of the issue 
proceeds, and names of the asset and property appraisers, auditors, bankers, underwriters and 
other advisers. Before 2004, IPOs were typically made at fixed offer prices and for a fixed 
quantity of shares. As the offer price is disclosed in the prospectus, it is in effect fixed two or 
                                                     
18
 H-shares and Red Chips are companies that list on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong but have their 
principle operations and majority shareholders in China. Red Chips differ from H-shares in that they 
incorporate in Hong Kong and their senior management is often located there. 
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three weeks before the offer acceptance and share allocation takes place. Alternatively in the 
bookbuilding process, a preliminary price range is disclosed in the prospectus, and the final 
price is shown in the allotment announcement normally one day before the offering.  
The offers are underwritten by financial institutions many of which are well known 
international firms. IPOs receive a lot of media coverage and are extensively reported in the 
popular press. Many IPO investors are non-professionals as it is very easy for the general 
public to subscribe to the new issue. The government as well as the stock exchange wants IPO 
shares to be sold to the general public so as to enhance market liquidity
19
. This characteristic 
of wide public ownership is common in current and former British Commonwealth countries. 
Issues are normally over-subscribed and companies have various schemes to allot the 
available shares. New issue shares generally start trading on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong a day after the allotment of shares.  
IPO prospectuses typically include a forecast of the current year‘s profit20. The profit 
forecast is made by the directors of the company and it is ‗audited‘ by the reporting 
accountants to the issue (the reporting accountants are invariably the auditors). The ‗audit‘ 
involves checking the calculations and ensuring the profit number is based on Hong Kong 
GAAP; the assumptions underlying the forecast are the sole responsibility of management. 
Although underwriters and other advisers (apart from the reporting accountants) are not 
directly involved with the profit forecast, they are, nevertheless, likely to assure themselves 
that the forecast has been adequately prepared and is free from deliberate bias. All the 
advisers to an IPO issue stand to damage their reputation and potentially incur litigation costs 
                                                     
19
 The Stock Exchange rules require that at least 25 percent of the share capital be in the hands of individual 
investors. Most Hong Kong IPOs issue the minimum number of shares to meet the 25 percent threshold. 
According to the investigation of Chan et al. (2001), the remaining 75 percent of shares are retained by the original 
owners who are often from the same family or family group; these shares are rarely traded. Over time the ―75 
percent family ownership‖ is diluted but a majority of Hong Kong listed companies still remain controlled by 
family groups. 
20
 Although this disclosure is frequently observed in British Commonwealth countries (e.g. very common in 
Britain and Australia, and mandated in Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore), they are rarely found in some 
other countries including the United States. 
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if the prospectus is found to contain material mis-statements or contain erroneous information; 
this gives advisers the incentive to monitor management‘s profit forecasts. 
The profit forecast is arguably the single most important valuation parameter given in the 
prospectus (Firth, 1998). IPO companies recognize this and prominently display the 
prospective earnings per share and, more pertinently, the prospective price earnings ratio at 
the front of the prospectus. The prospective price earnings multiplier is the issue price divided 
by forecasted earnings per share. The news media and stockbrokers‘ research reports focus on 
the prospective price earnings ratio. They compare the ratio with the ratios of already listed 
companies that are similar in industry, size, or other dimension, and then estimate a likely 
market price for the IPO. Based on the estimated market price (which is a function of the 
forecast profit), analysts and investors decide whether to subscribe to the new issue (or which 
IPO to subscribe to if there are several new issues occurring at the same time). Firth (1997, 
1998) demonstrated empirically that investors rely on profit forecasts in pricing shares on the 
first day of trading and that deliberate underpricing of IPOs can be signaled via profit 
forecasts.  
The decision to issue or not to issue a prospectus forecast, for companies to list on the Main 
Board of HKEx, reflects provisions set out in Chapter 11 of HKEx‘s Listing Rules21 (Rules 
11(16)-(19)). Rule 11(16), for instance, requires that, ―A listing document (other than one 
supporting a capitalisation issue) must not contain reference (general or particular) to future 
profits or contain dividend forecast based on an assumed future level of profits unless 
supported by a formal profit forecast. Dividend forecasts not based on assumed future profit 
are not subject to this rule.‖ (HKEx Listing Rules, parentheses shown as used). 
As required by HKEx, the issuer must determine in advance, with its financial adviser or 
sponsor in the case of a new applicant, whether to include a profit forecast in a listing 
document. As a profit forecast appears in any listing document, it must be clear, unambiguous 
                                                     
21
 The shortened form, of ‗HKEx Listing Rules‘, is used in the following to refer to the Rules 
Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd., Update No. 84 (latest 
Update: 01 January 2007). 
150 
 
and presented in an explicit manner and the principal assumptions, including the commercial 
assumption, upon which it is based, must be stated and such a profit forecast must be prepared 
on a basis that is consistent with the accounting policies normally adopted by the issuer. The 
accounting policies and calculations for the forecast must be reviewed and reported on by the 
reporting accountants and their report must be set out. The financial adviser or sponsor must 
report in addition that they have satisfied themselves that the forecast has been made by the 
directors after due and careful enquiry. 
According to the Rules, a ‗profit forecast‘ for this purpose means any forecast of profits or 
losses, however worded, and includes any statement which explicitly or implicitly quantifies 
the anticipated level of future profits of losses, either expressly or by reference to previous 
profits or losses or any other benchmark or point of reference. It also includes any profit 
estimate, being any estimate of profits or losses for a financial period which has expired but 
for which the results have not yet been audited or published. Any valuation of assets (other 
than land and buildings) or businesses acquired by an issuer based on discounted cash flows 
or projections of profits, earnings or cash flows will also be regarded as a profit forecast. 
A profit forecast appearing in a listing document (other than one supporting a capitalization 
issue) should normally cover a period which is coterminous with the issuer‘s financial 
yearend. If the profit forecast period ends at a half year-end the Exchange will require an 
undertaking from the issuer that the interim report for that half year will be audited. Profit 
forecast periods not ending on the financial year end or half year-end will not be permitted. 
The assumptions upon which any profit forecast appearing in a listing document are based 
must provide useful information to investors to help them in forming a view as to the 
accuracy and reliability of the forecast. Such assumptions should draw the investors‘ attention 
to, and where possible quantify, those uncertain factors which could materially disturb the 
ultimate achievement of the forecast. The assumptions should be specific rather than general. 
All assumptions and those relating to the general accuracy of the estimates made in the profit 
forecast should be avoided. Furthermore it will not normally be acceptable for assumptions to 
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relate to matters which the directors, by virtue of their particular knowledge and experience in 
the business, are best able to take a view on or are able to exercise control over since such 
matters should be reflected directly in the profit forecast itself. 
Although profit forecasting is voluntary, if the management of issuing companies and their 
underwriters opt to disclose their profit forecasts, they should follow the various provisions of 
the Listing Rules describing the requirements for such forecasts (as required by paragraph 
34(2) of Part A and paragraph 29(2) of Part B of Appendix 1 of the Listing Rules). In fact, it 
is a company‘s commercial decision for the voluntary inclusion of any profit forecast in the 
prospectus. The underwriters believe that investors will be more inclined to have a stronger 
confidence in an issuer if there is a profit forecast available (Hung, 1993). Hence quite a large 
proportion of companies going public would provide profit forecasts so as to attract larger 
subscription rates and to push up the market prices on the listing date. The absence of a 
forecast can be damaging to the launch of an IPO. 
 
4.2.2 Short-Sale Constraints in Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
In January 1994, in line with the reform of the securities borrowing and lending regime, the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange introduced a pilot scheme for regulated short selling. Under the 
scheme, 17 securities could be short sold, but a short sale could not be made below the best 
current ask price (the so-called ―tick rule‖). The scheme was revised in March 1996, when the 
number of securities designated for short selling was increased and the tick rule was repealed. 
The rule was reinstated in September 1998, following the October 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
However, short-selling transactions by stock options market makers to hedge the risk of the 
portfolio that results from their market-making activities are exempt from the rule. Finally, on 
03 December 2001, an exemption from the tick rule on short selling in the stock market for 
index arbitrageurs and market makers took effect to help improve market liquidity, especially 
in a falling market. The number of designated securities for short selling is revised on a 
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quarterly basis, based on liquidity and market capitalization criteria. By the 4th Quarter of 
2006, there were 364 common stocks (out of 975 common stocks traded on the Main Board 
and 198 traded on the Growth Enterprises Market) that could be short sold. 
 
So far, this section has introduced the forecasting information disclosure and the short sell 
constraints in Hong Kong. The following section will summarize widely cited studies on IPO 
information disclosure, forecasts errors, and divergence of opinions, which are the literature 
foundations for the empirical investigations in this chapter.  
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4.3 Literature Review and Tested Hypotheses 
 
4.3.1 International Empirical Evidence of Forecast Errors 
Prior studies have provided much empirical evidence on the IPO profit forecast accuracy 
across global markets. For instance, earlier studies by Firth and Smith (1992) and Mak (1989) 
find actual profits were double the forecast profits in New Zealand, though it improved in the 
year 1987-1994 (Hsu, Hay and Weil, 1999). They argue a systematic relationship between 
deal characteristics with the accuracy of earning forecasts, including company‘s size and 
forecasting time horizon. 
In terms of other markets, Pedwell, Harsame and Neu (1994) shows that, in Canada IPO 
forecasts, on average, exceed the actual profits with the mean absolute error being 88%. In 
their study, both of forecasting time horizon and auditors‘ reputation are highlighted as the 
crucial determinants to the level of forecasting biases.  
In other market, Keasey and McGuinness (1991) discover more accurate forecasts in the 
U.K than those in New Zealand. They conclude that manager‘s profit forecasts in IPO 
prospectuses are more able to indicate a likelihood of future earnings than other statistical 
models.  
Researches in the Asian markets report comparatively smaller errors. By testing Malaysia 
data, Mohamad, Nassir, Kuing and Ariff (1994) find the statistically negative relationship 
between leverage and the absolute forecast error, implying that  higher risk companies (higher 
debt to gross assets ratio) are easier to forecast. A latter study by Jelic, Saadouni and Briston 
(1998) further conclude that, the future earnings of IPOs are under-estimated on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange. They also find level of management forecasts are closely related to 
company‘s age and industry classification. It is noted that, it is a mandatory requirement for 
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Malaysian IPOs to report management earning forecasts in IPO prospectus, which is not as 
the same as the listing regulations in Hong Kong. 
Widely cited papers using Hong Kong data are Chan, Sit, Tong, Wong and Chan (1996) 
and Jaggi (1997). They reported mean absolute forecast errors of 18% and 12.86%. Similar 
levels of forecast accuracy have been reported for China (Chen and Firth, 1999). The errors 
are very small compared to the errors from Australia and New Zealand. Both studies used 
cross-sectional regressions to model the variability in absolute forecast errors. Chan et al. 
found that low profit variability and smaller changes in economic growth accompany small 
forecast errors. Jaggi found that older companies were associated with smaller errors.  
The present study extends the work of Chan et al. (1996) and Jaggi (1997) by using 
different measures of accuracy and by using a later sample period which allows us to include 
Chinese company initial public offerings that list in Hong Kong. This chapter also test 
whether investors anticipate forecast errors at the time of listing; this issue was not addressed 
in prior research on IPOs in Hong Kong. This chapter uses a sample of 256 IPOs listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange Main Board from 2000 to 2006, including both forecasting (172) 
and non-forecasting (84) observations. According to the empirical results, the mean of IPO 
profit forecasts error in prospectuses is about 5.4 percent, indicating the forecasted profits are 
slightly lower than the actual profit on average. The magnitude of forecasting errors, the 
absolute forecast error, is about 10 percent, which is quite close to prior results in Chen et al. 
(2000). Although forecast errors exist, the management‘s forecasting has superiority over 
other popularly used forecasting models. The result shows evidence of a possible agency 
problem where, issuing firms have better knowledge than others, which yields the opportunity 
to seek additional benefits when they report the profit forecasting in initial offerings. 
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4.3.2 Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Signaling Models 
4.3.2.1 Overview 
Asymmetric information and ex ante uncertainty affect firm valuation and IPO underpricing, 
as outside investors are unable to properly value the firm due to a lack of information. Widely 
used valuation models, such as discounted cash flow analysis or comparable firms‘ analysis, 
are hardly capable enough to provide accurate estimations.  
This lack of information has wealth transfer consequences for all parties involved in the 
IPO transaction. Many mechanisms for reducing ex ante uncertainty and the asymmetric 
information challenge are employed in practice. For instance, managers may voluntarily 
disclose the future profit estimate in the coming financial year so as to reduce ex ante 
uncertainty or promote the pre-IPO subscription level (Jog and McConomy, 2003). Also, 
managers may also disclose the number of uses of IPO proceeds, without providing detailed 
disclosure of proprietary information to competitors (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Alternatively, 
insiders may attempt to signal the quality of their IPO by, for example, retaining a large 
fraction of ownership in the post-IPO period (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Firth and Liau-Tan, 
1998). This assures potential investors that insiders will share the wealth consequences of 
improper valuation.  
This chapter focuses on two of the key issues associated with the issuing of and investment 
in IPOs (Marshall, 1998). The first is the potential for mispricing (underpricing) at the time of 
the IPO issue and the second arises during the post-issue period (post-issue return 
performance). In particular, a reduction in asymmetric information via the inclusion of an 
earnings forecast may not only reduce underpricing, but is may also impact after-market 
performance by providing a better benchmark by which investors can assess ex post earnings 
realizations. In particular, those who ‗cheat‘ by including a misleading forecast may be 
penalized by the marketplace (this would be consistent with Beatty and Ritter‘s argument that 
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‗the market penalizes underwriters who cheat on the underpricing equilibrium‘22). This is also 
consistent with recent research that indicates that IPOs perform more poorly in the long run 
when analysts are more optimistic about their long-term growth projections (Rajan and Srvaes, 
1997). The stylized facts indicate that IPOs are, on average, underpriced and that they 
underperform (relative to a matched sample of firms or an index portfolio) in the post-IPO 
period. 
 
4.3.2.2 Asymmetric Information and Voluntary Disclosure 
Since wealth transfers among parties involved in an IPO may have unintended and negative 
consequences, various mechanisms have been developed to minimize the occurrence and the 
extent of these transfers. Voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts provides an additional 
mechanism to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry, which can lead to market 
failure under certain conditions (Akerlof, 1970).  
Studies on the voluntary disclosure generally presume that firms will disclose information 
such as earnings forecasts if the benefits of disclosure outweigh the associated costs 
(Verrecchia, 1983). Managers release earning forecasts in order to give investors an 
indication of management quality. This may enhance investors‘ assessment of the manager‘s 
ability to anticipate future changes and to adjust production accordingly (Trueman, 1986). 
It has also been argued that there is equilibrium between the expected underpricing of an 
IPO and the extent of ex ante uncertainty regarding the IPO‘s value (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). 
Beatty and Ritter build on the asymmetric information model introduced by Rock (1986), 
where both informed and uninformed investors submit purchase orders for IPO shares. Even 
though, on average, IPOs have positive initial returns, a large fraction of IPOs experience 
price declines. Beatty and Ritter show that: 
                                                     
22
 Beatty and Ritter, 1986, Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of initial public 
offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 15, pp.227. 
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(the) degree of underpricing is directly related to the ex ante uncertainty 
about the value of the issue … because as ex ante uncertainty increases, the 
winner’s curse problem intensifies (Beatty and Ritter, 1986, pp. 215-216). 
The uninformed investor will therefore demand higher average underpricing as ex ante 
uncertainty increases. In their paper, Beatty and Ritter use two proxies for ex ante uncertainty 
(number of uses of proceeds and the reciprocal of grow issue proceeds) and show that there is 
a positive relationship between ex ante uncertainty and expected underpricing. Similarly this 
chapter tests the voluntary inclusion of an earnings forecast as a means of reducing ex ante 
uncertainty and underpricing. In this context, it can be argued that if the disclosure of earnings 
forecasts can reduce the uncertainty faced by uninformed investors, then it should result in 
reduced underpricing (on average) for those IPOs providing forecasts. It may also be argued 
that the post-issue return performance of those firms that provide misleading or overly 
optimistic forecasts may be affected negatively. These predictions are tested directly in this 
chapter.  
 
4.3.2.3 Asymmetric Information and Signaling 
Signaling literature is based on the notion that high quality issuers have lower costs for their 
signaling activities. Since signaling devices involve self-selection, for a signal to be effective, 
it must be unprofitable for issuers of low quality IPOs to imitate a high quality firm. It would 
appear to be particularly important to forecast only ‗good news‘ in an IPO setting, where 
firms are unlikely to signal an earnings decline prior to going public. If lower quality firms do 
decide to forecast ‗good news‘ (either because they are genuinely optimistic about their 
prospects or because they ‗cheat‘) then they are more likely to suffer abnormal negative 
returns when actual results are released. This would be particularly costly to the extent that 
owner- managers retain shares that are subject to trading restrictions. Similarly a decision to 
forecast could be costly for a firm of lower quality to copy, because if the forecast is too 
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optimistic, then the firm, its directors, auditors and underwriters would not only suffer 
damaged reputations but would be subject to potential lawsuits and penalties. Other direct 
costs may include resistance the firm may face in raising additional funding through a 
subsequent offering. 
In the context of IPOs, Leland and Pyle (1977) provide further evidence on the signaling 
theory. By retaining a higher proportion of ownership in IPO events, entrepreneurs actually 
face higher cost to diversify their risks. Hughes (1986) develops a model that is consistent 
with Leland and Pyle, in which the entrepreneur is willing to increase their retained 
ownership if the investment opportunity is sufficiently attractive. Then both of entrepreneur‘s 
estimates of future cash flows and retained ownership can properly indicate firm‘s value. 
Clarkson, Dintoh, Richardson and Sefcik (1992) also conclude a positive relationship between 
retained ownership and market value, and between the earnings forecast signal and market 
value. Titman and Trueman (1986) model that valuation of new issues in relation to 
information quality. They show that firm value is an increasing function of auditor and 
investment banker quality.  
Overall, these studies suggest that because of information asymmetry, owner-managers 
have an incentive to signal firm value to differentiate their IPOs from firms of lower quality. 
Furthermore, IPOs are expected to use multiple signals to hit the target of maximizing fund 
raised, which may include the voluntary issuing of an earnings forecast. This chapter controls 
for the impact of signals such as retained ownership, choice of auditor and underwriter on 
underpricing, and post-issue performance, in order to focus on the ability of earnings forecasts 
to reduce information asymmetry and ex ante uncertainty. However, to the extent that an 
earnings forecast can also be considered a signal of value, results in this chapter provide 
evidence consistent with both voluntary disclosure and signaling theory.  
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4.3.3 The Divergence of Opinion 
The literature proposes numerous theoretical explanations for the short-term underpricing and 
long-run underperformance of IPOs. This chapter tries to be in line with the divergence of 
opinion hypothesis and investigate whether initial trading performance plays a role in IPO 
long-term performance, which has received limited attention from the literature.  
Miller (1977) proposes that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and 
subsequent underperformance in markets with restricted short-selling, such as the IPO market. 
Because of the short-sales constraint, optimistic investors are more likely to show their 
opinions by purchasing shares, whereas pessimistic investors mostly stay out of the market. 
This would bias share price upward as long as there is sufficient demand. As short-sales 
constraints are removed over time, the IPO market price can freely converge to its 
fundamental value, producing underperformance in the long run. Miller proposes that a 
greater divergence of opinion among IPO investors will translate into greater short-run 
overvaluation, and hence, greater long-run underperformance. 
While differences of opinion among investors are generally believed to play an important 
role in asset pricing, the conflicting theoretical predictions of divergence of investor opinion 
on asset prices remain an unresolved issue. Moreover, there is both very little and 
contradictory evidence on how difference of opinion influence asset prices. Cragg and 
Malkiel (1968, 1982), Friend et al. (1978) and Harris (1986) provide some evidence in favour 
of a positive association between stock returns and dispersion in analysts‘ earnings forecast. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) present a rational expectations model in which short 
constraints do not lead to overvaluation but reduce the speed at which new information, and 
bad information in particular, is incorporated into prices. Similar results, though in a very 
different context, are derived in Hong and Stein (2003). Qu et al. (2003) also show that 
dispersion is priced as an information risk factor especially for small and value firms. 
Similarly, Doukas et al. (2004) argue that divergence of opinion is more pronounced among 
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value stocks and this is behaves as a risk factor that can partly explain the value-growth 
anomaly.  
On the contrary, Diether, Molloy, and Schebina (2002) examine the effect of analyst 
forecast dispersion on non-IPO stock returns. They show that stocks with a higher dispersion 
in analysts‘ earnings forecasts earning lower future returns than otherwise similar stocks. 
They interpret their findings as being consistent with Miller‘s prediction that divergence of 
opinion is priced at a premium. 
Recent theoretical research has revived the overvaluation hypothesis. Duffie et al. develop 
a model in which short sale constraint together with divergence of opinion (modeled by 
assuming different priors about the payoff distribution) may lead to overvaluation. In Johnson 
(2004), the model argues that dispersion can be viewed as a proxy for unpriced information 
risk when fundamentals are unobservable. As a result, a rise in dispersion (unpriced / 
idiosyncratic risk) raises the option value of a levered firm, which lowers its expected return. 
Hence he claims that the negative association between dispersion and future returns 
documented in Diether et al. (2002) is not necessarily a manifestation of mispricing as in 
Miller (1977)
23
. In Scheinkman and Wei (2003) overconfidence creates divergence of opinion 
and, in the presence of short sale constraints, may lead to overvaluation. A similar result is 
derived in Jiang (2005). 
In January 1994, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange launched a pilot program to establish the 
so-called short-sale designation list. Initially, there were 17 stocks on the list. Since 1994, the 
list has been frequently changed. Only stocks on the list can be short sold, and when an 
individual stock is deleted from the list, it cannot be short sold again. This market practice 
and the unique database enables us to directly compare stock price effects before and after the 
stock enters/exits the list, with the other characteristics of the sampled stocks naturally 
controlled. And since the restrictions for short sales are prohibited and reinstated for different 
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 Doukas, J.A., C. Kim, and C. Pantzalis, 2006, Divergence of Opinion and Equity Returns under 
Different States of Earnings Expectations, Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 9, Issue 3 (August),  311. 
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stocks at different times, a subsequent cross-sectional analysis would suffer less from the 
potential confounding effects of other concurrent effects. 
Researchers have used various avenues in order to empirically test the overvaluation 
hypothesis. The most common approach is to consider a cross-section of stocks and to test 
whether stocks that are subject to short selling constraints are overvalued, and whether 
overvaluation depends on the degree of divergence of opinion. This requires (a) identification 
of stocks that are short sale constrained, (b) a measure for the degree of divergence of opinion, 
and (c) a measure of asset value to identify overvaluation. 
An ideal measure of divergence of opinion would be dispersion of analyst or manager 
earnings forecasts because it is an ex ante proxy. The standard deviation of returns and the 
turnover ratio have also been employed (Boehme et al., 2006). Diether et al. (2002) examine 
the effect of analyst forecast dispersion on non-IPO stock returns. Yet ex ante analyst 
forecasts are not available for IPO firms; even ex post analyst coverage (particularly earnings 
forecasts) right after IPOs is limited
24
. As a result, Houge et al. (2001) examine the effect of 
three-day variables (opening bid-ask spread, time of the first trade, and flipping ratio) as 
proxies for divergence of opinion in IPO markets. They find all of them are significantly 
related to IPO long-term returns.  
In this chapter, the proxies for divergence of opinion are the early-market return volatility 
and first-day turnover. The former is the IPO daily return volatility for the first 25 trading 
days after issuing. According to Gao, Mao and Zhong (2006), there are several advantages of 
this measure. First, use of return volatility can be justified by several theoretical and empirical 
studies. Shalen (1993) argues that greater divergence of opinion leads directly to higher return 
volatility. Diether et al. (2002) document a positive relationship between divergence of 
opinion and price volatility in the stock market. Although this chapter agrees that the three 
opening-day proxies in Houge et al. (2001) are related to uncertainty about an IPO, it is not 
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 Only about 10 percent of IPO sample in this chapter had three or more earnings forecasts available 
on the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) within three months after an offering. 
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clear how they are related to divergence of opinion. Secondly, using return volatility allows 
an alternative test of Miller‘s (1977) prediction. Miller‘s prediction depends on the presence 
of short-sales constraints, which are more prevalent in the IPO market than in other markets. 
This chapter expects a negative relationship between the proxy for divergence of opinion and 
long-term return. This helps to evaluate whether the relationship is relevant to Miller‘s 
prediction or merely a spurious correlation resulting from the use of proxy variables. Third, 
all the measures may not be clean proxies of divergence of opinion as they are correlated with 
the intrinsic business risk of a particular IPO firm. The uncertainty of intrinsic business would 
not directly relate to divergence of opinion. This chapter uses the method in Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) to decompose the return volatility and extracts a cleaner proxy for the 
divergence of opinion.  
 
4.3.4 IPO Long-run Underperformance and Methodology Approaches 
The long-run performance of IPOs has attracted considerable attention. Ibbotson (1975) 
finds a negative average return during the three-year holding period after the issuing date in 
the US market. Ritter (1991) documents significant underperformance of IPOs from 1970 to 
1990. The international application is by Levis (1993) and Aggarwal et al. (1993), that report 
the low long-run returns of IPOs is also applicable to countries such as Great Britain, Chile 
and Mexico. Brav and Gompers (1997) additionally find that underperformance is 
concentrated among small and non-venture-backed firms. Gopers and Lerner (2003) find that 
IPOs issued between 1935 and 1972 display underperformance when event-time buy-and-
hold abnormal returns are used. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) relate this long-run underperformance to the ownership structure. 
Consistent with the agency theory, they argue that firms with higher insider selling of shares 
at the IPO should have worse long-run performance. Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000) 
suggest that conflict of interests would explain the underperformance of venture-backed IPOs.  
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Shiller (1990) argues that the IPO market is subject to fads, which results in long-run bad 
performance. In this framework, Levis (1993) and Loughran, Ritter and Rydquist (1994) all 
report that IPOs with moderate initial returns perform better than those with negative or large 
initial returns
25
. Consistent with the supply response hypothesis of Ritter (1991), Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) conclude that underperformance is more severe in high than in low trading-
volume periods. 
Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1995) find that firms may adopt extensive discretionary accounting 
accruals to manipulate reported earnings before and soon after the IPO. Naïve investors may 
be systematically fooled by ―window-dressing‖ operations of earning management and will 
accept paying a high offer price. Long-run underperformance will result from stock price 
adjustment to actual earnings following IPOs. 
However, recent studies suggest that the long-run performance of IPOs is sensitive to the 
valuation method. Loughran and Ritter (2000) suggest that adopting the market return as a 
benchmark causes a test bias towards no abnormal return, as the benchmark includes these 
IPOs. Espenlaub, Grogry, and Tonks (2000) report a long-run underperformance irrespective 
of the benchmark used for UK IPOs. Sthele et al. (2000) shows that underperformance is 
reduced considerably when the abnormal return estimate makes reference to size-adjusted 
portfolios instead of market portfolios. 
Fama (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) have argued that the method of performance 
measurement influences both the magnitude of the abnormal returns as well as the size and 
power of the statistical test. In this context, Brav et al. (2000) reveal that there low long-run 
returns of the IPOs do not exist. Thus, these firms obtain long-run returns that are similar to 
those obtained by firms that have not gone public if the comparison is made in terms of size 
and book-to-market ratio of firms. This result reveals that the return patterns of firms that 
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 Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) conclude that while the first-day ―winners‖ have a positive 
abnormal return over the first-day period, first-day ―dogs‖ have negative abnormal return. 
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have carried out IPOs are not different to those of firms that have not done so and that the 
results found in previous works are motivated by the long-run returns measures used. 
There are diverse methodological questions that affect the estimation of long-run returns. 
Using cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) or buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR)
26
. All 
the methods used for the estimation of abnormal returns are subject to problems arising from 
the poor specification of the models and no method is able to minimize these problems for all 
classes of events (Fama, 1998). Even closed models, such as the Fama-French three-factor 
model and benchmarks matched on size and book-to-market ratio, since they both control for 
variations in the returns motivated by these two variables. This gives rise to different 
estimations of the abnormal returns (Fama, 1998). This work has opted to use a wide range of 
methodologies and variations of these, in order to give the greatest possible robustness to the 
estimations. 
To summarize, this literature review chapter aims to jointly test the above hypotheses for 
both the short-run and the long-run trading performance with the relationship to forecasting 
accuracy. The following section will introduce the methodology and testable research 
question respectively. 
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 This is the return obtained by an investor as a consequence of a strategy consisting in buying stocks 
at the end of the first day‘s trading and holding them for a period of time. 
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4.4 Methodology, Testable Implications and Research Questions 
 
In terms of the methodology, in the short run, t-statistics, sign-statistics, and Wilcoxon-
statistics are used in this chapter to test the profit forecast accuracy. The accuracy measures 
include forecast error (AFE), absolute forecast error (AFE), the squared forecast error (SQFE), 
time-series forecast errors (AFE(RW) and AFE(G)), Superiority proxies (SUP(N) and 
SUP(G)). Rationality tests are based on De Bondt and Thalor‘s (1990) methodology. The 
determinants of forecast accuracy are run by OLS cross-sectional regressions via controlling a 
number of systematic characteristics, as well as the tests of underpricing. In the long run, IPO 
performance measures include the cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns, which are adjusted by market indices as well as control firms matched by market 
value and industry. Detailed explanation of the methodology will be illustrated separately for 
reading and understanding convenience. 
Separated by a number of testable implications, the research questions are listed as follows: 
1. Are IPO profit forecasts in prospectuses accurate enough for investors to make an 
investment decision? 
2. To compare with popular time-series forecasting models, i.e. the random model and 
growth model, does IPO profit forecast have superiority, i.e. whether IPO forecasts 
have lower errors? 
3. Are managers rational in reporting profit forecasts? And will they incorporate all 
available information and provide unbiased forecasting? 
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4. Does underpricing vary between forecasting and non-forecasting firms significantly? 
And can China-related firms with a large forecast error obtain a higher level of 
abnormal returns in the first trading day? 
5. As an extension to the studies in Chapter II, which characteristics are highly associated 
with underpricing, and is the forecasting error related (including the comparison 
between optimistic and pessimistic, excessive and non-excessive forecasting )? 
6. During the period of the first financial announcement after listing, will the abnormal 
returns be affected by the accuracy of forecasts (including the comparison between 
optimistic and pessimistic, excessive and non-excessive forecasting )? And will the 
sign of forecasting errors and magnitude be systematically related to the abnormal 
return during the time window? 
7. To test various behavioural finance hypotheses, can the theory of divergence of 
opinion partially explained the aftermarket abnormal returns powerfully in the event 
study? 
8. Whether IPOs underperformance in the long-run? Will profit forecasting in 
prospectuses and the level of forecast accuracy affect the long-run trading 
performance? And will China-related companies persistently underperform once 
compared to local shares? 
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4.5 Data Selection and Description 
 
The sample comprises 256 IPOs on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) Main Board 
over the period January 2000 to March 2006, with 173 IPOs forecasting their profits in the 
prospectus when going public and 84 IPOs no doing so. The sample period depends on the 
sample availability. The list of issuing firms is received from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Annual Listing Reports, which is posted on the HKEx official website. Meanwhile, this report 
includes offering companies‘ proceed amounts, number of shares offered, accountants, 
auditors, lead sponsor(s), subscription price (offer price), and H-share flag. The tested sample 
represents the majority population of IPOs in the HKEx Main Board during the sample period. 
Table 4.1 reports the comparison between the whole population and tested samples.  
Proxies of company and firm-specific variables is handle collection from companies IPO 
prospectuses and annual reports, including management‘s profit forecasts and three-year 
historical profit records from each prospectus, actual profits released in annual reports, 
financial year end, number of years of operating history, number of risks related to issuing, 
forecasting horizon, total assets, total number of shares outstanding, gearing ratio, and 
commission fee charged by underwriters. All collected prospectuses and annual reports are 
available in the Thomson Research Database. The public subscription level is from the HKEx 
official website. 
Data related to stock trading performance is collected from DataStream Database. To 
specify, market trading data includes the first day closing price for calculating initial returns, 
first day turnover and first 25-day daily prices for divergence of opinion proxies, monthly 
share prices, market values, book-to-market ratios, matching firms‘ and indices (Hang Seng 
Index and Hang Seng Composite Index) daily and monthly price (or price index).  
168 
 
Table 4.2 reports a wide distribution of the tested samples across industries. The 
distribution among industries also depends on the industry structure of Hong Kong. For 
instance clothing products, computer related products, electronic equipments, and financial 
services all significantly contribute to the regional economy. 
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4.6 Empirical Tests and Discussions of Results 
 
4.6.1 Accuracy, Rationality and Superiority of IPO Profit Forecasts 
4.6.1.1 Testing of Accuracy 
Unlike investing in companies which are already listed, IPO investors are unable to observe a 
consensus market price. They cannot choose to rely on the general opinion of the market. 
Thus, accounting figures constitute a fundamental part of the evaluation process by which 
IPO investors decide whether the subscription price asked by the issuer is warranted. The 
reliability of profit forecasts will be of important concern to investors. The usefulness of 
profit forecasts provided by management in the prospectuses has been a cause of regulatory 
concern in the US and the UK for more than a decade. Reliability (i.e., precision) has been 
regarded as an essential characteristic of the data provided in prospectuses (including 
forecasts), and as such is one of the main areas of regulatory concern. 
The forecast error (FE) for company (i) in the year of the IPO (t) is defined as the 
difference between the actual profit and the forecasted profit divided by the absolute value of 
the actual profit, shown in Equation (4.1): 
                         (4.1) 
where in Equation (4.1), APit is company i‘s actual profit in the year of the IPO, and FPit is 
company i‘s forecasted profit in the IPO prospectuses. A positive value for FE implies that on 
average IPO companies have a pessimistic bias (under-forecast) while a negative value for FE 
represents an optimistic bias (over-forecast). 
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The absolute forecast error (AFE) and the squared forecast error (SQFE) are defined in 
Equation (4.2) and (4.3): 
AFEit = | FEit |                               (4.2) 
SQFEit = (FEit)
2
 × 100                   (4.3) 
It is noted that, AFE is the major measure used to evaluate forecast accuracy. The mean of 
the absolute forecast errors represents the overall accuracy of IPO profit forecasts. AFEs vary 
quite significantly across companies. One reason for these differences will be the inherent 
difficulty in predicting a specific company‘s earnings; this inherent difficulty is not, however, 
directly measurable. One proxy for inherent difficulty is the change in annual profits 
measured from before the IPO to after it. This chapter argues that the greater the change in 
profit, the more difficult it will be to forecast the profit. Apart from AFE, SQFE additionally 
highlights IPOs with degree of forecasting errors.  As argued by Bhaskar and Morris (1984) 
and Jelic, Saadouni and Briston (1998), SQFE is more appropriate for an analysis of 
investors‘ losses when the forecast is so inaccurate.  
The summary statistics of IPO profit forecast accuracy measures (FE, AFE and SQFE) is 
shown in Table 4.3. The mean FE for the total sample is 5.37% with a mean of 4.26%. The 
results are consistent with Chen and Firth (2000) but have a lower level of both forecast error 
and absolute forecast errors
27
. The mean of AFE appears to be double the level of average FE, 
at about 10% during the sample period. And the average SQFE is about 5% for all samples. 
Table 4.4 additionally presents the summary statistics of IPO profit forecast accuracy 
measures by cohort years. Except for the forecast error (FE) in 2000, all the means and 
medians are positive. In 2000, levels of FE and AFE are significantly different from each 
other. The large difference indicates that prospectus profit forecasts are more pessimistic (i.e. 
the actual profit for the year is less than the forecast profit) than optimistic (i.e. the actual 
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 As reported by Chen et al. (2000), by using data from the HKEx during the period 1993 – 1996, the 
mean forecast error is 9.94 percent with a median of 5.79 percent. 
171 
 
profit for the year is higher than the forecast profit). The large difference between FE and 
AFE in 2003 is mainly due one of company (2628.HK) which over-estimated profits by more 
than 50% in prospectus. 
Since profit forecast is one of the most important factors to value new issuing firms, 
particularly for investors with very little information, theoretically it has to be accurate. 
Therefore this chapter expected that once being unbiased, both forecast error and absolute 
forecast error are equal to zero, as show in Equation (4.4) and (4.5): 
H1:    FE = 0                                  (4.4) 
H2:   AFE = 0                                (4.5)  
The means (with t-test statistics), medians, and standard deviations of errors are 
disaggregated with reference to China-related IPOs, including Red Chips and H-shares, and 
local IPOs, as shown in Table 4.5. The means of both FE and AFE for the overall sample are 
statistically different from zero at a 0.01 level. The significant positive sign indicate that, on 
average, the forecast profits are less than actual profits and so the forecasts are said to be 
conservative or pessimistic. The average SQFE is about 5%, being insignificantly different 
from zero for all samples.  
By breaking down the forecast errors by type of issue, both AFE and SQFE are statistically 
significant for Chinese-related IPOs, suggesting a possibly persistent bias in their IPO 
forecasts. However, FE and AFE for Red Chips are not significantly different from zero at the 
0.01 level, implying that there is no bias in the forecasts for this group of IPOs. Cross-issue 
type comparisons show that the mean error for H-shares is significantly different from the 
mean error of local IPOs. The mean forecast errors for local companies are lower than those 
reported by Jaggi (1997). Mean absolute forecast errors are also lower than the errors reported 
in Chan et al. (1996, 2000) and Jaggi (1997).  
To further illustrate the distribution of forecasting errors, Figure 4.1 provides a prediction 
realization diagram. An oblique line through origin represents the exact forecast accuracy, the 
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observations to the left of the oblique line represent optimistic forecasts, while observations to 
the right of the oblique line represent pessimistic forecasts. 
Once the level of forecasting errors is discovered, we need to compare these forecasts with 
other popular models to investigate whether the management forecasting is more accurate 
since managers are normally assumed to have better knowledge of the issuing firm than other 
do. Therefore, the following section will turn to discuss the superiority of IPO management 
forecasting. 
 
4.6.1.2 Testing of Superiority in Managers’ Forecasts to Other Forecasting Models 
The AFE is compared against the errors from using simple statistical time series 
extrapolations of historical profits. Based on the study by Cheng and Firth (2000), two time 
series models are examined, i.e. the naïve no-change model (N), where the forecasted profit 
(NAÏVE_F) is the latest profit before listing (APt-1), and the growth (G) model, where the 
forecast profit (GF) is AP t-1 multiplied by an annual compound growth in profits over the 
three years prior to listing. The absolute errors from these statistical models, AFE (N) and 
AFE (G), are calculated as Equation (4.6) and (4.7): 
                                   (4.6) 
                                           (4.7) 
The growth model may have better predictability than the naïve no-change model because 
many IPOs have strong profits growth in the three years prior to listing and the growth model 
captures and extrapolates the growth into the next year (Cheng and Firth, 2000). Cameron 
(1982) and Jelic, Saadouni, and Briston (1998) also confirm that the relatively simple models 
for forecasting earnings seem to be less accurate than management forecasts. Also, the growth 
model captures the impact of recent inflation. To examine whether managements‘ forecasts of 
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profits are better than the statistical models this chapter deducts AFE from AFE (N) to yield 
SUP (N) and deducts AFE from AFE (G) to yield SUP (G), shown in Equation (4.8) and (4.9): 
SUP (N) = AFE (N) – AFE                          (4.8) 
SUP (G) = AFE (G) – AFE                            (4.9) 
According to prior literature, it is expected that, the managements‘ profit forecasts 
appearing in prospectuses are more accurate. Management should be able to make better 
forecasts because they can incorporate in their forecasts the actual results for the year up to 
the date of the prospectus; they can also incorporate the effects of changes in the business 
environment that have become apparent since the previous fiscal year end; and they can 
estimate the profits generated and expenses incurred from investing the new issue proceeds. 
This chapter tests the hypotheses in alternative form as shown in Equation (4.10) and (4.11): 
H3:   SUP(N) = AFE(N) – AFE > 0                       (4.10) 
H4:   SUP(G) = AFE(G) – AFE > 0                     (4.11) 
[AFE(N) – AFE] gives the superiority of the IPO forecast relative to the random walk forecast 
(the superiority is denoted SUP(N)) and [AFE(G) – AFE] also gives the superiority of the IPO 
forecast relative to the growth forecast (the superiority is denoted SUP(G)). Superiority means 
prospectus forecasts are more accurate than the time series models. Descriptive statistics of 
these superiority measures is reported in Table 4.6.  
 
4.6.1.3 Testing of Rationality 
Condition on the voluntary disclosure of profit forecasts in IPO prospectuses, companies, the 
original shareholders, and the underwriters may have an incentive to convey such information 
to potential investors. If investors are assumed to have very little information on new shares, 
such information disclosure will in turn promote market demand and receive an optimal 
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pricing level. The previous section suggests management forecasts are more accurate than 
other forecasting models. The following will try to capture the bias and rationality of 
management forecasts, i.e. whether managers can fully and correctly incorporate the historic 
information into forecasts. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1990) and Capstaff et al. (1995) designed and used tests to capture 
the bias and rationality of investment analysts‘ earnings forecasts. These techniques are 
applied to IPO profit forecasts in this chapter, which is also consistent with Cheng and Firth 
(2000). Firstly, the actual changes in profits are compared to forecast changes in profits via 
the following regression model:  
(APt - APt-1) / APt-1 = α + β (FPt - APt-1) / APt-1 + εi             (4.12) 
where the variables are as described earlier, and α and β are estimated via the regression. 
The left side in Equation (4.12) is the actual profits change of the issuing firms, and the 
right side is the forecasted profits change. The null hypothesis states that IPO profit forecasts 
are unbiased, which implies α=0 and β=1 as shown in Equation (4.13). Following the 
arguments of DeBondt and Thaler (1990), profit forecasts have an optimistic bias (predicted 
profits exceed actual) if α<0 and a pessimistic bias if α>0. β<1 is interpreted as an 
overreaction to available information (e.g. APt-1) because the absolute value of the forecast is 
too high, and β>1 is interpreted as an underreaction to available information (Capstaff et al., 
1995).  
H5:  α = 0   and   β = 1                               (4.13) 
where, α=0 indicates that there is no forecasted error on average, and β=1 could be interpreted 
as an excellent forecast at the consensus level. Student‘s t-statistics is used to verify the 
statistical significance of α and β coefficients and to compare the coefficient of determination. 
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Following De Bondt and Thaler (1990), the results of tests for bias and rationality, as 
shown in Equation (4.13), are reported in Table 4.7. The model fit for Equation (4.13) is good. 
The intercept is positive and significantly different from zero for the whole sample, for China-
related companies, as well as for H-shares. According to De Bondt and Thaler (1990) and 
Capstaff et al. (1995), this implies a pessimistic bias in IPO prospectus earnings forecast. The 
slope coefficient suggests that forecasts are not rational in the sense that management fully 
and correctly incorporates the available information (i.e. the historical profit, APt-1, and the 
historical growth rate) in its forecasts.  
However, it remains a question that whether this under-estimate is conservative or strategic. 
Many studies argue releasing inside information has wealth transfer consequences for all 
parties involved in the IPO transaction. Many mechanisms for reducing ex ante uncertainty 
and the asymmetric information challenge are undertaken to mitigate the potential loss 
associated with IPO valuation in the absence of more credible information about a firm‘s 
prospects. It is noted that, historical data may not be feasible predictors of future earnings 
because of the typically fast growth of the IPO companies and because they are not able to 
completely anticipate and incorporate the payoffs from the newly raised capital through IPO 
activities. Along with the tests of forecasting matrix in the previous section, this study is 
disposed to agree with that managers are more conservative than strategic. Certainly, a 
conservative forecast will additionally benefit the aftermarket trading more or less. Under this 
circumstance, the following tests have to find out the determinants of forecasting accuracy 
magnitude as well as the relationship between forecasting accuracy and the aftermarket 
trading activities. 
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4.6.2 Forecasting Errors and Underpricing 
4.6.2.1 Determinants of forecasting accuracy magnitude  
Based on prior research, including Brown, Foster and Noreen (1985) Collins and Hopwood 
(1980), Cooper and Taylor (1983) and Firth and Smith (1992), on a priori reasoning Chan et 
al. (1996) investigates the impact of company size, length of the forecast period, historical 
variability in profits, age, leverage, auditor, underwriter, ownership, Chinese companies, 
industry sector, and return on assets, on the absolute forecast error (AFE). The absolute 
forecast error is defined as the actual profit minus the forecast profit, scaled by forecast profit; 
the sign of the error is ignored when computing AFE. AFE represents the magnitude of the 
error while the average forecast error (inclusive of sign) measures the bias in forecasts. 
This chapter, again, empirically tests the determinants of forecasting accuracy magnitude. 
A number of research questions have been raised, (1) which firm- and market-specific 
characteristics can systematically affect the absolute forecast error; (2) can ex ante 
uncertainties and other asymmetric information models explain the differences in forecast 
accuracy; and (3)do underwriters and insiders in issuing firms have an incentive to manage 
the profit forecast. The following testable hypotheses will be examined via cross-sectional 
regression. Control variables include size, age, industry, leverage, risks, insider benefits, 
promotion effects, forecasting horizon, companies‘ Chinese background, underwriters, and 
market movement, etc. 
 
Ex ante Uncertainty – Size  
There is some support in literature (Bhaskar and Morris, 1984; Firth and Smith, 1992; Chan, 
Firth & Krishnan, 2001) for the contention that larger size companies are ‗easier‘ to forecast 
than their smaller size counterparts. This may be predicated in part by the idea that larger 
companies have greater control over their market settings and that they enjoy some 
177 
 
comparative economies of scale which make them less susceptible to economic fluctuations.  
Also, large companies are likely to have more influence over their market settings and they 
are more likely to be price-setters; this gives them more control over the level of their profit. 
To examine this notion the following hypothesis is tested: 
H6: Forecasting accuracy improves with larger companies. 
This hypothesis implies a negative relationship between forecast error and company size. It 
should be noted here that new issue companies in general tend to be small in comparison to 
existing listed firms. In this chapter, the logarithm of proceed amount raised in offerings is 
assigned as the proxy (SIZE).  
 
Ex ante Uncertainty – Corporation History 
Profit forecasting is likely to be more difficult for risky companies so this chapter therefore 
hypothesizes positive relationships exist between absolute forecast errors and the risk 
variables, indicating a negative relationship with the age of the company. Control variables 
are well accepted measures of company risk in the literature (Ritter, 1984; Beatty and Ritter, 
1986). Older companies may be viewed as being less risky as they have more experience to 
draw on when making forecasts of their profits. 
The profit of companies which have been in existence for a small number of years would 
appear to be intrinsically more difficult to forecast (Berlinger and Robbins, 1986; Firth and 
Smith, 1992; Chan and Firth, 2001). At the extreme prediction of earnings for brand new 
firms seems to be particularly fraught with difficulty. This leads to another hypothesis: 
H7: Forecasting accuracy improves the longer the company has been in existence. 
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This hypothesis is tested via a variable, AGE, defined as the logarithmic value of a 
company‘s years operating history.  
 
Ex ante Uncertainty – Industry 
Industrial classification may have an association with the level of forecast accuracy; that is, 
some industries‘ profit levels may be inherently more difficult to predict than others. 
Empirical evidence on whether differences exist in forecasting errors across industries has 
been mixed (Ferris, 1976; Ferris and Hayes, 1977; Richards, 1976; and Bhaskar and Morris, 
1984). Dev and Webb (1972) reported some industry differences in forecasts contained in 
new issue prospectuses in the UK. 
H8: High-teche companies are expected to have a higher risk as well as a higher level of 
forecasting error than manufacturing companies. 
This chapter uses a tech-stock dummy (TECH), which is defined as those in four-digit SIC 
codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 
(communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 
(navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling devices), 
3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communications 
services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, and 7379 (software). A positive 
relationship is predicted between the dummy variable and the forecasting errors. 
 
Ex ante Uncertainty – Leverage Level 
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The net profits of companies with comparatively high levels of debt are traditionally 
regarded as being more difficult to forecast. To accommodate for this factor as a determinant 
of forecast accuracy, the following hypothesis is constructed:  
H9: Forecasting accuracy improves when the leverage is lower. 
The proxy of leverage level in this chapter is defined as the gearing ratio (GEAR). A 
positive relationship is expected between the forecast error and the leverage ratio. 
 
Ex ante Uncertainty – Risks 
Issuing companies normally release the possible risks which can affect the operating 
performance of the company. The proxy of risk is defined as the number of risk factors (RISK) 
listed the prospectuses. This factor is also adopted by Beatty and Ritter (1986) as one of the 
measures of ex ante uncertainty. 
H10: Firms with more risk factors will be associated with higher forecast errors. 
 
Ex ante Uncertainty and the Agency Problem – Insider Benefit 
This chapter predicts a negative relationship between AFE and the percentage of shares 
held by outsiders. The argument is that while ‗insiders‘ have other means to predict profits, 
outsiders have to rely on the prospectus forecast. The following hypothesis is constructed: 
H11: The larger the number of outside shareholders, the greater the chance of litigation if the 
forecasts are inaccurate. 
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Loughran and Ritter (2002) separate the gain from the wealth effect and dilution effect for 
firm‘s insiders. In which, the wealth effect is raised by the price jump in secondary market, 
while the dilution effect is positive if the after-market price is less than the initial offer price. 
Bradley and Jordan (2002) further simplify Loughran and Ritter‘s expressions. In additional, 
knowing as the insider wealth maximizing hypothesis, Ang and Brau (2003) show that many 
IPO insiders use different concealment strategies to prevent outside investors from knowing 
how many shares they sell in the secondary market, which is consistent with Cook, 
Kieschnick, and Ness (2006).  
Therefore, this chapter uses a dummy variable, the insider benefit (INSIDER), as the 
control variable in the cross-sectional regression. The insider benefit dummy equals to one if 
the wealth effect is higher than the dilution effect, and zero otherwise. The wealth effect and 
dilution effect are defined in Equation (4.14) and (4.15): 
Wealth Effect = (P1 – PM) × (Shares Outstanding – Number of Shares Sold)   (4.14) 
Dilution Effect = (P1 – P0) × Number of Shares Sold in IPO          (4.15) 
where, P1 is the closing price on the first trading day, PM is the midpoint of the preliminary 
price range
28
, and P0 is the offer price of each observation. ‗Total shares outstanding‘ is the 
number of outstanding shares after initial public offerings. 
 
Agency Problem – Promotion Effects 
The role of marketing, and particularly promotion, in the pricing and trading of securities is 
limited in most asset pricing models. This partially stems from the frequent treatment of 
investors possessing the same information and identical likelihood functions, which results in 
                                                     
28
 In the offering method of bookbuilding, issuing companies and their underwriter will initially release 
a preliminary price range in the prospectus. In the following road show process, more newly received 
information will be incorporated in finalizing the offer price, which is normally within the price range. 
The midpoint of the preliminary price range is broadly used as a predictor of the ultimate offer price. 
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homogeneous expectations about a security‘s returns. When one or another of these 
assumptions is dropped (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993) and short-selling is allowed (e.eg 
Lintner, 1969), security market prices reflect an average of heterogeneous investor 
expectations, producing an unbiased estimate of a security‘s value. When both of these 
conditions fail to hold, security prices reflect the valuations of more optimistic investors and 
thereby represent biased estimates of security values.  
Building upon Miller‘s work, Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006) argue that issuers 
and regular (institutional) customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of 
sentiment investors or noise traders in the market for an IPO. If correct, then an investment 
banker‘s efforts to promote an IPO, particularly to retain investors, should benefit both the 
issuer and the investment banker‘s regular customers. Consequently, an investment banker‘s 
ability to promote an issue to retail investors should influence the issuer‘s decision to use the 
same investment banker in subsequent equity offerings. Therefore investment bankers have 
an incentive to create demand for an IPO by promoting it. In terms of the profit forecast 
released in prospectuses, Cook et al. (2006) further argues that, pre-issue publicity attracts 
retail (noise) investors to an IPO; also, attracting retail investors through publicity is good for 
the issuer; and attracting retail investors through publicity is good for an investment bank‘s 
regular IPO investors; finally, attracting retail investors through publicity is good for 
investment banks. Although Cook et al. does not focus on analyst coverage as part of the 
marketing effort, it is clear from Dunbar (2000), Krigman et al. (2001) and Degeorge et al. 
(2004) that such coverage is important to issuers. For instance, Krigman et al. finds that 
issuers generally switch underwriters to obtain additional sell-side analyst coverage, which 
suggests that firms regard this as important to increasing investor awareness of their firms. 
Similarly, a management profit forecast reported in an IPO prospectus is also able to promote 
the subscription and result in investors‘ sentiments.  
In terms of the proxy of publicity, Cook (2006) adopted the number of headlines with the 
company name and the number of news stories with the company name in the text. This 
chapter alternatively uses the times of public subscription (SUB) as the proxy. Although it is 
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an ex post proxy, public subscription is one of the most remarkable and countable variables 
for the market effort of issuing firms and underwriters, as well as the pre-market measure of 
opinion dispersion.  
H12: A higher absolute forecast error is expected for IPOs with a higher level of publicity 
since both the issuers and underwriters have the possibility to benefit from market promotion.  
 
Ex ante Uncertainty – Forecasting Horizon 
Previous studies have shown that the shorter the forecasting period (the time between the 
prospectus date and the forecasting date) the more accurate the profit prediction becomes; this 
finding also applied to the new issue forecasts analyzed by Dev and Webb (1972). The 
following hypothesis is tested: 
H13: Forecasting accuracy improves when the forecast interval is shorter.  
A variable, HORIZON, representing the number of months making up the forecast interval, 
is calculated and it is hypothesized that it has a positive relationship with the error measure; 
the longer the interval the greater the error. 
 
Higher Asymmetric Information and Ex ante Uncertainty – China-related Firms 
According to the tests in previous sections, the study has discovered the higher biased and 
less rational forecasts for Chinese firms in Hong Kong. Since being listed overseas, China-
related companies may be associated with a higher level of asymmetric information. 
Theoretically, the regulatory restrictions, disclosure requirements and investors‘ degree of 
recognition will increase the indirect costs of cross-border listing. Many prior studies, such as 
Sun and Tong (2000) and Wang and Jiang (2004), all define the overseas primary listing as 
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conventional wisdom to the extents of high costs and high uncertainty. In this case, it is 
reasonable to question the influence of such forecasting. 
H14: China-related companies will have a higher level of profit forecast error than local firms. 
This chapter uses a dummy variable (CHN) equal to one for H-shares or Red Chips, and 
zero otherwise.  
 
Ex ante Uncertainty and the Agency Effect – Sponsor and Underwriters 
A number of theoretical studies have examined the role of advisers, principally auditors, 
bankers, and underwriters, in adding credibility to companies when raising capital. For 
example, the appointment of a ‗high quality‘ sponsor (lead underwriter) is argued to lower 
agency costs and lower the risk of a company; this in turn increases the market value of the 
company. High quality sponsors invest heavily in building and enhancing their reputation 
capital and they are careful to avoid actions that might jeopardize their hard won reputation. 
Large forecast errors will damage underwriters‘ reputations and so they have incentive to 
closely monitor the profit forecasts. This oversight will lead to more accurate forecasts. 
Unlike listed companies, there are fairly limited sources of information on firms before 
going public. Therefore, outsiders including underwriters and investors have to heavily rely 
on financial statement information until the trading of shares in the capital market starts. The 
evidence that underwriters use accounting variables to set an offer price with few other 
sources of information (e.g. DeAngelo, 1988; Titman and Truman, 1986), on average, creates 
a strong incentive for IPO issuers to boost reported earnings through discretionary accounting 
choices in order to extract higher offering prices. Aharony et al. (1993) and Friedlan (1993) 
investigate whether IPO issuers overstate earnings in the pre-IPO period, without assuming 
that underwriters detect and adjust accounting choices. Aharony et al. argues that the income 
manipulation hypothesis merely depends on the perception of entrepreneurs to influence the 
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offering price, and it is not crucial for participants in the new issue market to detect and adjust 
for accounting choices. Friedlan assumes that not fully adjusting issuers‘ financial statements 
for all the accounting choices may be the most efficient and cost-effective way for 
underwriters to use the information.  
 
In this chapter, it is assumed that underwriters detect and adjust for the effect of earnings 
management at least partially since they would benefit from doing so (Nagata and Hachiya, 
2006). If underwriters fail to adjust for the effect of earnings management, they may end up 
overpricing the IPO firm that intentionally increases the reported earnings by making 
discretionary accounting choices. Overpricing may result in a high probability that the offer is 
subscribed to by fewer investors causing shares to be unsold, which may substantially damage 
the underwriters‘ reputations. As Betty and Ritter (1986) argue, underwriters repeat business 
with potential purchasers (investors) and can earn a return on their reputation. Therefore, they 
have an incentive to price issues appropriately. In addition, underwriters are assumed to have 
a closer relationship with IPO issuers than with others and this possibly enhances the 
underwriters‘ capability of detecting earnings management. Therefore, it is also a rational 
expectation that underwriters adjust for the effect of earnings management, and thus the 
extent of earnings management consequently has a negative influence on the offering prices. 
 
H15: Forecasting accuracy improves if the company’s lead underwriter is a highly prestigious 
banker. 
The proxy of highly reputable bankers (UNDWR) is a dummy equal to one if the 
observations are managed or co-managed by the Bank of China International (11 IPOs), 
China International Capital Corporation (9 IPOs), Citigroup (7 IPOs), Credit Suisse First 
Boston (14 IPOs), Credit Lyonnais Securities (14 IPOs), DBS (22 IPOs), HSBC (19 IPOs), 
Goldman Sachs (18 IPOs), JP Morgan (2 IPOs), Merrill Lynch (6 IPOs), and Morgan Stanley 
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(14 IPOs). It is noted that, potentially for some massive offers, these top investment bankers 
will cooperate to be joint-lead managers. In the sample, there are 55 out of 127 observations 
that are underwritten or jointly underwritten by these investment bankers. 
 
Ex ante Uncertainty – Market Risk 
The sample period in this chapter covers five years. Since the market changes over time, a 
higher market return dispersion represents a higher level of ex ante uncertainty. This chapter 
predicts a relationship between the market systematic risk and absolute forecast error.  
 
H16: Management forecasts tend to be more biased when market risk is higher. 
 
Two proxies are assigned for systematic risk, including market returns (MKT-R) and 
market volatility (MKT-V), where MKT-V is the volatility of daily returns of the Hang Seng 
Index one month (20 trading days) prior to the offerings. A positive relationship is expected 
between the market volatility and absolute forecast errors.  
Hypotheses H6 to H16 are tested by multiple regression with the absolute forecast error 
(AFE) as the dependent variable and size, age, industry, gearing, number of risk factors, 
insider dummy, forecasting horizon, subscription times, China-related dummy, underwriter, 
market return and market volatility as the independent variables. The above Table 4.8 reports 
the descriptive statistics of control variables. To further discover the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables, the following table alternatively reports the statistics 
summary with segmenting variables by their mean value. 
In Table 4.9, variables are roughly consistent with H6 to H16. Larger companies with a 
longer corporation history have a stronger ability to forecast profits. High-tech companies 
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appear to have a higher level of forecast error than non-tech companies. Gearing ratios, 
number of risk also representing the ex ante uncertainty, and a negative relationship is 
expected between the forecast error and uncertainty. There is not much difference if the 
insider dummy is equal to one or zero, but pre-offering marketing efforts, measured as 
subscription times, will positively affect the accuracy in management forecasting. A longer 
forecasting horizon increases the possibility of higher inaccuracy, as shown above.  
In addition, on average China-related companies have higher levels of forecasting errors 
than local IPOs, which indicate a higher level of asymmetric information for China-related 
companies listing overseas will generate higher ex ante uncertainty and a higher level of the 
agency problem, as well as larger forecasting biases.  
In terms of underwriters‘ reputation, higher reputable bankers will prevent large forecasting 
biases in prospectus so as not to hurt their reputation capital. As far as market conditions are 
concerned, forecasting errors will be larger in bull markets than in bear markets, and high 
systematic risk (market volatility) will result in a greater tendency for incorrect management 
forecasts. 
The correlation matrix of explanatory variables is given in Table 4.10. And the results of 
the cross-sectional regression for absolute forecasting errors are reported in Table 4.11. The 
overall observations include 173 Hong Kong Main Board operating firms IPOs from 2000 to 
2006. All coefficients (Column 1), t-statistics (Column 2), and two-tail p-values (Column 3) 
are shown for individual control variables respectively. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
calculated using White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method at a 0.05 level. The F-
statistics indicate the overall significance of the cross-sectional linear model. 
As predicted in H7, firms with a longer operating history and financial records will have 
more accurate management profit forecasting. The AGE is significantly negatively related to 
the level of absolute forecast error. Although the SIZE is also negatively associated with AFE, 
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it is not statistically significant. While firms that have a higher gearing ratio and longer 
forecasting horizon are associated with larger forecasting biases.  
Consistent with expectations, high-tech companies appear to have more inaccurate 
forecasting. However, tech- and non-tech firms only have little differences on the level of 
AFE, which may be due to the market trading platforms offered by HKEx, i.e. smaller and 
riskier high-tech firms would like to choose the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) rather than 
the Main Board. Consequently, the high-tech effect will be weaker. 
The number of risks reported in prospectuses, one of the proxies of ex ante uncertainty, is 
positively but insignificantly related to AFE. One of the possible reasons is that, there is no 
set format for the identifications, reporting, and the type of risk factors in Hong Kong. 
Examples of some commonly reported risk factors are those relating to supplies of input 
materials, customers, quota restrictions on exports, technological changes, MFN trade status 
with the US, foreign exchange rates, and legal and economic uncertainties associated with 
operating in and trading with China. 
When insiders‘ wealth gain is higher than the loss raised by dilution after offering, insiders 
have a high incentive to manage profits as for seeking more benefits. Although the result is 
not statistically significant, the positive sign indicates the possible earning management in 
issuing firms. Moreover, pre-offering effort of marketing can enhance the public subscription. 
Therefore when companies have higher publicity in the market before going public, managers 
in these companies are more likely to inaccurately present their profits. The insignificant and 
positive sign may suggest an optimistic behavior of management teams. 
As far as China-related IPOs are concerned, a statistically significant result suggests a 
positive relationship between China-related firms and absolute forecast errors. Due to a higher 
level of asymmetric information, on the one hand, a lack of understanding of prior operating 
history and accounting standards may generate a relatively large magnitude of forecasting 
biases; on the other hand, managers in Chinese companies suffer more pressure from 
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successful overseas offerings and strong market performance. In this case, there will be more 
agency problems as well as a higher level of forecasting errors. It is noted that, inaccuracy in 
forecasting errors is also affected by the Chinese government‘s activities. For instance, once a 
large- or medium-sized state-owned company successfully applies for listing in Hong Kong, 
its major shareholder(s) will ensure that a certain amount of capital is raised. H-share 
companies have state shares and legal-person shares. Where legal-person shares are shares 
owned by domestic institutions, most of which are themselves partially owned by the central 
or provincial government. However, after successfully listing, the government will ―re-
distribute‖ resources. For instance, China-related companies suffer a serious taxation effect 
raised by an unstable and discontinuous fiscal policy of the government, as the case of Bank 
of Communication (BOCMM 3328.HK) mentioned in Chapter II. 
In terms of underwriters‘ behaviour, although there is an insignificantly negative sign, it is 
still consistent with the hypothesis that higher reputable investment bankers will prevent large 
profit forecasting biases to protect their reputation. Another explanation for the insignificant 
result is that, the investment banking industry in Hong Kong has monopolization and the 
majority of the market power is shared by a few top international flagships and China-related 
pilots of financial institutions. In particular, as Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) argue, facing a 
local oligopoly of underwriters, both analyst coverage and ―spinning‖ activity can bring 
additional compensation to highly reputable bankers, meanwhile, this reputation create an 
incentive for top underwriters to seek rather than avoid underpricing. Additional evidence 
includes Hoberg (2004), which presents a rational model of strategic underwriting that is 
capable of explaining the underwriter persistence phenomenon. Consequently, the underwriter 
dummy used in this chapter may not be able to fully describe the relationship between 
bankers‘ reputation and forecasting magnitude.  
Finally, market volatility has a strong and positive effect on management forecasting 
magnitude. According to finance literature, market portfolio volatility is the proxy of 
systematic risk which the equities cannot diversify away. Therefore larger volatility indicates 
a higher total risk of individual firm. Consequently, as market conditions increase in volatility, 
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the managers have a stronger incentive for ‗strategically‘ reporting profit forecasts in 
prospectuses. 
 
4.6.2.2 Relationship between forecast errors and short-term underpricing 
a. Comparison between forecasting and non-forecasting IPOs 
As mentioned in the prior section, management profit forecasting is voluntary in Hong 
Kong. The question remains that, whether investors in the market can discover biases in 
forecasts or whether investors can rationally incorporate the level of forecasting accuracy 
when they make investment decisions. In other words, the following section turns to 
investigate the relationship between forecast errors and the short-term underpricing 
phenomenon.  
To begin with, theoretically, given the prevalence of underpricing one might assume that 
the level of underpricing is the same for all companies. Observations show that the level of 
underpricing does vary between companies. Since some companies will release forecasts 
when some do not, it is worthy to compare the underpricing level of two portfolios, i.e. 
forecasting and non-forecasting, to find whether their first-day returns are statistically and 
significantly different from each other.  
This chapter will test the differences of both raw and market-adjusted initial returns for an 
individual portfolio, by using the conventional method: 
IR = (Pi,1 – Pi,0)/Pi,0                                                (4.16) 
MAIR = (Pi,1 – Pi,0)/Pi,0 - (Ii,1 – Ii,0)/Ii,0                   (4.17) 
where, Pi,0 is the i firm‘s offer price, Pi,1 is i firm‘s first-day closing price, Ii,0 and Ii,1 are 
index values from the date of i firm setting the final offer price and first trading day. 
Therefore, (Ii,1 – Ii,0)/Ii,0 represents the daily market return on each offering date.  
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Therefore, the hypothesis can be written as follows: 
H17:     IRf    =    IRnf                                        (4.18) 
           MAIRf   =   MAIRnf                               (4.19) 
where f and nf are for forecasting and non-forecasting portfolios respectively. The result of 
the comparison is reported in Table 4.12. 
The mean of IRs, MAIRs and their respective standard deviations are listed in Column (1) 
and (2) of the table, and Column (3) tests the t-statistics for whether the IR and MAIR are 
different between forecasting and non-forecasting portfolios. Tests are separated into 
individual year as well as for the whole sample period. Except for year 2005, underpricing 
and market-adjusted initial returns are not significantly different. It is noted that, the standard 
deviation of both IR and MAIR for both portfolios is minimal in 2005. Several factors may 
affect the empirical results. Firstly, recalling Chapter II, underpricing is still a puzzle in 
financial research, which means neither asymmetric information models nor behavioral 
finance models can fully explain the level of underpricing. In this case, the management‘s 
profit forecasting is only expected to partially influence the initial price jump once assuming 
investors have the ability to judge biases in either optimistic or pessimistic forecasting errors. 
In addition, dramatic mispricing of a few IPOs results in a more complicated situation. For the 
positively significant t-statistics of IR and MAIR in year 2005 with lowest standard deviations 
of 0.014 and 0.015 respectively, it may be interpreted that, once the IPOs‘ initial returns 
during a period are all about the same level, releasing a management‘s profit forecast in a 
prospectuses will partially enhance aftermarket return since investors can discover the 
pessimistic error in forecasting and subscribe to ‗undervalued‘ shares. 
To further investigate the effect of biased forecasting on the level of underpricing, the 
following empirical question solely focuses on forecasting IPOs, to discover the relationship 
between forecasting accuracy and IPO initial returns.  
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b. Comparison between optimistic and pessimistic forecasting IPOs 
The profit forecasting accuracy results in Table 4.13 reveal considerable variability. The 
distribution of errors especially highlights the dispersion. Of interest is whether investors 
were able to predict, at the time of the issue, those forecasts which were overly optimistic and 
those which were overly pessimistic. If it is assumed that the IPO is, on average, correctly 
priced, given the profits forecast, then the initial listing price would be expected to be the 
same as the issue price. In practice, however, underpricing of the IPO appears to be the norm 
and this is rationalized on the basis of risk considerations (Rock, 1986), which has been tested 
in detail in Chapter II. 
It is hypothesized that differences in the levels of underpricing arise, in part, because of 
investors‘ expectation that actual profits will depart significantly from those being forecast. If 
investors believe that the forecasted profits are unduly pessimistic, then they are likely to 
attach a greater premium to the issue price when companies going public. Conversely, if 
investors believe forecast profits are unduly optimistic, then the initial listing price could be 
below the issue price.  
To test the effect of forecasting accuracy, this section initially compares the underpricing 
between pessimistic and optimistic forecasting. The t-statistic is -0.722 meaning the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. It indicates that the underpricing level of optimistic forecasting 
IPOs is not significantly different from the underpricing of pessimistic ones. First, this may 
only be due to 10 out of 172 IPOs reporting optimistic forecasts rather than pessimistic ones. 
Second, it cannot presume all managers in IPOs persistently misreport their forecasting, since 
25 observations have a pessimistic forecasting of less than 1%, and another 20 observations 
have a pessimistic forecasting of between 1 to 2%. Finally, the first financial announce is 
normally in three to six months after trading, if investors do not have preconception to IPO 
profit forecasts, the level of forecast errors is not strong enough to dramatically affect the 
underpricing significantly. Therefore, the objective is to investigate excessive forecasting 
errors, as stated in H18: 
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H18: The level of underpricing is closely related to the excessive forecast errors. 
Where, the breakeven of excessive and non-excessive forecast errors is the median of 
absolute forecast errors, i.e. being excessive when AFE is higher than 0.0467, and non-
excessive when AFE is lower than 0.0467. The t-test is applied and the results are reported in 
Table 4.13.  
According to Panel A in Table 4.13, conditional upon whether there is excessive 
forecasting, 172 observations are roughly separated into half and half. As expected, t-statistics 
indicate a significantly negative relationship between effects of excessive and non-excessive 
forecasts. As predicted, the level of the underpricing is closely related to the excessive 
forecast errors. One of the possible reasons is dispersions among investors. The difference in 
the level of underpricing is partially due to investors‘ expectation on actual profits being 
significantly different from the managers‘ forecast at the offerings. Especially, since most 
IPOs give pessimistic forecasts, in this circumstance investors have discovered this group of 
new shares is undervalued and thus would like to attach a greater premium in aftermarket 
trading. 
In separate tests for China-related and non-China related forecasting firms (Panel B of 
Table 4.13), the results of non-CHN observations are consistent with prior results. Since 
investors are assumed to have a better knowledge of local firms, investors‘ expectations will 
be more accurate and rational for local firms than China-related firms. However, the results 
for China-related firms do not support a significant relationship between underpricing and 
excessive forecast errors. This may still be reasonable since: (1) A higher level of asymmetric 
information makes Hong Kong‘s local investors feel difficulty to judge the accuracy of 
forecasting; (2) Management groups in Chinese state-owned companies normally represent 
two levels of the agency problem. The first level is managers themselves, and the second level 
is major shareholders, who are the government as opposite to a natural person. Therefore 
profits of companies with the Chinese government shareholding background will be more 
uncertain and unsteady. 
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However, when Panel C of Table 4.13 further separates tested observations into different 
levels and compares the initial return of Chinese and non-Chinese firms, it is interesting that 
forecasting errors are more convergent than other Hong Kong firms. Although Chinese IPOs 
were suffering higher underpricing, most of them will properly provide an appropriated 
management forecasts in offering prospectuses. Apparently, to do so is propitious for further 
recognition among Hong Kong investors. And investors have ability to adjust over-biased 
information regarding to the Hong Kong-listed Chinese companies. 
 
4.6.3 Event Study for the Effect of the First Financial Announcement after Official 
Listing 
Based on the theory of the divergence of opinion by Miller (1977), this chapter further 
relates the profit forecast error with IPO after-market trading performance. Apart from 
general tests of long-run performance the cross-sectional regressions will be more specific on 
the forecast errors and divergence of opinion. It is noted that, an ideal measure of divergence 
of opinion would be the dispersion of analyst forecasts because it is an ex ante proxy. 
However, even ex post analyst coverage right after IPOs is limited. For instance, one of the 
most popular proxies is early market data, including the first day turnover and trading volume. 
In this chapter, the proxy for divergence of opinion is the early-market return volatility, which 
is the IPO daily return volatility for the first 25 trading days after issuing. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of IPOs are differences between the IPO returns 
and market index returns (Hang Seng Index returns) for the same period. 
 
4.6.3.1 Effects of First Financial Announcements to all IPO Abnormal Returns 
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Since IPO profit forecasting is voluntary in Hong Kong, once the first financial statement is 
announced after issuing, the effects of the difference between forecasted profit and real profit 
will offer investors more information about the issuing firms so they can make investment 
decisions accordingly. This chapter, following the comparison of the level of underpricing, 
will turn to discuss the effects of first financial announcements. In particular, forecasting and 
non-forecasting IPOs are expected to have different levels of returns during a time window of 
11 trading days (two weeks) around the announcement date; moreover, public companies who 
offer pessimistic or optimistic forecasting are expected to be different in raw returns and 
market-adjusted returns; finally, since a number of companies have excessively and 
incorrectly presented their forecasting in prospectuses, around the announcement dates, the 
after-market returns will reflect investors‘ reaction. 
This chapter includes all IPOs with or without forecasting in prospectuses to test this effect 
empirically. If markets are semi-strong form efficient, on the day of the announcement one 
would expect an abnormal return but not on other days. However, normally some abnormal 
return is found on the days surrounding the announcement. An abnormal return after the 
announcement day is either due to information taking time to be reflected in share prices or 
the announcement taking place so late in t0, possibly even after the markets close, that its 
effect can only be reflected in trades and prices on the day following the announcement. 
Abnormal returns prior to the announcement day can come from the following sources. First, 
the fact that an important announcement will take place is often released to the public prior to 
the announcement, and the news release that an announcement will take place and the way the 
release is handled may convey information. In addition, if the announcement is at the 
discretion of the firm, it may be partially caused by prior abnormal returns, and an event study 
of this announcement will show prior abnormal returns. Finally, abnormal returns prior to the 
announcement day could reflect leakage of the information by those with access to it. 
This chapter, consequently, investigates this effect by setting a time window of 11 trading 
days. During these 11 days, the announcement dates are defined as time 0 (t0), then the 
chapter designates -5, -4, -3, -2, -1 as the 5 days prior to the announcements, and +1, +2, +3, 
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+4, +5 as the 5 days after the announcements. For each of the firms in the sample, it computes 
the raw returns on the individual day being studied, then calculates the ―abnormal‖ return for 
each of the days of each firm. Abnormal return is the actual IPO raw return less the Hang 
Seng Index daily return of the respective date.  
The cross-sectional regressions aim to examine whether management forecasting can 
systematically affect IPO after-market returns during the announcement period, in other 
words, it is worthy to know whether forecasting or non-forecasting, pessimistic or optimistic 
forecasting, and dxcessive or non-excessive forecasting, will result in different equity 
premiums systematically. The tested independent variables are IPO raw returns (IR) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the studied period. Control variables cover ex 
ante uncertainty hypothesis (SIZE, AGE), asymmetric information proxies (CHN, IR), 
forecasting dummies (EXC) market movement (MKT-R), and, more importantly, divergence 
of opinion (VOL25).  
In particular, Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated as: 
                        (4.20) 
where ri,t and mi,t are daily (or monthly for long-run tests) raw and benchmark returns (the 
index returns).  
In terms of independent variables, SIZE and AGE are defined in the previous section. The 
CHN dummy equals to one if it is a China-related firm, and zero otherwise. IR is the initial 
return (also called underpricing) of issuing firms. FC, OPT, EXC are dummy variables for 
forecasting effects, where FC equals to one if firm report forecasted profits and price new 
share according to this forecasting, OPT equals to one if the firm gives optimistic forecasting, 
and EXC equals to one if the firm has excessive forecasting bias (absolute forecasting error is 
no less than 10%), and zero otherwise. MKT is the Hang Seng Index average daily return; and 
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VOL25 is the early market volatility, which is defined as the standard deviation of the first 25 
daily returns right after the offering, excluding the initial return. 
 
4.6.3.2 Comparing Returns between Forecasting and Non-forecasting Firms during the 
First Financial Announcement Period 
According to Table 4.14, both SIZE and AGE are expected to be negatively associated with 
abnormal returns and raw returns. Since larger and older companies relatively have a 
relatively lower level of unsystematic risk which lowers the total risk, they therefore have a 
smaller fluctuation in market price. On the contrary, China-related firms will have a higher 
return than local firms, since the CHN dummy represents a higher level of asymmetric 
information and therefore greater risk.  
As far as the forecasting effect is concerned, the firms who provide profit forecasts 
normally have a higher level of abnormal return. The forecasted profit is positive on average, 
which indicates a pessimistic bias compared to the actual profit reported in the first financial 
announcement. Consequently, when the newly released profit is higher than originally 
forecasted, the market price will reflect this new ‗positive‘ information.  
In addition, initial underpricing is expected to be positively associated with aftermarket 
returns. Ritter (1991) argues that there is a negative relationship between initial return and 
after-market abnormal returns. This section does not contradict the previous result because 
normally, issuing firms will release their first financial statement in three to six months after 
the offering, and this section is testing the raw and abnormal returns during a short time 
window.  
Early market return volatility is a proxy of divergence of opinion. This chapter expects a 
positive relationship between the proxy and abnormal returns. Shalen (1993) argues that 
greater divergence of opinion leads directly to a higher return volatility. Based on Miller 
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(1977), higher divergence of opinion results in overvaluation in initial trading but reduces the 
return in the long run. In the end, the market movement is more likely to promote equities‘ 
returns therefore a positive coefficient is predicted. Empirical retests are reported in Table 
4.15. This displays the coefficient, t-statistics, and p-statistics for both raw returns (Column 1) 
and cumulative abnormal returns (Column 2). 
According to results shown in Table 4.15, ex ante uncertainty proxies, SIZE and AGE, are 
negatively related to both raw returns and abnormal returns as expected, although the t-values 
are not statistically significant. China-related IPOs appear to have positive and significant raw 
returns and abnormal returns, which reflect investors‘ confidence on the portfolio. The 
positive information will influence the trading price with an upward shift if investors are 
satisfied with the financial positive and performance. It does not necessarily mean that 
investors have lower confidence in local firms. The more appreciated reason is a remarkable 
improvement in China-related companies. 
Underpricing is positively associated with returns during the event time window. And the 
25-day return volatility, a proxy of the divergence of opinion, is positively and significantly 
related to both raw and abnormal returns with t-statistics of 3.95. As predicted in Miller 
(1977), the divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvalued with short-sell constraint. It 
will return back when the intrinsic value is discovered by the market. At the firm level, 
according to prior studies (Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989), stock prices 
react positively to earnings news but require several quarters to fully reflect the information in 
earnings. Consequently, the early market dispersion is more likely to remain during the period 
of the first earning announcement, and stock prices reflect a high divergence of opinion and 
overvaluation.  
Forecasting firms have better returns than non-forecasting firms, which can be explained by 
relatively pessimistic profit forecasting before going public. However, an insignificant result 
is due to a low level of forecasting bias, which is 5.37% on average, and 45 out of 173 
forecasting errors are between 0 and 0.02. Alternatively, two proxies are adopted as the 
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substitutes to the forecasting dummy, including the excessive dummy (EXC, equal to one if 
the absolute forecast error is higher than 4.67%, zero otherwise) and optimistic dummy 
(OPTM, equal to one in the forecast being optimistic, zero otherwise). Two proxies are tested 
separately in Model 1-2, 1-3 and Model 2-2, 2-3. In particular, since excessive forecasts are 
more conservative or pessimistic, the surprisingly better financial performance is accepted by 
investors and significantly promotes the stock prices during the announcement period. 
Apparently, an optimal forecast does not appear to be powerful enough to influence the 
trading performance, additionally reflecting the management forecasts are accurate in most 
cases.   
To more specifically test the effect of forecasting error on aftermarket returns, the next part 
turns to compare raw and abnormal returns among forecasting firms.  
 
4.6.3.3 Comparing Returns among Forecasting Firms during the First Financial 
Announcement Period 
Table 4.16 shows the statistic summary and distribution of the control variables. With the 
exception of using two new dummy variables, instead forecasting dummy (FC) used in 
previous tests, other variables are kept.  
In Panel A and Panel B, for raw IPO returns between pessimistic and optimistic forecasting, 
there does not appear to be a significant difference, as is also true of cumulative abnormal 
returns. Again, only a very small proportion of issuing firms offer optimistic forecasting 
rather than pessimistic forecasting, which results in insignificant statistics. However, the 
negative sign of t-statistics offers a prediction that pessimistic forecasting firms have a higher 
level of price rises during the announcement period than optimistic forecasts do. In other 
words, investors in the market normally give positive feedback and welcome the good news 
that companies‘ profitability is better than predicted. Alternatively, in the comparison 
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between excessive and non-excessive forecasting portfolios, a significant and negative 
relationship shows that serious bias will affect stock returns to a considerably lower level. 
Panel C further provide the distribution of raw returns for all samples, Chinese firms, and 
non-Chinese firms. Over biased IPO forecasts received higher market dispersion and result in 
higher daily return, while modest forecasts coincide with investors‘ anticipation followed by 
minor price changes. Moreover, to compare Chinese and non-Chinese firms across different 
level of forecasting errors, Chinese firms consistently outperform than local counterparts. It is 
noted that, the first financial announcement is normally in one to three months after the initial 
listings, the primary cause to such performance remain unclear. To further discover the 
relationship between forecast error magnitude and aftermarket stock returns, this chapter 
rearranges the previous cross-section regressions by using a dummy of excessive error (EXC) 
instead of the forecasting dummy to investigate whether a serious forecasting bias will 
dramatically affect stock price movement. Results are listed in following Table 4.17. 
Empirical results are consistent with prior predictions. Larger companies with a longer 
cooperating history have more stable price movement and hence lower abnormal returns, 
although this relationship is not statistically significant, which may be attributable to the 
announcement effect. China-related observations have higher abnormal returns than the local 
observations, and firms‘ underpricing is positively related to raw returns and abnormal returns. 
Market movement promotes IPO trading performance during the announcement period, and 
reduces the abnormal returns accordingly. 
Early return volatility is significantly and positively associated with raw returns and 
abnormal returns. This is also consistent with previous results of divergence of opinion, which 
expects an overvaluation for IPOs with larger dispersion among investors.  
As far as the dummy variable for excessive forecast errors is concerned, it has positive 
coefficients and significant t-statistics. There are two possible explanations. First, most of the 
excessive absolute forecast errors are from pessimistic forecasting, thereby a sharp increase in 
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actual profit would have a positive effect on market trading performance. In addition, this 
indicates the existence of dispersion among investors. To specify, not all investors have the 
ability to discover the forecast errors, since this event study starts from 5 trading days before 
the announcement date, and a high return during this period reflects investors‘ expectations. 
Meanwhile, the first financial statements are normally released between three to six months 
after offering, which is still not long enough for investors to find the intrinsic value. Therefore, 
even if a company reports a very different actual profit than the forecasted one, investors still 
need time to adjust their expectations and to discover their true value, especially those 
investors who are doing more fundamental analysis than technical analysis.  
In short, this section investigates the effect of the first financial announcement on the basis 
of voluntary forecasting and excessive forecast errors. In particular, the empirical test 
suggests both ex ante uncertainty and public information will affect IPO trading performance 
during a time window of 11 days around the announcement. Moreover, China-related 
companies have better returns than the local companies. Although whether to report 
forecasted profit in prospectuses is not a crucial determinant of price movement, excessive 
forecast biases are strongly and negatively associated with both raw and abnormal returns.  
Last but not least, this section starts to discuss the divergence of opinion. The proxy of 
dispersion and early return volatility show a significantly positive effect on trading 
performance. This is a signal that, divergence of opinion is possibly one of the systematic 
characteristics that affects long-term returns. The following section, in turn, will investigate 
IPO long-run returns and their relationship to forecast errors and divergence of opinion. 
 
4.6.4 Forecast Errors and Long-term Performance –Testing on the Divergence of 
Opinion 
As an extension of Chapter II to test the short-run underpricing phenomenon and ―hot 
issue‖ market phenomenon, this chapter additionally examines the third anomaly in the long-
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run. IPOs appear to have significantly underperformed as documented by Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995). The beginning of this section will test the overall performance of 
observations, including both forecasting and non-forecasting firms from 2000 to 2005. This 
section continuously focuses on testing the potential effects of IPOs‘ forecasting errors on the 
long-run trading performance. This includes the comparison between optimistic and 
pessimistic forecasting, the excessive forecast biases, as well as investors‘ irrational 
behaviours, etc.  
Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon et al. (1999), and Kothari and Warner (1997) document 
three main potential biases in the calculation of long-term returns: (1) survivor bias, which 
may occur if failing firms are excluded from the sample; (2) rebalancing bias, related to the 
calculation of cumulative returns, and (3) skewness bias, due to the fact that long-term returns 
are typically skewed. In order to minimize three potential misspecifications, this chapter will 
calculate long-term buy-and-hold market-adjusted compounded returns (MA-BHARs), and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all IPOs (including forecasting and non-forecasting 
observations). The abnormal returns are compared with three benchmarks: the value-weighted 
indices (Hang Seng Index, Hang Seng Composite Index, and a portfolio of matching firms 
adjusted for industry and market value).  
In particular, the Hang Seng Index (HSI) is the most popular benchmark in empirical 
studies in Hong Kong, however, this index did not include China H shares in the beginning. 
Only companies with a primary listing on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK) are eligible as constituents. From 2005, mainland enterprises that have a H-
share listing in Hong Kong are eligible for inclusion in the HSI when they meet any one of 
the following conditions: (1) the H-share company has 100% of its ordinary share capital in 
the form of H-shares which are listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong; (2) the H-share 
company has completed the process of Share Reform, with the result that there is no unlisted 
share capital in the company; or (3) for new H-share IPOs, the company has no unlisted share 
capital. While, the Hang Seng Composite Index Series (HSCI) comprises 18 indexes to gauge 
the performance of the Hong Kong stock market from different aspects. In addition to the 
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HSCI, there are six indexes based on the geographical status and market capitalisation of the 
constituent stocks, and 11 indexes based on industry classification. HSCI aims to cover 90% 
of the market capitalisation of stocks listed on the Main Board in Hong Kong and there are 
currently 200 constituent stocks. Therefore, with two indices representing different market 
risk and returns, there is no reason to only choose one of them as a market index benchmark. 
The issuing month is defined as Month 0, which is for excluding the effect of initial 
underpricing. The long-run returns are calculated from Month 1. Therefore, one-year returns 
start from Month 1 to 12, two-year returns to Month 24, and three-year returns start from 
Month 1 to 26. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) have been defined in Equation 
(4.21). The buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are defined as follow: 
             (4.21) 
where Ri,t is the company i raw return in month t, and Rm,t is the return of the benchmark in 
the respective month.  
 
4.6.4.1 Empirical Evidence for IPOs Long-run Underperformance 
According to prior literature, several research questions are raised about the long-run factor: 
Initially, whether IPOs truly underperform other stocks in one-year, two-year, and three-year 
time periods after issuing; whether IPOs with higher initial returns will have a lower long-run 
return due to overoptimistic bias among investors in the beginning of trading (Miller, 1977; 
Blazenko, 1989); whether management profit forecasts in prospectuses will help promote 
trading performance; and finally whether forecast errors are systematically associated with 
long-run returns. This section will jointly test the signalling model, market timing hypothesis, 
the impresario hypothesis, and divergence of opinion.  
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Based on Ibbotson (1975), this chapter expects a generally positive performance in the first 
year, and a negative performance in the next 3 years. To specify, the hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H19: IPOs are expected to have long-run underperformance in the three years after trading. 
Table 4.18 reports the descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-
hold returns in years 1, 2 and 3 by comparing with indices and controlled firms. By testing the 
sample of 227 observations in the first 12 months, both of the market-index-adjusted CAR 
(14% and 16% on average) and the BHAR (15% and 16% on average) are significantly 
positive. In the second year after issuing, market-adjusted cumulative returns become higher, 
but there is a divisional tendency between the two indices. A possible explanation may be due 
to the components differential, i.e. the worse performance of H-share companies after 24 
event months. This chapter will further discuss the differences between China-related and 
non-China related firm‘s long-run performance. The reported CARMtch (-16.8%) is slightly 
lower than empirical evidence in McGuiness (1993) and Ljungqvist and Yu (2003), where in 
the working paper of Ljungqvist and Yu, they report an average underperformance of 17.3% 
for IPOs between 1997 and 2001. 
To discover the tendency of abnormal returns, Table 4.19 and Figure 4.2 show a clear 
picture by separating long-run cumulative abnormal returns into each month, Month 1 to 
Month 36, via comparing with HSI, HSCI and control firms matched by industry and market 
capitalization. Both index-adjusted abnormal returns have an upward trend in the first year, 
and tend to fluctuate in the second year after trading. Following that, there is a downward 
movement after the 24
th
 or 25
th
 month, and the abnormal return become insignificantly 
different from the index returns. That is to say, after the outperformance duration of about two 
years, the IPO firms suffer from a decrease in stock return. This could be regarded as an 
evidence for the divergence of opinion. After overvaluation in the initial trading period, firms 
with a higher dispersion among investors tend to return back to their intrinsic value. In terms 
of CARMTCH, in the first trading year, IPO cumulative abnormal returns are significantly 
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negative in comparison to control firms. This decreasing trend occurs through three years 
time from Month 10. This is consistent with Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) in 
testing IPO underperformance for the US market. 
 
4.6.4.2 Empirical Evidence on Long-run Underperformance for China-related and non-
China-related IPOs 
Table 4.20 listed the descriptive statistics to compare CARs and BHARs in 1-year, 2-year, 
and 3-year period between China-related and local IPOs. To begin with, on average Chinese 
IPOs have lower Hang Seng Index adjusted cumulative abnormal returns than local 
companies in the first two trading years. This gap is more obvious when choosing the HSCI 
as a benchmark. This is consistent through all proxies of long-run abnormal returns. As it is 
mentioned, HSCI includes more China-related companies, especially H shares, than HSI. 
Therefore, while HSI may represent the general risk in the market, HSCI may be more 
favourable since which also indicate the potential systematic risks caused by China-related 
companies‘ overseas listing. In terms of firm-adjusted abnormal returns, local firms greatly 
outperform overseas companies, with a differential of around 2% on average. Consequently, 
apart from testing long-run performance, this research question is also an extension to 
Chapter II.  
As far as the three-year index-adjusted returns are concerned, the China-related IPOs 
appear to outperform local observations. It provides further evidence to the prior studies. For 
instance, Huang and Song (2001) conclude that the performance of newly listed private firms 
declined more than H-share firms, probably because the positive privatization effect 
somewhat offset the negative IPO effect for H-firms. Sun, Tong and Wu (2006) also argue 
that H-share companies improve leverage and efficiency after listing, engage less in earning 
management. The reputational effect of state-owned background and the congenital 
characteristics (such as firm size and business) are favoured by international investors. 
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It is noted that, the long-run performance cannot simply be classified by a company‘s 
background. There is a group of systematic characteristics closely related to the long-run 
abnormal returns. The following research question will start to investigate the first effect 
raised by initial underpricing, and this will be a direct test for investors‘ over-optimistic bias. 
 
4.6.4.3 The Relationship between IPO Initial Returns and Long-run Performance 
The previous section demonstrates that the divergence of opinion has a significant 
explanatory power of initial returns and the announcement effect. To test for possible market 
overreaction, this part conducts two portfolios. They are a low IR portfolio and a high IR 
portfolio (the cut-off point being the median IR in individual time duration).  
H20: It is expected that, in the absence of initial over-optimism, the long-term returns of 
IPOs with different levels of underpricing should be similar and should not be significantly 
different from the returns of benchmarks.  
According to Table 4.21, most of the means and medians of low underpricing firms have 
higher long-term abnormal returns than high underpricing ones, which is consistent with prior 
literature, for instance Ritter (1991), Shiller (1990), Levis (1993) and Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydquist (1994). In this framework, they all report that IPOs with moderate initial returns 
perform better than those with large initial returns. Although abnormal returns in the first two 
years and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns have lower t-statistics, the negative sign also 
supports the prediction that the overoptimistic bias in initial trading is closely and negatively 
associated with long-run underperformance.  
Meanwhile, this is a direct test of Miller‘s theory that divergence of opinion can lead to 
asset overvaluation and subsequent underperformance in markets with restricted short-selling. 
Higher underpricing is at least partially due to the investors‘ dispersion on evaluating the new 
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stocks, with the true value released over time. It is difficult for higher dispersed stock to 
maintain high trading performance, therefore resulting in long-run underperformance.  
In the subsequent study, an OLS cross-sectional test will further emphasize the important 
role of underpricing and divergence of opinion to the level of long-run underpricing. The 
dependent variables in the OLS regression use all abnormal returns conducted in this section, 
i.e. CARHSI, CARHSCI, CARMTCH, BHARHSI, and BHARHSCI in one- and three-year time 
periods. The design of the control variables, following the literature, include uncertainty 
factors (SIZE, B/M), a background factor (CHN), and divergence of opinion factors (VOL25, 
Ln(T/Over)). Correlation matrix is reported in Table 4.22. 
To specify, SIZE and the dummy variable, CHN, have been defined. B/M is the book-to-
market ratio of each observation, which is one of the popular proxies in the asset pricing 
model. Size and book-to-market ratios have been widely discussed in financial literature as 
the proxy of risk (Fama and French, 1993). Higher risk IPOs are expected to have higher 
abnormal returns. Consequently, this chapter predicts a negative relationship to firm size and 
a positive relationship to the book-to-market ratio.  
H21: IPOs with higher risks and undervaluation are expected to have worse performance in 
the long-run. 
To measure the market sentiment in the early stage of offering, this chapter chooses public 
subscription times (SUB) as an ex ante proxy. A higher level of subscription may represent a 
higher level of underpricing, as suggested by Chapter II. Also, a high public subscription level 
causes investors to judge the sentiment or interest of other investors (Welch, 1992; Ljungqvist, 
Nanda, and Singh, 2006). Thus, a negative relationship between subscription and long-run 
performance is expected.  
H22: Market sentiment during the initial trading period will lead to underperformance in the 
long run.  
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In addition, the OLS regression also directly tests the divergence of opinion hypothesis via 
using early market volatility and first-day turnover as proxies. The 25-day volatility has been 
defined in prior section, which is expected to be negatively related to long-run performance. 
Meanwhile, adopting the first-day turnover is from Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999) and 
Chordian and Swaminathan (2000). These researches investigate the relationship between 
underpricing and the investors‘ interest prior to and after the IPO day. A higher turnover for 
underpriced issues than overpriced issues, used as a proxy of divergence of opinion among 
investors, suggest that the informed investors participate mainly in underpriced issues. 
Consequently, this section additionally chooses the first-day volatility as a secondary proxy 
for the divergence of opinion, to calculate a logarithm for decreasing skewness.  
H23: High divergence of opinion can result in worse trading performance in the long-run.  
The results are reported in Table 4.23. To begin with, SIZE appears to have a negative 
relationship to both cumulative returns and buy-and-hold returns as expected before, however, 
the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at a 0.05 level. However, the book-to-
market ratio (B/M) is significantly and positively associated with long-run performance 
proxies. Since a high B/M presents the respective security as undervalued, both active and 
passive investors are more likely to trade or hold this kind of firms. China-related dummy 
(CHN) is negatively but insignificantly related to long-run performance measures. 
Underpricing (IR) and long-run performance measures are significantly and negatively 
correlated. The results are consistent with Ritter (1991), Shiller (1990), Levis (1993) and 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydquist (1994) such that, unusual underpricing of an IPO is followed 
by an underperformance in the long-run.  
This section also finds that the coefficient estimate of 25-day abnormal return volatility 
(VOL25) is negative but statistically significant in three-year tests, however, in the one-year 
test, only the Hang Seng Composite Index adjusted for cumulative abnormal return has a 
significant negative coefficient. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate is much smaller 
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than that reported for three-year tests. This is actually consistent with the hypothesis of the 
divergence of opinion. However, in three-year time, the true values of issuing firms have been 
discovered by the market, therefore the effect of initial dispersion become more remarkable. 
The secondary proxy of divergence of opinion, first-day turnover (T/O), also provides a 
negative sign, which, again, supports Miller‘s (1977) theory that greater divergence of 
opinion about an IPO leads to short-term overreaction and long-term underperformance. 
So far, this section has carefully discussed the long-run performance for all observations. 
This chapter focuses on the effect of management profit forecasts and its effects on the short 
run and long run. The following research question therefore will turn to investigate the 
difference of long-run performance between forecasting and non-forecasting IPOs. 
 
4.6.4.4 Empirical Evidence on Long-run Underperformance for Forecasting and Non-
forecasting IPOs 
This chapter has investigated the differences of abnormal returns during the first financial 
announcement period. The results show an insignificant t-statistic therefore the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. This section will turn to compare the long-term performance 
between these two portfolios, i.e. forecasting and non-forecasting.  
H24: It is expected that, if investors do not over-rely on the IPO profit forecasts in evaluation 
of new firms, in the absence of initial over-optimism, the long-term returns of two portfolios 
should be similar and should not be significantly different from the market return.  
It is noted that, the tests in this part are particularly set for divergence of opinion. Bauman 
and Miller (1997) use the adaptive expectations hypothesis, where investors and analysts 
become psychologically attached to certain growth firms and thus attempt to extrapolate 
recent earning growth rates into the future. 
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Table 4.24 reports the statistics summary for IPO long-run performance measures by 
comparing two portfolios in one, two and three-year time periods. According to the summary, 
the average performance of forecasting IPOs is better than non-forecasting ones, which is 
consistent with Bauman and Miller‘s argument. However, t-values for most abnormal return 
measures are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Although the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns have better power in explaining the gap between two portfolios, the 
cumulative returns have little difference. Consequently, the empirical results are not powerful 
enough to reject the null hypothesis. 
So far, the impact of forecasting errors is still unknown. To further discover the effect, the 
following two research questions will separately examine the rationality and forecasting 
accuracy effect for long-run performance. Therefore, the testable sample reduces from 227 
IPOs to 149 IPOs which report management profit forecasting in prospectuses in 2000 to 
2005.  
 
4.6.4.5 Testing the rationality for long-run performance 
Lim (2000) argues that rational analysts, minimizing the expected squared error of their 
forecasts, may optimally report biased forecasts. In this framework, he shows that positive 
bias is positively related to uncertain information environments. Therefore, the rationality 
tests are assigned to examine the relationship between IPO management‘s forecasts the long-
run performance.  
H25: If investors do not heavily rely on forecasts in their valuation of IPOs, the long-run 
performance of forecasting and non-forecasting portfolios should be similar and should not 
be significantly different from the market return. 
According to Table 4.25, a pessimistic forecast has a negative effect on long-run 
performance. The long-run performance measures of pessimistic forecasting firms are all 
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lower than IPOs with optimistic management profit forecasts. The t-statistics are small, 
especially for one-year tests. The less of explanatory power is due to: (1) the small proportion 
of optimistic forecasts in the sample cannot efficiently impact the overall performance; (2) 
managers do not intentionally mis-present the future profits. However, a positive sign is 
consistent with Firth (1998) that, the accuracies of the forecasts are positively related to post-
listing stock returns, excluding those firms which have excessive forecasting biases.  
The rationality analysis is also tested in the long run. According to the above tests, neither 
the forecasting and non-forecasting, nor optimistic and pessimistic forecasting is the dividing 
line of underperformance. Therefore, the following tests use companies‘ shareholding 
background to investigate whether China-related forecasting IPOs will have worse 
underperformance than local forecasting ones. Conditional on the asymmetric information, 
when evaluating overseas companies, investors will rely on the offering documents. Holding 
the hypothesis of the divergence of opinion, a subsequent long-run underperformance is 
expected. 
H26: China-related companies with a higher level of forecasting errors are expected to have 
worse trading performance in the long-run. 
The description statistics and results of t-tests are reported in Table 4.26. China-related 
stocks indeed have worse performance than local firms in the long-run. Both mean and 
median abnormal return measures for CHN are statistically and significantly lower than 
measures of local firms. Although index-adjusted first-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
have insignificant t-statistics, the negative sign is consistent through measures for any 
benchmarks and any time windows. According to the divergence of opinion, investors are 
supposed to adjust their stock price expectations based on the arrival of news about the true 
value of the firm. China-related companies have a higher underpricing level and worse long-
run performance in comparison to local firms. 
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The following research questions will turn to focus on the impact of forecasting magnitude 
on the long-run performance. It is known that initial market valuation for an IPO depends, in 
part, on the earnings forecast published in the prospectus. It follows that if the forecast is 
inaccurate then revisions to the share price will occur.  
 
4.6.4.6 Magnitude Forecasting Errors and IPO Long-run Underperformance 
Prior research has attempted to model post-listing returns in the US and elsewhere, which 
are usually negative, as a function of various characteristics of the IPO. This section does not 
solely incorporate variables representing whether actual earnings are above or below 
expectations, but links the magnitude forecasting errors with IPO long-run performance. The 
testable hypothesis is listed as follows: 
H27: Where profit forecasts are used by investors in pricing IPOs, if the forecasts prove to be 
inaccurate, abnormal returns occur, which will affect the investors’ expectations as well as 
long-run returns.  
To test whether there is a positive relationship between long-run returns and forecast 
accuracy, this section adopts the proxy of magnitude in forecast errors, absolute forecast error 
(AFE), and the OLS regression follows previous design. In particular, the dependent variables 
include all abnormal returns measures conducted in this chapter, i.e. CARHSI, CARHSCI, 
CARMTCH, BHARHSI, and BHARHSCI in one- and three-year time periods. Control variables 
include uncertainty factors (SIZE, B/M), a background factor (CHN), investors sentiment 
factors (SUB), the divergence of opinion factors (VOL25, Ln(T/Over)), and finally, the 
magnitude of forecasting error (AFE). 
Table 4.27 reports the results of OLS regressions for testing one- and three-year abnormal 
returns measures. Firth (1998) reports a positive relationship between percentage earnings 
forecast error and the first year performance of Singaporean IPOs. The results in this section 
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remain robust and are consistent with Firth‘s argument by using Hong Kong data. The overall 
model fit is modest with an adjusted R
2
 ranging from 0.21 to 0.28. A positive and significant 
coefficient for the book-to-market ratios suggests that trading performance is driven by the 
undervaluation level. 
Coefficients of IR are negative in all years and are more significant in the third years after 
listing. Meanwhile, subscription times have a negative impact to the long-run performance, 
although the explanatory power decreases.  
In addition, to further support divergence of opinion, both 25-day volatility and initial-day 
trading volume are inversely associated with abnormal returns, although 25-day volatility is 
consistently significant, while initial volume is only statistically significant for three-year 
Hang Seng Index adjusted CARs.  
In terms of forecasting error magnitude, the positive and significant coefficient on AFE 
supports the argument that profit forecasts are used by investors in pricing new shares; if the 
forecasts prove to be inaccurate, abnormal returns occur. Since forecast error cannot be 
determined until the IPO company releases its financial results for the fiscal year ending after 
the new issues, the magnitude of forecast biases will be strongly related to first year 
performance, but much weaken the effect to the extent of three-year performance. The 
positive sign is consistent with prior literature, for instance Firth (1998), which suggests that 
‗pessimists‘ outperform ‗optimists‘ during at least the first 15 months following official 
listing.  
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4.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
To jointly test a number of hypotheses, including the agency problem, signalling, investor 
sentiments, overreaction, the divergence of opinion, and the windows of opportunities, this 
chapter investigates the IPOs profit forecast effects on short-run and long-run puzzles by 
using 172 forecasting observations and 84 non-forecasting observations listed on the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange Main Board from between 2000 and 2006. 
 
4.7.1 Summary of Main Findings 
The average level of IPO profit forecasts error in prospectuses is about 5.4%, representing 
a pessimistic bias compared to actual profit which is consistent with prior studies in Chen et 
al. (2000). The magnitude of forecasting errors is higher for China-related companies than for 
local firms. Although forecast errors exist, management‘s forecasting has superiority over 
popular time-series forecasting models. The result shows evidence of a possible agency 
problem. Issuing firms have better knowledge than others, which gives them opportunity to 
seek additional benefits when reporting the profit forecasting in initial offerings.  
In the further tests for forecasting rationality, according to De Bondt and Thaler‘s (1990) 
model, the result demonstrates a pessimistic bias. The significant slope coefficients suggest 
forecasts are not rational in the sense that management correctly incorporates the available 
information (i.e. the historical profit) in its forecasts.  
Regarding the determinants of the magnitude of forecast accuracy, various systematic 
characteristics are tested in cross-sectional regressions. Proxies of higher level in ex ante 
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uncertainty, including firm size, age, gearing, industry, number of risks, and underwriter are 
directly and negatively related to forecast accuracy. Moreover, when the market condition is 
more volatile, the managers have a stronger incentive to mis-report the profit forecast.  
By comparing the initial return and market-adjusted initial returns, forecasting and non-
forecasting IPOs have a similar level of underpricing, and the results are consistent with the 
whole sample in most tested years. There is no statistically significant difference between 
pessimistic and optimistic forecasting, which may be due to the announcement of first annual 
reports being three to six months after trading. The evidence suggests that if the forecast is 
over-biased, i.e. the forecasting error is excessive (higher than the median of absolute forecast 
error), investors have the ability to adjust investment expectations, which in turn causes a 
higher level in underpricing. 
This chapter also conducts an event study during the first financial announcement period by 
using the cumulative abnormal returns of IPOs. According to Miller‘s (1977) theory, the 
empirical test includes a proxy of the divergence of opinion, known as the early-market 
volatility. Underpricing, early-market volatility, market volatility, and China-related 
background are significantly associated with abnormal returns. The result also demonstrates 
that excessive forecast bias will have a short-term effect on stock prices since investors need 
time to discover intrinsic value of the firm and adjust their expectation.  
In terms of a long-run investigation, it directly tests the investor sentiment hypothesis and 
divergence of opinion theory. In the first part, the study tests the long-run underperformance, 
which mainly follows Ritter (1991). Using different abnormal return measures, IPOs 
significantly underperform compared benchmarks in three years after issuing. The 
performance decreases month by month, while China-related companies have worse 
performance than local observations. In addition, consistent with the divergence of opinion 
theory, firms with higher initial returns actually underperform in the long-run, which is due to 
the initial overvaluation. Moreover, although only a few long-run performance measures are 
significant in the testing of performance difference between forecasting and non-forecasting 
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firms, the magnitude of forecast errors still systematically affects the one-year trading 
performance. And finally, all variables of divergence of opinion are powerful enough to 
partially explain the long-run underperformance of IPOs.  
 
4.7.2 Contributions, Implications and Limitations of the Study 
The studies in this chapter are important because profit forecasts are the major valuation 
parameter for IPOs. It highlights the managers‘ earning forecasts in IPOs. It is expected to 
benefit investors, especially retail investors, to the extent of understanding management 
teams‘ incentives and behaviour in information disclosure. Also, for issuing firms and their 
managers, the accuracy of information disclosure during the IPO period is not the only 
strategy to promote public subscription, which is also tightly linked to the market 
performance in a certain period after going public. 
In terms of academic contributions, the chapter adopt new proxies in testing the 
determination of forecast error magnitude, such as using an insider dummy to control the 
wealth effect and dilution effect. Also, the research replicates analyst earning forecasting 
method towards management earning forecasts reporting, and the tests combine IPO the 
forecast and the stock performance in immediate market to explain the long-run 
underperformance, which is in line with divergence of opinion hypothesis. However, it is still 
critical to adopt various proxies in the empirical investigation. Meanwhile, limitation of 
methodology on long-run performance and specific market features in Hong Kong result in 
the congenitally weak basis of the research. 
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Table 4.1 Total Number of IPOs on the Main Board in Hong Kong and Usable Sample  
(Jan. 2000 – Dec. 2006) 
 
  Total 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Population 298 42 31 60 46 49 57 12 
Excluding: Offer By Introduction 22 2 -- 5 7 3 3 2 
Excluding: Missing Prospectuses 4 2 1 2 -- 1 -- -- 
Excluding: Investment Fund 15 -- 1 9 2 1 -- -- 
Final Sample 
        
With Profit Forecasts 172 31 23 24 26 26 36 6 
Without Profit Forecasts 84 7 6 20 11 18 18 4 
Total 256 38 29 44 37 44 54 10 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Sample Distribution by Industry in Hong Kong  (Jan. 2000 – Dec. 2006) 
 
Industry Two-digit SIC codes Frequency Percentage 
Oil and Gas, Electric and Gas 
Service 
13, 29, 49 6 3.5% 
Food Products 20 9 5.2% 
Clothing Products 22, 23 12 7.0% 
Chemical Products, Manufacturing, 
and Paper Products 
24-27, 28,30-34 28 16.3% 
Computer Hardware & Software 35, 73 12 7.0% 
Electronic Equipment 36 13 7.6% 
Transportation 37, 39, 40-42, 44, 45 21 12.2% 
Retail 53, 54, 56, 57, 59 8 4.7% 
Banking and Insurance, Financial 
Services 
60-65 14 8.1% 
Investors, Venture Capitals 67 19 11.0% 
Entertainment Services and 
Consulting Services 
70, 78, 79, 87 7 4.1% 
All Others 
1, 10, 12, 15, 16, 38, 
46-48, 50-52 
23 13.4% 
Total  
 
172 100.0% 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics of IPO Profit Forecast Accuracy (All Sample) 
 
  FE AFE SQFE 
Average 0.05 0.10 5.25 
Median 0.04 0.05 0.22 
SD 0.20 0.18 20.17 
Max 0.91 1.17 140.29 
Min -1.17 0.00 0.00 
Skew -1.74 3.72 5.27 
Kurt 17.65 15.23 29.35 
The metrics are Forecast Error (FE = (AP-FP)/|AP|), Absolute Forecast Error (AFE = |FE|), and 
Squared Forecast Error (SQFE = (FE)2 ×100 ). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics of IPO Profit Forecast Accuracy (by Cohort Year) 
 
Year 
Number of FE   AFE   SQFE 
Forecasting
＃
 Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D.   Mean Median S.D. 
2000 31 (81.58%) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
0.21 0.21 0.21 
 
16.66 0.08 36.53 
2001 23 (79.31%) 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
0.63 0.18 1.75 
2002 24 (54.55%) 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
0.48 0.28 0.82 
2003 27 (71.05%) 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 
0.11 0.11 0.11 
 
3.02 0.60 6.85 
2004 25 (58.14%) 0.09 0.09 0.09 
 
0.09 0.09 0.09 
 
2.87 0.22 10.42 
2005 36 (66.67%) 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
1.50 0.30 3.91 
2006 6 (60.00%) 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 
0.07 0.07 0.07 
 
24.38 0.16 6.82 
All 172 (67.19%) 0.05 0.04 0.20   0.10 0.05 0.18   5.25 0.22 20.17 
 
＃ 
Numbers in bracket are the percentage of IPOs releasing profit forecast in prospectuses in each calendar year. 
The metrics are Forecast Error (FE = (AP-FP)/|AP|), Absolute Forecast Error (AFE = |FE|), and Squared Forecast 
Error (SQFE = (FE)2 ×100 ). 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics of IPO Profit Forecast Accuracy and Comparison 
Between Chinese and Non-Chinese IPOs 
 
  All  CHN H-Share Red Chip Non-CHN 
  (173 IPOs) (45 IPOs) (34 IPOs) (11 IPOs) (128 IPOs) 
Forecast Error (FE) 
Mean 0.054 0.105 0.092 0.145 0.035 
t-statistics (3.48)* (3.17)* (2.56)* (1.81) (2.08)* 
Sign test (p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) 
Median 0.043 0.075 0.077 0.026 0.041 
S.D. 0.202 0.223 0.210 0.267 0.192 
Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) 
Mean 0.100 0.151 0.153 0.145 0.083 
t-statistics (3.29)* (5.23)* (5.28)* (1.81) (2.71)* 
Sign test (p-value) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) 
Median 0.047 0.077 0.080 0.026 0.042 
S.D. 0.183 0.194 0.170 0.267 0.176 
Squared Forecast Error (SQFE) 
Mean 0.050 6.117 5.145 8.564 3.756 
t-statistics (1.77) (2.91)* (2.85)* (1.32) (1.74) 
Sign test (p-value) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) 
Median 0.040 0.217 0.637 0.068 0.176 
S.D. 20.170 17.061 10.530 21.487 18.082 
 
 
 
This table shows profit forecast accuracy using two metrics for all sample, China-related observations (CHN), H-
share observations (H-Share), Red Chip observations (Red Chip) and non-China-related observations (Non-CHN). 
The metrics are Forecast Error (FE = (AP-FP)/|AP|), Absolute Forecast Error (AFE = |FE|), and Squared Forecast 
Error (SQFE = (FE)2 ×100 ). *Statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. T-test and non-
parametric sign test is to test the level of significant for the difference in the mean error metrics from zero. 
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Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics of Superiority Measures of IPO Profit Forecast 
(Naïve No-change and Growth Models) 
 
 
  SUP(N) 
  All  CHN  H-Shares Red Chips Non-CHN 
Mean 0.367  0.4334  0.4495   0.4922   0.3432   
t-statistics (2.94)*  (6.293)* (5.231)* (3.494)* (2.408)†  
Median 0.168  0.2784  0.2686   0.5055   0.1421   
Minimum -5.836  -0.378  -0.3778   -0.1449   -5.836   
Maximum 17.241  2.0046  2.0046   1.6831   17.241   
  SUP(G) 
 
All  CHN  H-Shares Red Chips Non-CHN 
Mean 0.141  0.3029  0.2883  0.4420  0.0834   
t-statistics (1.98)
†
  (5.787)* (4.619)* (3.431)* (0.886)
††
 
Median 0.215  0.2316  0.2230  0.3824  0.2145   
Minimum -7.614  -0.469  -0.4685  -0.0972  -7.614   
Maximum 3.124  1.4776  1.4776  1.4776  3.1242   
 
By comparing with the naïve no-change forecasts and growth forecasts, two superiority 
measures test the whether the management forecast has superiority over popular time-series 
forecasting models. 
SUP (N) = AFE (N) – AFE   , and SUP (G) = AFE (G) – AFE ;  where: 
 ; and  
 
Note: * statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level; † significantly different from zero at the 0.01 
level; and †† insignificantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 4.7 Regression Results in Testing for Bias and Rationality  
by Applying De Bont and Talyor Forecasting Rationality Model 
 
 
 
t-Test H0: α=0 and β=1  
Independent Variables (FPt - APt-1) / APt-1 
 All CHN H-Shares Red Chip Non-CHN 
 (172 IPOs) (45 IPOs) (34 IPOs) (11 IPOs) (127 IPOs) 
Intercept (α) 0.103 0.234 0.168 0.533 0.056 
 (3.06)* (2.63)* (3.33)* (1.56) (1.747) 
(APt - APt-1) / APt-1 1.073 1.055 1.127 0.559 1.080 
 (36.05)* (13.16)* (26.50)* (1.35) (37.92)* 
 (2.33)
†
 (0.689) (2.98)* -- (2.80)
 †
 
Adjusted R
2
 0.884 0.797 0.955 0.952 0.919 
 
 
The reported regression trys to capture the bias and rationality of management forecasts, i.e. 
whether managers can fully and correctly incorporate the historic information into forecasts. 
(APt - APt-1) / APt-1 = α + β (FPt - APt-1) / APt-1 + εi 
H5:  α = 0   and   β = 1 
 
 
Notes: 
t-statistics (for α=0 and β=1) in parentheses. They are computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent estimate of the standard errors of the coefficients. FP is forecast profit in prospectuses, and AP is 
actual profit for the forecasted IPO fiscal year. 
*Statistically significantly different from zero (0) at the 0.01 level; † significantly different from the 
hypothesized slope coefficient of one (1) at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 4.8 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables in Testing the Determinants of 
the Magnitude of Forecasting Errors 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 173 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 
2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. SIZE is the logarithm of proceed 
amount raised in offerings; AGE is the logarithmic value of company‘s years of operating history; 
INDUSTRY is the dummy variable equal to one if being high-tech company; GEAR is the gearing 
ratio reported in the last annual reported prior to offering; RISK is the number of risk factors listed 
prospectuses; INSIDER, the insider benefit dummy equals to one if the wealth effect is higher than 
dilution effect, and zero otherwise; SUB is times of public subscriptions for new shares; HORIZON is 
the forecasting duration, representing the number of months making up the forecast interval; CHN is 
dummy variable equal to one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero otherwise; UNDWR is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm underwritten by high reputable bankers (including BOCI, 
CICC, Citigroup, Credit Suisse First Boston, DBS, HSBC, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, 
and Morgan Stanley), and zero otherwise; MKT-RT; and MKT-V is the proxy of systematic risk equal 
to the volatility of daily return of Hang Seng Index one month (20 trading days) prior to the offerings. 
 
 
  SIZE AGE GEAR RISK HORIZON SUB 
Mean 19.006  2.588  41.856  25.355  1.622  89.511  
Median 18.622  2.553  24.315  23.000  1.033  15.835  
Maximum 22.594  4.579  431.37  62.000  13.600  969.00  
Minimum 15.730  -1.596  5.000  9.000  -7.933  0.186  
S.D. 1.326  0.738  57.022  9.848  3.412  170.77  
Skewness -0.182  5.349  14.557  0.675  1.793  8.513  
Kurtness 0.621  -0.705  3.135  0.917  0.033  2.871  
  INSIDER TECH CHN UNDWR MKT-RTN MKT-V 
Mean 119
§
 20
§
 45
§
 55
§
 0.014  0.012  
Median 69.19%
※
 11.63%
※
 26.16%
※
 31.98%
※
 0.020  0.011  
Maximum --   --   --   --   0.162  0.026  
Minimum --   --   --   --   -0.117  0.004  
S.D. 0.463  0.321  0.441  0.468  0.055  0.005  
Skewness -1.313  3.878  -0.812  -1.409  -0.286  -0.412  
Kurtness -0.838  2.415  1.094  0.780  -0.226  0.728  
 
Note: § the number of dummy variables which equal to one, and ※ the percentage of dummy variables 
which equal to one. 
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Table 4.9 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables in Testing the Determinants of the 
Magnitude of Forecasting Errors (Segmented by Mean) 
 
The Sample in the table includes 173 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 
2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. SIZE is the logarithm of proceed 
amount raised in offerings; AGE is the logarithmic value of company‘s years of operating history; 
INDUSTRY is the dummy variable equal to one if being high-tech company; GEAR is the gearing 
ratio reported in the last annual reported prior to offering; RISK is the number of risk factors listed 
prospectuses; INSIDER, the insider benefit dummy equals to one if the wealth effect is higher than 
dilution effect, and zero otherwise; SUB is times of public subscriptions for new shares; HORIZON 
is the forecasting duration, representing the number of months making up the forecast interval; CHN 
is dummy variable equal to one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero otherwise; UNDWR is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm underwritten by high reputable bankers (including BOCI, 
CICC, Citigroup, Credit Suisse First Boston, DBS, HSBC, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill 
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley), and zero otherwise; MKT-RT; and MKT-V is the proxy of systematic 
risk equal to the volatility of daily return of Hang Seng Index one month (20 trading days) prior to the 
offerings. The columns of Mean report the average AFE of respective portfolios and the columns of 
No. report the number of observations included in respective portfolios. 
 
 Mean No.  Mean No.   Mean No.  Mean No. 
Segmented by Mean of Ln(SIZE) [19.00]  Segmented by Mean of Subscription [89.51] 
 Large  Small   High  Low 
 0.084 75  0.123 97   0.102 46  0.098 126 
Segmented by Mean of AGE [2.59]   Segmented by Mean of Horizon [1.62] 
 Old  Yong   Long  Short 
 0.078 80  0.122 92   0.107 75  0.097 97 
Segmented by Tech and Non-Tech   Segmented by CHN and Non-CHN  
 Tech  Non-Tech   CHN  Non-CHN 
 0.145 20  0.096 152   0.151 45  0.083 127 
Segmented by Mean of GEAR [41.86]   Segmented by Underwriters' Reputation  
 High  Low   High (=1)  Low (=0) 
 0.117 56  0.094 116   0.124 55  0.091 117 
Segmented by Mean of Risk [25.35]  Segmented by Mean of Market Return [0.014] 
 High  Low   High  Low 
 0.093 72  0.107 100   0.093 98  0.112 74 
Segmented by Insider's Benefits   Segmented by Mean of MKT Volatility [0.012] 
 W>D (=1)  W<D (=0)   High  Low 
 0.103 119  0.103 53   0.131 79  0.076 93 
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Table 4.10 Correlation Matrix of Control Variables in OLS Regression to Test 
Forecasting Error Metrics of Hong Kong IPOs 
 
 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 173 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 
2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. SIZE is the logarithm of proceed 
amount raised in offerings; AGE is the logarithmic value of company‘s years of operating history; 
GEAR is the gearing ratio reported in the last annual reported prior to offering; RISK is the number 
of risk factors listed prospectuses; INSIDER, the insider benefit dummy equals to one if the wealth 
effect is higher than dilution effect, and zero otherwise; SUB is times of public subscriptions for new 
shares; HORIZON is the forecasting duration, representing the number of months making up the 
forecast interval; CHN is dummy variable equal to one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero 
otherwise; UNDWR is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm underwritten by high reputable 
bankers (including BOCI, CICC, Citigroup, Credit Suisse First Boston, DBS, HSBC, Goldman Sachs, 
JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley), and zero otherwise; MKT-R is the market return of 
Hang Seng Index one month (20 trading days) prior to the offerings; and MKT-V is the proxy of 
systematic risk equal to the volatility of daily return of Hang Seng Index one month (20 trading days) 
prior to the offerings. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White‘s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent method. 
 
 
  SIZE AGE GEAR RISK INSIDER SUB HORIZON CHN UNDWR 
MKT 
RTN 
MKT 
V 
SIZE 1.00  
          
AGE 0.18  1.00  
         
GEAR 0.09  0.10  1.00  
        
RISK 0.46  0.10  0.10  1.00  
       
INSIDER 0.15  0.01  -0.03  0.04  1.00  
      
SUB 0.39  -0.01  0.03  0.28  0.25  1.00  
     
HOR 0.18  0.05  0.03  0.21  0.00  -0.21  1.00  
    
CHN 0.42  0.16  0.08  0.38  0.05  0.23  0.12  1.00  
   
UNDWR 0.44  0.13  0.14  0.40  0.06  0.21  0.20  0.45  1.00  
  
MKT 
RTN 
0.18  -0.06  0.11  0.10  0.08  0.23  -0.19  0.10  0.18  1.00  
 
MKT V -0.24  -0.08  -0.06  -0.36  -0.08  -0.14  -0.26  -0.22  -0.22  -0.23  1.00  
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Table 4.11 OLS Regressions in Testing  
Forecasting Error Metrics of Hong Kong IPOs (2000-2006) 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 173 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 
2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the AFE (Column 1) and SUP(G) (Column 2). SIZE is the logarithm of proceed 
amount raised in offerings; AGE is the logarithmic value of company‘s years of operating history; 
INDUSTRY is the dummy variable equal to one if being high-tech company; GEAR is the gearing 
ratio reported in the last annual reported prior to offering; RISK is the number of risk factors listed 
prospectuses; INSIDER, the insider benefit dummy equals to one if the wealth effect is higher than 
dilution effect, and zero otherwise; SUB is times of public subscriptions for new shares; HORIZON 
is the forecasting duration, representing the number of months making up the forecast interval; CHN 
is dummy variable equal to one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero otherwise; UNDWR is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm underwritten by high reputable bankers (including BOCI, 
CICC, Citigroup, Credit Suisse First Boston, DBS, HSBC, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill 
Lynch, and Morgan Stanley), and zero otherwise; MKT-R is the market return of Hang Seng Index 
one month (20 trading days) prior to the offerings; and MKT-V is the proxy of systematic risk equal 
to the volatility of daily return of Hang Seng Index one month (20 trading days) prior to the offerings. 
The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
method. 
 
 
Coefficient t-statistics p-value 
Constant -0.494 (-1.18) [0.238] 
SIZE -0.1738 (-1.58) [0.116] 
AGE -0.0604  (-3.17)* [0.002] 
INDUSTRY 0.0530 (1.49) [0.138] 
GEAR 0.0454 (1.07) [0.286] 
RISK 0.0056 (1.29) [0.009] 
INSIDER 0.139 (0.96) [0.336] 
SUB 0.0004 (1.09) [0.279] 
HORIZON 0.0073 (0.34) [0.738] 
CHN 0.3741  (2.07)* [0.040] 
UNDWR -0.1906 (-1.07) [0.288] 
MKT RTN 1.4473 (1.20) [0.232] 
MKT V 29.3982  (2.02)* [0.045] 
R
2  
= 0.1706 
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Table 4.12 Comparison of Portfolios Initial Returns and Market-adjusted Initial Returns for Forecasting and Non-forecasting IPOs 
 
  
(1) Forecasting 
  
(2) Non-Forecasting 
 
(3) t-statistics 
 
No. IR S.D. MAIR S.D. 
 
No. IR S.D. MAIR S.D. 
 
IR MAIR 
2000 31 0.037  0.324  0.041  0.326  
 
7 0.116  0.219  0.128  0.221  
 
-0.783  -0.855  
2001 22 0.092  0.149  0.091  0.151  
 
6 0.777  1.781  0.770  1.765  
 
-0.942  -0.941  
2002 26 0.227  0.720  0.225  0.720  
 
20 0.039  0.154  0.041  0.151  
 
1.288  1.268  
2003 26 0.133  0.225  0.133  0.226  
 
11 0.043  0.154  0.040  0.152  
 
1.402  1.474  
2004 25 0.055  0.118  0.052  0.120  
 
18 0.020  0.195  0.022  0.195  
 
0.681  0.577  
2005 38 0.081  0.014  0.080  0.015  
 
18 0.009  0.125  0.006  0.125  
 
2.45*  2.48*  
2006 4 0.427  0.298  0.426  0.302  
 
4 0.282  0.320  0.280  0.323  
 
0.661  0.661  
All 172 0.109  0.338  0.108  0.338  
 
84 0.100  0.507  0.100  0.503  
 
0.144  0.137  
 
*Statistically significantly different at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 4.13 Tests of Differences in Underpricing for Forecasting IPOs 
(Pessimistic v.s Optimistic; Excessive v.s Non-Excessive) 
 
 
[Panel A] 
 
No. of IR 
 
MAIR 
 
IPOs Mean t-statistics 
 
Mean t-statistics 
Pessimistic    (FE>0) 162 0.111  -0.722 
 
0.203 -0.692 
Optimistic     (FE<0) 10 0.206  -- 
 
0.108 -- 
Excessive     (AFE>0.0467) 84 0.181  2.318* 
 
0.178 2.197* 
Non-Excessive (AFE≤0.0467) 88 0.061  -- 
 
0.064 -- 
 
 
 
[Panel B] 
  No .of IR  MAIR 
  IPOs Mean t-statistics  Mean t-statistics 
[CHN] 
 
        
Excessive (AFE>0.0467) 29 0.133 1.329  0.130 1.306 
Non-Excessive (AFE<0.0467) 16 0.071 --  0.068 -- 
[Non-CHN] 
   
  
 
Excessive (AFE>0.0467) 56 0.202 2.268*  0.198 2.166* 
Non-Excessive (AFE<0.0467) 71 0.033 --  0.037 -- 
 
Note: t-test for whether two portfolios‘ initial returns or market-adjusted initial return are statistically different. 
*Significantly different from null hypothesis at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
[Panel C] 
  All   CHN   Non-CHN 
  No. of IPO Mean   No. of IPO Mean   No. of IPO Mean 
-∞ < FE ≤ -1 6 0.07 
 
0 -- 
 
6 0.07 
-1 < FE < 0 5 0.35 
 
2 0.11 
 
3 0.45 
FE = 0 14 0.09 
 
3 0.19 
 
11 0.06 
0 < FE ≤ 0.05 74 0.04 
 
9 0.14 
 
62 0.03 
0.05 < FE ≤ 0.1 36 0.11 
 
12 0.08 
 
24 0.12 
0.1 < FE ≤ 0.2 17 0.14 
 
7 0.03 
 
10 0.20 
0.2 < FE ≤ 0.5 6 0.10 
 
6 0.10 
 
0 -- 
0.5 < FE 4 0.05   2 0.09   2 0.01 
227 
 
 
Table 4.14 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables in Testing IPO Returns during 
the First Announcement Period (Segmented by Mean) 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 256 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 
2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the Cumulative Abnormal Return (Column 1) and Row Return (Column 2) during 11 
trading days around the first financial announcement date after going public. SIZE is the logarithm of 
proceed amount raised in offerings; AGE is the logarithmic value of company‘s years of operating 
history; CHN is dummy variable equal to one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero otherwise; FC 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports a profit forecast in prospectus, zero otherwise; IR 
is the IPO initial return, or called underpricing; MKT-R is the daily market return of Hang Seng Index 
during in respective period; and 25-Day Volatility is the early market volatility, which is defined as the 
standard deviation of the first 25 daily returns right after the offering, excluding the initial return. The t-
statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. 
 
 
 
    CAR            IPO Rtn   
  Mean No.   Mean No.   Mean No.   Mean No. 
Segmented by Mean of Ln(SIZE) [18.86]  
 Large   Small  Large   Small 
  2.695   98    2.986  158   0.124 98   0.1450   158 
Segmented by Mean of AGE [2.62]       
 Old   Yong  Old   Yong 
  2.846   119    2.898  137   0.118  119   0.154   137 
Segmented by CHN and Non-CHN       
 CHN   Non-CHN  CHN   Non-CHN 
  3.053   53    2.827  203   0.147  53   0.135   203 
Segmented by Forecasting and Non-Forecasting     
 FC=1   FC=0  FC=1   FC=0 
  2.907  172   2.807   84    0.144   172   0.124    84 
Segmented by Mean of IR [0.1024]       
 High   Low  High   Low 
  2.926  158     2.842 98   0.142   158   0.130    98 
Segmented by Mean of 25-Day Volatility [0.0333]   
 High   Low  High   Low 
  2.964   99    2.732 157   0.175  99   0.113  157 
Segmented by Mean of Mkt-Rtn [0.025]    
 High   Low  High   Low 
  2.479   171    2..157   85   0.148   171   0.114    85 
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Table 4.15 Cross-sectional Tests for IPO Returns during Announcement Period 
Forecasting v.s Non-Forecasting Firms 
 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 256 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 
2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the Row Return (Column 1) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (Column 2) during 
11 trading days around the first financial announcement date after going public. SIZE is the 
logarithm of proceed amount raised in offerings; AGE is the logarithmic value of company‘s years of 
operating history; CHN is dummy variable equal to one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero 
otherwise; FC is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports a profit forecast in prospectus, 
zero otherwise; EXC is a dummy variable equal to one if the absolute forecast error is higher than 
4.67 per cent (median of AFE), zero otherwise;  OPTM is a dummy variable equal to one in the 
forecast being optimistic, zero otherwise. IR is the IPO initial return, or called underpricing; MKT-
RTN is the daily market return of Hang Seng Index during in respective period; and 25-Day 
Volatility is the early market volatility, which is defined as the standard deviation of the first 25 daily 
returns right after the offering, excluding the initial return. The t-statistics and p-statistics (in 
parentheses) are calculated using White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. * Statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. 
 
    IPO Raw Rtn      CAR   
 
Model  
1-1 
Model  
1-2 
Model  
1-3 
  
Model  
2-1 
Model  
2-2 
Model  
2-3 
Constant 0.346 
   
0.346 
  
 
(2.42)*  
   
(2.41)*  
  
SIZE -0.013 
   
-0.013 
  
 
(-1.74)  
   
(-1.74)  
  
AGE -0.011 
   
-0.011 
  
 
(-1.05)  
   
(-1.05)  
  
CHN 0.050 
   
0.05 
  
 
(2.13)*  
   
(2.13)*  
  
IR 0.080 
   
0.08 
  
 
(4.03)*  
   
(4.03)*  
  
FC 0.016 
   
0.016 
  
 
(0.93) 
   
(0.93) 
  
EXC 
 
0.109 
   
0.109 
 
  
(2.323)*  
   
(2.32)*  
 
OPTM 
  
0.030 
   
0.030 
   
(1.05) 
   
(1.05) 
VOL25 1.760 
   
1.760 
  
 
(3.95)*  
   
(3.95)*  
  
MKT-R 0.010 
   
-0.010 
  
 
(2.18)*  
   
(-2.18)*  
  
R2 0.165 0.169 0.152   0.194 0.202 0.189 
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Table 4.16 Test of Differences in Raw Returns  
and Abnormal Returns for Forecasting IPOs 
 
[Panel A] 
 
No. of Raw IPO Rtn 
 
Rtn during Announcement 
 
IPOs Mean t-statistics 
 
Mean t-statistics 
Pessimistic    (FE>0) 163 0.138  1.158    
 
2.828 1.850 
Optimistic    (FE<0) 10 0.130    -- 
 
2.179 -- 
Excessive     (AFE>0.0467) 84 0.114   2.723*  
 
2.389 2.252* 
Non-Excessive (AFE≤0.0467) 88 0.140 -- 
 
2.878 -- 
 
Note: t-test for whether two portfolios‘ initial returns or market-adjusted initial return are statistically different. 
*Significantly different from null hypothesis at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
[Panel B] 
  No .of Raw IPO Rtn  Rtn during Announcement 
  IPOs Mean t-statistics  Mean t-statistics 
[CHN] 
 
      
 
Excessive (AFE>0.0467) 29 0.133 1.329  0.130 1.306 
Non-Excessive (AFE<0.0467) 16 0.071 --  0.068 -- 
[Non-CHN] 
   
  
 
Excessive (AFE>0.0467) 56 0.202 2.268*  0.198 2.166* 
Non-Excessive (AFE<0.0467) 71 0.033 --  0.037 -- 
 
Note: t-test for whether two portfolios‘ initial returns or market-adjusted initial return are statistically different. 
*Significantly different from null hypothesis at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
[Panel C] Distribution of Raw Returns 
  All   CHN   Non-CHN 
  No. of IPO Mean   No. of IPO Mean   No. of IPO Mean 
-∞ < FE ≤ -1 6 0.06 
 
0 -- 
 
6 0.06 
-1 < FE < 0 5 0.02 
 
2 0.02 
 
3 0.02 
FE = 0 14 -0.01 
 
3 -0.03 
 
11 0.00 
0 < FE ≤ 0.05 74 0.02 
 
9 0.03 
 
62 0.01 
0.05 < FE ≤ 0.1 36 0.01 
 
12 0.01 
 
24 0.01 
0.1 < FE ≤ 0.2 17 0.00 
 
7 0.02 
 
10 -0.01 
0.2 < FE ≤ 0.5 6 0.03 
 
6 0.03 
 
0 -- 
0.5 < FE 4 0.01 
 
2 0.02 
 
2 0.01 
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Table 4.17 Cross-sectional Tests for IPO Returns during Announcement Period 
(Excessive v.s non Excessive Forecasting) 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 256 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 
2000 to 2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is the Row Return (Column 1) and Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (Column 2) during 11 trading days around the first financial announcement date 
after going public. SIZE is the logarithm of proceed amount raised in offerings; AGE is the 
logarithmic value of company‘s years of operating history; CHN is dummy variable equal 
to one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero otherwise; EXC is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the absolute forecast error is higher than 4.67 per cent (median of AFE), zero 
otherwise; IR is the IPO initial return, or called underpricing; MKT-RTN is the daily 
market return of Hang Seng Index during in respective period; and 25-Day Volatility is the 
early market volatility, which is defined as the standard deviation of the first 25 daily 
returns right after the offering, excluding the initial return. The t-statistics and p-statistics 
(in parentheses) are calculated using White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. 
* Statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
 
  
 
  Raw IPO Rtn     CAR   
Coefficients t-value p-value   Coefficients t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.270  (1.544)   [0.125]    0.098  (0.080)  [0.937]  
SIZE -0.007  (-0.805)  [0.422]    -0.076  (-1.186)  [0.238]  
AGE -0.016  (-1.324)  [0.187]    -0.089  (-1.013)  [0.313]  
CHN 0.063  (2.223)*  [0.028]    0.357  (2.388)*  [0.007]  
25VOL 1.644  (2.953)*  [0.004]    1.419  (2.361)*  [0.008]  
IR (%) 0.095  (4.313)*  [0.000]    0.070  (1.448)   [0.155]  
EXC 0.035  (1.982)*  [0.049]    0.523  (3.463)*  [0.001]  
MKT R 0.010  (1.623)*  [0.107]    -0.563  (-3.346)*  [0.001]  
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Table 4.18 Statistic Summary of Market-adjusted and Firm-adjusted 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Buy-and-hold Returns 
 
 
 
[Year 1] No. Mean Median S.D Min Max  t-value 
CARHSI-1 227 0.144 0.091  1.897  -1.089  0.576  (3.76)*  
CARHSCI-1 227 0.166 0.135  2.212  -1.102  0.607  (3.84)*  
CARMTCH-1 227 -0.042 -0.100  1.485  -1.297  0.569  (-2.38)* 
BHARHSI-1 227 0.152 0.072  3.077  -1.191  0.663  (3.44)*  
BHARHSCI-1 227 0.163 0.040  2.981  -1.141  0.677  (3.63)*  
[Year 2] 
       
CARHSI-2 179 0.158 0.126  5.132  -1.749  0.884  (2.39)*  
CARHSCI-2 179 0.199 0.146  5.518  -1.799  0.956  (2.66)*  
CARMTCH-2 179 -0.104 -0.161  6.062  -2.324  1.004  (-4.17)* 
BHARHSI-2 179 0.126 -0.061  7.190  -1.462  1.094  (2.55)*  
BHARHSCI-2 179 0.134 -0.057  7.423  -1.553  1.128  (2.59)*  
[Year 3] 
       
CARHSI-3 141 0.131 -0.050  5.337  -2.352  1.066  (1.45)  
CARHSCI-3 141 0.195 0.014  5.834  -2.504  1.162  (1.96)  
CARMTCH-3 141 -0.168 -0.164  5.997  -2.459  1.166  (-4.88)* 
BHARHSI-3 141 0.064 -0.372  7.457  -1.661  1.442  (1.45)  
BHARHSCI-3 141 0.085 -0.226  7.476  -1.958  1.510  (1.96)   
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Table 4.19 Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPOs with HSI, HSCI, 
and Control Firms as Benchmarks (2000-2005) 
 
 
Cumulative HSI-adjusted, HSCI-adjusted and matching firm-adjusted returns in percentage, with associated s-
statistics for the 36 event month after going public, excluding the initial return. No. is the number of IPOs in each 
event month. 
 
  
CARHSI  
CARHSCI  
CARMTCH 
 
No Mean t-value 
 
Mean t-value 
 
Mean t-value 
Month 1 227 1.7% 1.69  
 
2.2% 1.99  
 
3.6% 1.49  
Month 2 227 2.6% 2.01  
 
3.6% 2.30  
 
3.0% 1.98  
Month 3 227 2.9% 1.66  
 
4.2% 2.33  
 
2.8% 1.06  
Month 4 227 4.2% 2.05  
 
5.9% 2.12  
 
1.7% 0.99  
Month 5 227 8.9% 3.34  
 
10.9% 3.00  
 
1.9% 1.57  
Month 6 227 9.8% 3.24  
 
11.9% 3.61  
 
0.0% 1.91  
Month 7 227 11.5% 3.53  
 
14.0% 3.66  
 
-0.1% -1.88  
Month 8 227 11.3% 3.24  
 
13.9% 3.61  
 
-1.7% -2.01  
Month 9 227 10.0% 2.78  
 
12.9% 3.65  
 
-2.2% -2.13  
Month 10 227 13.1% 3.53  
 
15.8% 3.71  
 
-2.8% -2.31  
Month 11 227 13.3% 3.58  
 
15.7% 3.63  
 
-3.3% -2.57  
Month 12 227 14.4% 3.75  
 
16.6% 3.84  
 
-4.2% -2.38  
Month 13 218 15.5% 3.66  
 
18.0% 4.00  
 
-4.9% -2.62  
Month 14 216 15.4% 3.49  
 
17.8% 3.53  
 
-5.6% -2.95  
Month 15 214 14.5% 3.21  
 
17.0% 3.61  
 
-5.7% -3.03  
Month 16 210 13.6% 2.92  
 
16.2% 3.20  
 
-6.6% -3.43  
Month 17 201 14.1% 2.94  
 
17.3% 3.20  
 
-6.5% -3.51  
Month 18 197 13.3% 2.73  
 
16.7% 3.11  
 
-7.2% -3.67  
Month 19 196 12.6% 2.55  
 
15.8% 3.07  
 
-8.1% -3.82  
Month 20 195 14.1% 2.42  
 
17.2% 2.97  
 
-8.6% -3.81  
Month 21 192 13.9% 2.32  
 
17.1% 2.83  
 
-9.3% -4.00  
Month 22 191 14.6% 2.35  
 
17.9% 2.84  
 
-9.8% -4.00  
Month 23 181 14.8% 2.25  
 
19.0% 2.72  
 
-10.0% -4.02  
Month 24 179 15.8% 2.39  
 
19.9% 2.66  
 
-10.4% -4.17  
Month 25 174 16.7% 2.42  
 
21.4% 2.98  
 
-11.1% -4.21  
Month 26 172 19.0% 2.69  
 
23.8% 2.89  
 
-11.9% -4.34  
Month 27 171 17.3% 2.39  
 
22.2% 2.57  
 
-11.9% -4.33  
Month 28 168 17.9% 2.44  
 
23.1% 2.61  
 
-12.5% -4.39  
Month 29 160 17.1% 2.23  
 
23.4% 2.30  
 
-13.1% -4.43  
Month 30 160 15.9% 2.01  
 
21.6% 2.16  
 
-13.7% -4.48  
Month 31 156 14.8% 1.85  
 
20.7% 2.12  
 
-13.6% -4.50  
Month 32 150 15.8% 1.94  
 
22.4% 2.00  
 
-14.3% -4.55  
Month 33 149 16.2% 1.96  
 
22.8% 2.15  
 
-15.0% -4.64  
Month 34 148 16.5% 1.94  
 
22.9% 2.09  
 
-15.7% -4.67  
Month 35 144 15.2% 1.75  
 
21.8% 1.78  
 
-16.9% -4.81  
Month 36 141 13.1% 1.45  
 
19.5% 1.96  
 
-16.8% -4.88  
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Table 4.20 Statistic Summary for IPO Long-run Return 
by Comparing between Chinese and Non-Chinese Samples 
(One-Year, Two-Year, and Three-Year CARs and BHARs) 
 
 
 
      CHN             Non-CHN        
  No Mean Max Min S.D   No Mean Max Min S.D   
CARHSI-1 46 0.126  1.483  -0.945  0.454   
181 0.148  1.897  -1.089  0.604  
 
CARHSI-2 32 0.095  1.760  -1.515  0.601   
147 0.172  5.132  -1.749  0.935  
 
CARHSI-3 20 0.163  1.391  -1.035  0.578   
121 0.124  5.337  -2.352  1.128  
 
CARHSCI-1 46 0.110  1.398  -1.102  0.482   
181 0.180  2.212  -1.081  0.635  
 
CARHSCI-2 32 0.081  1.601  -1.674  0.662   
147 0.225  5.518  -1.799  1.009  
 
CARHSCI-3 20 0.199  1.390  -1.272  0.674   
121 0.194  5.834  -2.504  1.226  
 
BHARHSI-1 46 0.150  3.077  -1.191  0.663   
181 0.156  2.401  -0.960  0.665  
 
BHARHSI-2 32 0.122  4.586  -1.462  0.993   
147 0.127  7.190  -1.346  1.118  
 
BHARHSI-3 20 0.066  3.078  -1.650  0.983   
121 0.064  7.457  -1.661  1.507  
 
BHARHSCI-1 46 0.133  2.981  -1.141  0.673   
181 0.171  2.326  -0.950  0.679  
 
BHARHSCI-2 32 0.071  4.388  -1.553  1.013   
147 0.147  7.423  -1.400  1.154  
 
BHARHSCI-3 20 0.043  2.857  -1.872  1.044   
121 0.092  7.476  -1.958  1.577  
 
CARMTCH-1 46 -0.151  1.069  -1.275  0.481   
181 -0.009  1.485  -1.297  0.595  
 
CARMTCH-2 32 -0.320  0.723  -1.559  0.553   
147 -0.043  6.062  -2.324  1.093  
 
CARMTCH-3 20 -0.325  0.892  -1.154  0.521    121 -0.135  5.997  -2.459  1.260    
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Table 4.21 Statistic Summary for IPO Long-run Return 
by Comparing Samples between High and Low Initial Returns 
(One-Year, Two-Year, and Three-Year CARs and BHARs) 
 
 
    IR High     IR Low   t- 
 
Number Mean Median   Number Mean Median   value 
CARHSI-1 114 0.118  0.099   
113 0.169  0.084  
 
(-2.11)* 
CARHSI-2 82 0.116  0.115   
97 0.194  0.228  
 
(-1.59)  
CARHSI-3 68 0.015  -0.106   
73 0.237  0.005  
 
(-2.24)*  
CARHSCI-1 114 0.140  0.127   
113 0.192  0.135  
 
(-1.94)  
CARHSCI-2 82 0.172  0.104   
97 0.222  0.165  
 
(-1.35)  
CARHSCI-3 68 0.074  -0.091   
73 0.308  0.079  
 
(-2.19)*  
BHARHSI-1 114 0.151  0.065   
113 0.152  0.072  
 
(-2.01)* 
BHARHSI-2 82 0.129  -0.132   
97 0.124  -0.005  
 
(1.67)  
BHARHSI-3 68 -0.036  -0.393   
73 0.158  -0.261  
 
(-1.89)  
BHARHSCI-1 114 0.163  0.028   
113 0.163  0.084  
 
(-2.00)* 
BHARHSCI-2 82 0.158  -0.083   
97 0.113  0.031  
 
(0.73)  
BHARHSCI-3 68 -0.016  -0.281   
73 0.178  -0.168  
 
(-1.99)* 
CARMTCH-1 114 -0.087  -0.100   
113 0.003  -0.100  
 
(-1.94)*  
CARMTCH-2 82 -0.118  -0.161   
97 -0.088  -0.161  
 
(-1.16)   
CARMTCH-3 68 -0.316  -0.383    73 -0.035  -0.164    (-2.12)*  
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Table 4.22 Correlation Matrix of Control Variables in OLS Regression to Test Forecasting Error Metrics of Hong Kong IPOs 
 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 227 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 2006 where the complete data on 
all of the variables is available. SIZE is the logarithm of proceed amount raised in offerings; AGE is the logarithmic value of 
company‘s years of operating history; CHN is dummy variable equal to one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero otherwise; 
VOL25 is the early market volatility, which is defined as the standard deviation of the first 25 daily returns right after the offering, 
excluding the initial return; IR is the IPO initial return, or called underpricing; B/M is the book-to-market ratio in respective year. AFE 
is the absolute forecast error defined as |Actual Profit – Forecast Profit|/(Actual Profit). The t-statistics (in parentheses) and p-statistics 
[in parentheses] are calculated by using White‘s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. * Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
 
 
  SIZE AGE CHN VOL25 IR B/M T/O AFE 
SIZE 1.00  
       
AGE 0.03  1.00  
      
CHN 0.46  0.21  1.00  
     
VOL25 -0.24  0.02  -0.23  1.00  
    
IR 0.11  0.10  0.01  0.08  1.00  
   
B/M 0.11  0.04  -0.13  0.04  0.36  1.00  
  
T/O 0.09  0.04  0.08  0.11  0.17  -0.06  1.00  
 
AFE 0.08  0.20  -0.04  0.00  0.05  0.05  0.04  1.00  
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Table 4. 23 OLS Regression For IPO Long-run  
Abnormal Returns in One- and Three-Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 227 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 
2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold returns in one-year (Panel A) 
and three-year (Panel B) duration. SIZE is the logarithm of proceed amount raised in offerings; AGE 
is the logarithmic value of company‘s years of operating history; CHN is dummy variable equal to 
one if being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero otherwise; VOL25 is the early market volatility, which 
is defined as the standard deviation of the first 25 daily returns right after the offering, excluding the 
initial return; IR is the IPO initial return, or called underpricing; B/M is the book-to-market ratio in 
respective year; T/O is the logarithm of first trading-day total turnover. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) and p-statistics [in parentheses] are calculated by using White‘s (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent method. * Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
LR Abnormal Rtni =α+β1SIZE +β3VOL25 +β3IR +β4 B/M +β5 CHNr+β6 T/O + εi 
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Panel A Intercept SIZE VOL25 IR B/M CHN T/O R2 
CARHSI-1 -0.063  -0.028  -3.246  -0.284  0.157  -0.021  -0.044  0.127  
 
(-0.09)  (-0.75)  (-1.60)  (-3.12)*  (4.37)*  (-1.19)  (-1.39)  
 
 
[0.93]  [0.46]  [0.11]  [0.00]  [0.00]  [0.23]  [0.17]  
 
CARHSCI-1 0.005  -0.033  -6.200  -0.258  0.145  -0.028  -0.045  0.145  
 
(0.01)  (-0.85)  (-2.93)*  (-2.72)*  (3.87)*  (-1.24)  (-1.36)  
 
 
[0.99]  [0.40]  [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.20]  [0.17]  
 
BHARHSI-1 -0.292  -0.020  -1.560  -0.262  0.194  -0.002  -0.049  0.111  
 
(-0.37)  (-0.45)  (-1.66)  (-2.48)*  (4.64)*  (-1.02)  (-1.33)  
 
 
[0.71]  [0.65]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.32]  [0.19]  
 
BHARHSCI-1 -0.209  -0.026  -4.069  -0.237  0.185  -0.010  -0.050  0.116  
 
(-0.26)  (-0.59)  (-1.70)  (-2.20)*  (4.35)*  (-1.08)  (-1.34)  
 
 
[0.79]  [0.56]  [0.09]  [0.03]  [0.00]  [0.44]  [0.18]  
 
CARMTCH-1 -0.417  -0.024  -2.432  -0.216  0.104  -0.101  -0.020  0.166  
 
(-0.47)  (-0.45)  (-0.96)  (-2.47)*  (2.22)*  (-1.77)  (-0.43)  
 
  [0.64]  [0.66]  [0.34]  [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.08]  [0.67]    
Panel 2                 
CARHSI-3 -1.610  -0.002  -9.156  -0.261  0.197  -0.036  -0.125  0.217  
 
(-0.98)  (-0.03)  (-2.25)*  (-1.91)*  (4.15)*  (-1.13)  (-1.84)  
 
 
[0.33]  [0.98]  [0.03]  [0.05]  [0.00]  [0.26]  [0.07]  
 
CARHSCI-3 -1.764  -0.015  -13.650  -0.258  0.188  -0.069  -0.116  0.225  
 
(-0.99)  (-0.16)  (-3.09)*  (-2.03)*  (3.65)*  (-1.23)  (-1.57)  
 
 
[0.32]  [0.87]  [0.00]  [0.04]  [0.00]  [0.20]  [0.12]  
 
BHARHSI-3 -2.560  -0.050  -8.205  -0.396  0.294  -0.095  -0.112  0.182  
 
(-1.13)  (-0.42)  (-1.46)  (-1.97)*  (4.48)*  (-1.25)  (-1.20)  
 
 
[0.26]  [0.67]  [0.15]  [0.05]  [0.00]  [0.18]  [0.23]  
 
BHARHSCI-3 -2.734  -0.061  -11.300  -0.373  0.289  -1.099  -0.108  0.183  
 
(-1.16)  (-0.50)  (-1.99)* (-2.00)*  (4.21)*  (-1.25)  (-1.10)  
 
 
[0.25]  [0.62]  [0.05]  [0.05]  [0.00]  [1.18]  [0.27]  
 
CARMTCH-3 -1.505  -0.064  -13.209  -0.399  0.182  -0.047  -0.044  0.245  
 
(-0.64)  (-0.47)  (-2.41)*  (-1.99)*  (2.27)*  (-1.12)  (-1.39)  
 
  [0.52]  [0.64]  [0.02]  [0.05]  [0.03]  [0.23]  [0.17]    
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Table 4.24 Statistic Summary for Long-run Return 
by Comparing between Forecasting and Non-Forecasting IPOs 
 
 
 
    All 
   
FC 
   
Non-FC t- 
 
No Mean Median No Mean Median No Mean Median statistics 
CARHSI-1 227 0.14  0.09   
149 0.17  0.11  
 
78 0.08  0.08  (1.08)  
CARHSI-2 179 0.16  0.13   
119 0.24  0.14  
 
60 0.00  0.08  (1.51)  
CARHSI-3 141 0.13  -0.05   
98 0.24  0.05  
 
43 -0.13  -0.19  (0.16)  
CARHSCI-1 227 0.17  0.14   
149 0.21  0.16  
 
78 0.08  0.03  (0.14)  
CARHSCI-2 179 0.20  0.15   
119 0.30  0.23  
 
60 -0.01  0.07  (0.98)  
CARHSCI-3 141 0.20  0.01   
98 0.34  0.15  
 
43 -0.13  -0.21  (1.78)  
BHARHSI-1 227 0.15  0.07   
149 0.15  0.07  
 
78 0.16  0.07  (2.21)*  
BHARHSI-2 179 0.13  -0.06   
119 0.16  -0.06  
 
60 0.06  -0.16  (0.61)  
BHARHSI-3 141 0.06  -0.37   
98 0.11  -0.28  
 
43 -0.05  -0.55  (0.92)  
BHARHSCI-1 227 0.16  0.04   
149 0.17  0.08  
 
78 0.15  0.00  (1.98)*  
BHARHSCI-2 179 0.13  -0.06   
119 0.19  -0.01  
 
60 0.03  -0.17  (2.03)*  
BHARHSCI-3 141 0.09  -0.23   
98 0.16  -0.14  
 
43 -0.08  -0.55  (2.35)*  
CARMTCH-1 227 -0.04  -0.10   
149 -0.05  -0.10  
 
78 -0.07  -0.08  (0.59)  
CARMTCH-2 179 -0.10  -0.16   
119 -0.10  -0.13  
 
60 -0.14  -0.17  (0.81)  
CARMTCH-3 141 -0.17  -0.16    98 -0.17  -0.16    43 -0.17  -0.18  (1.95)  
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Table 4.25 Statistic Summary for Long-run Return 
by Comparing between Optimistic and Pessimistic Forecasting IPOs 
 
 
 
     All      Pessimistic    Optimistic t- 
 
No Mean Median No Mean Median No Mean Median statistics 
CARHSI-1 149 0.29 0.35  
139 0.17 0.08 
 
10 0.17 0.11 0.73 
CARHSI-2 119 0.75 0.30  
110 0.20 0.12 
 
9 0.24 0.14 1.38 
CARHSI-3 98 0.48 0.09  
90 0.22 0.05 
 
8 0.24 0.05 1.65 
CARHSCI-1 149 0.42 0.54  
139 0.20 0.16 
 
10 0.21 0.16 0.82 
CARHSCI-2 119 0.93 0.70  
110 0.25 0.21 
 
9 0.30 0.23 2.00 
CARHSCI-3 98 0.71 0.45  
90 0.30 0.11 
 
8 0.34 0.15 1.15 
BHARHSI-1 149 0.01 0.01  
139 0.16 0.07 
 
10 0.15 0.07 0.98 
BHARHSI-2 119 0.61 0.22  
110 0.12 -0.08 
 
9 0.16 -0.06 1.26 
BHARHSI-3 98 0.09 
-
0.16  
90 0.12 -0.28 
 
8 0.11 -0.28 1.04 
BHARHSCI-1 149 0.1 0.16  
139 0.17 0.08 
 
10 0.17 0.08 0.34 
BHARHSCI-2 119 0.73 0.09  
110 0.14 -0.05 
 
9 0.19 -0.01 1.46 
BHARHSCI-3 98 0.22 0.06  
90 0.15 -0.14 
 
8 0.16 -0.14 1.12 
CARMTCH-1 149 -0.04 
-
0.08  
133 -0.05 -0.1 
 
10 -0.05 -0.10 0.87 
CARMTCH-2 119 0.35 0.46  
105 -0.14 -0.16 
 
9 -0.10 -0.13 1.43 
CARMTCH-3 98 0.21 0.37   79 -0.21 -0.16   8 -0.17 -0.16 1.91 
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Table 4.26 Statistic Summary for Long-run Return 
by Comparing between Chinese and Non-Chinese Forecasting IPOs 
 
 
 
    All      CHN      Non-CHN t- 
 
No Mean Median No Mean Median No Mean Median statistics 
CARHSI-1 149 0.17  0.11   
40 0.05  0.08  
 
109 0.22  0.11  (-2.36)*  
CARHSI-2 119 0.24  0.14   
28 -0.04  0.09  
 
91 0.32  0.21  (-2.89)*  
CARHSI-3 98 0.24  0.05   
18 -0.03  0.04  
 
80 0.31  0.05  (-2.18)*  
CARHSCI-1 149 0.21  0.16   
40 0.04  0.07  
 
109 0.27  0.19  (-2.28)*  
CARHSCI-2 119 0.30  0.23   
28 -0.03  -0.01  
 
91 0.41  0.28  (-2.59)*  
CARHSCI-3 98 0.34  0.15   
18 0.04  -0.04  
 
80 0.40  0.16  (-2.17)*  
BHARHSI-1 149 0.15  0.07   
40 0.04  0.05  
 
109 0.19  0.08  (-1.71)  
BHARHSI-2 119 0.16  -0.06   
28 -0.10  -0.20  
 
91 0.24  -0.04  (-1.95)   
BHARHSI-3 98 0.11  -0.28   
18 -0.17  -0.34  
 
80 0.18  -0.20  (-2.21)*  
BHARHSCI-1 149 0.17  0.08   
40 0.02  0.03  
 
109 0.22  0.12  (-1.69)  
BHARHSCI-2 119 0.19  -0.01   
28 -0.13  -0.16  
 
91 0.29  0.03  (-2.00)*  
BHARHSCI-3 98 0.16  -0.14   
18 -0.17  -0.23  
 
80 0.23  -0.06  (-2.14)*  
CARMTCH-1 149 -0.05  -0.10   
40 -0.14  -0.13  
 
109 -0.01  -0.05  (-2.25)*  
CARMTCH-2 119 -0.10  -0.13   
28 -0.33  -0.32  
 
91 -0.04  -0.16  (-2.30)*  
CARMTCH-3 98 -0.17  -0.16    18 -0.35  -0.48    80 -0.13  -0.16  (-2.68)*  
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Table 4.27 OLS Regression for IPO Long-run Abnormal Returns  
in One- and Three-Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Sample in the table includes 227 Hong Kong Main Board operating firm IPOs from 2000 to 
2006 where the complete data on all of the variables is available. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold returns in one-year (Panel A) and 
three-year (Panel B) duration. SIZE is the logarithm of proceed amount raised in offerings; AGE is 
the logarithmic value of company‘s years of operating history; CHN is dummy variable equal to one if 
being H-shares or Red Chips, and zero otherwise; VOL25 is the early market volatility, which is 
defined as the standard deviation of the first 25 daily returns right after the offering, excluding the 
initial return; IR is the IPO initial return, or called underpricing; B/M is the book-to-market ratio in 
respective year; SUB is the times of public subscription; T/O is the logarithm of first trading-day total 
turnover; and AFE is the absolute forecast error defined as |Actual Profit – Forecast Profit|/(Actual 
Profit). The t-statistics (in parentheses) and p-statistics [in parentheses] are calculated by using White‘s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent method. * Statistically significant at 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
  
 
LR Abnormal Rtni =α+β1SIZE +β3VOL25 +β3IR +β4 B/M + β5 CHNr+β6 T/O +β7 AFE + εi 
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Panel A Intercept SIZE B/M IR VOL25 T/Over CHN AFE R
2 
CARHSI-1 -0.96  -0.01  0.16  -0.40  -3.12  -0.05  -0.19 0.47  0.25  
 
(-1.39)  (-0.34)  (4.03)*  (-1.97)*  (-2.46)*  (-1.44)  (-1.96)* (2.23)*  
 
 
[0.17]  [0.73]  [0.16]  [0.05]  [0.02]  [0.15]  [0.05] [0.03]  
 
CARHSCI-1 -0.61  -0.02  0.14  -0.36 -5.95  -0.04  -0.20 0.62  0.28  
 
(-0.84)  (-0.04)  (3.32)*  (-1.96)*  (-2.63)*  (-1.16)  (-1.67) (2.74)*  
 
 
[0.40]  [0.97]  [0.00]  [0.05]  [0.01]  [0.17]  [0.10] [0.01]  
 
BHARHSI-1 -1.40  -0.03  0.19  -0.41 -3.15  -0.07  -0.22 0.06  0.21  
 
(-1.76)  (-0.60)  (4.16)*  (-2.05)*  (-2.13)*  (-1.78)  (-1.73) (2.46)*  
 
 
[0.08]  [0.55]  [0.00]  [0.04]  [0.03]  [0.08]  [0.09] [0.02]  
 
BHARHSCI-1 -1.08  -0.01  0.18  -0.38 -2.70  -0.07  -0.22  0.16  0.21  
 
(-1.31)  (-0.24)  (3.71)*  (-2.02)*  (-2.06)*  (-1.63)  (-1.85) (2.54)*  
 
 
[0.19]  [0.81]  [0.00]  [0.04]  [0.04]  [0.11]  [0.07] [0.01]  
 
CARMTCH-1 -0.81  -0.05  0.10  -0.2 -2.86  -0.03  -0.12 0.03  0.27  
 
(-0.96)  (-0.99)  (2.13)*  (-2.19)*  (-2.06)*  (-1.69)  (-1.97)* (2.50)*  
 
  [0.34]  [0.32]  [0.04]  [0.03]  [0.04]  [0. 91] [0.50] [0.01]    
Panel 2                   
CARHSI-3 -2.28  -0.04  0.18  -0.24 -10.17  -0.19  -0.25  0.31  0.24  
 
(-1.21)  (-0.39)  (2.70)*  (-3.15)*  (-2.16)*  (-2.05)*  (-2.04)*  (0.84)  
 
 
[0.23]  [0.31]  [0.01]  [0.00]  [0.03]  [0.04]  [0.04]  [0.40]  
 
CARHSCI-3 -1.80  -0.02  0.17  -0.24 -14.40  -0.17  -0.20  0.43  0.25  
 
(-0.88)  (-0.19)  (2.36)*  (-2.66)*  (-2.81)*  (-1.71)  (-2.00)* (1.05)  
 
 
[0.38]  [0.85]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.09]  [0.04]  [0.30]  
 
BHARHSI-3 -3.65  -0.04  0.25  -0.53 -7.78  -0.23  -0.52  0.37  0.22  
 
(-1.47)  (-0.34)  (2.92)*  (-2.82)*  (-2.28)*  (-1.94)  (-2.31)* (1.12)  
 
 
[0.14]  [0.73]  [0.00]  [0.01]  [0.04]  [0.06]  [0.03]  [0.27]  
 
BHARHSCI-3 -3.28  -0.03  0.24  -0.51 -10.46  -0.23  -0.52  0.36  0.22  
 
(-1.25)  (-0.19)  (2.68)*  (-2.54)*  (-2.62)*  (-1.80)  (-2.22)* (1.03)  
 
 
[0.21]  [0.85]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.08]  [0.04]  [0.31]  
 
CARMTCH-3 -2.74  -0.13  0.18  -0.36 -13.15  -0.06  -0.10  0.38  0.26  
 
(-1.19)  (-1.09)  (2.17)*  (-1.97)*  (-2.41)*  (-1.51)  (-2.27)* (0.74)  
 
  [0.24]  [0.28]  [0.03]  [0.05]  [0.02]  [0.13]  [0.03]  [0.46]    
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Figure 4.1 Prediction Realization Diagram  
for Forecasting Errors in IPO Prospectuses 
 
Note:  
∆Ft = Ft – At = Forecast change in earnings for period T; ∆At = At – At-1 = Actual change in earnings 
for period T. At = Actual earnings for period T, Ft = Forecast earnings for period T. 
An oblique line through origin represents the exact forecast accuracy. Then observations to the left of 
the oblique line represent optimistic forecasts, while observations to the right of the oblique line 
represent pessimistic forecasts. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Comparison between CARHSI CARBHAR and CARMTCH  
for IPOs in 2000-2005 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DECISION FOR THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT  
TO TAKE STATE-OWNED COMPANIES PUBLIC IN HONG KONG 
 – AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The term privatization can be traced back to the late 1970s when the Thatcher government of 
Great Britain first sold state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private investors. This change in 
ownership has greatly reduced the role of the state in many national economies. Meanwhile, 
an interesting phenomenon is rising. There are some governments who even pursue the 
privatization programmes via overseas listing approaches. Academic studies have identified a 
host of reasons, including hypotheses related to investor recognition, access to capital, 
protection of minority shareholders, visibility, and improvement of the information 
environment. 
China‘s government has practiced the way to develop a domestic financial market to 
match the large-scale economy since early 1990s. The growth of privatization programmes 
throughout the world has been phenomenal, and so has the spread from developed countries 
towards emerging markets during the most recent decade. The topic on Chinese foreign stock 
listings is timely and warranted. There have been several recent newspaper reports about the 
interest in foreign-listed Chinese stocks by foreign investors (The Wall Street Journal) and the 
surge in the number of Chinese firms‘ foreign listings in world leading stock exchanges (New 
York Times; Financial Times; Reuters News). The Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) recently simplified the approval process to make it easier for Chinese 
firms to list on foreign stock exchanges. (Reuters News, May 26, 2003). 
This chapter aims to investigate the meaning and political objectives of such overseas 
listing. Since the Chinese government regards overseas listing as part of the domestic 
privatization programme and an important step of economic reforms, rather than merely 
protecting the immature domestic financial market, overseas listing may bring the state 
authorities more successful experience to take the reform into next level. In particular, by 
testing the determinant of selection progress and criteria, both market participant and Chinese 
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SOEs may realize the targets and goals of government to pursue overseas listing, to 
understand the current stage of economic reform and privatization. In addition, the 
improvement in accounting and disclosure practices as well as other aspects of corporate 
governance of H-share companies may have positive influence on domestic listed firms. Also, 
by testing the relationship between long-run performance and investor protection, Chinese 
authorities may find a possible direction to further and deeper amend the investment 
environment in the A-share market. 
The chapter jointly tests a number of arguments, including the market order hypothesis, 
bonding hypothesis, market timing hypothesis related to the decision of overseas listing, the 
signaling hypothesis and other asymmetric information models related to the improvement in 
corporate governance, investor protection theory and IPO underperformance argument related 
to the long-run after-market stock trading.  
The tests provide various empirical evidence and conclusions. Since the Chinese 
government uses primary overseas listings as a mean of forcing SOEs to conform to 
‗international standards‘ and to establish ‗modern corporate governance‘, such activities have 
been attached with more political considerations. The government has carefully selected 
qualified enterprises and helped with pre-listing restructures to meet high standards in foreign 
stock exchanges. These strategic activities have lasted for fifteen years since the first launch 
of an overseas-listed company in Hong Kong in 1993. It is likely to be maintained at the 
current stage. Such activities do not necessarily represent direct intervention in the market or 
discrimination to other participants. On the one hand, due to past political and economic 
burdens attached by the macroeconomic growth and reform, SOEs were not capable enough 
to process reorganization without any assistance from either state government or local 
authorities; on the other hand, SOEs could be embarrass for the Chinese government to 
pursue economic reform more deeply and widely. Partial privatization and capitalization, 
therefore, must be the unlocking key for subsequent reformatory policies and activities. 
Once only considering issuing firms‘ incentives, large-scale and ‗healthy‘ state-owned 
companies within the government‘s supporting industries are more likely to issue their shares 
on foreign, open, and well-developed stock exchanges when the target market is in good time 
of pricing and offering, in order to obtain more capital-raising, to operate under international 
standards, to send positive signal of Chinese economic reform, and to indirectly protect the 
development of the domestic financial market. 
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As far as the offering proceeds of proposed H-shares are concerned, they are mainly 
determined by their financial position and performance, proportion of government-backed 
shareholding, as well as market conditions and movements. Based upon the bonding 
hypothesis and signaling hypothesis, the overseas listing is promoted by the government with 
a relatively rational consideration to develop the domestic financial market. 
Since H-share listing is driven by the needs of China‘s economic reform and SOEs partial 
privatization, they are offered reorganization priority and have exhibited better governance 
structure after listing. In other words, overseas listing does improve the corporate governance 
and has spread its positive effects onto the domestic financial market. 
Although still suffering from long-run underperformance, LaP, as the proxy of ex post 
public control to the extent of investors‘ protection, is statistically significant across tested 
models, which is consistent with the prediction of a positive relationship with the long-run 
abnormal returns. Holding the bonding hypothesis, legal origin is an important determinant to 
accounting practice, corporate governance, disclosure procedures, and investors‘ protection, 
which in turn will crucially affect the development of financial markets as well as market 
participants‘ investment expectations and activities.  
Consequently, the partial privatization through an overseas primary listing approach is 
indeed a feasible way to facilitate the domestic financial market and to benefit the economic 
reform, particularly for countries with a large economic scale but a lack of the developed 
capital market and mature trading platform. 
As a result of China‘s fast-growing economy, the number of publicly listed Chinese firms 
has increased dramatically. There are more Chinese firms eager to tap into a capital market 
beyond the Chinese domestic market. This chapter provides propositional guidance to the 
practice. Also, as a step on from prior studies, this chapter contributes to existing literature in 
the following ways. In the tests of making decisions towards an overseas listing, the conflicts 
between theoretical predictions and the Chinese government‘s activities still remain a 
question. This chapter has found evidence for the government‘s incentives to do so. 
Meanwhile, LaPorta et al. (2006b) measures of ex post public control have been introduced 
into the cross-sectional investigation for the first, which yield significant and valuable 
outcomes. 
The rest of chapter is arranged as follows: Section 5.2 cites a number of related studies as a 
literature review, while Section 5.3 lists tested research questions. Section 5.4 mainly reports 
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the data collection and used sources. Section 5.5 introduces recent privatization programmes 
of Chinese SOEs. Empirical studies will start from Section 5.6 to investigate the choice and 
size of overseas listing. After the discussion on the improvement in corporate governance in 
Section 5.7, Section 5.8 turns to illustrate the long-run stock performance by linking to the 
effects of investor protection. Conclusions will be summarized in the end. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
 
This chapter examines the impacts of political, legal, and economic aspects that can affect the 
decision of selling the SOE in the foreign capital markets. Since this topic has aroused great 
attention in academia, there is abundant empirical evidence, especially to the extent of 
privatization motives, methods, improvement in corporate governance and operating 
performance, as well as political effects. The review begins with motives and methods of 
privatization, which will help to understand Chinese government‘s political end in pursuing 
overseas listing. In addition, prior literature has summarized a number of uncertainties and 
risks associated with privatization programmes, which offers various research questions to 
this chapter. In terms of the importance and design of Chinese privatization as well as the 
choice of overseas listing, this chapter argues that both the ―market hypothesis‖ and ―bonding 
hypothesis‖ work hand in hand, though the latter carries more weight in explaining the 
ultimate goals of the Chinese government. Moreover, as further evidence for the bonding 
argument, overseas listing positively influences the development of the domestic market, 
especially to the extent of the investors‘ protection. 
 
5.2.1 Share Issue Privatizations (SIPs) – Motives, Methods, Uncertainties, and Risks 
5.2.1.1 Motives and Methods of SIPs 
Privatization of SOEs through a primary overseas listing approach brings together the IPO, 
privatization, and overseas listing literatures. The term privatization refers to the process by 
which a government transfers ownership of assets and control of commercial activities to the 
private sector
29
. 
This chapter aims to isolate the overseas primary listing as a particular issue. By reviewing 
privatization literature, on could possibly ascertain the Chinese government‘s logic and 
activities, including why they take large-scale enterprises from selected industries to list in 
                                                     
29
 Comstock, A., R. J. Kish, and G. M. Vasconcellos, 2003, The Post-privatization Financial 
Performance of Former State-owned Enterprises, International Financial Market, Institute, and Money 
13, pp. 20. 
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Hong Kong, how they choose a prospective company, why overseas listing costs do not upset 
the increasing tendency of overseas listing, and what are the ultimate goals behind such 
activities. 
In general, for private-owned enterprises, the choice of going public is usually based on 
whether the seller (or issuing firms) can receive the best outcome of raising funds. The pricing 
is a function of the characteristics of the firm, activities of the investors, as well as the 
movement and development of the financial market. However, to pursue SIPs, governments 
play a dual-role of being issuers and regulators. Therefore, privatization is attached more 
meaningful motives than private-owned firms‘ listing. A government may always consider a 
number of factors, including characteristics of the markets and the potential investors, the 
institutional environment, the prospective firm, as well as national macro-economic 
conditions and government‘s own political objectives (Stulz, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1999; and Levine, 1997). 
First of all, political and economic factors influence the decision and design of SIPs.  
Much depends on the proposed level of post-privatization direct control. Both private and 
state-owned firms are all facing an underpricing problem when going public, Perotti (1995) 
states that, for a market-oriented government, significantly underpricing a relatively large 
portion of an SOE can signal to investors the absence of interference in the privatized firm in 
the future. While, a populist government, which is not likely to resist the political pressure to 
interfere with the privatized firm, prefers to underprice less relatively to raise issue proceeds 
in the short run. Biais and Perotti (1997) further demonstrate that a privatizing government, 
which will not give up interfering with the issuing of SOEs, can still reduce the investors‘ 
perceived likelihood by strategically allocating newly issued shares to median-class voters. 
Subsequently, both the number of shares initially issued and the associated underpricing will 
increase correspondingly. 
Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter (1999) find that governments always insert control 
restrictions in the charters of privatized firms, or retain a special class of shares, which are 
designed to ensure that the privatized firms will not be fully controlled by foreign 
shareholders or targeted for hostile takeover. They conclude that the underpricing is a 
concession by governments to overcome the political obstacles in the way of successful 
privatization. It is also a means to subsequently yield economic benefits.  
In terms of the methods of privatization, Slovin, Sushka, and Feraro (1995) analyze the 
choice between the use of public and private capital markets in restructuring. They compare 
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carve-outs (IPOs of a subsidiary‘s equity in the public market), spin-offs (pro rata stock 
dividends), and asset selloffs (sales of subsidiaries to third parties in the private market). They 
argue that firms use equity carve-outs ―when outside investors are likely to price the equity 
favorably relative to managers‘ perceived value‖ and that they use asset selloffs when it is 
more difficult to value the unit. 
Megginson, Nash, Randenborgh, and Poulsen (2004) examine the impacts of various 
factors on the choice between selling a SOE in the public capital market through a SIP and 
selling it privately in an asset sale, including political, institutional, and economic 
characteristics. SIPs are more common in less developed markets, and for more profitable 
enterprises. In particular, the choice between using the private or public market in 
privatizations of SOEs is determined by three aspects, i.e. market consideration, political or 
legal environment, and firm-specific characteristics.  
The above literature answers why the Chinese government pursues partial privatization 
and chooses to sell state-owned capital to public sectors. To further and deeply reform the 
domestic market, the Chinese government and its SOEs have been forced to fling themselves 
into a real and competitive market environment, where privatization is imperative as a 
precondition. In addition, since the current private sector is not capable enough to entirely 
accommodate such a massive capital thread, after considering the experience from the past 
and other countries, a gradual progress is appreciated to avoid stinging and over-spread 
shocks, which requires a certain level of post-privatization control at the present stage.  
 
5.2.1.2 Risks and Uncertainties surrounding SIPs 
Both enterprises and government need risk control management. The early empirical evidence 
on IPOs of SOEs is highly consistent with that on privately-owned companies to the extent of 
underpricing, including Jacquillat (1987), Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Jekinson and Mayer 
(1988), Levis (1993), Perotti and Guney (1993), Jones et al. (1999), and Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997). Even the IPOs underpricing itself remains a puzzle in the finance literature, 
the most recent literature alternatively attempts to find motives behind various and complex 
SIPs. It is noted that, the similarity in average underpricing between initial SIPS and private-
sector IPOs is actually surprising based commonly accepted asymmetric information models. 
Jones et al. (1999) argues that, in contrast to privately-owned issuing companies, governments 
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also structure the offers of privatized SOEs to achieve political and economic policy 
objectives other than proceed maximization.  
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) demonstrate that, each country employs a fairly consistent 
approach to its privatization transactions. In most cases, the stated goals of privatization 
include fostering the development of capital market institutions or broadening share 
ownership, improving the economic performance of privatized enterprises, and raising 
revenue. Though governments place different weights on these various goals, which can be 
reflected by the pace, scope and structure of privatization programmes. Government officials 
may not seek to maximize proceeds but to pursue other political and economic objectives. 
Meanwhile, unlike a corporate issuer, a privatizing government pursues multiple 
objectives that have both political and economic objectives. Furthermore, in private sector 
offerings, the role of the government is of a regulator, both during and after the offer. 
However, in SIPs, the government is in a position to be both the issuer and the regulator. This 
dual role puts private investors in to a circumstance of information asymmetry. It is not only 
about the value of the individual company but also regarding a government‘s commitment to 
privatization (Jones et al., 1999). 
According to North (1994), the public ownership of an SOE has the effects on the political 
and economic ends behind the selection of SIP offering terms. In addition, to build political 
support for privatization, these terms could help foster a culture of domestic share ownership, 
as well as establish a national or regional stock market. This compatibility between political 
and economic objectives is likely to occur when a political system mimics the neoclassical 
market with zero transaction costs enabling wealth-maximizing political exchanges to occur.  
Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2001) examine 201 cases of privatization in 32 
developing countries and find that the relinquishment of control by the government is one key 
determinant of changes to profitability. However, given the fact that privatization is typically 
sequential whereby governments sell their shares imperceptibly, it may not be that critical to 
shift controlling shares to the private sector to obtain improvement in the performance of 
privatized SOEs. 
The governments in countries with relatively primitive capital markets are those most 
likely to promote broader share ownership by deeply discounting privatization shares in IPOs. 
In addition, there is probably greater uncertainty in determining the intrinsic value of initial 
share offerings than in developed markets. For instance, the less-developed capital markets 
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may have few existing publicly-traded firms that are closely comparable, the ―the appraisal of 
offering firms is more difficult and the production and dissemination of information 
pertaining to shave values is less extensive under primitive capital market conditions
30‖.  
As for the attached high costs in SIPs due to the partial sales and political uncertainty, 
prior literature, including Megginson‘s series of studies, has illustrated one of the possible 
reasons. If uncertainty of a government‘s future policy is high, then private investors are 
likely to perceive that a small initial sale indicates the government does not intend to 
relinquish control making the likelihood of a future policy change, or interference, greater.  
In terms of market valuation levels, high underpricing has sent a signal that the 
government desires to promote wider equity ownership by significantly underpricing shares. 
Also, the great uncertainties regarding the SOE‘s intrinsic value in lesser-developed markets 
are factors that influence costs attached to privatization. Consequently, high costs result in 
SIPs in a less-developed financial market to aspire to maximize sale proceeds. The argument 
is consistent with Perotti and Oijen (2001) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), to the 
extent that once new firms go public, the enhanced liquidity and efficiency encourage more 
public offerings, which in turn boosts the rapid growth of the financial market. Likewise, 
privatization through SIPs can accelerate stock market development and trigger gains in 
economic growth and efficiency, as called the ‗snowball effect‘.  
Although most privatization programmes begin with a period of partial privatization, the 
restriction to sell controlling shares of firms is regarded to have little impact. However, by 
using data on Indian SOEs, Gupta (2005) indicates this ignores the important role of the stock 
market to the extent of monitoring and rewarding managerial performance. Even after the 
partial privatization and government retaining its control, the privatized firms still gain benefit 
from the profitability, productivity, and investment. 
Studies on the effects of share issue privatizations with transfer of management control 
achieve complex conclusions. For instance, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) find significant 
improvement in the operating performance following privatization in 21 countries. However, 
having conducted cross-country investigation, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) argue that the 
earnings actually improve prior to privatization but decline subsequently. 
                                                     
30
 See Dewenter, K. L., and P. H. Malatesta, 1997, Public Offerings of State-Owned and Privately-
Owned Enterprises: An International Comparison, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 4 (September), 
pp.1663 
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Certainly, the influence of corporate governance and performance by privatization cannot 
be ignored. Boardman and Vining (1989), Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1992), 
Megginson et al. (1994), and Eckel et al. (1997) generally document significant improvement 
in firm output, efficiency, profitability, and/or capital investment spending following 
privatization, usually without job cuts. Also, Megginson et al. (2000) finds positive long-run 
returns in privatization.  
By using a sample of 634 SOEs in China that went public through SIPs over the period 
1994 to 1998, Sun and Tong (2000) find limited success in the privatization programme. 
Selling too few government shares to private shareholders cannot undergo fundamental 
changes in the governing control. Also, the improvement of corporate governance in partially 
privatized SOEs is relatively minor. 
Ng, Yuce and Chen (2006) indicate that the performance of some partially privatized 
companies was inferior to either completely privatized or completely SOEs due to the 
ambiguity in ownership, property and control rights. Thus SOEs should be carefully evaluated 
differently by their industrial characteristics and thus require different percentage of share 
ownership to perform at their optimum level. Government connection and support may add 
value to some SOEs‘ performance. Therefore, gradually reducing non-tradable shares is 
critical for some SOEs in the governments‘ supporting industries. As mentioned in Wan and 
Yuce (2007), listed companies have to pay great attention in defining clear board 
responsibilities, increasing representatives of tradable shareholders on the board, and 
strengthening the function of collective decision-making. They further suggest that good 
corporate governance is the determinant factor to help firms to improve their performance, 
efficiency, and long-term growth. 
In short, prior studies can help with the comprehension of the Chinese government‘s 
design of overseas listing, especially the associated high costs, the possible dilution effect of 
state ownership, and the potential influence to the corporate governance. According to 
empirical results, by taking SOEs public, the Chinese government is facing more political 
uncertainties than economic risks. In this case, the nation‘s authorities strategically select 
certain kinds of companies, carefully restructure them before going public, preventively offer 
favourable policies, and progressively follow the improvement of companies‘ corporate 
governance and operational performance. By doing so, the Chinese government may reduce 
the potential risks and uncertainties in a more political manner. 
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5.2.2 The Importance and Design of Partial Privatization in China 
The studies mentioned above have drawn a blueprint of China‘s partial privatization, and the 
following literature may provide more evidence of this issue. The Chinese government 
emphasized reforms of SOEs as its priority. At the early stage in the 1990s, the targets were: 
(a) to restructure the ownership and to create a modern corporate governance system in order 
to mitigate the non-performing loans problem caused by SOEs; and (b) to improve SOE 
productivity and efficiency. 
SOEs were required to follow the requirements of a market system and to establish a new 
enterprise system with ―clarified property rights, designated authorities and responsibilities, 
separated government and enterprise function, and established scientific management‖ (State 
Economic Reform Commission, 1994). 
The Chinese domestic stock market has played a critical role in helping SOEs transform 
into joint stock companies that allow non-state capital investment. However, the reforms of 
SOEs were a gradual process. The Chinese government did not intend to privatize or give up 
the controlling interest in the SOEs at the beginning. This can be shown by the different 
classes of shares with or without tradable restrictions.  
In ―Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective‖, Gerschenkron (1962) suggests 
that there were two approaches regarding government regulation. One is the ‗helping-hand‘ 
approach, which means that the government‘s involvement is to correct market failures and 
thus to improve social welfare. The second one is the ‗grabbing-hand‘ approach where the 
intention of the regulators is to support political constituencies. The transition of SOEs in 
China from fully state-owned to partially privatized is also a transition of the government‘s 
regulatory practices from a grabbing-hand approach to a helping-hand approach.  
As claimed in Megginson and Netter (2001), ―the evidence from China suggests that 
enterprise restructuring, concentrating on improving the allocation of property rights and 
incentive, can yield large benefits even without privatization. Naturally, this raises the 
question whether economic reform coupled with privatization could lead to even greater 
performance improvement. Unfortunately, there is little evidence on this question and it 
would be very difficult to develop such evidence.
31‖ 
                                                     
31
 See Megginson and Netter, 2001, pp. 338. 
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Jones et al. (1999) compares share issue privatizations between developed, developing and 
transitional countries during the period between 1977 and 1997, to conclude a persistent 
underpricing phenomenon when governments issue new privatized shares. By using Chinese 
data, other related studies, including Su and Fleisher (1999), Chi and Padgett (2005), and 
Chen (2005), all suggest that Chinese IPO underpricing is mainly driven by two key reasons, 
(1) the inequality of supply and demand due to the China‘s unique quota system, and (2) the 
high proportion of uninformed individual investors. Repeated mention of these reasons goes 
further in explaining the immaturity of the domestic capital market. Since Chinese SOEs 
crucially and tightly affect the national macroeconomic position, a primitive stock trading 
platform is far from being capable enough to allow large SOEs to realize the successful 
reform of privatization. In particular, Chen (2005) studies listed companies on both the SHSE 
and the SZSE during the period of 1995-1999 and finds that state ownership leads to poor 
market performance both during the IPO and after-market stages. 
Guo and Yao (2004) investigate various hypotheses regarding the causes of privatization 
in China. Among the efficiency hypothesis, the market liberalization hypothesis, the soft-
budget hypothesis, the financial liability hypothesis and the constraint hypothesis, they find 
efficiency and financial liability did not contribute to privatization decisions in China, but the 
budget constraint and market liberalization hypothesis played an important role on the 
motives and progress of privatization. 
By using more updated data from 1996 to 2003, Ng et al. (2006) concludes a relationship 
between state ownership and market performance. They also suggest that state control brings 
benefits to SOEs to the extent of government support, political advantage, protection from 
bankruptcy, and monopolies. Their findings are consistent with Wei and Varelas (2003) and 
Qi, Wu, and Zhang (2000) such that market performance is positively related to the 
proportion of legal shares but negatively related to the proportion of state-owned shares. 
Alternatively, since Chinese SOEs are highly controlled by state authorities, Yang and Wu 
(2006) examine the impact of government regulations on China‘s share issue privatization. In 
the study, they illustrate an existing conflict. This is that the Chinese government tightly 
controls the IPO process with regulations while poor and incomplete regulations with 
ineffective monitoring provide opportunities for managers to manipulate earnings to 
maximize the proceeds from IPOs. This results in the long-run poor performance of newly 
privatized firms as documented in prior literature. 
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Sun and Tong (2003) study the partial privatization of 53 Chinese SOEs listing in HKEx 
during 1993 and 2002. They find that listing has led to a median increase in real new profits, 
total sales, capital spending, and a mild but insignificant improvement in coverage ratios. 
Moreover, they further point out that firm performance is negatively related to state 
ownership, but positively related to legal-person ownership and foreign ownership. 
Furthermore, Sun, Tong and Wu (2006) argue that, if the domestic market is not well 
developed and bears rapid and large SIP activities, conducting SIPs abroad to maintain the 
domestic market order may be an optimal alternative. Listing shares on more developed 
overseas markets enables domestic SOEs to attain better accounting practices, governance, 
and legal standards. However, the benefit to facilitate stock market development is probably 
limited, which is inconsistent with the arguments of Megginson et al. (2004). If the SIP 
progresses more rapidly than the development of the domestic market and if the SIP scale is 
larger than the domestic market can absorb, large-scale SIPs may hinder rather than facilitate 
market development. In this case, to sell shares in a foreign and well-developed market with 
rigorous regulations and abundant capability can be an alternative choice for the government 
to purse privatization.  
By June 2005, just before the most significant reform in the Chinese domestic stock 
markets, there were a total of 1350 A-share companies which raised capital of up to RMB 
735.6 billion. In particular, the 12 largest listed SOEs account for more than 84 percent of 
total A-share market capitalization. However, the value of the non-tradable shares was RMB 
469.4 billion, accounting for roughly 64 percent of the total market capital
32
. Li Rongrong, the 
Minister of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC) made a speech on the 15th Session of the 10th National People‘s Congress 
Standing Committee in 2005. He summarized that there were 1828 large- and medium-sized 
SOEs which operated poorly and needed to declare bankruptcy. The net losses of these SOEs 
were RMB 15 billion and the cumulative new losses reached RMB 122.1 billion during the 
years of 2004-2005. These loss-suffering SOEs borrowed RMB 173 billion of loans from 
state-owned financial organizations. As stated in Wan and Yuce (2007), ―concentrated 
ownership and non-tradable shares … combined with a lack of protection for minority 
shareholders‘ rights and the poor disclosure of information, have caused an inefficiency of the 
stock markets and unsatisfactory performance of SOEs
33‖.  
                                                     
32
 See Securities Market, No. 43, 12 November 2005. 
33
 See Wan, J., and A. Yuce, Listing Regulations in China and Their Effect on the Performance of IPOs 
and SOEs, Research in International Business and Finance 21, pp. 375.  
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Consequently, they only rely on the less-developed home market to fully incorporate 
Chinese SOEs‘ privatization can become an impossible mission at the current stage. The 
overseas listing must be an additional or even vital channel to China‘s privatization. 
Meanwhile, over-border listing is a global trend, becoming more important over time as the 
government acquires experience and the integration of financial market advances. 
 
5.2.3 The Choice of Overseas Listing and Selling SOEs Abroad 
It is not unusual for governments to sell SOEs abroad like the Chinese government does. To 
help in answering why privatization through overseas listing tends to occur in countries with 
less developed markets, academics have identified a host of reasons to explain the motive of 
privatization via an overseas primary listing approach, which include hypotheses relating to 
investor recognition, access to capital, protection of minority shareholders, visibility, and 
improvement in the information environment. As summarized in Megginson et al (2004), two 
popular arguments, the ―Market Order Hypothesis‖ and the ―Bonding Hypothesis‖, are able to 
explain Chinese SOEs‘ overseas primary listings. The former focuses on protection of the 
domestic immature financial environment, while the latter pays more attention to the further 
development of the home market. 
 
5.2.3.1 The Market Order Hypothesis 
As demonstrated in Fuerst (1998), Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), and Leuz and 
Verrecchia (1999), overseas listed firms may be not satisfied with the reputation of their 
domestic market and wish to borrow the host country‘s reputation, as the foreign market acts 
as a ‗certification‘. ―Managers of firms with high expected profitability may credibly convey 
their private information on future prospects of the firm by listing on a market where 
disclosure is higher and investor protection stricter (Bortolotti et al., 2002)
34‖. 
Bortolotti et al. (2002) argues that, governments in developing countries normally prefer to 
sell privatized SOEs in overseas markets since, economically, limited bank financing and 
                                                     
34
 See Bortolotti, B., M. Fantini, and C. Scarpa, 2000, Why Do Governments Sell Privatized Companies 
Abroad, FEEN, Working Paper, pp. 6. 
 258  
 
small debt markets could drive them to seek external financing. Politically, selling SOEs to 
foreign investors could be regarded as a signal that a government is committed to supporting 
market-oriented policies. Moreover, Biais and Perotti (1997) also state that right-wing 
governments tend to sell shares to domestic investors because the offering can increase 
domestic political support for market-oriented policies. 
It is known that, private-cross-listing may reduce the cost of capital. Lewis (1999) 
confirms that a strong home country bias exists, therefore investors tend to keep a larger than 
optimal amount of funds in the domestic financial market. In this case, overseas listing is a 
way for issuing firms to diversify the sources of external finance and reduce the cost of capital. 
Also, according to Griffin and Karolyi (1998), cross-border listing can also be an effective 
way to increase the liquidity of the stock, though the concept of such liquidity is ―intrinsically 
ambiguous
35 ‖, and factors like market fragmentation could have an offsetting impact 
(Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan, 1998).  
Recent studies go further. Apart from examining the general beneficial effects of overseas 
listing, they turn to state that the choice of listing location is also important. Froot and Dabora 
(1999) document that location of trade matters for the pricing of stocks. They compare twin 
companies whose charter fixes the division of cash flows to each twin, and find that a twin‘s 
relative price is more likely correlated with the market index of the country where it is traded 
most actively.  
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) investigate foreign companies listing in the US and find 
favourable abnormal returns due to the improvement in investor recognition and greater 
liquidity. Other studies regard overseas listing as a means to raise funds without giving up 
some private benefits of control for majority shareholders. Reese and Weisbach (2002) 
examine the relationship between cross-listing, investor protection, and SEOs. According to 
their results, firms from countries with a lower level of shareholder protection are willing to 
cross-list and give up some private benefits of control as a means to raise capital. Lins, 
Strickland and Zenner (2005) find that following an overseas listing in the US, the sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow decreases significantly for firms from emerging markets, but does 
not change for ones from a developed market. This is consistent with the argument that access 
to external capital markets is an important benefit of overseas listing for firms from 
developing countries.  
                                                     
35
 See Baker (1996) for a series of definitions of liquidity and of ways of measuring the liquidity of a 
market or of a stock. 
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Moreover, Yang and Lau (2006) identify two traditional benefits of a Hong Kong listing 
by examining both geographical proximity and other obvious explanations. Their studies find 
that Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong have a better information environment and less 
financial constraints than those solely listed in the US. 
Similarly, Chan, Hameed, and Lau (2003) find that Jardine stocks, which switch from 
Hong Kong to Singapore, correlated less with the original trading market, although their main 
business location remained in Hong Kong. Lau and McInish (2003) find that individual firm 
trading volume is most closely associated with the market where the stocks are traded. Firms 
that switch their primary listing locations can expect the trading characteristics of their shares 
to become similar to those of the new market. These studies suggest that different stock 
markets offer different advantages as a listing venue and the benefits of overseas listing may 
depend on the choice of listing location. As far as Chinese enterprises are concerned, although 
the main business of H-share companies is in China‘s mainland, initial pricing level and share 
trading performance are expected to be affected by the Hong Kong market rather than 
domestic markets, except for ―A+H‖ method of offering.  
The ―A+H‖ offering method refers to the issued IPO is open to be subscribed by investors 
form both domestic and HKEx on the same day. However, domestic investors are only 
allowed to buy A-share stocks in the offering, while H-share stocks are restricted for global 
subscription. Traditionally Chinese enterprises always issued H-shares prior to A-shares since 
the two markets have entirely disparate pricing levels and market conditions. The ―A+H‖ 
method cannot benefit to risk diversification. The first ―A+H‖ was the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China Ltd. (1398.HK) which went public on 16 October 2006, with vary 
closed offering prices in the two markets. Even the average market P/E ratios in the A-share 
market significantly exceed the level of HKEx at that time. It directly leads to another 
problem on valuations of A- and H-shares. Since these two segmented markets do not have 
comparable pricing measures and investors demand, it becomes a dilemma to either overprice 
H-shares or underprice A-shares. In the case of 1398.HK, A-share stocks were actually 
underpriced by 15 percent if compared to other domestic firms. However, the ―A+H‖ method 
lead to more complicated arguments on the pricing, offering, and marketing issues. To 
simplify the study, the chapter omits this particular topic. 
The previous chapters in the thesis have provided empirical evidence that is consistent 
with the ―market order hypothesis‖, which truly describes the listing activities and 
performance. However, it seems weak in explaining the increasing tendency of Chinese 
SOEs‘ overseas listing across industries over time. Naturally, more studies need to turn to 
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seek the ultimate goal, i.e. the government‘s consideration and destination, which brings the 
attention to the ―bonding hypothesis‖. 
 
5.2.3.2 The Bonding Hypothesis 
The bonding hypothesis builds upon the framework of accounting and disclosure practices, 
agency problems, signaling effects, as well as corporate governance. If we define the ―market 
order hypothesis‖ as an alternative to pursue privatization, the ―bonding hypothesis‖ may 
greater clarify what the Chinese government can obtain from SOEs‘ primary overseas listing 
and why high associated costs do not bother them too much. 
Being different from private firms which seek external financing channels through going 
public, a government must pay close attention to the amount of uncertainty regarding the 
value of the SOEs, i.e. the firm-specific characteristics and the level of asymmetric 
information. Particularly, with early privatizations, governments stake a great deal of 
reputational capital on the economic success of the newly privatized firms, as supported by 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997), and Alexandrowicz (1994). The public‘s perception of the 
newly privatized firm‘s performance is important to the success or failure of the privatization 
programme.  
In the early stages of privatization, listed SOEs must be financially successful to build 
credibility for the government and encourage investors to subscribe subsequent equity 
offerings (SEOs) for further and deeper privatizations. As stated in Pagano et al. (1998), the 
development of the domestic financial market is often an explicit objective of privatization 
programmes. In this respect, the decision of overseas listing appears puzzling since a fraction 
of equity will be held by foreign investors and traded abroad. However, privatized firms 
appear to be particularly eager to seek an overseas listing, submitting to the discipline of 
international capital markets. Simultaneously, SIPs involve the greatest amount of risk, for 
instance the sales are frequently preceded by extensive promotional campaigns and there 
often creates thousands of small, first-time shareholders (Megginson et al., 2004). 
There will be a significant change once the government is the seller. To the extent of 
public finance, Bortolotti et al. (2002) demonstrates that, given the decision of privatization, 
selling a firm abroad allows one to reach a large number of potential investors, therefore 
increasing the expected revenue from the deal, which in turn facilitates the channel of the 
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government‘s budget. Being a strategy to earn credibility of stabilization and structural 
adjustment policies, financially distressed countries are more likely to pursue overseas listing 
to signal their effort to the international community. As far as the country‘s openness to trade 
is concerned, the decision of foreign listing is naturally linked to the national economic 
body‘s relationship with the world-wide economy, which can be relevant to many factors, 
such as import, export, trade deficit and capital flows. In terms of information provided to the 
public, since the disclosure requirements vary across different exchanges, it automatically 
offers domestic investors at least the same protection offered to foreign shareholders. Turning 
to effects on domestic financial markets, foreign listing could be an important tool in the 
transitional phase, fostering stock market development and integration.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2 of the thesis, although the Chinese domestic stock market 
experienced high growth of market capability in recent years, it is still far behind any matured 
international financial markets, to the extent that there is a thin and weak investor structure, 
few investment diversifications, an unstable policy environment, as well as an uncompleted 
legal system. Thus the bonding argument may answer more questions to a greater depth.  
However, the market order hypothesis and bonding hypothesis cannot be isolated from 
each other as they actually work hand in hand and are balanced over time. Therefore, this 
chapter adopts a number of variables as implications of both hypotheses and, according to 
empirical investigation, proxies of the bonding argument carry more weight in the selection of 
prospective listing companies, the improvement in corporate governance, and their 
significantly positive influence to domestic listed firms. Certainly, Chinese SOEs may have 
engaged a majority of the state‘s resources and capital, serving in most important industries, 
and receiving political priorities from authorities. Their better performance cannot only rely 
on overseas listings. Thus, to further discover the benefits from foreign listings, this chapter 
also breaks through, by linking the after-listing performance with investor protection, to 
provide evidence of the ―bonding hypothesis‖ on how overseas listings amend the  domestic 
investment environment and how H-share companies bring successful experience to help with 
the A-share market development. 
  
5.2.4 LaPorta et al. System of Investors Protection  
The globalization of financial market and the capital liberalization has occured in many of the 
worlds‘ economies. Besides the segmented research on pure economics and finance areas, this 
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trend has also motivated a large body of research, often referred to as the law and finance 
literature, examining country-level governance characteristics and their effects on capital 
markets. A common concern is the relationship between investor protection and the breadth 
and depth of a country‘s capital markets (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2006a, and 2006b). The series of studies by LaPorta et al. 
examines the association between country-level governance characteristics, including investor 
protections, accounting standards, creditor rights, property rights, anti-self-dealing, 
public/private enforcement mechanism, and the development of the capital market. They 
generate a number of related indices and provide evidence that a country‘s characteristics, 
such as legal origin, have a strong influence on its governance, which in turn has a profound 
impact on the development of the country‘s capital market.  
La Porta et al. (1998) examines the legal rules on protection of investors by comparing the 
origin and quality of 49 countries. Existing commercial laws have their roots in two broad 
traditions: common law (English origin) and civil law (Roman origin). According to their 
results, common-law countries generally have the strongest legal protection of investors. In 
addition, concentration of ownership of shares in the large companies is negatively related to 
investor protections, while small and diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in 
countries that fail to protect their rights.  
Representing the traditional finance, Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest securities are 
recognized by their cash flows, while Hart (1995) defines features of various securities as the 
rights to owners, rather than the value itself. These include the voting rights of shareholders, 
and meeting financial obligations to bondholders. However, La Porta et al. (1998) 
alternatively indicates that securities are inherently characterized by some intrinsic rights. 
This is still incomplete since it ignores the fact that rights actually depend on the legal rules of 
the jurisdictions of the issuing markets. Law and quality of its enforcement are potentially 
important determinants of what rights security holders have and how well these rights are 
protected. As suggested by La Porta et al., since what protection investors receive determines 
their readiness to finance firms, corporations may critically turn on these legal rules and their 
enforcement. 
To make further efforts, La Porta et al. (2002) narrowed down the view to the relationship 
between investor protection and corporate valuation in particular. This time they focus on the 
legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling 
shareholder. The empirical results suggest a higher valuation of firms always occurs in 
 263  
 
countries with better protection and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the 
controlling shareholder.  
Moreover, La Porta et al. (2006a) continues to discuss the question of what works in 
securities laws, especially how laws regulate the issuance of new equity to the public. Under 
an asymmetric information assumption, there is a risk that an issuer may sell bad securities to 
the public, known as the ―promoter‘s problem‖ (Mahoney, 1995), thus this chapter also 
focuses on the information asymmetry problem between prospective investors in an initial 
public offering and the ―promoter‖ who offers shares for sale.  
According to Coase (1960) and Stigler (1964), the optimal government policy does not 
really have the power to solve the promoter problem. Issuers, alternatively called insiders, 
have incentive to disclose all the information for higher offering prices and better immediate-
after-market trading performance, otherwise, a failure to disclose would result in investors‘ 
pessimistic reaction (Grossman, 1981; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1986). The information is reliable for investors once the disclosures are reputational, legal and 
contractual penalties for misreporting, verification of accuracy is costless, or reporting 
accuracy is backed by warranties. As suggested by Ross (1979), when verification if costly, 
outperformed securities can resort to additional mechanisms to signal their quality. Such legal 
conditions can promote the prosperity of security markets.  
As far as the self-dealing and ex post public control are concerned, LaPorta et al. (2006b) 
focus as on private enforcement mechanisms, including disclosure, approval, and litigation, 
which govern a specific self-dealing transaction. For existing investor expropriation, 
managers or controlling shareholders can use their power to divert corporate wealth to 
themselves, without sharing it with the other investors, especially minority shareholders. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), it can be represented through various forms, such as 
executive perquisites to excessive compensation, transfer pricing, taking of corporate 
opportunities, self-serving financial transaction, and outright theft of corporate assets. LaPorta 
et al. (2006b) suggests facilitating private enforcement of good behaviour by emphasizing 
extensive disclosure, approval procedures for transactions, and facilitation of private litigation 
when self-dealing is suspected. They also expect all of these rely more on public enforcement 
than governance activities. 
Beside the principal development by LaPorta et al., there are also a large number of 
empirical studies on the investor protection. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) examine the 
association between country-level governance and financial market development. Their 
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research finds that the mere presence of insider trading laws is not reflected in the cost of 
equity in a country. Instead, the initial enforcement of insider trading laws is the event that 
triggers a decrease in the cost of equity. In an extension of their earlier study, Bhattacharya, 
Daouk, and Welker (2003) find that trading in a country‘s stock markets declines when the 
earnings capacity increases. Finally, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2005) hypothesize that it can 
be the case that the absence of law is better than an unenforced law. Together, the work of 
LaPorta et al. and Bhattacharya et al. illustrate the importance of investor protection to the 
development and continued effectiveness of a country‘s capital markets. 
The argument above will be carefully tested and interpreted in this chapter on H-share 
firms‘ post-listing performance, aiming to test the relationship among investor protection, 
improvement of companies‘ corporate governance, as well as the development due to the 
bonding mechanism. 
China‘s corporate governance has made great progress in the past few decades by 
increasing awareness of investor protection on significant policy issues. Recent research, such 
as Xin (2007), has proved that such legal provisions can contribute to the performance of 
companies and welfare of shareholders. 
Since Hong Kong used to be a British colony, the law system is built upon English-origin, 
while the law system in mainland China more likely belongs to the civil law system. Such 
intrinsic distinction offers a broad testing platform. Therefore, this chapter will not miss the 
chance to investigate the motivation, selection, and performance of overseas listing under two 
different law systems with regards to investor protection. 
The first Company Law of the People‘s Republic of China was adopted by the Fifth 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People‘s Congress on 29 
December 1993, and became effective on 1
st
 July 1994. Before this law, the modern theories 
of corporate governance were not introduced to China. A general view about corporate 
governance in China always highlights a number of aspects, including high-profile elements 
of shareholders‘ issues, transparency and disclosure, as well as monitoring of controlling 
shareholders and management (Feinerman, 2007). As far as the newly revised China‘s 
Company Law (2005) is concerned, Feinerman gives appraisal of legal reforms in the 
following areas: the fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders, shareholders‘ rights to 
challenge the resolution of a general or board meeting, a shareholder‘s right to information, 
constraints on related-party transactions, ex post remedies to aggrieved minority shareholders, 
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the appraisal rights of dissenting shareholders; and the reinforcement of powers for boards of 
supervisors
36
.  
Further comments regarding Feinerman‘s argument are given by Xin (2007) who states 
that, the revision will help to raise China‘s scores in the ―shareholder protection‖ index 
developed by LaPorta et al. (1998) therefore increasing the welfare of the minority 
shareholders of listed companies. Following the methodology introduced by LaPorta et al. 
(1998), after the revision, the law provision applying to listed companies China‘s shareholder 
rights scored 4 out of 6. With the old score, China was below the English-origin average (4) 
but above the German-origin average (2.33) and French-origin average (2.33), and is ranked 
―average‖ among all selected countries. With the new score, China is now doing as well as the 
average of English-origin jurisdictions. He also deeply investigates to what extent the ―law on 
the paper‖ will improve China‘s corporate governance in the real world.  
In particular, ―enforcement problems neutralize corporate governance and shareholder 
protection efforts in transition economics, where weaknesses in legal and market constraints 
are prevalent‖37. To eliminate this negative factor, a number of provisions were applied to the 
Company Law and the Securities Law in 2005. It authorizes shareholders with lawful rights 
and interest-receiving protection from infringement and damage. Such efforts can be regarded 
as enforcement on private rights of action.  
Meanwhile, CSRC always regards improving corporate governance of listed companies as 
one of its core missions. However, the law does not officially provide CSRC with specific 
powers to regulate the internal control or governance of listed companies. While, as a 
government agency, CSRC is limited to enforcing rules regarding disclosure and regulate 
merits of investment quality. At the same time, domestic exchanges are also doubtful of 
having enough effective and appropriate authority to achieve the status of a self-regulatory 
entity.  
The government has discovered a range of partial alternative solutions to formal domestic 
regimes, for instance, the role of overseas listing. Coffee (2002) has emphasized the primary 
listing on foreign stock exchanges as a mechanism by which firms in weak enforcement 
regimes can bond themselves to ―good‖ corporate law. Listing on a developed financial 
market imposes higher disclosure requirements and a more stringent regulatory environment. 
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The efforts of seeking alternative solutions are always simultaneously hand-in-hand with 
the regulation revisions.  From 1993 some of the local well-known companies listed in the 
American, British, Hong Kong and Singapore markets have faced class action lawsuits. 
Certain officers and directors were even sentenced to prison for misappropriating funds and 
fraud in connection with share option grants, the Bank of China would be a good case. A 
series of occurrences questioned whether the corporate governance in mainland China can 
achieve global convergence through encouraging domestic state-owned companies to seek 
listing on developed markets.  
Various reasons are concerned. Firstly, the selective range of listing companies was quite 
limited untill recently, and most of them chose Hong Kong as their preferred target trading 
platform. The influence of those companies‘ governance practices on their local counterparts 
may be still limited at the current stage. Secondly, since there are very limited channels for 
domestic citizens to invest in foreign capital, real competition among local and foreign stock 
exchanges have not been in full swing. However, the Chinese authorities progressively ease 
capital account controls to allow more capital outflows, helping alleviate the domestic 
liquidity problem. The Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) Scheme is such an 
attempt. Finally, cross-border supervision of cross-listed companies needs efficient co-
operation, which could bring about a failure of enforcement.  
When the regulation of related-party transactions is concerned, China‘s legislators have 
based the Company Law on the self-enforcing model. In 1997, 2000, and 2001, CSRC 
announced a series of important rules to strengthen the law governing shareholders meetings 
and introduced the independent director system.
38
 Meanwhile, CSRC also tries to seek help 
from the financial intermediaries, especially sponsors and financial consultants, to act as 
custodians of the market.  
However, whether the self-enforcing model of corporate law or corporate governance can 
play a major role in overcoming China‘s enforcement problem remains to be seen. Both 
cannot cover all the legal provisions needed to address liabilities and their formal enforcement 
(Black and Kraakman, 1996; Black, 2001). According to Xin (2007), the key point is, since 
company laws and securities regulations are inherently imperfect, ambiguous provisions and 
gaps will have to be filled in by a regulator. Otherwise, corporate governance failures may 
occur. Due to ―collective action problem‖, general meetings of shareholders may be weak in 
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providing real protection, as well as the supporters of a self-enforcing model may simply 
overrate the effectiveness of such laws in an emerging market with very weak judicial 
enforcement, market constraints and soft reputation institutions. 
In short, plagued by enforcement problems, some good legal provisions still fall short of 
fulfilling the demand for better governance. The functional substitutes for good local lawsuit 
and enforcement regimes, including self-enforcing corporate law models and overseas listing, 
will help to further develop the domestic securities market. 
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5.3 Tested Implications and Research Questions 
 
By reviewing most recent domestic financial reforms in China since 1999, it can be found that 
overseas primary listing is part of this reform. Therefore, how does Chinese government 
pursue the financial reform to develop the A-share market? Why is listing large SOEs in 
Hong Kong a necessary alternative? How does overseas listing, reform of SOEs, and A-share 
market development interact with each other? And what will be the subsequent effects and 
possible outcomes of this interaction? 
Empirical investigation will begin with the tests of the ―market order hypothesis‖, 
―bonding hypothesis‖, and other asymmetric information models, to answer the following 
questions: 
1. How does the Chinese government choose prospective issuing companies to go public 
in an overseas market? What are the systematic characteristics related to this approach? 
And what is expected by the government? 
2. In terms of issuing firms, what kind of companies are more likely to issue new shares 
in Hong Kong? 
3. What are the systematic characteristics related to the size of overseas listing? 
4. Of the ―Market order hypothesis‖ and the ―Bonding hypothesis‖, which is more 
powerful to explain the tendency of Chinese SOEs‘ foreign primary listing? i.e., is it 
for protecting or developing the domestic financial market? 
5. Does overseas listing help to improve listed companies‘ corporate governance? Do 
better accounting and disclosure practices as well as more restricted market regulations 
have significant influence to prevent their latent earning management and other 
violations? 
6. How do H-share companies perform after listing? Do they perform worse than 
domestic listed firms?  
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7. In the long run, can the bonding hypothesis variables systematically affect the 
performance of overseas listed shares? 
8. To what extent can the investor protection factor influence listed companies‘ activities 
and performance? 
9. After pursuing a number of SOEs to access the international capital market, what can 
the Chinese government do to take domestic financial reform into the next level? 
 
 270  
 
 
5.4 Data Selection and Sample Distributions 
 
The sample comprises 539 IPOs listed over the period January 2000 to May 2007, in which 
448 IPOs went public on domestic stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen), and 91 IPOs 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx), including both of the Main Board and the 
Growth Enterprises Market (GEM). The tested observations cover the population by 86 
percent of issued IPOs during the sample period. The most missing observations are short in 
primary issuing or financial information, especially during years from 2000 to 2002 for 
domestic listed IPOs. The decision of sample period choosing is due to the data availability, 
and the comparison between population and the tested sample is reported in Table 5.1.  
The list of overseas listing H-share firms is received from HKEx Annual Listing Reports, 
which are published on the HKEx official website, while, the list of domestic A-share stocks 
is obtained from Thomson One Banker database within the same sample period.  
Proxies of corporate governance and ownership, i.e. the size of the board, number of non-
executive directors, proportion of state-owned shares, proportion of legal person shares, first 
large shareholding, and second large shareholding, are handily collected from initial offering 
prospectuses from CSRC and HKEx official websites. Accounting data is collected from 
Datastream, complemented by companies‘ initial offering prospectuses and annual reports. 
The specific descriptive statistics will be reported in each section. 
Table 5.2 shows the sample distributions over issue size, industry, and proportion of 
ownership. To begin with the issuing size (the issue proceeds), most of the observations are 
located within the range of RMB 100 million and RMB 400 million, while about 28 percent 
of the sample is between the range of RMB 400 million to RMB 1,000 million. To further 
investigate the relationship between the overseas listing decision and the size of issuing firms, 
Panel A reports the distributions for both A- and H-share observations separately. Although 
the CSRC has set the quantitative criteria that only firms with issuing proceeds more than 
RMB 400 million (about US$ 50 million) are allowed to apply for overseas listings, a few H-
share firms did not meet these criteria. Within 46 out of 91 H-share companies that had issued 
less than US$ 50 million in their IPOs. Excluding 37 firms listed on the GEM with low listing 
requirements, there are still 9 firms that did not fully meet the enforced criteria. It is probably 
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due to other latent selection measures, such as industry, authority‘s shareholding, etc. Another 
interesting phenomenon is that, 36 percent of listed A-share firms had already qualified to 
apply for overseas listing with issuing proceeds exceeding US$ 50 million, which indicates 
that size of the firms may not be the only standards for the state authorities to pursue the 
privatization via a foreign primary listing approach. 
In this circumstance, it is worth discovering the sample distribution over other control 
variables. Panel B of Table 5.2 lists the result of industry distributions, for the government‘s 
supporting industries, i.e. energy, basic materials, transportation, and commercial banking
39
. 
35 percent of H-share companies are included within the range, while nearly 84 percent of A-
shares are included in other industries. However, although the difference between the two 
sub-samples is significant, ownership structure may also contribute to the selection criteria 
and have notable influence to the subsequent performance after primary listings. 
Panel C reports the distribution over the proportion of authority shareholding. Among 539 
observations, about a quarter has no state-owned or legal person shares
40
. It is noted that, most 
of these 25 H-share firms were listed on GEM, or with more indirect authority shareholdings 
which are difficult to be clearly defined. Also, the distinguishing feature between A- and H-
share companies is visible. For one thing, H-share firms own higher level in authority 
shareholdings; meanwhile, H-share firms appear to have higher proportion of state-owned 
shares. The following empirical sections will investigate the relationship between authority 
shareholding and overseas privatization in more details. 
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or local-government enterprises that have helped to start up the public companies. 
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5.5 Reforms of China’s SOEs and Their Overseas Listings  
 
According to Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), SIPs can facilitate the development of the 
capital market. Megginson et al. (2004) further provides the empirical evidence that, SIPs 
tend to occur in countries with a less developed market, even though from a number of 
developed nations. However, if the domestic financial market does not have enough capability 
and depth to continuously support large scale IPOs, such as the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges in mainland China, it may not be able to successfully process ongoing SIPs and 
this may cause the unanticipated uncertainty to the market. Specifically, the immature market 
conditions often result in mispricing and a smaller proportion of privatization.  
As reported in Sun et al. (2006), when the CSRC
41
 planned to sell state shares and make 
them tradable around 1999, it met with fierce resistance from various interest groups which 
caused panic and brought about a strong negative reaction from the market. It had to be 
cancelled after two failed attempts in 1999 and 2001.  
The first temptation by Chinese government to reduce the state-owned share of listed 
SOEs is from 1999. On the 22
nd
 September 1999, the ―Decision Regarding Some Issues of the 
Reforms and Development on SOEs‖ was approved at the 4th Plenum of the 15th Chinese 
Communist Party Congress. As argued by Copper (2003), this intention and plan of partially 
selling off state-owned shares would theoretically obtain the efficiency benefits of allowing 
diverse shareholders to supervise listed SOEs, while allowing the state to maintain an absolute 
majority holding, and simultaneously raising capital. However, due to the failure in pricing, 
the plan significantly dampened investors‘ enthusiasm and confidence on SOEs‘ reform at the 
very beginning of the offering. 
The second temptation is from 2001 when the State Council released the ―Provisional 
Measure on Management over the Reduction of State Shares to Raise Social Security Fund‖, 
which initially aimed to convert all non-tradable state or legal-person shares into tradable 
shares. This document allows listed companies to sell state-owned shares equalling 10 percent 
of the tradable shares at the market pricing level, and the money raised would contribute to 
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the Social Security Fund
42
. Unfortunately, because of the unreasonable share structures and 
pricing, the CSRC announced a halt to the reduction of state-owned shares (Zheng, 2002). In 
June 2002, the Chinese government gave up the plan and the State Council formally cancelled 
the provisional regulation issued in June 2001 (Copper, 2003).  
The unsuccessful approaches of selling off state-owned shares resulted in the Chinese 
domestic stock market to suffer a bear market from 2001 to 2005. Meanwhile, the government 
identified the non-tradable shares were the biggest issue in the stock markets and they 
announced that creating a full circulation market was the top priority.  
As the third temptation, on 29
th
 April 2005, the CSRC issued the ―Notice concerning 
Issues in relation to Experimental Reforms for the Redesignation of Shares in Listed 
Companies‖ (the ―Share Redesignation Notice‖). Meanwhile, to avoid having this specific 
problem on the newly issued shares, the CSRC suspended IPO issuing in the Chinese stock 
market to solve the non-tradable shares problem thoroughly. This reform aimed to keep a 
steady development of the capital market, to establish fair and uniform rules, to give floating 
shareholders the right of voting and negotiating, and to protect the rights of public investors 
was also critical to the success of the reform. 
The Share Redesignation Notice sets out a procedure by which certain PRC listed 
companies may apply for a percentage of the non-tradable shares held by their controlling 
shareholders to be reclassified as stock exchange tradable shares. The procedure would 
require the approval of all shareholders and would be decided thereafter by the CSRC. For a 
period of 12 months from the date such shares become tradable, the holders of non-tradable 
shares may notdeal in any reclassified shares on the stock exchange. After the expiry of the 
12-month period, holders of non-tradable shares may not list and deal in shares representing 
more than 5.0 percent of the total issued share capital of the relevant company in the 
following 12-month period and not more than 10.0 percent in aggregate in the 24-month 
period after such initial trading date. The Share Redesignation Notice does not state whether it 
applies to H Share companies.
43
 
On 8
th
 May, 2005, four companies, including Sany Heavy Industries, Tsinghua Tongfang, 
Zijiang Enterprises, and Jinjiu Energy were chosen as the first pilot companies. By 19
th
 June, 
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there were 42 companies, including both central- and local-government owned SOEs and 
some collective-owned enterprises, involved in the second round of reform
44
. 
By the end of April 2006, among 924 publicly listed SOEs, 441 had completed the reform 
and 164 were in the process of the reform, accounting for 68.36 percent of the trading value 
of the domestic stock market. On the 17
th
 May, the CSRC released the ―Administrative 
Measures on IPO issuing‖ and reopened the launch of IPOs. Under the newly revised 
Securities Law and Corporate Law, there will be no non-tradable shares in the new IPO firms. 
This reform had deep and significant affects on the domestic market both during and after 
the reform period. The temporary suspension of new and subsequent equity offerings created 
a number of problems, such as low turnover and illiquidity. These problems were exacerbated 
due to a lack of derivative trading platforms. Both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange 
A-share indices reached the bottom during this year. Moreover, the bear market further 
influenced linking markets, especially the Hong Kong market which had similar trends within 
this period. However, immediately after the offering process was resumed from June 2006, as 
shown in Figure 5.1, markets experienced an unparalleled growth.  
Under this reform plan the government, as the major shareholder, gave out shares to the 
tradable A-share shareholders as a means of compensation by various valuation methods to 
close the pricing gap between tradable and non-tradable shares. Such compensation is based 
on the anticipation that once the non-tradable shares become tradable, the stock market will 
suffer wild fluctuation. Hence, maintaining market order is a key concern of the government. 
In this view, the chapter proposes the ―market order hypothesis‖ as the motive behind 
overseas listing: diverting large IPOs to foreign markets releases the issuing pressure in the 
domestic market. Meanwhile, the ―Bonding Hypothesis‖ cannot be ignored since to reform 
Chinese SOEs, enhance profitability, improve corporate governance, change the role of 
government, and develop the domestic capital market, have always been the main targets and 
the core agenda of China‘s privatization programmes. 
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5.6 The Choice of Overseas Primary Listing – An Empirical Investigation 
 
This Section will begin with the systematic characteristics related to the overseas primary 
offerings, from both the government‘s angle and Chinese SOEs‘ views. The regression 
models are expected to answer about which aspects can determine this decision, political-
oriented, capital-driven, or both of them. 
Control variables adopted in the cross-sectional regressions can be categorized into three 
groups by their corresponding tested hypotheses: (1) Market Order Hypothesis, including 
issue size, market-related PE ratio, industry, firm‘s leverage, and liquidity; (2) Bonding 
Hypothesis, including the proportion of tradable shares, proportion of state-owned shares, 
proportion of legal person shares, first large shareholding, and the size of the board; and (3) 
Signaling Hypothesis, including a number of financial position and performance measures.  
 
5.6.1 Testable Implications for the “Market Order Hypothesis” 
The size of the firm always plays an important role on its financial decisions, which is 
expected to be positively related to the overseas listing decision since a large firm usually 
issues more equity capital and thus exerts more downward pricing pressure on the domestic 
market. This is also consistent with other explanations such as economies of scale and 
availability of information (Pagano et al., 2002; Das and Saudagaran, 1998). Pagano et al. 
showed that firm size is one of only two common factors that can explain a firm‘s decision to 
cross-list in the US and European markets. However, this explanation may be secondary to 
the case of Chinese foreign listing firms (Yang and Lau, 2006). As mentioned earlier, most H-
shares are issued at a lower PE ratio than domestic listed shares and are persistently traded at 
a heavy discount relative to the domestic market price. There must be compelling reasons for 
Chinese SOEs to take a more costly route to raise capital. By using the natural logarithm of 
inflation-adjusted total assets (TA) as a proxy for firm size, it is expected that TA would 
significantly and positively contribute to the overseas listing decision. 
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The market pricing and valuation level should also be closely related to the listing decision. 
This is a direct test of the hypothesis relieving the issuing pressure from the domestic market 
through foreign listing. This chapter constructs a proxy, the relative market PE ratio (RLT-
MKT-PE), measuring the market depth of two markets. RLT-MKT-PE is defined as the 
monthly average PE ratios of the Hong Seng Index during the same time in A-share market, 
either Shanghai Stock Exchange A-share Index or Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-share Index, 
depending on which trading platform the firms are listed on. The positive relationship 
between relative market PE ratio and decision of overseas listing is anticipated based on the 
market order hypothesis. 
The empirical test cannot ignore the effects of industry factors. As already mentioned, 
government supporting industries have priority to list on overseas markets for the economic 
and financial reform. The industry variable (IND) used in this chapter is a dummy, which 
equals to one if the company is within one of the government supported industries, including 
energy, basic materials, transportation, and commercial banking, and zero otherwise. The 
decision of foreign listing is expected to be positively and significantly related to the industry 
dummy as evidence of the government‘s macro-control of the state economy.  
Domestic listing normally faces costs of a long IPO waiting queue while overseas listing 
entails different costs of a low initial pricing level. Firms with more urgent needs for equity 
capital would have more incentive to jump the long queue and list overseas. Since there is a 
lack of a straightforward proxy to measure the degree of hunger for equity capital across firms, 
this chapter alternatively adopts a number of accounting variables, with the expectation that 
firms with lower pre-listing liquidity but a higher leverage and growth rate should need more 
equity capital. Using the debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) as the proxy for leverage, and the quick 
ratio (QUICK) as the proxy for liquidity, it is expected that the H-share listing decision should 
be positively related to D/E, but negatively related to QUICK. Since these accounting 
variables are also expected to be proxies in the signaling and earnings management 
hypotheses, they will be introduced in more details in the following section. 
 
5.6.2 Testable Implications for the “Bonding Hypothesis” 
Other than relieving the pressure on domestic issues, the Chinese government may also use 
overseas listings as a means to force SOEs to conform to ‗international standards‘ and 
establish ‗modern corporate governance‘, which is in line with the bonding hypothesis in the 
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cross-listing literature. Since the bonding hypothesis builds upon the framework of accounting 
and disclosure practices, agency problems, signaling effects, and corporate governance, if the 
H-share listing is driven by the motive of reforming the SOEs, then H-share firms should 
exhibit a better governance structure and accounting practices than their domestic 
counterparts when they finish pre-listing restructuration and initial issuing overseas. It is 
noted that, since for most SOEs the state is the single or majority owner of the SOEs before 
listing, it seems safe to assume that all listed SOEs had poor corporate governance and 
accounting practices prior to reorganization. Consequently, during the preparation for 
overseas listing, the corporate governance is expected to improve dramatically to meet the 
listing standards.  
As far as the corporate governance factors are concerned, this chapter adopts two sets of 
control variables, including the ownership concentration and the board structure. For the 
ownership concentration, four proxies are constructed, i.e. the percentage of tradable shares 
(A- or H-shares) (TRD), the percentage of state ownership (SO), the percentage of legal 
person ownership (LP), and first large shareholding (FIRST). For the board structure, the size 
of board (BOARD) is assigned to the regression functions.  
In particular, TRD, the percentage of tradable shares (A- or H-shares), is a direct proxy, 
providing the information of whether the  government will sell more shares in initial offerings. 
It is predicted that, this variable will be sensitively related to a number of characteristics of 
the listing firms, such as industry sectors, sizes and scales of the business, the percentage of 
government ownership, as well as the adjustments in government policy and listing rules over 
time. In the testable sample, the proportion of tradable shares is about 30 percent on average, 
without significant difference between A- and H-share companies. However, it is still worth 
including such a proxy and this section expects a positive relationship between the tradable 
shareholding and the decision of overseas listing.  
Moreover, SO and LP are defined as the percentage of state-owned shares and legal person 
shares respectively. According to all observations in this chapter, there are about 14 percent 
state-owned shares and 24 percent legal-person shares on average. In which, H-share 
companies have a significantly higher state-owned shareholding of 28 percent on average 
(with standard deviation of 0.25), while A-share firms only have 10 percent (with s.d. of 0.21). 
On the contrary, A-share companies have a larger proportion of legal-person shares (about 27 
percent with s.d. of 0.29) when compared to H-share ones (about 12 percent with s.d. of 0.22). 
As mentioned in the previous section, legal-person shares are shares owned by domestic 
institutions, most of which are themselves partially owned by the central or provincial 
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government. Legal persons are those who typically engaged in helping to start up the public 
companies by either giving the companies the permission to operate or by allowing resources 
under their control to be used for the start-up. Once considering their nature of being non-
tradable (at least within a few years after public offering), some economists argue that legal 
persons are similar to state shareholders. Consequently, although the different characteristics 
have already been discovered from the descriptive statistics of observations, to aggregately 
underline the effects of concentration of government shareholding, this chapter consistently 
adopts two control variables into the selection regression functions to control for ownership 
concentration of the government, i.e. SO and LP, to control for the government‘s preference.  
Another proxy of concentration is the percentage of first large shareholding, FIRST, 
which mainly focuses on the absolute control. It is noted that, FIRST is not a simple repeat of 
SO or LP, since a large number of SOEs are not solely controlled by only one of the state‘s 
departments or provincial institutions, but are jointly held by many related government 
divisions. In such a case, it is not redundant to include a proxy of the absolute control into the 
regression functions.  
As far as the board structure is concerned, this chapter constructs the following proxies: 
the board size (BOARD) and the proportion of non-executive directors (NON) on the board, 
where in the tests of the overseas listing decision, the size of the board has been highlighted. 
Jensen (1993) argues that, based upon the agency problem, a large-sized board is less 
effective in controlling governance. Also, Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg, Sundgren and 
Wells (1998) find an inverse association between the board size and firm value. However, 
other studies, including Pfeffer (1973), and Perce and Zahra (1992), are consistent with the 
argument that a larger board size may yield benefits by creating a network with the external 
environment and securing a boarder resource base. It is noted that, the board size may be 
more crucial for Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong. Xu and Wang (1999) have pointed 
out that Chinese firms have the characteristics of over-representation by the state on the board. 
Yet, the listing requirement of HKEx demands that Chinese firms have Hong Kong investors 
sitting on the board, which tends to increase the size of the board. Once assuming the aim of 
restructuring SOEs is to meet the overseas listing criteria, it is reasonable to expect a positive 
relationship between the board and foreign listing decision. However, it is noted that, the 
efforts of enlarging the board size is still questionable, since the effects to the improvement in 
corporate governance are unknown at the current stage. Certainly, the subsequent tests on 
corporate governance will investigate this in further details. 
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As for non-executive directors, according to Higgs Report (2003), it is preferable to have 
more independent, outside directors to the board. However, to meet listing standards in 
different stock exchanges, NON is expected to be distinct across markets but convergent 
within the same trading platform. The data of tested samples used to construct the above 
proxies of corporate governance variables are collected from IPO prospectuses in the year of 
going public. 
 
5.6.3 Testable Implications for Financial Performance, Signaling Hypothesis and 
Earnings Management 
According to the literature review, based on asymmetric information, if the issuer is more 
informed than outside investors, rational investors fear a ‗lemons problem‘, i.e., only issuers 
with worse-than-average quality are willing to sell their shares at the average price.  To 
distinguish themselves from the pool of low-quality issuers, high-quality issuers may attempt 
to signal their quality. Although the signaling hypothesis focuses more on the underpricing 
puzzle of new shares, it is still worth investigating the relationship between financial 
performance and the choice of overseas listing for Chinese SOEs. 
On the one hand, linking with the ‗bonding hypothesis‘, the primary overseas listing aims 
to build ‗modern corporate governance‘ and sending positive signal about Chinese economic 
reform. The pre-listing reorganization and optimization of firms‘ financial position and 
performance must distinguish listing candidates apart from their domestic counterparts. On 
the other hand, once considering their state-owned background, this is also an indirect test of 
the operating efficiency and managing ability of government ownership. 
Furthermore, according to prior studies, Chinese IPO firms, both domestic and overseas 
listed, engage in earnings management and the patterns of earnings management depends on 
each firm‘s relationship with the government and on where its shares are listed (Aharony, Lee 
and Wang, 2000; Chen and Xiong, 2001; Qi et al., 2000; Xu and Wang, 1999; Chan, Firth and 
Kim, 2000; and Huang and Song, 2005). In particular, Aharony et al. (2000) examines the 
earning pattern and finds that the H-share firms exhibit a smaller post-IPO ROA decline than 
B-share firms
45
. The possible reason is that H-share companies normally have a restructure 
                                                     
45
 The B-shares, traded in US dollars on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in Hong Kong dollars on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, are exclusively for foreign investors and allocated primarily by private 
placement until February 2001, the CSRC allowed domestic individual investors to open B-share 
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before their initial public offering in the foreign stock exchange, including both financial 
restructuring and operational restructuring. However, as far as domestic shares are concerned, 
especially domestic A-share stocks, Wang, Xu and Zhu (2001) document that A-share 
companies‘ performance decreased significantly after listing, but they could not determine 
whether the privatization effect in these Chinese companies is positive or negative. Therefore, 
another reason to include proxies of financial performance at the time of offering is to link 
with the earnings management tests in the long run studies in next section. It is noted that, in 
the short-run tests, this chapter does not include earnings management proxies due to the data 
limitation in domestically listed SOEs. 
The control variables adopted in this section are well-documented proxies within 
accounting and auditing, including the operating profit margin (OPM), return on equity 
(ROE), debt-to-equity ratio (D/E), and quick ratio (QUICK).  
In particular, the operating profit margin is, by definition, not only an accounting ratio of 
profitability, but also a measure of operating performance for management. To compare with 
other accounting ratios of profitability, for example the gross profit margin and net profit 
margin, operating margin is more preferred in this case. Although the gross profit margin 
measures the net revenue from core business, it has also included the considerable 
administrative costs in SOEs; meanwhile, since the net profit margin has completely omitted 
the tax effect raised by government supporting activities, it is not appreciated. To be more 
specific, restructuring a state-owned company to meet the listing criteria in foreign stock 
exchanges, government or state authorities always offer tax-deduction or other alternative 
financially favourable policies. However, having completing the restructuring and being ready 
to go public, the abolishment of underlying privilege will be intensively, rapidly and 
negatively reflected in the financial performance in the year of the IPO. The government‘s 
economic policies, such as taxation, are potential risks for China-related companies which 
have already been beyond the profitability or operating performance. Therefore, this chapter 
alternatively uses OPM
46
 as a proxy for profitability instead. 
Meanwhile, as far as the efficiency accounting ratio is concerned, the choice between the 
current ratio and quick ratio (acid test ratios) is also for the consideration of excluding 
                                                                                                                                                        
accounts and trade B shares in foreign currency. One company can issue both A- and B-shares on 
Chinese domestic stock exchanges. A- and B-shares have equal voting power and dividend rights. In 
recent years, B-share market is declining and lack of after-market liquidity. 
46
 OPM is defined as the annual operating profit one year prior to initial listing over the total revenue in 
the corresponding period, while ROE is the net profits over total common shareholders‘ equity one year 
before the offering. OPM and ROE provide information on firms‘ profitability. 
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disturbed factors. To be more specific, the definition of the current ratio accounts for the 
inventories, which actually tends to be various across industries and lack of converting ability 
into other forms of current assets. In addition, as a cost measurement, the actual amount of 
inventories heavily depends on the calculation methods, which will further result in the 
misrepresenting to individual observation. Hence, in order to more accurately investigate the 
liquidity of the listed companies, this chapter uses quick ratios instead to avoid the possible 
bias due to accounting method and any other potentially indirect influences.  
Following the efficient measurement, the tested function also includes the debt-to-equity 
ratio (D/E) as a proxy of leverage level and return on common equity (ROE) as measure of 
profitability. It is noted that, ROE is one of the key issues that investors are concerned with 
for investment decision-making, especially in well-developed overseas markets, by linking 
between profitability and efficiency which has been widely discussed in both academia and 
practice. D/E represents the financial position and capital structure, while QUICK points out 
the operating efficiency of tested observations.  
 
5.6.4 Regression Functions, Predictions, and Descriptive Statistics 
Following Bortolotti et al. (2003) and Yang and Lau (2006), to investigate the choice of 
Chinese companies‘ overseas listing, this chapter employs a generalized Type II Tobit model 
which allows simultaneously examination of two questions: the decision of overseas listing 
and the offering scale of H-share issues. A decision (selection) equation and an OLS 
regression equation are included in the model, as shown in Equation (5.1) and (5.2).  
Decision Equation 
Hi   =   β0 + β1 RLT-MKT-PEi + β2 INDi  
               + β3 TRDi + β4 SOi + β5 LPi + β6 FIRSTi + β7 BOARDi   
                       + β8 OPMi + β9 ROEi + β10 TAi + β11 D/Ei + β12 QUICKi + εi           (5.1) 
OLS Regression Equation 
E [Yi | Hi=1] =   β0 + β1 RLT-MKT-PEi + β2 INDi  
               + β3 TRDi + β4 SOi + β5 LPi + β6 FIRSTi + β7 BOARDi   
                       + β8 OPMi + β9 ROEi + β10 TAi + β11 D/Ei + β12 QUICKi + εi           (5.2) 
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In particular, the decision equation is a Logit model, where the independent variable, 
choice of listing in HK (Hi), is a binary variable taking the value of one if the observation 
included in the regression is a H-share firm, and zero otherwise. In the OLS regression 
equation, Yi is the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted H-share IPO proceeds of firms in 
RMB. All control variables are defined before. 
Bortololotti et al. (2003) believe there is no need to distinguish these two logical steps as 
ex ante. Therefore, the two equations include the same independent variables. Moreover, 
according to Yang and Lau (2006), the error terms are assumed to be jointly normally 
distributed. The main advantage of applying such a model is that the selection equation can 
use the information from the OLS regression to improve the estimation accuracy of the 
coefficients, and allow the same independent variable to have a different impact on the 
selection and OLS regression equations, for instance carrying different signs.  
Table 5.3 reports the summary statistics of control variables in the tests on the choice of 
Chinese companies‘ overseas listing, including all observations, sub-sample of A-share 
companies, and sub-sample of H-share firms. 
Table 5.4 presents the correlation matrix of regressors. The correlation coefficients among 
the control variables are mostly low, the highest correlation is between TA and IND. 
Moreover, a number of regressors are likely to hold a relatively high correlation to each other, 
including the IND, SO, and TA, which is due to the intrinsically specific characteristics of 
Chinese SOEs.  
RLT-MKT-PE 
In Table 5.3, being one of the variables in the market order hypothesis, the average market 
related PE ratio of 0.43 distinguishes pricing levels between the two markets. In other words, 
the composite market portfolio is roughly half the price in Hong Kong than in China A-share 
market. This looks like H-share firms are subject to lower listing PE multiples and a higher 
cost of capital than in the domestic market. A compelling explanation is the market order 
hypothesis, which demonstrates that, since the Chinese stock market is in an early stage of 
development, and speculative bubbles, to force the economic reform as well as maintain the 
market order, firms may have chosen to list at a large price discount as a shortcut. Also, it is 
worth pointing out that, large IPO activities in the A-share market exert downward pricing 
pressures to the market (Yang and Lau, 2006). In this case, it is hard to imagine the actual 
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pricing level and potential shock to the market if these H-share firms initially listed on the 
domestic stock exchange instead.  
In addition, there is another possibility that the domestic market negatively responds to the 
large IPO issues, whatever the target market is. This prediction is consistent with the market 
order hypothesis, since H-share companies are significantly larger than domestic listing firms, 
if the scale of the SIP is larger than the market can afford, this may lead to market disorder, 
and foreign primary listing would be an efficient alternative. This chapter will provide further 
support that, a lower cost is not a necessary motivation, at least not the most important 
motivation, for firms in a less-integrated market to seek primary overseas listing. However, 
this tendency is expected to reduce as the time elapses and the market becomes more 
integrated. 
Meanwhile, the RLT-MKT-PE for H-share firms is significantly higher than the one of A-
share companies, which probably accounts for a market timing motive. A tendency is detected 
that, although Chinese SOEs are looking forward overseas listings, they still need to choose a 
―good‖ time. Their foreign primary listing will be put into practice when the target market is 
relatively hot, with a higher market pricing level, to receive more funds and better trading 
performance in both primary and secondary markets. Meanwhile, it is reasonable to predict 
that SOEs tend to issue more shares in the hot market than others. Therefore, the relative 
market PE ratio is expected to be positively related to the choice of overseas listing, and 
negatively related to the H-share offering proceeds. This prediction is consistent with the 
major literature on the motivation of going public, with further evidence for the behavioural 
hypotheses.  
IND 
20 percent of listed companies are within the government supporting industries, where H-
share firms carry significantly larger weight than A-shares. In particular, there are roughly 
one third of H shares from supporting industries, compared to A shares which only have about 
one sixth out of 448 observations. It is natural to assume that the government has an incentive 
to strategically and selectively pursue overseas listing for the concern about the development 
of the domestic market and the success of their privatization efforts, which is, again, 
consistent with two principal hypotheses mentioned in this section. Consequently, a positive 
relationship is predicted between government supporting industries and the decision of 
foreign primary listing. 
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TRD and BOARD 
As a convention, all listing companies in both markets have the same level of tradable 
shares at 30 percent on average. Also, as far as the board size is concerned, there is no 
significant difference between HK and the China‘s domestic markets. Legal corporate 
structure is apparent and the HKEx does not have more restricted requirements on the level of 
tradable shares with the prospective listing issues. Meanwhile, to some extent, the Hong Kong 
listing framework is a vivid example of the Chinese domestic capital market, therefore the 
similarity on corporate structure and operational systems is reasonably understandable.  
SO and LP 
According to the tested sample, the state-owned share is 13.5 percent on average among all 
observations, while the legal-person ownership has a mean of 24.1 percent, nearly two times 
of the state-owned. This situation coincides with the Chinese economic reform tendency of 
reducing the state‘s direct control of each company, even though, at the current stage, the 
legal person shares essentially cannot be distinguished from government control.  
However, the difference of priority between these two classes of shares can still be 
discovered from the sample. In particular, within H-share observations, the government 
directly controls 28.3 percent of shares in listed H-share companies, which is dramatically 
higher than A-share companies with less than 10 percent of state ownership. Meanwhile, the 
percentage of legal person shares in A-share companies is two times that of H-share 
observations. There are two possible explanations: (1) government ownership is closely 
related to both large scale and supporting industries; and (2) the A-share companies have a 
greater variety of backgrounds than H-share firms do, representing dispersive distribution in 
ownership structures. According to the sample, the difference between two sub-samples is 
statistically significant. Therefore, although the two classes of ownership are quite similar, it 
seems that companies with a higher level of government direct control will have priority to 
seek listing on overseas markets. This expectation is consistent with the bonding hypothesis to 
send positive signals of economic reform efforts and achievements. Meanwhile, the market 
order hypothesis is tested to the extent that, under the control of government, large-scale state-
owned companies prefer to primarily list on foreign exchanges so as to avoid unexpected risks 
on the domestic market. 
FIRST 
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As the proxy of the shareholding structure, FIRST is about 46.1 percent on average for all 
observations, which means the first large shareholder holds almost half of the company, 
representing a relatively high level of ownership concentration. Comparably, H-share firms 
appear to be slightly more intensive in ownership control than A-share companies. Since this 
proxy does not separate classes of shares, it cannot be an explicit sign that the government 
still remains its immediate influence in companies‘ daily operating. However, once being 
associated with other variables, for instance, the size of listed companies, it is reasonable to 
assume government-backed issues have a higher concentration level in ownership structure, 
as well as the motive of overseas listing. 
Operating Profit Margins (OPM), ROEs, D/E Ratios, and QUICK Ratios 
H-share companies represent a significantly higher earnings level than domestic-listed 
shares. Although the profitability level cannot be a crucial standard of overseas listing, it can 
still be anticipated that, the government will carefully choose better performing state-owned 
companies to issue IPOs overseas to send a positive signal of China‘s economic reform. 
Besides, the comprehension of stronger financial ability can be interpreted as pre-listing 
restructuring as well. Consequently, foreign listed firms are expected to have a higher level of 
efficiency, better profitability, and a more reasonable leverage level within the firm.  
 
5.6.5 Empirical Results and Discussions 
Table 5.5 reports the regression results for both the decision equation (Panel A) and the OLS 
equation (Panel B), to answer the question of the selection method used by the Chinese 
government for overseas listing. The examinations have been divided into three models: 
Column 1 focuses on corporate governance variables, Column 2 lays particular stress on the 
accounting factors, while Column 3 adopts all variables for both Panel A and Panel B in 
Table 5.5. 
5.6.3.1 Decision Equation 
To begin with the Decision Equation (Equation 1), largely consistent with previous 
expectations, most control variables are systematically associated with the decision of 
overseas listing, or, more critically, with the government‘s selection standards of overseas 
listing.  
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In particular, the corporate governance model provides sufficient information on selection 
standards. RLT-MKT-PE is significantly and positively related to the listing decision, which 
is consistent with the prediction of market timing. Meanwhile, the positive relationship 
supports the market order hypothesis to the extent of a contradictive market reaction to new 
primary listing. In other words, once a large SOE goes public in Hong Kong, the domestic 
market will more pessimistically reflect the negative responses to this event and react 
inversely in comparison to overseas market movements.  
In addition, IND shows a significantly positive relationship to the selection, which, again, 
provides empirical evidence of the Chinese government‘s privatization efforts, i.e. firms 
within the government supporting industries have priority of foreign primary listing. 
As far as the series of firm-specific ownership structure proxies are concerned, the test 
actually lays particular stress to the selection criteria set by the government. SO and LP 
classes of shares represent inverse influence on the selection of overseas listing: a larger 
percentage of state ownership conduces to the qualification of overseas listing, while legal-
person shareholding has a lack of priority to pass the selection standards. 
Correspondingly, as further evidence, the significant and positive relationship between 
FIRST and the overseas listing decision reflects a vital selection preference of the government, 
in terms of the foreign primary listing being one of the key approaches towards the target of 
privatization and achievement of economic reform. In other words, once combining the 
empirical results of the series of ownership structure variables, it is obvious that a selection of 
underlying overseas-listed firms is for more political interests. Doing so is to exchange future 
development than to solely maximize government-backed owners‘ economic wealth.  
Moreover, TRD also appears to have a certain relationship with overseas listing. There are 
two possible explanations: the public interest and market capability. In terms of market 
conventions, the HKEx requires a higher level of public holding. For instance, according to 
the Listing Rules 8.08(1.a)
47
, to ensure an adequate market for, the exchange must be satisfied 
with sufficient public interest, which means at least 25 percent of the issuer‘s total issued 
share capital must at all times be held by the public. For securities having an expected market 
capitalization at the time of listing of more than HKD50 millions, the public holding is 
required to be no less than 15 percent. Comparatively, although the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
                                                     
47
 The shortened form, of ‗HKEx Listing Rules‘, is used in the following to refer to the Rules 
Governing the Listing of Securities on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd., Update No. 84 (Update 
No.85: 25 June 2007). 
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also requires a 25 percent as the bottom level of public interest, for primary listing candidates 
with new offered shares of more than 4,000 billion shares (no matter how much is the 
capitalization once higher than RMB500 billion), the required public holding level reduces to 
10 percent. It is noted that, according to observations in the this chapter, only 4 out of 54 
main-board-listed firms in Hong Kong have market capitalization of less than HKD50 million, 
indicating the minimum public interests of most overseas listing SOEs is 15 percent and 
significantly higher than the 10 percent level of domestic trading platforms. Since the 
domestic market capability is still limited at the current stage, more spread in the shareholding 
structure means larger offering proceeds, which could possibly bring more uncertain risks and 
unexpected concussions to the domestic financial market. As the former explanation further 
highlights the difference across trading platforms, the latter, again, proves the ―market order 
hypothesis‖. However, although BOARD also closely depends on the market conventions, it 
is insignificant, indicating the similarity in this case. 
To further investigate the systematic relationship to accounting variables, Model 2 mainly 
highlights three aspects. These are size, profitability, and efficiency. The relationship between 
SIZE and the decision of overseas listing is significant, indicating a priority of large SOEs to 
raise capital on an international basis. Moreover, both OPM and ROE are significantly and 
positively related to a foreign primary listing, which is consistent with the facts that The 
Chinese government intentionally reorganizes and modifies prospective issuing firms to meet 
listing criteria in foreign stock exchanges.  However, proxies of financial leverage (D/E) and 
liquidity (QUICK) are not statistically significant in this case, with comparably low t-values. 
It is noted that, Model 2 does not exclude RLT-MKT-PE as a control variable since market 
movement influences an individual security‘s decision and performance. The significantly 
positive coefficient is consistent with Model 1 to a certain degree. 
In Model 3, the consistence of empirical results is held in principle. Large, reorganized and 
recovered state-owned companies within the government supporting industries will prefer an 
overseas listing when the market is hot, to obtain more capital-raising, to operate under 
international standards, to send a positive signal of Chinese economic reform, and to 
indirectly protect the development of the domestic financial market. 
 
5.6.3.2 OLS Regression and Discussions 
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Panel B in Table 5.5 reports the empirical results of the OLS Regression Equation (Equation 
5.2), i.e. the systematic determinants of the size of overseas listing. The basic idea of this 
function is likely to be the same as the decision equation. It only replaces the dependent 
variable from a decision-making dummy into the natural logarithm of inflation-adjusted H-
share IPO proceeds of firms. This alternative examination aims to identify the systematic 
characteristics associated with the scale of primary overseas listing, even if the effects of 
included ex ante factors cannot be distinguished to the extent of both dependent variables. 
In Model 1 of corporate governance factors, the market-specific proxy of RLT-MKT-PE 
becomes statistically insignificant, which is consistent with the prediction of the ―slap-up‖ 
sentiments of the Chinese government to push through the privatization by foreign listings. As 
mentioned before, at the current stage of market development, a low cost is not necessarily 
the crucial concern. Having decided an overseas primary listing, the issuing SOE and related 
government department will achieve a successful offering by all means. It is noted that, the 
insignificance of such a variable does not held across all three model. A possible explanation 
would rely on the level of market effect. That is to say, although overseas initial offerings are 
not mainly driven by the comparably low costs, H-shares do not completely abandon the 
opportunities of timing the market.  
The concentration of ownership in determining proceed amounts is relatively not as 
important as it is in the decision-making process. The negative sign also indicates a latent 
protection from the subsequent dilution effect. 
As far as the percentage of tradable H-shares are concerned, TRD is inversely related to 
the offering proceed, representing an apparent motivation of raising capital. However, 
according to the empirical tests in prior chapters, the high pricing level does not consequently 
account for a mispricing of China-backed issuing firms in Hong Kong. Both H shares and Red 
Chips are actually suffering a higher level of underpricing (dramatic initial returns) than local 
shares and any other cross boarder listings. H-share issuing firms are likely to alienate partial 
benefits for investors‘ interest in order to ensure a successful overseas listing and to achieve 
the target of privatization. Also, the correlation between the percentage of new issued shares 
and the size of the firms should be aware. Since even a small proportion of tradable shares is 
massive for larger-than-average scales, the subsequent proceeds are reasonably and 
remarkable higher than the average. 
Meanwhile, SO, LP and IND show strong and positive relationships with the issuing 
proceed, which can also be intercepted as the size effect. In other words, state or legal person 
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shareholdings and industry categories are more likely to be the criteria of decision-making. 
The significant associations with the issuing amount are more driven by their correlations to 
the size of SOEs. Such a certain size effect can also be applied to the BOARD though the 
influence is much lower than SO, LP and IND correspondingly. 
To sum up Model 1 in Panel B, offering proceeds are mainly determined by the intrinsic 
characteristics of SOEs‘ large scale and the stock exchange‘s conventions, rather than other 
exogenous aspects.   
Firm-specific accounting characteristics also appear to have systematic impacts on the 
offering proceeds. As shown in Model 2 of Panel B, apart from the substitute proxy of size, 
TA, the offering proceed are more closely associated with both profitability and leverage 
ratios. In particular, ROE, with a coefficient of 0.74 and a t-statistics of 2.83, suggests that 
more profitable SOEs will issue more equity in the overseas market to maximize the amount 
of funds raised. Meanwhile, D/E is determined by the comparison in cost of capital between 
equity and debt. To be more specific, being a government-backed enterprise, it is much easier 
to access financing resources, from either government departments or commercial banking 
institutes. In the past two decades, especially in the 1980s and the 1990s, the government and 
local authorities acted as immediate lenders. Although recently the state has avoided this 
direct assistance as much as possible, they still feel having duty to get involved as sponsors. 
For instance, there is a common perception amongst commercial bankers that, once balancing 
two comparable applications of business loans, a SOE will have a higher probability to 
receive the agreement duo to government‘s creditability and administrative means. For many 
years, Chinese bankers suffer from both high subprime and low provision. However, such a 
negative relationship impliedly reflects the government seeking lower financing costs to 
process cross-border listings. 
Model 3 in Panel B further incorporates all the independent variables to control the 
determinants of H-share offering proceeds. Accounting factors are persistently consistent with 
the obtained results, the corporate factors. However, they tend to vary from the prior model, 
especially the statistical significance of IND and SO. The change has actually coincided with 
the conclusion in Model 1 that, IND, SO as well as LP are only selection standards for 
overseas listing set by the government, therefore the underlying insignificance has more 
economic meaning than statistical sense. Meanwhile, the change in LP also supports the 
prediction of the relationship between the state‘s shareholding and offering size, since the 
increase in LP accounts for the rise in total government-backed ownership. 
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In short, from the Chinese government‘s point of view, to process H-share offerings, the 
issuing proceeds are mainly determined by their financial position and performance, the 
proportion of government-backed shareholding, as well as market movements. Although the 
market order hypothesis does not hold at any circumstance to the extent of high associated 
costs, the overseas listing is still promoted by the government based on the bonding 
hypothesis and signaling models with a relatively rational consideration to develop the 
domestic financial market. In other words, since the market hypothesis focuses on the 
protection of the domestic market while the bonding hypothesis emphasizes more on the 
development, the empirical results in this section coincide with the predictions that, 
strategically selecting SOEs to go public in Hong Kong is not merely due to the current 
immaturity of the A-share market, but is a means to gain successful experience on domestic 
financial reform for the future. 
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5.7 Improvement in Corporate Governance via an Overseas Listing 
Overseas listing is based upon the framework of accounting criterion, disclosure practices, 
agency problems, as well as corporate governance.  Since asymmetric information models 
have been stressed in Chapter III, while accounting and disclosing practices have been 
discussed in Chapter IV, this section, alternatively, turns to focus on the omitted part related 
to corporate governance. If H-share listing is principally driven by the needs of China‘s 
economic reform and SOEs placid privatization, the H-share companies should be assigned 
with the reorganization priority and exhibit better governance structure after listing, i.e. better 
accounting and disclosure practices, less earning management, as well as improved financial 
position and performance. This is also a subsequent test of the ―Bonding Hypothesis‖. 
 
5.7.1 Regression Equations and Predictions 
The idea of empirical investigation in this section is, once overseas listing is considered for 
the further development of the domestic financial market, H-share companies listed in Hong 
Kong should behave under more restricted international standards. Tested models maintain 
control variables of the bonding hypothesis and earning management, to test whether 
accounting and disclosure practice as well as corporate governance have to be improved by 
overseas listing experience. 
The test follows simple Logit model to investigate whether improved corporate 
governance and accounting practices can help to distinguish H-share firms from their 
domestic counterparts. The tested regression function is listed in Equation (5.3):  
Prob (Hi=1) = β0 + β1 SOi + β2 FIRSTi + β3 TRDi + β4 BOARDi + β5 NONi  
+ β6 INC-SMTHi + β7 PRF-Ci + Accounting Control Variables + εi             (5.3) 
where, the dependent variable, Hi, is equal to 1 for H-share firms, and zero otherwise. SO, 
FIRST, TRD, BOARD and accounting control variables have been defined in the previous 
section. The adoption is for the consideration of the panoramic view in corporate governance 
aspects. Moreover, the percentage of non-executive directors within the board, NON, is 
included to capture the structure and monitoring power of the board. According to Beekes, 
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Pope, and Young (2004), a higher proportion of outside the board members are more likely to 
recognize negative news related to earnings on a timely basis and act conservatively in 
reporting and disclosing. Although it has mentioned that the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board more rests with the exchange ordinance conventions, the restructuring 
inside SOEs prior to overseas listing, including invitation of non-executive directors, is an 
effort to enhance the corporate governance more or less. Apart from that, accounting control 
variables are mainly maintained as previous regression functions, including TA, D/E, and 
QUICK.  
Moreover, the two proxies of the earning management are introduced in this section to 
measure the quality of accounting and governance, i.e. the income smoothing (INC-SMTH) 
and the inconsistency between profits and cash flows (E-CASH). Prior studies have provided 
empirical evidence, for instance, Lobo and Zhou (2001). They report that corporate disclosure 
is negatively related to the earnings management. Furthermore, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 
(2003) observe the existence of an endogenous link between corporate governance and the 
quality of reported earnings. They conclude that earnings management is partially driven by 
increasing benefits from private control. Once they discover the decline in such benefits, 
insiders will have less incentive to manage earnings. Consequently, it is presumable to 
anticipate that better governance and accounting practices tend to abstain from earning 
management.  
Meanwhile, there is an additional reason to account for the earnings management effect. 
Along with the hot topic on China, there has been much empirical evidence on Chinese listed 
firms recently. By examining the earnings patterns of B- and H-shares in China, Aharony et al. 
(2000) finds that Chinese IPOs do engage in earnings management. The underlying pattern 
heavily relies on the firm‘s relationship with the government and the market listed on. Wang 
et al. (2001) addresses the empirical tests on A-share firms and documents that the company 
performance significantly decreases after listing. However, they still barely isolate the 
impacts owing to privatization, while Huang and Song (2005) complement the investigation 
and conclude that, the privatization effect in China‘s overseas listed companies is still positive. 
More literature includes Xu and Wang (1999), Chen et al. (2000), Qi et al. (2000), and Chen 
and Xiong (2001). Therefore, it is indispensable to consider the possible earnings 
management when judging the improvement in corporate governance of Chinese overseas-
listed firms.  
INC-SMTH is defined as a ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of annual operating 
profits and net cash flow from operating activities, aiming to capture the degree of income 
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smoothing
48
. The less volatile the operating earnings are relative to cash flow, the larger the 
amount of earnings management is expected. Meanwhile, E-CASH is conducted as a ratio of 
the absolute value of the firms‘ accruals49 and the absolute value of the firm‘s cash flow from 
operations. The accrual and cash flow from operating activities are predicted to move together 
if the earning management is controlled at a relatively low level. In other words, the value of 
E-CASH tends to be fairly small under constraints in earnings management. 
In addition, most of the accounting variables remain the same as in previous equations, 
except for adding a profit growth rate (GROWTH). It is defined as the average growth rate of 
net profits in the three years after listing, as an ex post proxy of listed firms‘ potentials in 
profitability.   
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix cross control variables are reported in Panel A 
and Panel B in Table 5.6 respectively. Most variables have been demonstrated in the previous 
section. 
NON, as one of the proxies of corporate governance, appears to differ across sub-samples. 
On average, there are 48 percent of the board members acting as non-executive directors in H-
share companies, while A-share observations hold an average proportion of 25 percent. As 
mentioned before, to the extent of improvement in monitoring power within the board, H-
share firms are expected to be more advanced with stronger administrative strength and 
lawsuit obligation. In other words, NON is expected to be positively related to overseas listing 
to reflect the improvement in corporate governance. 
The mean of INC-SMTH for H-share observations is 3.23 with a standard deviation of 
11.31, while the average INC-SMTH of A-share observations is much smaller at 0.86 with a 
standard deviation of 3.24. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a positive relationship 
between INC-SMTH and overseas listing, which means H-share firms with less earnings 
management will have higher volatility in operating earnings related to the cash flow. The 
INC-SMTH of H-shares, as a proxy of income smoothing, should tend to be larger than 
domestic listed firms. 
                                                     
48
 Income smoothing is one form of earnings management in which the company ―smoothes‖ reported 
operating earnings by altering the accounting component of earnings, namely accruals, to reduce its 
variability (Sun, Tong and Wu, 2006, pp. 18).  
49
 According to Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003), Accruals are calculated as: (∆Total Current Assets - 
∆Cash) – (∆Total Current Liabilities - ∆Short-term Debt - ∆Taxes Payable) – Depreciation Expenses. 
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The other proxy of earnings management, average E-CASH of H-shares is -0.075 when 
compared to 0.29 of A-shares. Hence it is expected to be negatively associated with foreign 
primary listings. However, the t-test of the mean is not statistically significant. We have to 
leave the question open. 
Moreover, the accounting proxy of GROWTH shows the operational gap between foreign 
and domestic listed shares. The mean of profit growth rate of H-share companies is positive 
and nearly reaches at a level of 10 percent level; on the contrary, A-share firms appear to 
suffer a minor decline in net profit growth on average. There are a number of reasons to be 
addressed on this issue. Since business profitability should reflect the economic fundamentals 
and other macro factors, the difference in operating performance may be driven by their 
intrinsic characteristics, for instance, being export-oriented or domestic-market-oriented. Also, 
once considering their government shareholding proportions, the attached abilities of 
accessing resources and chances of obtaining administrative supports have a lack of 
comparability. However, one cannot negate the efforts of overseas listed H-shares to improve 
their operating performance and corporate governance. Consequently, GROWTH has been 
included in the following tested models, even if the difference in means is not statistically 
significant. 
 
5.7.2 Empirical Results and Discussions on the Improvement of Corporate Governance 
Regression results are reported in Table 5.7, in which Panel A shows the corporate 
governance and earnings management across A- and H-firms without accounting control 
variables, and Panel B are models with accounting control variables. 
5.7.2.1 Regressions without Accounting Control Variables 
Model A(1) only includes two earnings management control variables in the equation, which 
can be regarded as a start point for subsequent models by adding various variables in turn. As 
predicted, INC-SMTH appears to be significantly and positively related to the H-shares, 
indicating a comparably lower level in earnings management than their domestic counterpart. 
In particular, although the underlying effect of income smoothing is minor, at approximately 
1 percent, the economic meaning is prominent. Such well-behaved activities may be mastered 
by the accounting and disclosure practices in Hong Kong and for the avoiding of violation 
purposes. In other words, the costs of breaking rules may be more negative than turning away 
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from earnings management. In addition, this indeed illustrates the original intention of 
overseas listing and provides empirical evidence to the bonding argument. To list on a well 
established and internationally formulated trading platform, Chinese SOEs themselves have to 
improve their corporate governance and operating management to realize continuous and 
successful trading as well as spill-over onto the domestic market. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of E-CASH is not statistically significant in the model. Once 
considering two earnings management control variables together, it is known that, although 
H-share firms abstain from earnings management, they still cannot be distinguished 
remarkably from domestic-listed companies at the current stage. 
Model A(2) turns to examine the systematic influences of administrative power within 
corporate governance, including SO, BOARD, and NON. SO is statistically and positively 
associated with H-shares. Based on the assumption that overseas listings help with formatting 
modern corporate structure and improving corporate governance, H-share companies take 
advantages from their state-owned background.   
Foreign listed firms are likely to enroll more non-executive directors in the board. This 
coincides with the argument the, the pre-listing reorganization of Chinese enterprises, 
including both A- and H-shares, are more likely to follow the framework of previous 
succeeded examples in international markets. Further, this is also consistent with a number of 
prior studies, for instance, Beekes et al. (2004) and Yang and Lau (2006). The latter suggests 
that larger proportion of non-executive directors enhance the corporate governance in H-share 
firms. To combine with the results in Model 2, it can be concluded that, at least partially, 
NON positively influences the accounting and disclosure practices, which in turn improves 
the accuracy in operating management as well as efficiency in corporate governance. 
In terms of BOARD, it is not statistically significant. However, even the board size cannot 
be distinguished between A- and H-share firms, the insignificance can still be reasonably 
explained by the following likelihoods: (1) the correlation matrix in Panel B of Table 5.5 has 
dropped a hint that, the board is more closely related to industry and size of firms; (2) as far as 
overseas listed companies are always the flagships within the corresponding industries and 
regional markets. Their restructures prior to listing must have been the model for other 
subsequent offerings to follow, which can easily result in indifference across firms no matter 
what market they list on. In other words, the indifference may imply an ongoing broadcasting 
effect for the domestic market participants to track flagships‘ restructuring experiences, even 
merely for an ad hoc or incentive-driven purpose. 
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Model A(3), by combining the prior two models, examines the impacts of two groups of 
control variables, i.e. the earnings management and administrative power. All results are 
completely and systematically consistent across the models, as well as their statistical 
significance. 
Model A(4) solely focuses on corporate governance variables with an additional proxy of 
first-large shareholding (FIRST) to control the concentration of ownership. Once other 
aspects are equal, more concentrative shareholding is significantly associated with H-shares to 
distinguish from domestic listing firms. The result suggests that H-share firms are more likely 
to have a controlling shareholder than pure A-share firms, which is inconsistent with the 
general argument that the controlling shareholder is linked to poor corporate governance. 
However, again, once investigating the correlation between FIRST and SO, such a conflict is 
actually an intrinsic conjunction and mostly driven by its state-owned shareholding. 
Model A(5) further adopts earnings management control variables based on Model 4 for 
the speculative motive. The maintenance in coefficients and statistics significance of all 
variables is kept, proving the consistency and stability of the series of models.  
By substituting FIRST for TRD, Model A(6) focuses on the affects generated from spread 
in ownership, especially public shareholding. The insignificance is not critical in economic 
meaning, since the percentage of tradable classes of shares depends on legal clauses and 
administrative prescripts rather than an individual firm‘s preference or decisions. Such 
convention is consequently not expected to be one of the most crucial characteristics in this 
issue.  
Finally to sum up, Model A(7) comprises all control variables from all of the models 
above, aiming to provide a clear and entire view of corporate governance and earnings 
management. The high and reliable likelihood in the empirical results comes to a conclusion 
that improvement in corporate governance of H-share firms is significantly attributed by their 
overseas listing. The state-owned ownership, concentrative shareholding, engagement of more 
non-executive directors, and abstaining from earnings management positively impel such 
improvement.  
5.7.2.2 Regressions with Accounting Control Variables 
Model B(1) to Model B(4) in Panel B of Table 5.7 pushes the Logit regressions by including 
the accounting control variables, with the interests of whether improved corporate governance 
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and accounting practices can help to distinguish H-share firms from their domestic 
counterparts. In particular, the subsequent models are essentially generated for one of 
previous models, by persistently adopting TA, D/E, GROWTH, and QUICK as the control 
variables to capture the effects of the firm‘s size, leverage, potential, and efficiency. 
Moreover, IND and FIRST will be selectively engaged in. However, NON has been excluded. 
The rearrangement in control variables is expected to tell more stories of other potential 
influences. 
Based on Model A (6), Model B(1) excludes both FIRST and IND as a simplified origin. 
SO maintains persistent significance and is positively associated with H-share firms. However, 
being different from the prior models, TRD is significantly and positively related to overseas 
listing. It is noted that, the positive sign of the coefficients is consistent across models. Also, 
this result indicates the relationship between the proportion of tradable shares and the 
guarantee in accountability, improvement in economic efficiency, and enhancement in 
shareholders‘ wealth. As suggested by the majority of relevant studies, the higher the 
percentage in public shareholdings, the better the corporate governance. 
In addition, as for the earnings management, a positive coefficient of INC-SMTH provides 
further evidence to the relationship between overseas listing and resistance from income 
smoothing activities. 
Moreover, within four accounting control variables, only TA represents an outstanding 
positive relationship to overseas listing and the improvement in corporate governance. In the 
prior literature, firm size is often used as a proxy for information availability. Since market 
participants are assumed to have better knowledge and information than large firms, they 
should have less incentive to smooth earnings (Albrecth and Richardson, 1990). Therefore, 
such positive connection to better corporate governance is accorded with predictions. 
Model B(2) further introduces the control variable of FIRST into the regression function. 
It can be ascertained that more absolute control in ownership produces better managing 
efficiency and corporate governance. 
Model B(3) turns the view to the industry aspect. Based on Model B(1), a dummy variable 
of government supporting industries, IND, is to discover the possible link between industry 
and corporate governance. Although the result is not statistically significant, the positive sign 
is still consistent with the expectation that overseas listing helps with the improvement of 
corporate governance for H-share companies. The insignificance can be explained by the 
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concentrated distribution of industries among H-shares. In other words, since government 
supporting industries have already owned the priority to pursue primary foreign listing, all the 
listed H-share firms represent convergence and derive advantages from same jurisprudence 
and market conditions. Thus a positive relationship may generate more economic sense than 
statistical meaning. 
Lastly, Model B(4) integrates all control variables used in the previous three models to 
provide a panoramic view. All variables as well as their corresponding statistical significance 
are maintained steadily and systematically. 
To sum up, all tested models come to one conclusion, H-share companies, representatives 
of partially privatized Chinese SOEs, have already substantially revised and reformed the 
corporate governance through a primary overseas listing channel. They have spilled over 
positive effects back to the domestic financial market and become models to guide other 
domestic counterpart to follow.  
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5.8 Investor Protection and Long-term Performance 
5.8.1 Methodology - Do H-share Firms Have Better Post-listing Performance? 
The World Development Report (1996), ―From Plan to Market‖, acknowledges that, ―each 
approach to privatization creates trade-offs among various goals, among which, initial public 
offerings generate revenues, create control of shareholders over managers, access to capital 
and skill, and provide efficiency‖ 50. During 2006 alone, Chinese SOEs executed share issue 
privatizations worth over US$ 35 billion, including the US$ 21.9 billion IPO of the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (1398.HK), the largest initial offering in history.  
Such tendency raises a question that, in the long run, is it worthy while for the Chinese 
government to pursue SOEs‘ primary overseas listing? What have they learned from other 
international markets? And how can A-share market apply these experiences? 
Therefore, this section aims to compare the after-market trading performance between A- 
and H-share firms. In particular, according to literature, holding the bonding hypothesis, the 
legal origin is an important determinant to the accounting practices, corporate governance, 
disclosure procedures, and investors‘ protection. It will in turn affect the development of the 
financial markets as well as market participants‘ investment expectations and activities. By 
adopting a variable of LaPorta et al. index, this section will particularly investigate the legal 
effects on the performance of overseas listing, i.e. ex post public control. This also 
distinguishes the research from the traditional tests of IPO long-term performance. 
 
5.8.1.1 Long-term Stock Trading Performance 
Prior literature has already discovered the significant privatization activities, especially on the 
issue of whether privatization improves the operating and financial performance of ―divested‖ 
firms. Although the conclusions are mixed, most studies agree to the remarkable improvement 
in both developed and emerging markets (Galal et al. 1994; Megginson et al., 1994; Boubakri 
and Cosset, 1998; LaPorta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999; D‘Souza and Megginson, 1999; and 
Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). Megginson (2006) suggests that privatization IPOs have 
                                                     
50
 World Development Report, 1996, From Plan to Market, World Bank, page 241. 
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significantly outperformed their domestic stock market in the long run, because, in contrast to 
private firms, the privatization IPOs seem to have less asymmetric bias after trading. 
As far as China‘s privatization is concerned, there are still some studies, such as Chan, 
Wang, and Wei (2004) document the negative long-run trading performance of Chinese 
privatized IPOs. While some others, including Jain and Kini (1994), and Mikkelson, Partch, 
and Shah (1997), also report poor subsequent operating performance. However, the most 
recent studies on China privatized IPOs support the significant achievements of both financial 
and trading performance through overseas listing approach. 
In the existing literature, Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Schwartz (2002) report significant 
and positive long-run abnormal returns. This outstanding trading performance in turn reflects 
the improvement of the operating performance and managerial efficiency of private firms. 
As a further and closer support, Jia, Sun and Tong (2005) find the partial privatization of 
Chinese SOEs through overseas listing approach leads to a median increase in financial 
performance but significant underperformance of returns against several market index 
benchmarks. Also, the study shows that firm‘s performance is negatively related to the state 
ownership, but is positively related to legal-person ownership and foreign ownership. 
However, in terms of the debate regarding the methodology of measuring long-run 
performance, the empirical results are critically challenged. So far, there has no single long-
term performance methodology that is widely supported by both theory and empirical 
evidence. Also, the use of appropriate benchmarks remains critical. In the event-study, 
benchmarks‘ returns are normally calculated by using the CAPM. However, CAPM does not 
work well in testing the long-run performance. Although the Fama-French three-factor model 
has been introduced for decades, there has not generally accepted theoretical explanation for 
the size and book-to-market ratio to be the determining variables. As mentioned in the second 
empirical chapter, Barber and Lyon (1997) recommend using BHARs in a size-and-BM 
approach to eliminate the biases, however, Fama (1998) points out that, buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs) tend to yield statistically artifacts because a distribution of long-
horizon returns is positively skewed and has very fat tails. Alternatively, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) suggest using the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and a calendar time 
regression approach by Fama-French (1993). However, Loughran and Ritter (2000) state that 
such approach is the uniformly lease powerful test of market efficiency. 
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Previous studies offer indeterminacy in methods of testing the long-run performance, this 
chapter, for a neutral consideration, uses market-adjusted abnormal returns to test the long-run 
stock performance for observations. Table 5.8 and Figure 5.2 report the market-adjusted 
CARs by each month after the firm going public in segmented marketplaces. It includes both 
A- and H-share firms and the benchmarks include three stock market indices respectively, i.e. 
the Hong Kong Hang Seng Index, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index, and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange Composite Index, depending upon which trading platform the 
underlying observation is listed on.  
The market-adjusted CARs are negative on average for all three samples, indicating a 
possible underperformance to benchmark portfolios. Moreover, in comparison in the means of 
CARs across markets, overseas listed shares were actually suffering from a greater downside 
pressure than domestic listed firms. However, it is noted that, the corresponding margins are 
not statistically significant between two markets (t-statistics of 1.79 for zero difference 
between means, not reported in the Table 5.8).  
In addition, Figure 5.2 shows a clear view of the market-adjusted CARs of all samples, A-
share firms, and Main Board listed H-shares. To list on the two segmented stock exchanges, 
A- and H-share stocks were moving along a similar trend and were following the same pattern 
over time. The results are consistent with the relevant literature on information spillover 
across market. In a FIVECM-BEKK GARCH approach, Qiao, Chiang, and Wong (2008) 
provide empirical evidence that the China‘s domestic market and the Hong Kong market are 
fractionally co-integrated. 
Some recent literature explores the distinct price movement of stocks that are 
simultaneously traded in the China‘s segmented markets. One of these contentious issues is 
the price differentials among different classes of shares. By using a two factor model, Li, Yan 
and Greco (2006) successfully explain the risk premiums associated with A and H shares. 
Relative discounts of H-shares to A-shares are reflecting the contemporaneous movements of 
the H-share local market index to the A-share local market index, as well as the spread of 
saving rates between Hong Kong and mainland China. In other words, the change in 
individual security is always with the relative movement of trading platforms and 
macroeconomics factors. The results suggest that the risk premiums associated with the 
segmented A- and H-share markets exert crucial impacts on the price differentials between 
the two types of shares. 
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5.8.1.2 Ex post Public Control, Investor Protection, and Long-term Operating and 
Trading Performance 
The systematic characteristics associated with the IPO long-run performance have been 
discussed in previous chapters, including the size, initial underpricing level, market 
movements. Therefore, this chapter turns to focus on a number of other possible explanations. 
To be connected with the tests in the previous section on the decision of overseas listing and 
the improvement in corporate governance via such approach, the following examinations will 
focus on the relationship between improved corporate governance, better investor protections, 
and Chinese partially privatized IPO long-run trading performance. The dependent variable in 
tested OLS regressions is cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in one and three years after 
initial listing. CARs are calculated as: 
                                                                                (5.4) 
where ri,t and mi,t , representing monthly raw and benchmark returns (index returns), are 
statistics computed from the event time-series of portfolio-average monthly abnormal returns.  
To isolate from other studies, apart from maintaining control variables introduced in the 
previous section, this section includes a new control variable, LaPorta Index (LaP), to control 
the effects of investor protection The existing series studies by LaPorta et al. have not covered 
the data of China for all issues, which brings difficulties to full investigation based on 
authorized indexing value. Moreover, the following tests are on the after-market trading 
performance, the investors‘ protection will be narrowed down to ex post public controls. 
Although the legal system and investor protection could be one of the reasons to conduct a 
foreign primary listing, Hong Kong initially was not the first choice for the Chinese 
government to pursue partial privatization. The intended target markets have more capital 
capability, such as LSE, NYSE, and Nasdaq, especially LSE since its law system is also 
English-origin. Hong Kong eventually became the preferred choice of the Chinese 
government and the state authorities to process primary offering, warrants, and other 
derivatives in the rest of the stock exchanges. The core consideration will be much more than 
the law system and investor protection. 
However, as far as the bonding hypothesis is concerned, to encourage Chinese SOEs 
towards foreign initial offerings is to seek alternatives to complement the domestic lawsuit 
and enforcement regimes, once establishing the power of government administrative 
influences, the following tests can change the view to the post-listing effects of ex post public 
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control. CSRC always regards improving corporate governance of listed companies as one of 
the core missions. However, the law does not officially provide CSRC with specific powers to 
regulate the internal control or governance of listed companies. At the same time, domestic 
exchanges are also doubtful of having enough effective and appropriate authority to achieve 
self-regulatory entity. Consequently, based on LaPorta et al. (2006b), the corresponding 
examinations determine the structure of the regulation of public control as well as ex post 
public control and apply different values of underlying measure into the regression functions 
as one of the control variables. 
To determine whether the public control measures are related to the development of 
financial markets, LaPorta et al. (2006b) evaluates various strategies of public control 
regulations from both scientific and policy perspectives. They start with a fixed self-dealing 
transaction, and then measure the controlling shareholder rights if he must jump in order to 
get away from this transaction. The higher bundles, the higher the public control index is.  
The value assigned to the control variable, LaP, is to simulate the level of ex post public 
control. In particular, LaP equals to 7.99 if firms are listed in Hong Kong, and 3.59 if listed in 
one of the domestic stock exchanges. The specific calculation is reported in Table 5.9.  
There are two reasons why each aspect in ex post public control has not been tested 
individually. First, any one of these aspects is too minor to solely affect the overseas listing 
decision and the development of domestic governance. Even to compare the ex post private 
control of self-dealing, based on the investor structure in the domestic financial market that 
over 90 percent are retail investors, a dramatic increase in this factor can change the 
investment psychology entirely. Second, although most of the measures have different values, 
to omit any factors with the same value will possibly bias the index on the whole.  
Tested function is shown as follows. Table 5.10 reports the regression results of the 
relationship between the systematic governance, financial as well as legal variables and the 
long-run stock trading performance.  
CARi  = β0 + β1 INDi + β2 LaPi + β3 TRDi + β4 SOi + β5 LPi + β6 FIRSTi + β7 BOARDi  
+ β8 INC-SMTHi + β9 TAi + β10 D/Ei + β11 GROWTHi + β12 QUICKi + εi        (5.5) 
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5.8.2 Empirical Results on Investor Protection and Long-run Stock Performance 
Empirical results reported in Table 5.10 are separated into one-year (Panel A) and three-year 
(Panel B). To compare the effects of an individual variable over time, the results will be 
interpreted following both control variables and the time shaft. 
To begin with, being included in all models, IND does not hold an extraordinary 
significant relationship to either CAR-1 or CAR-3. However, it cannot be neglected that 
government supporting industries tend to have a better long-run performance in a three-year 
time horizon.  
LaP, as the proxy of ex post public control to the extent of investor protection, is 
statistically significant across models and time shaft, which is consistent with the prediction 
of a positive relationship. In other words, based on the bonding hypothesis, the legal origin is 
an important determinant to accounting practice, corporate governance, disclosure procedures, 
and investors‘ protection, which in turn will crucially affect the development of financial 
markets as well as market participants‘ investment expectations and activities. Consequently, 
the partial privatization through an overseas primary listing approach, as what the Chinese 
government is pursuing, is indeed a feasible way to facilitate the domestic financial market 
and to benefit economic reform.  
However, it has to be aware of potentially hiding information which is omitted duo to the 
limitation of tested sample. This chapter only includes H-share companies as representatives 
of overseas listed firms, and the Hong Kong market is always regarded as a connected 
economic body to mainland China. In this circumstance, the Hong Kong market is expected to 
value China-backed companies without extraordinary informative bias, while market 
participants, including both institutional and retail investors, are expected to have better 
knowledge of companies and the economic fundamentals of China. After Hong Kong became 
the Special Administrative Region of China in 1997, the economic and political links tend to 
be increasingly tightening. The tested sample period is exactly allocated during this period. 
Consequently, the significance in the LaPorta measure of ex post public control is wholly 
anticipated but crucially accepted.  
As far as the proxies of ownership are concerned, in models of testing CAR-1, none of 
them shows a significant association to abnormal returns, however, in models of testing CAR-
3, LP is likely to have a significantly positive relationship to long-run abnormal returns. In 
addition, BOARD is negatively related to one-year CARs. Such a negative relationship 
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becomes weaker in three-year CARs. If the board size is positively related to the issuing 
firm‘s size and China background, it can be explained as an improvement in disclosure 
practices as well as corporate governance. To the extent of accounting proxies, the 
coefficients TA and GROWTH are positive and significant in all tested models, indicating 
that larger companies with a higher growth rate in profits perform better in the long run, 
which is consistent with Chapter IV of this thesis. 
In short, by investigating the long-run trading performance and the influence of investor 
protection, this section provides further evidence to the bonding hypothesis. As expected by 
the Chinese government, H-share companies have performed ―properly‖ under the more 
restricted trading rules and accounting standards. In particular, apart from corporate 
governance tested in the previous section, investor protection, as one of the aspects of legal 
origin characteristics, appears to have strong influence on the companies‘ performance. For 
the Chinese government, the financial reform cannot only rest on enlarging the market 
capability, enrolling more institutional investors, or taking more SOEs from various industries 
to access the capital market. The subsequent development of the domestic market should step 
further towards the adjustment in the legislation sector, which will in turn take the domestic 
financial market into the next level. 
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5.9 Summary and Conclusions 
5.9.1 Summary of Main Findings 
China‘s government and Chinese SOEs have practiced for decades to pursue the overseas 
primary listing. The growth of such privatization programmes and national economic reform 
are in parallel all the while since 1990s. However, since Chinese enterprises‘ cross-border 
listings spear to be quite different from other countries to the extent of bearing higher costs 
and higher risks, to fill the gap in current literature, this chapter investigates the meaning and 
political objectives of the ongoing overseas listings. 
The study jointly tests a number of hypotheses related to privatization and primary 
overseas listing, including the market order hypothesis, the bonding hypothesis, and the 
market timing hypothesis related to the choice of overseas listing, the signalling hypothesis 
and other asymmetric information models related to the improvement in corporate governance, 
as well as investors‘ protection theory and IPO underperformance hypothesis.  
To draw a conclusion, for a state like China with a large scale of economy but without a 
developed financial market, the partial privatization through an overseas primary listing 
approach is a feasible way to facilitate the domestic financial market and to benefit the 
economic reform. In particular, the determinant of selection progress and criteria of 
prospective H-share companies indicates the targets and goals of government to pursue 
overseas listing. Besides to protect home market, an ultimate aim is more likely to further 
develop domestic financial market and benefit to economic growth. The improvement in 
accounting and disclosure practices as well as other aspects of corporate governance of H-
share companies may have positive influence on domestic listed firms. Also, by testing the 
relationship between long-run performance and investor protection, Chinese government may 
find a possible direction to amend the investment environment in the domestic A-share 
market. 
Main findings are listed as follow. 
(1) Chinese government uses primary overseas listings as a mean of forcing SOEs to 
conform to ‗international standards‘ and to establish ‗modern corporate governance‘. To this 
end, the decision to pursue primary overseas listings is actually determined by the government 
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needs. The government has carefully selected qualified enterprises and helped with pre-listing 
restructures to meet high standards in foreign stock exchanges. Based upon the bonding 
hypothesis and signaling hypothesis, the overseas listing is promoted by the government with 
a relatively rational consideration to develop the domestic financial market. 
(2) Once purely considering issuing firms‘ incentives, large and ‗healthy‘ state-owned 
companies within the government supporting industries will prefer an overseas listing when 
the market is hot. This kind of new share offering is in order to obtain more capital-raising, to 
operate under international standards, to send a positive signal of Chinese economic reform, 
and to indirectly protect the development of the domestic financial market. 
(3) Such privatization approach assigns H-share companies the reorganization priority. 
They in fact exhibit better governance structure after listing as the evidence that the overseas 
listing improves the corporate governance and has spread its positive effects onto the 
domestic financial market.  
And (4), it is clear that legal origin is an important determinant to accounting practices, 
corporate governance, disclosure procedures, and investors‘ protection, which will in turn 
affect the development of the financial markets as well as the investment expectations and 
activities. Therefore, overseas listings not only contribute to the economic reform, but also 
help with the steady improvement of domestic investment environment. 
 
5.9.2 Implications and Contributions 
In terms of implications of the chapter, with more Chinese firms eager to tap into a capital 
market beyond the Chinese domestic market, the study provides propositional guidance to the 
practice. Also, this chapter contributes to existing literature to explain why Chinese 
government will bear such high cost and how overseas listing yield valuable outcomes to 
benefit domestic market. However, the aims and performance of China-related firms listed in 
Hong Kong actually varies over time, doing long-term investigation results in conclusions 
being lagged behind real business. In other word, standing on the original story of Chinese 
SOEs‘ overseas listing, related studies are always on the way. 
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Table 5.1 Comparison between Whole Population and Tested Sample (by Cohort Year) 
 
 
 
  All 
 
A Share 
 
H Share 
  Population Missing Sample Sample (%)*   Population Missing Sample   Population Missing Sample 
2000 132 23 109 82.58% 
 
126 19 107 
 
6 4 2 
2001 60 7 53 88.33% 
 
53 3 50 
 
7 4 3 
2002 81 20 61 75.31% 
 
65 18 47 
 
16 2 14 
2003 83 12 71 85.54% 
 
65 12 53 
 
18 0 18 
2004 115 12 103 89.57% 
 
99 12 87 
 
16 0 16 
2005 27 3 24 88.89% 
 
15 3 12 
 
12 0 12 
2006 83 8 75 90.36% 
 
60 7 53 
 
23 1 22 
2007
†
 46 3 43 93.48% 
 
42 3 39 
 
4 0 4 
Total 627 88 539 85.96% 
 
525 77 448 
 
102 11 91 
 
 
                Note: 
                * It is the ratio of tested sample to the whole population in percentage. 
                       † The sample period in the year 2007 covers till end of May. 
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Table 5.2 Sample Distributions over Issuing Size, Industry, and Proportion of Ownership 
 
 
Panel A Sample Distribution by Net Proceed Amount 
 
(RMB in Million) 0-100 100-400 400-1,000 >1,000 
All 
    No. 31 298 150 60 
Mean 61.96  254.38  587.65  3,352.98  
Percentage* 5.75% 55.29% 27.83% 11.13% 
A Share 
    No. 3 280 129 36 
Percentage* 0.67% 62.50% 28.79% 8.04% 
H Share 
    No. 28 18 21 24 
Percentage* 30.77% 19.78% 23.08% 26.37% 
 
 
Panel B. By Government Supporting Industries (Energy, Basic Materials, Transportation, and Commercial Banking) 
 
  Supporting Non-Supporting 
All 
  No. 104 435 
Percentage* 19.29% 80.71% 
A Share 
  No. 72 376 
Percentage* 16.07% 83.93% 
H Share 
  No. 32 59 
Percentage* 35.16% 64.84% 
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Panel C. By Proportions of State-owned and Legal Person Shareholding 
 
 
 
  State-owned Shares   Legal Person Shares   All Authority-owned Shares
†
 
 
0% 0 - 20% 20 - 50% >50%   0% 0 - 20% 20 - 50% >50%   0% 0 - 20% 20 - 50% >50% 
All 
              No. 390 26 44 79 
 
229 82 74 154 
 
140 57 94 248 
Mean 0.00% 10.24% 31.64% 65.43% 
 
0.00% 6.37% 35.73% 63.04% 
 
0.00% 7.48% 34.94% 64.78% 
Percentage 72.36% 4.82% 8.16% 14.66% 
 
42.49% 15.21% 13.73% 28.57% 
 
25.97% 10.58% 17.44% 46.01% 
A Shares 
              No. 341 23 40 44 
 
158 75 65 150 
 
115 42 83 208 
Percentage 76.12% 5.13% 8.93% 9.82% 
 
35.27% 16.74% 14.51% 33.48% 
 
25.67% 9.38% 18.53% 46.43% 
H Shares 
              No. 49 3 4 35 
 
71 7 9 4 
 
25 15 11 40 
Percentage 53.85% 3.30% 4.40% 38.46%   78.02% 7.69% 9.89% 4.40%   27.47% 16.48% 12.09% 43.96% 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
* It is the proportion of observations within individual sub-samples, i.e. all samples, A shares, and H shares.  
† Authority-owned shares are defined as the sum of state-owned shares and legal person shares. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables on the Choice of China Enterprises’ Overseas Listing (By Market) 
 
 
 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of control variables to investigate the choice of China enterprises‘ overseas 
listing. The sample in the table includes 539 observations which are Chinese enterprises going public between January 
2000 and May 2007, including 448 A shares and 91 H shares. The sample has excluded dual-listing observations. 
RLT-MKT-PE is the monthly average PE ratio of Hang Seng Index over that in A-share market; IND is a dummy 
variable which equals to 1 if the firm is within one of the government supporting industries, including energy, basic 
materials, transportation, and commercial banking; TRD is the percentage of tradable shares, either A shares or H 
shares; SO is the percentage of state-owned shareholding; LP is the percentage of the legal person shareholding; 1ST 
is the percentage of the first large shareholding; BOARD is the size of boards; OPM is the operating profit margins; 
ROE is return on shareholders‘ common equity; TA is the logarithm of total assets; D/E is the debt-to-equity ratios; 
and QUICK is the quick ratios. 
 
 
 
Note: For the dummy variable IND, * represent the number of observations which equal to one, and † states the 
percentage of observations with value equal to one. 
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All Observations                       
 
RLT-MKT-PE IND TRD SO LP FIRST BOARD OPM ROE TA D/E QUICK 
Mean 0.430  104* 30.2%  13.5%  24.1%  46.1%  11  0.183  0.184  13.733  0.682  1.368  
Median 0.390  19.29%† 30.0%   0.0%   4.1%  46.9%  11  0.147  0.162  13.318  0.458  0.898  
Minimum 0.188  -  2.2%   0.0%   0.0%   5.6%  2  -0.188  -0.064  9.930  0.045  0.000  
Maximum 1.030  - 90.2%  88.5%  85.0%  85.0%  21  1.123  1.072  22.588  11.547  43.758  
S. D. 0.189  0.411  0.089  0.247  0.280  0.170  3.294  0.138  0.132  1.636  1.053  2.271  
Skewness 0.726  1.390  0.642  1.550  0.579  -0.082  0.175  2.052  2.075  2.172  5.177  12.470  
Kurtosis -0.177  -0.068  4.578  0.816  -1.375  -1.001  0.084  6.796  7.363  6.972  39.978  217.568  
A-Share Observations                       
 
RLT-MKT-PE IND TRD SO LP FIRST BOARD OPM ROE TA D/E QUICK 
Mean 0.415  72* 29.9%  9.6%  27.4%  44.9%  11  0.169  0.170  13.487  0.618  1.357  
Median 0.387  16.07%† 29.8%   0.0%  15.0%  44.6%  11  0.141  0.152  13.270  0.451  0.907  
Minimum 0.188  -  3.6%   0.0%   0.0%   5.6%  2  0.003  0.022  11.715  0.045  0.000  
Maximum 0.976  - 90.2%  85.0%  85.0%  85.0%  21  0.889  0.671  20.373  9.414  14.257  
S. D. 0.172  0.368  0.088  0.206  0.285  0.168  3.341  0.117  0.104  1.163  0.903  1.503  
Skewness 0.623  1.854  0.592  2.099  0.361  -0.007  -0.009  2.078  1.316  2.490  4.964  4.022  
Kurtosis -0.008  1.443  4.692  3.144  -1.581  -0.971  0.001  6.465  2.877  9.964  40.370  22.738  
H-Share Observations                       
 
RLT-MKT-PE IND TRD SO LP FIRST BOARD OPM ROE TA D/E QUICK 
Mean 0.484  32* 31.2%  28.3%  11.5%  50.7%  10  0.232  0.236  14.659  0.922  1.409  
Median 0.473  35.16%† 30.0%   0.0%   0.0%  53.7%  10  0.186  0.192  14.577  0.505  0.879  
Minimum 0.200  -  2.2%   0.0%   0.0%  11.2%  5  -0.188  -0.064  9.930  0.005  0.000  
Maximum 1.030  - 73.5%  88.5%  75.0%  82.8%  20 1.123  1.072  22.588  11.547  43.758  
S. D. 0.236  0.496  0.091  0.322  0.220  0.169  3.102  0.191  0.197  2.571  1.467  4.023  
Skewness 0.555  0.328  0.824  0.374  1.773  -0.402  1.012  1.420  1.675  0.916  4.543  10.082  
Kurtosis -0.518  -1.925  4.430  -1.696  1.710  -0.861  0.953  3.518  3.388  1.053  26.858  106.505  
t-Value for Difference Between Mean                     
 
RLT-MKT-PE IND TRD SO LP FIRST BOARD OPM ROE TA D/E QUICK 
t-Value -2.980  -5.334  -1.406  -6.013  6.538  -3.312  1.216  -3.422  -3.546  -4.841  -2.290  1.903  
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Table 5.4 Correlation of Control Variables on the Choice of China Enterprises’ Overseas Listing 
 
 
 
 
 
The table reports the correlation matrix of control variables to investigate the choice of China enterprises‘ overseas 
listing. The sample in the table includes 539 observations which are Chinese enterprises going public between January 
2000 and May 2007, including 448 A shares and 91 H shares. The sample has excluded dual-listing observations. 
RLT-MKT-PE is the monthly average PE ratio of Hang Seng Index over that in A-share market; IND is a dummy 
variable which equals to 1 if the firm is within one of the government supporting industries, including energy, basic 
materials, transportation, and commercial banking; TRD is the percentage of tradable shares, either A shares or H 
shares; SO is the percentage of state-owned shareholding; LP is the percentage of the legal person shareholding; 1ST 
is the percentage of the first large shareholding; BOARD is the size of boards; OPM is the operating profit margins; 
ROE is return on shareholders‘ common equity; TA is the logarithm of total assets; D/E is the debt-to-equity ratios; 
and QUICK is the quick ratios. 
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  RLT-MKT-PE IND TRD SO LP FIRST BOARD OPM ROE TA D/E QUICK 
RLT-MKT-PE 1.000  
           
IND 0.011  1.000  
          
TRD -0.113  -0.072  1.000  
         
SO -0.009  0.334  -0.065  1.000  
        
LP -0.205  0.073  0.069  -0.391  1.000  
       
FIRST -0.151  0.200  -0.088  0.296  0.264  1.000  
      
BOARD 0.012  0.115  0.145  0.093  0.172  0.019  1.000  
     
OPM -0.095  0.248  -0.126  0.130  0.037  0.072  -0.049  1.000  
    
ROE -0.156  0.050  -0.083  0.005  -0.034  0.121  -0.134  0.258  1.000  
   
TA 0.179  0.481  -0.239  0.435  -0.024  0.206  0.171  0.118  -0.022  1.000  
  
D/E 0.004  0.196  -0.071  0.032  -0.012  -0.034  -0.073  -0.048  0.162  0.238  1.000  
 
QUICK 0.139  0.025  0.066  -0.072  0.036  -0.107  0.019  0.060  -0.039  -0.063  -0.061  1.000  
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Table 5.5 Regressions on the Choice and Issuing Size of China Enterprises Domestic or Overseas Listing 
 
 
The table reports the a Type II Tobit model  which allow simultaneously tests the choice and issuing size of China 
enterprises‘ overseas listing. The model consists of a decision equation and an OLS regression equation. The sample 
in the table includes 539 observations which are China enterprises going public between January 2000 and May 2007, 
including 448 A shares and 91 H shares. The sample has excluded dual-listing observations. RLT-MKT-PE is the 
monthly average PE ratio of Hang Seng Index over that in A-share market; IND is a dummy variable which equals to 
1 if the firm is within one of the government supporting industries, including energy, basic materials, transportation, 
and commercial banking; TRD is the percentage of tradable shares, either A shares or H shares; SO is the percentage 
of state-owned shareholding; LP is the percentage of the legal person shareholding; 1ST is the percentage of the first 
large shareholding; BOARD is the size of boards; OPM is the operating profit margins; ROE is return on 
shareholders‘ common equity; TA is the logarithm of total assets; D/E is the debt-to-equity ratios; and QUICK is the 
quick ratios. t-values are reported in paragraphs. * state the significance at 5 per cent level. 
 
 
 
Decision (Selection) Equation: 
 
Prob (Yi>0) = β0 + β1 RLT-MKT-PEi + β2 INDi + β3 TRDi + β4 SOi + β5 LPi + β6 FIRSTi + β7 BOARDi  
                             + β8 OPMi + β9 ROEi + β10 TAi + β11 D/Ei + β12 QUICKi + εi 
 
OLS Regression Equation: 
 
E [Yi|Zi = 1] = β0 + β1 RLT-MKT-PEi + β2 INDi + β3 TRDi + β4 SOi + β5 LPi + β6 FIRSTi + β7 BOARDi  
                             + β8 OPMi + β9 ROEi + β10 TAi + β11 D/Ei + β12 QUICKi + εi 
 
 316  
 
  
 
        Panel A. Decision (Selection Function) 
 
 
 
  a. Corporate Governance   b. Firm-specific   c. All 
  Coefficient t-Value   Coefficient t-Value   Coefficient t-Value 
Constant -0.178   (-1.84) 
 
-0.931  (-6.48)* 
 
-1.032  (-5.63)* 
RLT-MKT-PE 0.311  (3.66)* 
 
0.333  (3.71)* 
 
0.351  (4.00)* 
IND 0.214  (5.18)* 
    
0.105  (2.42)* 
TRD 0.634  (3.54)* 
    
0.947  (5.31)* 
SO 0.221  (2.65)* 
    
0.124  (1.47) 
LP -0.289  (-4.05)* 
    
-0.296  (-4.27)* 
FIRST 0.344  (3.22)* 
    
0.287  (2.76)* 
BOARD -0.009  (-1.91) 
    
-0.008  (-1.76) 
OPM 
   
0.380  (3.08)* 
 
0.372  (3.11)* 
ROE 
   
0.583  (4.43)* 
 
0.525  (4.18)* 
TA 
   
0.060  (5.81)* 
 
0.047  (3.91)* 
D/E 
   
0.015  (0.70) 
 
0.011  (0.56) 
QUICK 
   
-0.013  (-0.79) 
 
-0.016  (-1.04) 
R
2
 0.196      0.162      0.273    
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        Panel B. OLS Equation 
 
 
 
  a. Corporate Governance   b. Firm-specific   c. All 
  Coefficient t-Value   Coefficient t-Value   Coefficient t-Value 
Constant 19.681  (65.6)* 
 
14.455  (49.9)* 
 
15.152  (36.4)* 
RLT-MKT-PE -0.192  (-0.85) 
 
-1.075  (-5.20)* 
 
-0.959  (-4.5)* 
IND 0.472  (4.64)* 
    
0.048  (0.52) 
TRD -2.703  (-5.46)* 
    
-1.288  (-3.01)* 
SO 1.000  (4.77)* 
    
0.321  (1.76) 
LP 0.498  (2.63)* 
    
0.345  (2.18)* 
FIRST -0.041  (-0.15) 
    
-0.282  (-1.22) 
BOARD 0.053  (3.66)* 
    
0.022  (1.75) 
OPM 
   
-0.225  (-0.91) 
 
-0.349  (-1.37) 
ROE 
   
0.740  (2.83)* 
 
0.870  (3.32)* 
TA 
   
0.412  (19.2)* 
 
0.367  (14.00)* 
D/E 
   
-0.119  (-2.63)* 
 
-0.116  (-2.55)* 
QUICK 
   
0.012  (0.36) 
 
0.020  (0.63) 
R
2
 0.262      0.477      0.499    
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Table 5.6 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Control Variables in Long-run Empirical Tests 
 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and correlation matrix (Panel B) of control variables to test the improvement 
in corporate governance through overseas listing. The sample in the table includes 539 observations which are Chinese enterprises 
going public between January 2000 and May 2007, including 448 A shares and 91 H shares. The sample has excluded dual-listing 
observations. IND is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the firm is within one of the government supporting industries, 
including energy, basic materials, transportation, and commercial banking; TRD is the percentage of tradable shares, either A 
shares or H shares; SO is the percentage of state-owned shareholding; FIRST is the percentage of the first large shareholding; 
BOARD is the size of boards; NON is the proportion of non-executive directors in the board; INC-SMTH, one of earnings 
management proxies, is standard deviation between annual operation profits and net cash flow from operating activities; E-CASH, 
the other proxy of earnings management, is a ratio of the absolute value of firm‘s accruals and the absolute value of the cash flow 
from operations; TA is the logarithm of total assets; D/E is the debt-to-equity ratios; and QUICK is the quick ratios. 
 
 
 
Note: For the dummy variable IND, * represent the number of observations which equal to one, and † states the percentage of 
observations with value equal to one. 
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Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
All  IND TRD SO FIRST BOARD NON INC-SMTH E-CASH TA D/E GROWTH QUICK 
Mean 104* 30.2%  14% 46% 11 0.30 1.39 0.21 21.11 0.52 0.01 2.28 
Median 19.29%† 30.0%   0% 47% 11 0.29 0.26 0.71 20.84 0.33 0.08 1.70 
Max -  90.2%  89% 85% 21 0.85 61.93 38.29 26.88 16.57 6.17 9.15 
Min -  2.2%   0%  6% 5 0.06 0.12 -97.51 18.28 0.04 -11.05 0.24 
S.D 0.41 0.09 0.25 0.17 2.74 0.14 6.12 7.52 1.28 0.93 1.14 2.11 
             
H-Share IND TRD SO FIRST BOARD NON INC-SMTH E-CASH TA D/E GROWTH QUICK 
Mean 32* 31.2%  28% 51% 12 0.48 3.23 -0.07 21.80 0.50 0.09 2.15 
Median 35.16%
† 30.0%    0% 54% 12 0.48 0.45 0.57 21.92 0.31 0.06 1.65 
Max -  73.5%  89% 83% 21 0.85 61.93 38.29 26.85 3.55 0.58 8.77 
Min -  2.2%   0% 11% 6 0.11 0.12 -42.28 18.28 0.04 -0.47 0.24 
S.D 0.50 0.09 0.32 0.17 2.61 0.17 11.31 7.34 1.84 0.60 0.16 1.66 
             
A-Share IND TRD SO FIRST BOARD NON INC-SMTH E-CASH TA D/E GROWTH QUICK 
Mean 72* 32% 10% 45% 10 0.25 0.86 0.29 20.91 0.52 -0.02 2.31 
Median 16.07%
† 32%  0% 45% 10 0.25 0.23 0.75 20.77 0.33 0.09 1.70 
Max - 55% 85% 85% 20 0.50 45.66 24.80 26.88 16.57 6.17 9.15 
Min -   4%  0%  6% 5 0.06 0.00 -97.51 19.47 0.05 -11.05 0.34 
S.D 0.39 0.09 0.21 0.17 2.86 0.08 3.24 7.58 0.98 1.01 1.29 2.22 
             
t-value IND TRD SO FIRST BOARD NON INC-SMTH E-CASH TA D/E GROWTH QUICK 
(H/A) 4.46 0.16 4.35 2.30 5.11 18.23 3.39 -1.41 6.31 -0.19 0.84 -0.67 
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Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
  IND TRD SO FIRST BOARD NON INC-SMTH E-CASH TA D/E GROWTH QUICK 
IND 1.00 
           TRD -0.09 1.00 
          SO 0.25 -0.16 1.00 
         FIRST 0.18 -0.15 0.29 1.00 
        BOARD 0.09 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 1.00 
       NON 0.07 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.28 1.00 
      INC-SMTH -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.15 1.00 
     E-CASH -0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.03 0.02 1.00 
    TA 0.46 -0.24 0.31 0.22 0.11 0.10 -0.12 -0.06 1.00 
   D/E 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.18 1.00 
  GROWTH 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.18 1.00 
 QUICK -0.10 0.08 -0.10 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.16 0.04 -0.27 -0.23 -0.14 1.00 
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Table 5.7 Comparing Corporate Governance and Earnings Management  
across A- and H-share Firms 
 
 
 
The table reports the results of Logit regression for testing the improvement in corporate 
governance through overseas listing. The sample in the table includes 539 observations which are 
Chinese enterprises going public between January 2000 and May 2007, including 448 A shares and 
91 H shares. The sample has excluded dual-listing observations. IND is a dummy variable which 
equals to 1 if the firm is within one of the government supporting industries, including energy, basic 
materials, transportation, and commercial banking; TRD is the percentage of tradable shares, either 
A shares or H shares; SO is the percentage of state-owned shareholding; FIRST is the percentage of 
the first large shareholding; BOARD is the size of boards; NON is the proportion of non-executive 
directors in the board; INC-SMTH, one of earnings management proxies, is standard deviation 
between annual operation profits and net cash flow from operating activities; E-CASH, the other 
proxy of earnings management, is a ratio of the absolute value of firm‘s accruals and the absolute 
value of the cash flow from operations; TA is the logarithm of total assets; D/E is the debt-to-equity 
ratios; and QUICK is the quick ratios. 
 
Regression function is listed as follow. Panel A reports the tests without accounting control 
variables, while Panel B reports the tests with accounting control variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
Prob (Hi=1) = β0 + β1 SOi + β2 FIRSTi + β3 TRDi + β4 BOARDi + β5 NONi  
+ β6 INC-SMTHi + β7 PRF-Ci + Accounting Control Variables + εi 
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Panel A. Regressions without Accounting Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept -0.208   -0.257 -0.25 -0.352 -0.349 -0.345 -0.461 
 
(-1.30) (-3.04)* (-2.97)* (-3.77)* (-3.75)* (-3.18)* (-3.97)* 
SO 
 
0.221 0.225 0.169 0.174 0.241 0.186 
  
(3.44)* (3.51)* (2.57)* (2.64)* (3.71)* (2.82)* 
FIRST 
   
0.214 0.217 
 
0.234 
    
(2.33)* (2.37)* 
 
(2.55)* 
TRD 
     
0.267 0.308 
      
(1.39) (1.61) 
BOARD 
 
0.009 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
  
(1.66) (1.72) (1.59) (1.64) (1.66) (1.57) 
NON 
 
1.819 1.791 1.84 1.811 1.79 1.812 
  
(16.6)* (16.2)* (16.9)* (16.5)* (16.2)* (16.6)* 
INC-SMTH 0.011    
 
0.005 
 
0.005 0.005 0.005 
 
(3.40)* 
 
(2.00)* 
 
(2.01)* (2.03)* (2.11)* 
E-CASH -0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-1.48) 
 
(-1.23) 
 
(-1.26) (-1.33) (-1.37) 
R
2
 0.223 0.453 0.459 0.264 0.466 0.462 0.469 
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Panel B. Regressions with Accounting Control Variables 
 
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -2.048 -1.886 -1.789 -1.643 
 
(-5.6)* (-5.23)* (-4.58)* (-4.22)* 
SO 0.239 0.209 0.222 0.194 
 
(2.98)* (2.54)* (2.76)* (2.35)* 
FIRST 
 
0.027 
 
0.015 
  
(2.25)* 
 
(2.39)* 
TRD 0.661 0.587 0.648 0.569 
 
(2.78)* (2.47)* (2.74)* (2.40)* 
BOARD 0.038 0.040 0.039 0.040 
 
(5.83)* (6.00)* (5.92)* (6.09)* 
INC-SMTH 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 
(4.40)* (4.43)* (4.35)* (4.39)* 
E-CASH -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-1.70)  (-1.70)  (-1.61) (-1.60)  
IND 
  
0.091 0.082 
   
(1.84) (1.64) 
TA 0.115 0.110 0.102 0.099 
 
(7.23)* (6.90)* (5.90)* (5.69)* 
D/E -0.025 -0.022 -0.024 -0.021 
 
(-1.23)  (-1.06)  (-1.17)  (-1.00)  
GROWTH -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-0.21)  (-0.21)  (-0.23)  (-0.23)  
QUICK 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.06) 
R
2
 0.228 0.219 0.234 0.224 
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Table 5.8 36-Month Market-adjusted Abnormal Returns (ARs) of A- and H-share Firms 
 
Table reports the CARs with associated s-statistics for the 36 months after going public, excluding 
the initial return. t-statistics for differences being different from at 5% significance level. 
 
 
  All H All A All 
  (619 Obs.) (140 Obs.) (479 Obs.) 
Mth 0 -0.011 0.005 -0.020 
Mth 1 -0.017 0.014 -0.023 
Mth 2 -0.032 -0.027 -0.034 
Mth 3 -0.041 -0.039 -0.044 
Mth 4 -0.049 -0.060 -0.049 
Mth 5 -0.051 -0.061 -0.052 
Mth 6 -0.064 -0.085 -0.063 
Mth 7 -0.068 -0.090 -0.068 
Mth 8 -0.079 -0.115 -0.074 
Mth 9 -0.087 -0.145 -0.076 
Mth 10 -0.083 -0.134 -0.071 
Mth 11 -0.089 -0.164 -0.071 
Mth 12 -0.084 -0.159 -0.067 
Mth 13 -0.091 -0.182 -0.066 
Mth 14 -0.095 -0.180 -0.072 
Mth 15 -0.111 -0.226 -0.081 
Mth 16 -0.122 -0.252 -0.088 
Mth 17 -0.138 -0.264 -0.104 
Mth 18 -0.142 -0.256 -0.115 
Mth 19 -0.148 -0.243 -0.124 
Mth 20 -0.155 -0.249 -0.129 
Mth 21 -0.171 -0.272 -0.142 
Mth 22 -0.175 -0.295 -0.142 
Mth 23 -0.179 -0.279 -0.148 
Mth 24 -0.183 -0.287 -0.154 
Mth 25 -0.188 -0.298 -0.160 
Mth 26 -0.205 -0.295 -0.180 
Mth 27 -0.226 -0.324 -0.199 
Mth 28 -0.235 -0.328 -0.206 
Mth 29 -0.256 -0.360 -0.219 
Mth 30 -0.251 -0.333 -0.218 
Mth 31 -0.258 -0.322 -0.226 
Mth 32 -0.263 -0.348 -0.227 
Mth 33 -0.266 -0.350 -0.231 
Mth 34 -0.274 -0.368 -0.235 
Mth 35 -0.277 -0.374 -0.238 
Mth 36 -0.273 -0.352 -0.237 
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Table 5.9 LaPorta et al. (2006b) Measures of ex post Public Control 
 
 
 
Ex-post Public Control Hong Kong China 
Sum 7.99 3.59 
Disclosure in periodic filings 1 0.8 
Standing to sue 1 1 
Rescission 0.5 0 
Ease of holding (int.shrhld) liable 1 0 
Ease of holding approving body liable 1 0 
Access to evidence 0.75 0.25 
Ease of proving wrongdoing 0.85 0.25 
Ex-post private control of self-dealing 0.93 0.53 
Anti-self-dealing index 0.96 0.76 
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Table 5.10 OLS Regressions For A- and H-share Firms Long-run CARs in One- and Three-Year after Listing 
 
 
 
 
The table reports the results of OLS regression for testing the relationship between the systematic governance, financial as well as 
legal variables and the long-run stock trading performance. The sample in the table includes 539 (one-year) and 394 (three-year) 
observations respectively which are Chinese enterprises going public between January 2000 and May 2007, including 448 A shares and 91 H 
shares. The sample has excluded dual-listing observations. One- and three-year market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns are dependent 
variable, calculated according to the benchmarks of several market indices. IND is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the firm is within one 
of the government supporting industries, including energy, basic materials, transportation, and commercial banking; TRD is the percentage of 
tradable shares, either A shares or H shares; SO is the percentage of state-owned shareholding; FIRST is the percentage of the first large 
shareholding; BOARD is the size of boards; NON is the proportion of non-executive directors in the board; INC-SMTH, one of earnings 
management proxies, is standard deviation between annual operation profits and net cash flow from operating activities; LaP is value based on 
LaPorta et al. (2006b) to simulate the level of ex post public control to the extent of investor protection; TA is the logarithm of total assets; D/E 
is the debt-to-equity ratios; and QUICK is the quick ratios. 
 
 
 
 
Regression function is listed as follow: 
 
     CARi  = β0 + β1 INDi + β2 LaPi + β3 TRDi + β4 SOi + β5 LPi + β6 FIRSTi + β7 BOARDi  
+ β8 INC-SMTHi + β9 TAi + β10 D/Ei + β11 GROWTHi + β12 QUICKi + εi 
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  Panel A. CAR-1   Panel B. CAR-3 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Intercept -0.298 -0.546 -0.437 -0.569 
 
-0.01 -2.544 -2.611 -2.659 -2.598 
 
(-2.51)* (-1.76)  (-1.27)  (-1.80)  
 
(-4.01)* (-4.44)* (-4.10)* (-4.57)* (-4.54)* 
IND 0.006 0.068 0.047 0.065 
 
0.165 0.006 0.029 0.027 0.024 
 
(0.15) (1.54) (1.04) (1.47) 
 
(2.01)* (1.57) (1.35) (1.33) (1.29) 
LaP -0.046 -0.044 -0.051 -0.044 
 
-0.074 -0.084 -0.096 -0.094 -0.092 
 
(-5.80)* (-5.94)* (-6.42)* (-5.84)* 
 
(-4.83)* (-6.17)* (-6.34)* (-6.49)* (-6.47)* 
TRD -0.188 
 
-0.105 
  
-0.324 
 
-0.035 
  
 
(-0.90)  
 
(-0.51)  
  
(-0.83)  
 
(-0.89)  
  SO -0.075 
 
-0.108 
  
-0.132 
 
-0.282 -0.289 
 
 
(-0.83)  
 
(-1.21)  
  
(-0.74)  
 
(-1.65)  (-1.69)  
 LP -0.069 
 
-0.098 
  
-0.185 
 
-0.29 -0.301 
 
 
(-0.89)  
 
(-1.29)  
  
(-1.20)  
 
(-1.98)* (-2.07)* 
 FIRST 0.107 
 
0.109 
  
0.315 
 
0.322 0.337 
 
 
(0.94) 
 
(0.96) 
  
(1.40) 
 
(1.50) (1.60) 
 BOARD -0.014 
 
-0.015 
  
-0.002 
 
-0.007 
  
 
(-2.32)* 
 
(-2.43)* 
  
(-1.15)  
 
(-1.58)  
  INC-SMTH -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
  
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  
(-1.08)  (-1.28)  (-1.06)  
  
(-1.22)  (-1.39)  (-1.37)  (-1.35)  
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Cntd. 
 
 
 
 
 
  Panel A. CAR-1 
 
Panel B. CAR-3 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4   Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
TA 
 
0.03 0.035 0.032 
  
0.12 0.127 0.125 0.125 
  
(2.02)* (2.25)* (2.06)* 
  
(4.37)* (4.35)* (4.43)* (4.48)* 
D/E 
 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
  
-0.05 -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 
  
(-0.65)  (-0.68)  (-0.66)  
  
(-1.53)  (-1.56)  (-1.56)  (-1.57)  
GROWTH 
 
0.049 0.047 0.049 
  
0.122 0.123 0.124 0.123 
  
(3.40)* (3.28)* (3.38)* 
  
(4.68)* (4.69)* (4.76)* (4.74)* 
QUICK 
 
0.007 0.007 0.007 
  
0.023 0.024 0.024 0.024 
  
(0.91) (0.90) (0.88) 
  
(1.48) (1.56) (1.58) (1.55) 
R
2
 0.128 0.13 0.129 0.14   0.168 0.165 0.176 0.176 0.175 
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of Adjusted Price of Shanghai (SH) and  
Shenzhen (SZ) Stock Exchange A-share Indices (Jan. 2005 – Jul. 2007) 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Market-adjusted Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)  
of A- and Main Board listed H-share Firms 
 
 
330 
 
CHIAPTER VI  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
6.1 Summary and Conclusions 
In this thesis, several empirical and theoretical issues that concern the overseas primary 
listing journey of Chinese SOEs in Hong Kong have been investigated. The addressed 
empirical works have covered IPO, cross-border flotation, privatization, and other related 
topics in finance. It mainly answers the question why Chinese enterprises, especially state-
owned ones, are likely to go public through an overseas listing approach, including their 
motives, missions, strategies, performance, achievements, and influences regarding the home 
financial market.  
 
6.1.1 Summary of Main Findings of Each Chapter 
The addressed issues in the thesis can be summarized as follows.  
In Chapter II, to reduce the potential risks of cross-border flotation and mitigate the gap 
of the less-developed domestic financial market, Hong Kong is an optimal choice Chinese 
companies going public. However, according to the empirical results in Chapter III, overseas 
listings are more likely to have attached higher costs due to the existence of asymmetric 
information. Although a unique strategy of pricing, marketing, and offering, compounded 
with high reputable investment bankers and hot market environment, can efficiently promote 
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the market position and investors‘ confidence of Chinese new shares, the ―money left on the 
table‖ in the past fifteen years did not substantially upset these listed companies and the 
Chinese government. For further investigation, Chapter IV focuses on the information 
disclosure and earnings forecasting, by testing the accuracy of earning forecasts and their 
influence on after-market trading performance. This chapter provides supports for the 
divergence of opinion theory. In other words, the long-run underperformance of Chinese 
listed firms can be, as least, partially associated with IPOs‘ underpricing and early-market 
volatility. Chapter V, as the climax of the thesis, upon a review of the journey towards 
overseas listing, finds this approach is actually a method of China‘s partial privatization, a 
part of China‘s economic reform, and a way to protect as well as develop the domestic 
financial market.  
A number of performance determinants identified in prior literature are intensively 
examined.  To step further, every empirical chapter has adopted new variables and new 
proxies to enhance the explanation power. Meanwhile, since listing in Hong Kong is only the 
tentative stage for Chinese government and related enterprises, and the recent upsurge of 
China‘s capital outflow has received great attention from the global market, the empirical 
results in this thesis are expected to be applied to other international financial market. 
Therefore, this study not only fills in the gaps in the existing IPO literature, but also creates 
new avenues for future investigation. Principal conclusions of each chapter are summarized as 
follows.  
In comparison of the Hong Kong and Chinese domestic financial markets, Chapter II 
mainly discusses the possible explanations and motivations behind overseas primary listing. 
First of all, in the past fifteen years, Hong Kong has provided a strong and attractive 
foundation and offshore capital market for China-related companies to raise funds, with 
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sufficient market capability and liquidity, various investment alternatives and derivatives, 
restricted accounting and disclosure practices, as well as knowledgeable institutional and 
retail investors. Although the Chinese domestic financial market has experienced a fabulously 
fast growth rate since the end of 2005, it is not a mature market. Apparently, the most recent 
domestic financial reform of changing non-tradable shares into tradable stocks has reached 
great achievement, however, the original intention of this reform was to seek a equivalent 
valuation for different classes of shares as part of the privatization programme. The ultimate 
development of the financial market still has a long way to go. This chapter points out a 
number of possible reasons for overseas primary listings in Hong Kong. 
(1) Existing non-market-oriented listing selection procedures and simplified pricing 
methods in fact follow prejudiced criteria and create more information barriers, which 
results in the inefficiency in new shares‘ valuation. 
(2) Due to the serious imbalance in supply and demand of domestic listed shares, 
permanent abnormal public subscriptions has been not appropriated to measure market 
response, while the subsequent underpricing represents the lack of market rationale.  
(3) The gap between accounting standards adopted in the domestic market and the 
widely used international accounting standards exacerbates asymmetric information block 
and the underlying disclosure mechanism in the Mainland marketplace is pending for 
norms.  
(4) The development of an institutional investor base in China faces the obstacles of 
insufficient policy coordination and policy hindrance across sectors. The present investor 
structure therefore is waiting for constant modification in the long run.  
333 
 
(5) Although a number of new policies have been carried out to channel capital 
outflows across the border, the immediate influence is hardly observed at the current stage.  
And (6) since Hong Kong and the domestic market are likely to merge to the extent of 
closed movements and sentiments, Hong Kong can still be regarded as a segmented 
trading platform by reducing the intensive-policy-directed effects and providing a steady-
growing environment.  
Although this chapter does not directly give empirical evidence, it still provides a general 
view to the development of the Chinese domestic financial market. 
 
Chapter III, as the first empirical chapter, based on asymmetric information models 
which are rooted on the widely debated IPO underpricing puzzle, finds the significant 
abnormal returns of overseas listed Chinese shares as well as their specific marketing and 
pricing strategy to mitigate potential loss and ensure successful offerings.  
The results and main findings are summarized as follow.  
(1) Chinese IPOs suffered significantly higher underpricing than their local 
counterparts. Empirical investigation implies the positive relationship between ex ante 
uncertainty and IPO initial returns, but the explanatory power of the classic proxies of the 
winner‘s curse model appears to be minor. 
(2) Reputation of investment bankers can promote the aftermarket trading performance. 
Condition on the monopolistic competition among investment bankers in Hong Kong, the 
result provides indications to underwriters‘ persistent underpricing hypothesis.  
334 
 
(3) Empirical results are consistent with the market timing theory. Most of IPOs are 
likely to take advantages of optimistic valuation during the ―hot issue market‖. In addition, 
recent IPOs‘ offering performance has strong impacts on other new shares thereafter. 
(4) This chapter further isolates bookbuilding IPOs to test the partial adjustment 
hypothesis and other related theories. It is noted that the bookbuilding services in Hong 
Kong are normally provided by a few top international bankers and China-related leading 
financial institutions. When bookbuilding contracts are signed, the lead sponsors initially 
conduct the due-diligence and establish the underwriting syndicates. Institutional interests 
are believed to be incorporated into the preliminary valuation via the pre-offering meetings. 
And the substantial information leakage further lowers the valuation costs among retail 
investors. Therefore, the positive price revisions during the subscription period are more 
likely driven by retail demand and their confidence on underwriters. 
 (5) In Hong Kong, retail investors are more preferable in non-discretionary IPO 
allocation, and the exercise of the overallotment option solely depends on the level of 
public subscription. Consequently, the high public subscription can be easily transmitted 
to the aftermarket via a positive price revision, which in turn attracts more investors 
buying new shares and stimulates further ascent in share price. 
 (6) In testing the partial adjustment hypothesis, larger price revision reflects a greater 
yield of private information. A positive price revision indicates underwriters have 
knowingly incorporated more favourable information. The firm-specific characteristics 
cannot consistently and powerfully explain the level of underpricing, providing the 
additional supports to the changing risk composition hypothesis by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004). Also there is no strong evidence to reject the public information is freely available 
to all participants and price-setting reflects the market movements.  
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And (7) Chinese companies are endowed with a specific pricing and marketing strategy 
to reduce costs from underpricing and simultaneously ensure the success of equity 
offerings. They are normally underwritten by highly reputable bankers, and the 
overwhelming majority of Chinese firms went public via bookbuilding. The average price 
range seems to be relatively conservative, in order to encourage institutional and retail 
investors to submit subscription applications. More important, the potential loss can be 
partially mitigated via a positive price revision and carefully market timing. 
 
The following Chapter IV focuses on the information disclosure during the IPO 
bookbuilding period, since for most less-informed investors, the accuracy of information in 
offering prospectuses is crucial to make investment decisions. It investigates the accuracy of 
IPO profit forecasts and its subsequent influence to the after-listing performance, which 
extends the research onto a broader area. Especially the tests are in line with the arguments 
based on the divergence of opinion. Meanwhile, other related hypotheses, including the 
agency problem, investor sentiments, overreaction, and the windows of opportunities, are 
jointly examined in this chapter.  
(1) The average level of IPO profit forecasts errors represents a pessimistic bias when 
compared to the actual profits, which is consistent with studies in Chen et al. (2000). The 
magnitude of forecasting errors is higher for China-related companies than local shares, 
indicating a higher asymmetric information level. However, management forecasting has 
superiority over popular time-series forecasting models. In this section, the results also 
provide further evidence of the agency problem that issuing firms have better knowledge 
than others, which gives the opportunity to seek additional benefits when reporting the 
earnings forecasts in initial offering. 
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(2) In the further tests on forecasting rationality, according to DeBondt and Thaler 
(1990), the results demonstrate a pessimistic bias, suggesting the forecasts are not rational 
in the sense that managers correctly incorporate all available information, especially 
historical profits, in their forecasting. 
(3) This chapter has fixed various systematic characteristics as determinant factors to 
the magnitude of forecast accuracy. Particularly, when the market condition is more 
volatile, the managers have a stronger incentive to misreport earnings forecasts in 
prospectuses. 
(4) In terms of the relationship between forecast accuracy and short-run underpricing, 
this chapter conducts different groups of portfolios. Comparably, forecasting and non-
forecasting IPOs have similar levels of underpricing, however, if the forecast is over-
biased, the underpricing will significantly exceed a normal level, since investors have the 
ability to adjust investment expectations.  
(5) This chapter also investigates the influence during the first financial announcement 
period, suggesting early-market volatility, underpricing, and China-related background are 
all significantly associated with abnormal returns around the certain event.  
And (6) in the long-run investigation, both the investor sentiments hypothesis and 
divergence of opinion theory are considered to explain the IPO trading performance. By 
using different abnormal return measures after three years of trading, IPOs significantly 
underperform several benchmark portfolios. The performance decreases month by month, 
while China-related companies have worse performance than the local companies. In 
addition, in line with divergence of opinion theory, firms with higher initial returns 
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actually underperform in the long run, which is due to the initial overvaluation. Finally, the 
magnitude of forecasting errors can systematically affect the one-year trading performance. 
In terms of implication, this chapter not only simulates managers‘ forecasting behaviours 
which confirms the importance of the information accuracy during IPO period, but also 
provides valuable hints to investors as well as issuing firms to the extent of IPO short-run and 
long-run trading performance. 
 
By tracing back over the past fifteen years, the last empirical chapter, Chapter V, directly 
questions why and how the Chinese government takes so many SOEs public in the overseas 
market. The growth of privatization programmes and the increasing tendency of Chinese large 
companies‘ overseas listing have received great attention. Apparently, the recent dramatic 
expansion and fluctuation of the domestic securities market associated with the sentiment of 
capital boom are new for both market participant and researchers. This chapter jointly tests a 
number of models, including the market order hypothesis, bonding hypothesis, market timing 
hypothesis, and other asymmetric information models. By applying cross-sectional tests, this 
chapter discovers the political means behind the overseas listing channel, which can be 
confirmed as a successful effort for the Chinese government to push economy reform forward. 
(1) Chinese SOEs‘ overseas primary listing takes on the formidable tasks of 
macroeconomic partial privatization, home market protection, and domestic infantile 
market development. To this end, prospective selecting, restructuring, and offering are all 
carried through a core mission of promoting the ongoing economy reform.  
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(2) To perceive through the appearance of complicated classification of Chinese stocks, 
whatever being tradable or non-tradable, state-owned shares and the most-alike legal 
person shares define a company‘s meaning to national economy.  Therefore, the ownership 
structure, especially the concentration of state-owned shares, plays an important role in 
selecting procedure towards overseas listings. Meanwhile, companies within government 
supporting industries are likely to have priority to be selected. 
(3) Although contradictory to a popular argument in the literature that listing abroad 
allows companies to enjoy a lower cost of capital, empirical results suggest lower costs are 
not a necessary motivation, as least not the most important motivation, for Chinese firms 
to seek overseas primary listing. However, the Chinese government still abstemiously 
choose a ―good time‖ to take SOEs public in the international market, as further evidence 
of the market timing hypothesis. 
(4) In terms of SOEs themselves, large and ‗healthy‘ state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
within the government‘s supporting industries are more likely to issue their shares on 
foreign, open, and well-developed stock exchanges. 
(5) Overseas listing does bring benefits to listed firms and the home market. Listed H-
share companies appear to maintain a modest corporate structure, effective corporate 
governance, moral information disclosure, steady profit growth, and less earning 
management, which, in turn, gives a good example and successful experience to domestic 
companies.  
(6) As far as long-term significance is concerned, legal origin is an important 
determinant to accounting practice, corporate governance, disclosure procedures, and 
investor protection, which can crucially affect the development of financial markets as 
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well as market participants‘ investment expectations and activities. Therefore, partial 
privatization through an overseas primary listing approach, which the Chinese government 
is pursuing, is indeed a feasible way to facilitate the domestic market and to benefit 
economic reform. 
 
6.1.2 Contributions and Implications of the Study 
The investigations and applications in this thesis are expected to contribute to both 
academia and practice. First of all, to the practice, on the journey towards overseas listing, the 
Chinese government and enterprises have undergone fifteen years of improving operating 
performance, opening up new markets, and promoting international investors‘ confidence.  
The thesis concentrates on Chinese enterprises‘ offering preference, strategies, and 
performance. Being experienced global market participants, their specific offering strategy is 
expected to partially offset higher costs associated with information barriers. Therefore, with 
the spread of China‘s capital flow to other international stock exchanges, the underlying 
results and conclusions are expected to be applicable to other overseas well-developed 
markets.  
Also, to the academia, the thesis summarizes and jointly examines a number of popular 
hypotheses. Meanwhile, the study covers many finance research topics related to IPOs, such 
as accounting, asset pricing, corporate governance, market efficiency, privatization, and 
issues related to jurisprudence. 
In addition, the asymmetric information models, especially the principal-agency models 
have been tested in all of the empirical chapters, including the motives of issuing firms when 
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they hold superior information, incentives of top investment bankers if being an oligopoly, 
and the intentions of government when they act as both a regulator and a market participant. 
The findings do not only provide further empirical evidence to the existing literature, but the 
adopted variables and proxies have achieved the targets of complementing the current 
theoretical framework and entails suggestions to the future research.  
Forth, as far as each individual chapter is concerned, each has a few contributions 
summarized as follows. Chapter II, as an introduction of research background and target 
market overview, has discussed last updated policies and market movements deeply. It goes 
further to discover the possible explanations of overseas primary listings. Besides the unique 
offering strategy of China-related firms, Chapter III also discusses the importance of retail 
demand and market movement to anticipate the level of preliminary offering price revision 
and subsequent level of underpricing. Chapter IV links IPO after-market performance to the 
divergence of opinion hypothesis, replicates analyst earning forecasting method towards 
management earning forecasts reporting, and provides valuable evidence to analyze IPO long-
run performance. Chapter V, as a conclusive investigation, argues the overseas listing channel 
is in fact for achieving a further development of Chinese domestic financial market.  
 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
This thesis makes several contributions to the existing literature and financial practice, it 
also opens the door to a number of interesting issues which may be addressed by further 
research.  
To begin with Chapter II, although it summarizes several explanations behind the 
overseas primary listing channel and argues Hong Kong is an optimal choice towards this end, 
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due to some policies are newly effective, some of the opinions is to new to be lack of 
empirical investigation in current literature. Chapter III confirms the important roles of 
underwriters, but there is no conclusive result to the relationship between institutional 
allocation and the non-discretionary allocation. Current studies stress more on the process 
after releasing IPO prospectuses, which possibly neglects the information exchange between 
bankers and institutional investors during the pre-offering period. In addition, the empirical 
results are possibly driven by the regulatory concern, irreplaceable market features, the 
selection of samples, and even the measurement of tested proxies. In addition, Chapter IV 
and Chapter V all involve tests of stock trading performance; however, due to the 
contradictions on testing methods in literature, these two chapters are limited to the extent of 
choosing long-run performance measures. In this case, future research is worthy to go through 
this point to offer more prosperous discussions. Moreover, in terms of investigations of ex 
post public control and investor protection in Chapter V, further studies can be located on 
more related measures since to do so may spread implications of underlying research towards 
a more general level. Lastly, the aims and performance of China-related firms listed in Hong 
Kong actually vary over time, which results in conclusions being lagged behind real business. 
In other words, repeated research questions are always new and research is always on the way.  
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